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This thesis examines two crucial media policy decisions made during the 2010s: the 2012-13 
reforms of press self-regulation after the Leveson Inquiry into phone hacking at News of the 
World; and the 2015-16 review of the BBC’s Royal Charter and its licence fee funding. These 
changes in media law and regulation have had a major impact on the UK’s press and 
broadcasting industries, but these debates also reveal entrenched inequalities of power that 
shape how media policy decisions are made. Media policymaking is often dominated by a 
narrow selection of elite interests, while media organisations themselves represent policy 
debates largely in terms of their own objectives. This poses a critical challenge to the 
democratic ideals that underpin essential political and media institutions, and calls into question 
whether our media systems are truly accountable to the public and reflective of their interests. 
Based on interviews with 13 policy actors and analysis of over 270 policy documents, this 
research evaluates the dynamics of power in the post-Leveson and BBC Charter policy debates. 
Through examining the various decision-making practices, the political tactics actors use to 
influence these procedures, the ideological contests through which media policy is expressed, 
and the overlapping roles of media as reporters on and stakeholders in policy debate, this thesis 
details the specific forms of power at play in media policymaking. Combining analytical 
models of policymaking with sociological theories on power, this research also explores the 
role of media power, and argues that a ‘media policy power cascade’ is progressively shrinking 
the opportunities for non-elite groups to influence media policymaking. 
Ultimately this research seeks to expose the routinised imbalances of power that characterised 
two seminal British media policy debates, and offers a critical perspective for challenging these 
trends towards more democratic and public goals. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Media policy and media policymaking processes rarely excite very much public or 
political attention. Interest in ‘the media’ generally focuses on what media outlets make and 
how audiences use them, rather than the structures and systems that organise how media 
operate. This is of course not surprising. The social and cultural influences of media—some of 
the largest and most prominent organisations in everyday life—extend far beyond the official 
boundaries of government or legislative authority. Obscure technical discussions on market 
regulations, production quotas and governance schemes seem not just plainly dry and dull, but 
far removed from more pressing concerns that occupy public debate. Yet in just the last year, 
major press and broadcasting institutions in the United Kingdom have been at the centre of 
dramatic moments of public conflict and private tension that underline the pivotal connection 
between media policies, democratic processes and power. 
In March 2020, almost nine years after the phone hacking scandal at Rupert Murdoch’s 
News of the World newspaper, more intrigue erupted when a group of celebrities alleged in the 
High Court that journalists and editors at the Daily Mirror had also engaged in industrial-scale 
phone hacking during the early 2000s. Neither Mirror Group Newspapers nor Murdoch’s News 
UK have publicly accepted that any wrongdoing or illegality took place beyond NOTW, instead 
silencing the growing list of new hacking claims with exorbitant out-of-court settlements which 
are estimated to have cost both companies almost £500m to date. Notably, this growing 
evidence of corporate and journalistic malpractice at Britain’s biggest newspapers has not 
produced scathing condemnations from government ministers or calls for immediate reform. 
Instead the Conservative government has taken every step to appease the national newspaper 
industry, introducing lucrative tax breaks and even proposing statutory regulation for social 
media companies to buttress the declining print market. Publishers argue fiercely that the likes 
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of Facebook and Google should have a legal responsibility for the content that users post on 
their platforms, while insisting on their papers’ freedom from political interference through law 
or regulation. Somewhat paradoxically, as print circulation and revenues continue to fall, the 
power of corporate newspaper interests to steer press policy is growing and their intimate 
relationships with political elites are flourishing. Perhaps the clearest sign of this is the 
revelation that within just 72 hours of winning the November 2019 general election, one of 
Boris Johnson’s first engagements as Prime Minister was a private meeting with Rupert 
Murdoch. 
Over this same period the government has orchestrated a concerted attack on the British 
Broadcasting Corporation that threatens to undermine the core pillars of public service 
broadcasting in the UK. Defunding the BBC of its £4bn public income has long been the prized 
goal of right-wing politicians and newspapers alike, who see the Corporation as a bloated left-
liberal institution feathered by a regressive compulsory tax. Although this campaign is by no 
means new, the recent assault suggests that Britain’s unique model of public broadcasting faces 
an existential crisis. A consultation into decriminalising licence fee evasion, ostensibly an 
effort to find a proportionate and fair enforcement regime, may pave the way for replacing the 
BBC’s guaranteed income with voluntary subscription. Ahead of the review the Prime Minister 
publicly challenged whether the licence fee is justified “in an age when lots of media 
organisations have to compete”.1 Ironically, this desire for media markets free from the 
distortions of public intervention has been paired with brazen government interference in the 
BBC’s independence. Conservative ministers have boycotted appearing on flagship news 
programmes in protest against the Corporation’s supposed anti-Tory anti-Brexit bias. When 
the BBC suggested performances of ‘Rule Britannia’ may be cut from this year’s Proms concert 
in response to the global Black Lives Matter movement, Conservative politicians and right-
 
1 The Guardian, ‘Boris Johnson 'looking at' abolishing TV licence fee for BBC’, 9 December 2019. 
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wing commentators revelled in righteous fury. “If the BBC wants to cancel our patriotism and 
our history,” one former Tory MEP tweeted, “I want to cancel my licence fee”. The 
appointment of ex-Goldman Sachs banker and Tory mega-donor Richard Sharp as BBC 
Chair—though not as extreme as the government’s first preferred candidate, arch-Thatcherite 
licence fee critic Charles Moore—has made clear the government’s intent to recast the 
Corporation in its own image. With a mid-term review in 2022 and Charter renewal on its 
centenary in 2027, many of the policymaking conventions that have governed the BBC’s 
uneasy relationship with state power are being openly challenged by a government that makes 
no secret of its antipathy to traditional ideals of public service broadcasting. 
These lively debates on the UK press and the BBC coincide with a rapidly evolving 
media landscape beset by chronic challenges. Trust in institutions is at a nadir, with media 
organisations especially struggling to maintain public confidence. 60% of Britons say they hold 
little or no trust in media (the lowest rating in Europe), while trust in print and broadcast 
journalists in the UK has plummeted since the mid-2000s.2 The rise of digital media outlets 
and online streaming services has shattered much of the commercial base of traditional media 
markets, with many companies going bust or being swept up by a new generation of multimedia 
conglomerates—Disney, Amazon, Comcast, 21st Century Fox—that control increasingly 
concentrated swathes of global media industries. Social media platforms like Facebook, 
YouTube and Twitter are plagued by concerns of fake news, targeted harassment and unethical 
algorithm design. The ‘new’ media that once promised revolutions in how audiences make and 
use content have been captured by the same power structures that typify ‘old’ media. The 
bizarre spectacle of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg shunning an international committee 
of lawmakers in 2018 epitomises the elite status of these decidedly modern moguls (Fenton, 
 
2 European Broadcasting Union (2020); Jennings and Curtis (2020) for YouGov. 
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2011; Moran, 2018), and their apparent impunity from any attempts at regulation or public 
accountability. 
With countries like the UK riddled with growing economic inequality, social division 
and rampant political extremism, such unpredictable epochal changes point to a compounding 
democratic deficit in the aims and outcomes of current media policy. “How all these 
developments unfold and how they will affect our societies,” Just and Puppis usefully point 
out, “will be determined largely by crucial policy decisions” (2018:328). Yet the ongoing 
conflicts facing the British press and the BBC signal a deeper crisis in how media policymaking 
is organised, and the routinised effects of media power on the debates and decisions that take 
place. Media policy is unique in that “mass media not only disseminate the decisions of 
policymakers, but are also active in shaping public policy” (Ali and Puppis, 2018:285). Recent 
events suggest that these two roles are more entangled than ever, and the ‘mediatization’ of 
political institutions (Garland et al., 2018) has seen policymakers’ conduct increasingly guided 
by the corporate demands and political influence of dominant media organisations. 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
These structures are, however, not innate or inevitable. They are the combined effects 
of political institutions, the aims and practices of policy actors, ideological conflicts, historical 
precedent and the general distribution of political and economic power throughout society. In 
order to understand, predict and perhaps even intervene in the crises happening now, we need 
to look back and unpick the dynamics of power that have shaped previous decisions on media 
policy. This research presents case studies on two significant recent debates in British media 
policy: the 2012-13 reforms of press self-regulation following the phone hacking scandal, and 
the 2015-16 renewal of the BBC’s Royal Charter. These case studies are informed by the 
documentary record of legislative drafts, official reports, public statements and parliamentary 
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debates on these two policy questions, as well as original contributions from interviews with 
policy actors who were intimately involved in each policymaking process. 
The following chapters are partly intended to offer a detailed retelling of these events: 
how press and broadcasting policy is made, the different mechanisms and practices of official 
decision-making, the debates, campaigns and conflicts that surround them, who is involved in 
these processes, and how the resulting policies have changed the state of British media. Yet 
this research is fundamentally concerned with why these debates produced their particular 
policy outcomes, and seeks to denaturalise the media policymaking process as a pivotal site 
where power is both exercised in political conflicts and (re)distributed through official 
decisions. These case studies thus utilise analytical models of policymaking from political 
science and sociological theories of power, combining these to understand the dynamics of 
power in policymaking beyond the local contexts of individual political acts. Together these 
ideas provide the conceptual architecture for unpicking the media policy debates yet to come, 
using these case studies as the stepping off point for critiquing new arrangements of law, 
regulation and power in British media policy. 
Media policymaking is, at its core, a competition between various groups and organised 
interests in public life attempting to imprint their aims and values on the rules and systems that 
govern what media organisations can do. The ability of these groups to influence government 
decision-making is dependent on their own resources and activities, but is also constrained by 
the forces, structures and relationships in which these processes take place. Despite the 
presentation of policymaking as a highly ordered and rigid machine, actual policy decisions 
are often bound by unspoken codes, taken-for-granted behaviours, ideological biases and 
unpredictable human interactions. 
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Policymaking is also a distinctly elite activity which—while founded on the ultimate 
need for the consent of the public and their democratically elected officials—is conducted in 
private, exclusive settings by a vanishingly small minority of political, bureaucratic and 
corporate figures. Potential debates on the social and cultural impacts of media policy beyond 
market competition are shrouded in ambivalence and marginality. A second and far more 
pressing purpose of these case studies is thus to expose the often hidden forms of power that 
determine how different public and private actors can access, engage in and influence these 
elite processes of media policy decision-making. This is essential if we are to evaluate and 
critique media policies as major acts of state and legislative authority, purportedly made 
through open and balanced means, accountable to democratic institutions and with the interests 
of the public at their heart. 
The debates on press regulation and the BBC Charter review are important objects of 
study for a number of reasons. Both policy processes speak to the unique historical 
development of the press and broadcasting in one of the world’s oldest liberal democracies, 
and also illustrate the evolving patterns and tensions in how governments have made decisions 
on the central mass media in British society over the last century. Apart from common libel 
laws and monopolies regulation, the newspaper industry in the UK has been free from any 
external state or political controls on what it can publish or how it organises its commercial 
affairs since the abolition of the ‘taxes on knowledge’ in the mid-19th century (Conboy, 2004; 
Rooney, 2000). Royal Commissions in 1949, 1962 and 1977, along with the Calcutt Reviews 
in the early 1990s, targeted growing concerns about the ethical conduct of newspapers and 
further concentrations in press ownership, yet each of these interventions ended in anti-climax. 
Piecemeal recommendations for voluntary reform were openly ignored by the industry and 
buried by successive governments, who were unwilling to risk open warfare with the same 
newspapers they relied on for political support (Curran, 2000; O’Malley and Soley, 2000). The 
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2011 phone hacking scandal and the subsequent Leveson Inquiry marked a decisive break from 
this enduring ‘policy silence’ (Freedman, 2014:70-1), exposing the widespread institutional 
failures of the industry’s model of self-regulation as well as the insidious compact between 
political leaders and the national press that has moulded British political culture since the 
1980s. 
In contrast, the process of renewing the BBC’s Royal Charter has been a recurring event 
in British policymaking since its foundation as a public corporation in 1927. Negotiations 
between government and the BBC on the mission and constitution of the UK’s principal public 
broadcaster have developed an elite culture in their own right (Born, 2005; Mills, 2016; Smith, 
2006), yet the various methods of BBC policymaking have changed as much as the media 
landscape it operates in. The austere managerial reviews of the 1920s and 1930s gave way to 
far more intractable conflicts over the balance between public service and market competition, 
and policy change from the 1950s to the 2000s was characterised by deregulation and the 
growing influence of commercial lobbyists (Elliot, 1981; Freedman, 1999; Holland et al., 2013; 
Leys, 2001; Milland, 2004; Wilson, 1961). Arguments stressing the impact of new media 
formats and international broadcasting goliaths have seen the BBC recast as a tool for 
enhancing media markets rather than a vehicle of national social benefit. Charter review has 
correspondingly been built on industry consultations and bargaining with commercial interests 
with only the barest performative gestures of public engagement. This model of broadcast 
policymaking is coupled with increasingly frequent political interference in the BBC’s affairs, 
with governments of all shades insinuating, pressuring and threatening draconian reforms when 
the Corporation has been felt to have unduly favoured one party or viewpoint over another. 
The Charter renewal debates in 2015-16 were in one sense the latest predictable moment of 
bureaucratic deliberation, but also acted as the once-per-decade arena for myriad overlapping 
political, economic, social and cultural battles focussed on the future of the BBC. 
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These distinct backstories highlight the often messy and sometimes contradictory 
practices that forged the media systems we have today. The two case study debates symbolise 
the latest chapters in a complex history of British media policymaking, and invite us to question 
how the dynamics of power that shape current debates are as much inherited from past political 
behaviours as they are specific manifestations of the here and now. Moreover the post-Leveson 
debates and the recent BBC Charter review took place at a time when the prevailing view—at 
least amongst many government officials, regulators, media executives and politicians—is that 
“such policy projects are steadily less necessary, legitimate and practicable than they used to 
be” (McQuail, 2000:22). Technological convergence has, the argument goes, exposed the 
traditional policy division between distinct media formats as simplistic and unsuited to a 
modern global media ecology. The abundance of media outlets, news sources and content 
providers has overtaken the need for prescriptive regulations or clumsy government controls, 
and providing for unrestricted consumer choice between competing commercial products is 
regarded as far more efficient and beneficial than imposing subjective cultural and social ideals 
(van Cuilenberg and McQuail, 2003:200; Hallin and Mancini, 2004:67). This paradigm is not 
a natural or objective approach to media policy but a thoroughly ideological 
reconceptualisation of the fundamental purposes and meanings of media. Its core rationale, 
played out through successive debates and decisions over the last 30 years, has restructured 
media systems in order to facilitate expanding commercial opportunities and capital 
accumulation for private media businesses (Abramson, 2001; Basu, 2018; Braman, 2004; 
Fenton et al., 2020; McChesney, 2003; Seymour-Ure; 1987). 
Neo-liberal media policy is not only evident in the primary aims and ideals of recent 
debates, but also in the forms and processes of media policymaking. Authority for media policy 
decisions is increasingly detached from democratic institutions or public oversight, while light-
touch regulations and industry stakeholder negotiations are the preferred tools of executive 
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action (Feintuck and Varney, 2006; Gibbons, 2015:22-9). “Media policy, in other words, is 
always trying to remove traces of itself—which is, of course, precisely what the state attempts 
to do under neoliberalism: to use its power to rub itself out, to make itself invisible” (Freedman, 
2015:104). Yet despite the overt emphasis on market freedom and deregulation, neo-liberal 
policy actors are not averse to utilising the powers of the state to preserve politically valuable 
interests or guard against undesirable ‘externalities’ (Harvey, 2005). 
The importance of ideology highlights a second justification for analysing the two case 
study debates: the overarching role of values and language in shaping the practices and 
products of media policymaking. Both the post-Leveson debates and BBC Charter review 
revolved around distinct visions of the purpose of press and broadcast media in modern British 
society. The phone hacking scandal brought historic liberal principles of press freedom into 
stark and tragic contrast with ideals of commercial journalism’s ethical responsibilities to the 
public, while decisions on the future of the BBC amplified rival interpretations of public service 
broadcasting as either a universal benefit to British culture and society or a bloated impediment 
on free and fair market competition. 
How issues in public life are debated and acted on as matters of government policy 
stems from these vital contests of meaning-making, and media institutions clearly play a 
fundamental role in how such contests unfold. Newspapers, broadcasters and online media 
formats facilitate discussion and information exchange between policymakers, interest groups 
and the wider public. These media also pressure political actors to make or change decisions, 
public institutions and private organisations by exposing wrongdoing, highlighting failures or 
calling attention to rising demands for change in wider society. This ‘fourth estate’ ideal of 
media and journalism is not only the foundational model of representative democracies and 
political decision-making (Schudson, 2002; Spitzer, 1993), but is also one of the guiding 
normative objectives of much modern media policy. Content regulations, market controls and 
 
14 
structural interventions in media systems directly impact the ability of media institutions to 
scrutinise the powerful, provide a forum of social and cultural expression, and inform the public 
as active, rational participants in democratic processes. The power of the media to influence 
media policymaking (and indeed to influence many aspects of public life) is umbilically 
connected to the structures and effects of media policy itself. 
Both of the case study policies examined in this research had these essential 
characteristics of media and its democratic function at their core. The British press is heralded 
(most often by itself) as a raucous and adversarial agent of holding the powerful to account, its 
commercial titles representing the country’s diverse political constituencies in the public sphere 
by competing for readers in a vibrant ‘marketplace of ideas’. The BBC embodies a distinct 
ethos of public service broadcasting that sets out to articulate a shared national identity and 
expand the cultural horizons of its audiences, responsible to the public as a whole through its 
universal funding and Charter. Yet such optimistic interpretations of media power as a wholly 
liberalising force neglect the realities of how these two media institutions actually function as 
conduits of democratic process and political influence. Access to professional press and 
broadcasting media production—and thus access to and influence in elite policymaking 
through media—is not guaranteed equally to all social and political groups, but is instead mired 
in existing unequal distributions of power and status in society. Government officials, corporate 
bosses and other established powerful actors have the resources and connections to sustain their 
interests through engaging with national newspapers and broadcasters, whereas non-elite 
groups and the general public are broadly alienated from directly influencing what media make. 
The kinds of voices that are heard in media coverage of policy debates, and how these groups, 
their aims and activities are reported (if at all), often reflects elite debates and inter-elite 
conflicts, leaving policymakers and the public with a narrow and unrepresentative view of the 
issues at stake (Davis, 2007; Schlosberg, 2013). 
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The most significant aspect of media power raised by the post-Leveson and BBC 
Charter debates is the unique influence media organisations have at their disposal as both 
mediators of and active stakeholders in media policymaking. The economic needs of 
commercial publishing and broadcasting companies may lead executives and editors to direct 
their coverage in support of policy decisions that sustain their market share, while the BBC 
(while bound by strict impartiality regulations) controls significant cultural and social influence 
it can similarly deploy in attempts at swaying government policy. Though such activity is 
natural of any organisation seeking to preserve its own interests, the case becomes murkier 
when considering how media outlets can distort coverage of a policy debate by drowning out 
or attacking interests or proposals that threaten their policy aims. Media actors are some of the 
most influential and well-connected political and social elites, and over the last few decades 
newspaper editors, commercial media lobbyists and media tycoons have insinuated themselves 
into unaccountable relationships with political and state officials. The BBC, with its legal duty 
to impartiality and balance, is no more immune to the political and cultural biases of its staff 
and management, nor from the pressure of softening its coverage of contentious issues in order 
to stave off damaging political and media criticism. 
The close correspondence between the political aims of government policymakers and 
the private aims of media organisations stakes a serious challenge to democratic processes and 
public accountability. Given this high potential for conflicts of interest between how media 
organisations report policy processes and how their representatives engage in those processes, 
we need to consider whether certain patterns of private lobbying and policy engagement are 
reinforced and naturalised by how media coverage articulates the terms of debate. This raises 
the prospect of routinised media influence that pervades all aspects of political decision-
making, such that the dynamics of power in media policymaking are massively tilted in favour 
of established media elites and their interests rather than the broader interests of the public. 
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It is, however, necessary to caution against dismissing all media policymaking as 
inescapably captured by elite corporate interests, or invariably leading to greater concentrations 
in market ownership, further relaxations of basic public protections and a persistent drag 
towards media systems valued exclusively by competition and private profit. One of the most 
intriguing elements of the post-Leveson and BBC Charter debates is that each was, in its own 
way, characterised by brief but intense moments of challenge and disruption to the prevailing 
orthodoxies of contemporary British press and broadcasting policymaking. The phone hacking 
scandal in 2011 sparked a ferocious public backlash that for a time shattered the historic hands-
off approach to press regulation, with a small campaign of hacking victims and impromptu 
lobbyists securing unprecedented access to the most exclusive spaces and moments of elite 
decision-making. Public service-minded pressure groups and industry stakeholders similarly 
deterred the government from enacting its most extreme threats against the BBC, and the 
Corporation displayed a surprising resilience against the ideological attacks of its political 
opponents and the demands for reform from its commercial rivals. How these groups achieved 
their unexpected interventions in elite political processes—and how the potential moments for 
radical reform that peppered these two debates were ultimately doused—invites us to examine 
the campaign tactics, lobbying practices and wider forms of political mobilisation that different 
media policy actors employ, and the ways in which the influences of these activities are 
moulded by the structures and institutions of media policymaking. From this we can inquire on 
the balance between elite, non-elite and public influence on some of the most important issues 
facing modern democratic societies. 
The apparent instabilities and contradictions within elite policymaking processes 
highlight these two case studies as rich demonstrations of the different forms of power that 
shape the vital relationship between politics and media. The post-Leveson and BBC Charter 
debates exemplify unresolved crises at the heart of British media: the entrenched corruption of 
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press regulation and unchallenged unethical reporting practices, enabled by a political 
establishment captured by and dependent on corporate press power, with disastrous 
consequences for public trust in journalism; and the gradual but severe erosion of public service 
broadcasting, incited by pervasive political interference in the BBC’s independence along with 
the increasing influence of free market values and commercial interests on the normative aims 
of media regulation. Furthermore these recent policy debates offer the rare opportunity to 
examine how power operates at the precise intersection where media’s communicative 
functions and the policies that govern them collide. From this we can advance an understanding 
of media power as neither a disinterested by-product of policy arrangements nor as a totalising 
constraint on all democratic activities, but as a complex and dynamic manifestation of unique 
corporate and political influence, the effects of which must be forensically picked apart if we 
are to properly comprehend the true extent of the disconnect between the public, the media and 
democratic processes. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The central research question for this thesis may best be summarised as “what are the 
dynamics of power that shaped the post-Leveson and BBC Charter review policymaking 
process?” Rather than over-simplifying the many inter-related subjects and dilemmas raised by 
this one question, it is necessary to establish a more precise set of conceptual and critical 
focuses. 
(1) How did the organisation of the post-Leveson and BBC Charter policy processes affect 
the ability of interest groups to influence decision-making? 
The first of these concerns the policymaking process itself. Media policymaking does 
not occur accidentally but is purposefully organised by official decision-makers, and the tools 
and methods policymakers employ when formulating policy have a profound impact on how 
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different interest groups can engage in public policy deliberation. The two case study debates 
are unique for taking place across distinct combinations of legislation, parliamentary and 
government consultations, judicial inquiry and private negotiations. Both policies also centred 
on Royal Charters, an obscure legal instrument for creating public bodies by order of The 
Queen (on the advice of government ministers) rather than through statute in parliament. 
Further, these two debates emerged from markedly different political, historical and 
institutional contexts involving various technical precedents in policymaking. Whereas BBC 
Charter review in 2015-16 was a planned decision with established broadcast decision-making 
practices, the post-Leveson negotiations in 2012-13 were an unplanned and disorganised 
reaction to an explosive public scandal in an industry absent of political intervention. Analysing 
how these two processes were organised is valuable for identifying the common decision-
making practices but, more importantly, they offer a means to critically evaluate liberal-rational 
norms and assess whether media policy formulation is genuinely open and balanced for all 
interest groups. These are essential characteristics of any democratic system, and can provide 
us with strong indications of where power is situated within the official and unofficial 
mechanisms of British media policymaking. 
(2) Which people, interests and political tactics had the greatest impact on press and 
broadcasting policy decisions? 
The second research question advances on this relationship between political 
interactions and power, and concerns how media policy actors use different political, economic 
and social resources in their attempts to persuade decision-makers. Contrasting perceptions of 
the importance of various moments of decision-making, as well as the actual patterns of access 
different groups have to the policy processes, may have a substantive effect on how policy 
actors choose to interact with media policymaking through public campaigning, policy 
research, media engagement and intimate lobbying. In addition, the actors, interests and 
 
19 
political tactics that policymakers are most responsive to may be strongly linked with their own 
impressions of what kinds of public or private contributions are more or less useful for 
informing their decision-making. Clearly some figures and groups possess professional 
expertise and political connections for gaining access to elite spaces and processes that are far 
beyond the reach of most other groups. The issue is whether specific methods of policy 
engagement are innately more influential than others, how widely these forms of influence are 
distributed across elite and non-elite policy groups, and what this reveals about the balance of 
power both within the local contexts of press and broadcasting policymaking and across the 
central institutions of British democracy. 
(3) What impact did competing values, language and narrative accounts of press and 
broadcasting policy have on the content and shape of media policy debate? 
Competing sets of beliefs and ideas about how and why media should be governed in 
particular ways are central to media policy debates. One way policy actors seek to influence 
decision-makers is by convincing them that their interpretations and ideals of media’s roles are 
more effective or appealing for resolving policy problems. But these discourses also have a far 
more integral role in shaping the definitions and vocabulary that policymakers use to articulate 
and arrange their decision-making. Argument, rhetoric and normative principles of media 
policy establish the boundaries and scope of debate, and crucially legitimise or delegitimise 
what kinds of actors, interests and forms of political activity should be included in these 
processes. This third research question thus emphasises the effects of language and policy 
narratives on media policymaking, and seeks to reveal how ideological power is structured into 
political processes through these discursive phenomena. From this we can interrogate whether 
the normative definitions at the core of the post-Leveson and BBC Charter review processes 
represent a continuation of the contemporary neo-liberal mode of British media policymaking, 
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or if these two debates entailed new beliefs and principles that challenged or replaced dominant 
ideological practices. 
(4) What is the specific influence of media organisations on media policy decision-
making? 
As considered above, media perform a number of vital and intersecting roles within the 
media policymaking process. As policy actors, media organisations represent their respective 
policy aims as one among many other interest groups engaged in executive decision-making 
processes. Media outlets also perform an essential communicative role by reporting on and 
facilitating public debate about media policy issues as a means of informing decision-makers 
and other policy actors. Yet media actors—editors, journalists, corporate executives and 
business owners—are also political and cultural elites with unique access to and connections 
in exclusive government and policy spaces. Each of these roles pertains to specific notions of 
power and influence within political processes, but taken together they invite us to question 
whether the fundamental democratic functions of media are distorted by the private and 
institutional interests of media organisations, and whether these organisations unduly influence 
media policymaking in their favour through the unique forms of power at their disposal. By 
looking at coverage of the post-Leveson and BBC Charter debates across different media 
formats and publications, at the conduct of individual media actors within the two decision-
making processes, and at the extent to which non-media policy actors ‘use’ the media as part 
of their own political activity, this fourth research question aims to critically assess the specific 
power of media in policymaking and how this influence manifests. 
THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis addresses these questions through a series of thematic discussions on the 
specific formations and dynamics of power in British press and broadcast policymaking. 
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Chapter 2 reviews the political science literature on the policymaking process, examining the 
different ideas on how interest groups are organised in society and how political processes 
incorporate competing actors into democratic decision-making. Beginning with normative 
pluralist notions of political competition and advancing to modern theories of ‘new 
institutionalism’ and discursive politics, this chapter provides a brief genealogy of some of the 
most prominent analytical models of policymaking and considers how they can be adapted to 
the study of press and broadcast policymaking. 
Chapter 3 explores the various sociological perspectives on what ‘power’ is and the 
different theoretical definitions for how people influence the actions of others, both personally 
and through social and political institutions. This chapter critiques the division within the 
literature on power between ‘behavioural’ and ‘structural’ explanations, including ideas of 
‘media power’ that correspond with these schools, and proposes a combined model of these 
accounts for analysing power in the media policymaking process. 
Chapter 4 describes the specific methods used to sample and collect documentary 
evidence and interview data, and details the Critical Discourse Analysis methodology used to 
systematically evaluate the dynamics of power in the two case study debates. This chapter also 
explores underlying debates about the reliability and validity of the types of knowledge created 
through these research methods, and recounts some of the challenges involved in conducting 
research on elite political processes. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present accounts of the core policy debates, official decision-making 
processes, evolving technical proposals and political conflicts of the post-Leveson and BBC 
Charter review case studies respectively. These chapters are partly intended as detailed 
histories of how the two policies were made, and loosely follow the ‘stages’ concept of 
policymaking as a cumulative translation of undefined problems into tangible matters of policy 
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decision (Easton, 1953; Hill and Varone, 2017; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Jenkins, 1978; 
Picard, 2020). However these chapters also attempt to denaturalise official decision-making 
mechanisms and, in addressing the substance of Research Question (1), present a deeper 
argument about how the structures of media policymaking and its formative decisions are 
steeped in imbalances of power. 
Chapters 7 and 8 analyse the various forms and mobilisations of influence at the heart 
of the post-Leveson and BBC Charter policy processes, and compares how these dynamics 
played out between the specific political, historical and institutional contexts of press and 
broadcasting policy. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the issues of media policy language and narrative considered in 
Research Question (3), and explores how the different political arguments, rhetorical devices 
and philosophies of media expressed by competing actors in the two debates shaped the 
content, structure and aims of official decision-making. This chapter also expands on the 
concerns raised in Research Question (4) relating to the pervasive role of mass media coverage 
in moulding how media policy debates are articulated. 
Chapter 8 turns to the social relationships and political tactics that define how people 
interact with the policy process. The chapter first details how the organisation of ‘policy 
networks’ surrounding the two case study debates entrenched unique patterns of access and 
influence between different types of actors, groups and decision-making processes. Expanding 
on this and incorporating a broader discussion on matters raised by Research Questions (2) and 
(4), this chapter then critically examines the power of specific forms of public campaigning, 
media engagement and private lobbying to influence media policymaking. 
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis with discussions on the central dynamics of power 
revealed by the two case studies, and summarises key findings in relation to the thematic 
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focuses of each Research Question. This conclusion expands on the wider consequences of 
media power for democratic politics, and considers how the policy changes introduced by the 
post-Leveson and BBC Charter debates have shifted the balance of power both within the press 
and broadcasting industries and across media policymaking more broadly. Integrating the core 
analysis of this thesis into my own prospective ‘Media Policy Power Cascade’ model, these 
closing discussions consider how the shifting political precedents and evolving modes of 
decision-making established by these two case study debates have further entrenched 
concentrations of elite and corporate media influence at the heart of British media 
policymaking. As we move into a period of deep uncertainty for press and broadcasting media, 
not just in Britain but around the world, this model offers a means for critiquing the systemic 
dynamics of power in media policymaking, and for denaturalising these dynamics with an aim 
to seizing new opportunities for genuine public involvement (and possibly even radical 




2. REFLECTIONS ON THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS 
Studying the public policymaking process is an essential part of evaluating how modern 
democracies work. Policymaking is the primary means for governments, legislatures and other 
organs of representative democracy to exercise the political authority invested in them by the 
public, and to manage the rules and institutions that govern significant parts of public life. 
Through examining what kinds of decisions are made, how they are made, who is involved in 
making them and the changes in laws or regulations that these decisions produce, we can 
develop a deeper understanding of how a political system is organised and the balance of power 
within it. The premise of ‘good’ policy infers that change not only creates a better outcome 
than what stood before, but also that it results from a process in which all groups have equitable 
say in how the decision was reached. In this regard policymaking is a participatory process, in 
which competing groups mobilise their interests in the public sphere and elected officials are 
held accountable on the basis of how they respond to these expressions of popular will. 
Policymaker’s decisions do not favour a single-minded majority against a minority, but instead 
reflect an aggregate consensus of the collective public and private interests across society. 
This normative model of the ‘political marketplace’ continues to underpin 
contemporary definitions of policymaking and its study. Yet such an ideal raises a number of 
issues about how this model can be applied to analysis of the realities of policymaking. 
Understanding how an ‘interest’ is defined involves considering whether such elementary 
political units are limited to just economic and demographic groupings or encompass a more 
nebulous range of associations, and if so how policymaking processes account for the varying 
public and private interests mobilised across society. This also calls to attention the distinction 
between equality of participation and equality of influence, and the extent to which official 
decision-making practices embody or recreate the wider political, social and economic 
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equalities in everyday life. These are not new or especially intractable questions, but they 
nonetheless form the basis of numerous scholastic attempts to scientifically model the policy 
process as a staple part of democratic organisation. These theories provide useful sets of 
methods and analytical frameworks, but they also entail particular arguments about the kinds 
of systems, dynamics and causal factors that can or cannot be identified as influential in 
political decision-making. These perspectives in turn make assertions about the nature of power 
in policymaking and the variables for evaluating its democratic credentials. 
This chapter does not catalogue all debates, nor reconciles a meta-model of the policy 
process. It offers instead a discussion of some of the major shifts in contemporary policy theory, 
and explores the value of these developments for a study of the media policymaking process. 
Each compounding branch of theory reflects historical changes in how governments and 
polities have structured decision-making, yet these schools also emphasise advancing 
conceptualisations of how interest groups and other political actors influence the democratic 
process. Through their varying models of the political system, these accounts chart how policy 
change happens and the salient institutions and processes that shape it. This chapter also 
explores the differing definitions of the particular role of media institutions in the policy 
process, and how these strands of policy theory can be applied to the unique circumstances of 
the post-Leveson and BBC Charter review debates. 
PLURALISM AND PRESSURE GROUPS 
As both an explanatory framework and the dominant normative description of decision-
making in modern democracies, pluralist theory has a long genealogy of different schools and 
reappraisals. Yet these all share an interest in three major shifts in social and political systems 
from the beginning of the 20th century. First, mass industrialisation had brought about rapid 
changes in working and living that fractured the ‘common ground’ that defined traditional 
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social and economic interests. Second, the expansion of corporate entities that took charge of 
growing industrial and financial organisations altered the central relationships of production 
and consumption. Third, the state itself created vast empires of new programmes, agencies and 
departments to negotiate these evolving expressions of public and private life. 
Early pluralists saw this modernisation as a positive contribution to individuals’ ability 
to mobilise with others, to advance their collective interests, and to do so equally across as 
many interests as may bring personal advantage (Blokland, 2011:19). To accommodate this 
exploding constellation of ‘pressure groups’, the model in which elected decision-makers acted 
on behalf of the public was replaced by new systems of bargaining and consultation between 
political parties, government actors and the organised associations of public and private 
interests (Hill and Varone, 2017:26-6). In this view, the unelected state institutions that put 
policies into action were subordinated to elected leaders, and elected leaders were in turn 
subordinated to the public through their appeals to the numerous pressure groups representing 
the electorate. 
Robert Dahl’s 1961 work Who Governs? is the most renowned case study of pluralism 
in policymaking. Charting the social and political changes in New Haven, a rapidly growing 
Massachusetts city, since the late 18th century, Dahl noted how the assimilation of previously 
disparate ethnic groups into civic life had made it “increasingly difficult to build or hold 
followings by means of hallowed appeals to ethnic loyalties or effects on income” (Dahl, 
2005:60). New electoral coalitions were required to reconnect decision-makers with 
developing urban needs that merged or moved beyond ethnic and socioeconomic issues. For 
Dahl, the new focus on collective group interests and the shared benefits of public policy 
brought to the fore the impact of “technicians, planners, professional administrators, and above 
all to professional politicians” (2005:62). Those figures most likely to succeed in public affairs 
were no longer the ethnic or economic elites at the heights of their respective constituencies, 
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but the ‘Social Notables’ who could manage these competing yet overlapping groups in their 
favour. 
The central challenge facing Dahl and other pluralist theorists was to dispel claims 
(explored in the next section) that the new complex of policymaking institutions was still 
vulnerable to historic patterns of political inequality and domination by a few powerful groups. 
Dahl concedes that social and economic elites possess imposing resources, that many aspects 
of public life are framed in terms of their interests, and that the expansion of public policy into 
business and social organisation provides notables with a “strong and steady stimulus to 
participate in city decisions” (2005:76). However, Dahl also contends that these groups are 
small in number and “often in disagreement even on questions directly in their own interests” 
(2005:77). The regularity of this ‘inter-elite’ conflict hinders one group from dominating 
decision-making, and their patterns of influence remain tethered to the leadership structures 
and democratic processes that allot them their ‘notable’ status. 
From this Dahl derives a central tenet of pluralist theory; the political resources needed 
to influence policymaking are not accumulated in tandem with other resources like wealth, 
social standing, property or higher education. Dahl does not suggest that inequalities in political 
resources don’t exist, but that they instead “tend to be noncumulative. The political system … 
is one of dispersed inequalities” (2005:85, original emphasis). Although different groups 
possess different types and degree of resources depending on the specific social or economic 
interests they represent, their influence over decision-making is ultimately dependent on their 
command of public support. “Electoral competition,” as Blokland puts it, “provides politicians 




Dahl doesn’t dispute that a small number of privileged individuals hold a degree of 
direct influence over policymaking that few others enjoy. But the prospects for total elite 
control are, in his view, negated by the indirect influence that flows up from pressure groups’ 
mobilisation of collective public wants (2005:101). This indirect influence is partly 
communicated through a ‘political stratum’ of campaigners, lobbyists, policy experts and 
technical professionals, who serve as a medium of influence between decision-makers and the 
wider assortment of interests in society. Leaders reach out to public at large through this sub-
culture “to adapt their policies to what they think their constituents want” (Dahl, 2005:101). 
Again it could be argued that such a system privileges those individuals whose policy 
goals appeal to leaders’ preconceptions of what is in the public interest or, similarly, that only 
those with the political resources or nous can succeed in penetrating the ‘political stratum’. 
Here Dahl returns to the cumulative strength of the collective, and emphasises the competition 
between those within the stratum to develop their own exclusive constituencies, arguing that 
“a political issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until it commands the attention of a 
significant segment of the political stratum” (2005:92). Public preferences emerge through 
competition between leaders which, far from causing a myopic or artificial representation of 
political issues, creates “alternative sources of information” (2005:165) that limit the 
possibility of a dominant elite class. Here Dahl offers an explicit recognition of the role of 
media in policymaking, though this is restricted to a functional layer for mediating interests 
between policymakers and citizens. 
The mass media are a kind of filter for information and influence. Since few citizens 
ever have much immediate experience in politics, most of what they perceive about 
politics is filtered through the mass media. Those who want to influence the electorate 
must do so through the mass media. (Dahl, 2005:256) 
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Dahl acknowledges a tension in this relationship between policymakers, citizens and the media, 
as policymakers’ perceptions of the influence of the media will dictate the extent to which they 
‘use’ media to inform their decisions. However, newspapers (and Dahl was concerned solely 
with print media in local contexts) are treated much like mobilised interest groups more 
generally – one amongst many organised means for mediating sectional aims between the 
public and policymakers, and therefore not exercising any greater degree of influence. 
In Dahl’s account of the New Haven pluralist democracy, power over policymaking is 
not a process of covert manipulation, but a demonstrable exercise in which one leader builds 
support by presenting the means to manifest public interests through political action. But this 
one-dimensional view of power (to which I will return in the next chapter) ignored, as Dahl 
later considered, how “the citizen often does not understand how his ‘interests’ are involved” 
in the arcane and distant mechanisms of the policy process (in Blokland, 2011:272). Dahl’s 
observation that elected leaders seek to build broad coalitions of support is therefore not 
sufficient to claim that the genuine interests of the public as a whole feature meaningfully in 
political decisions. Validating Dahl’s normative assertions requires an analysis of the political 
and social contexts of policymaking, which looks beyond the fixed realm of a single city’s 
urban planning policy. 
Nonetheless, Dahl’s assessment of New Haven maintains an important place in the 
development of policy theory. Quite apart from its optimistic appeals to civic participation and 
bottom-up democracy in the symbolic town hall meeting, Dahl’s liberal-pluralist account 
emphasises that the analytical focus ought to remain on the observable interactions between 
interest groups and the official processes that mediate these interests. The group-to-
policymaker dynamic that Dahl examined persists as an enduring characteristic of later pluralist 
theories, which celebrate the indirect strength of the public at large as the basis of influence in 
the policy process. Politicians and other policy officials frequently appeal to pluralist values 
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and ideals in their descriptions of the decision-making systems they manage, and media policy 
is hardly unique in celebrating consultation, openness and ‘listening to all sides’ as evidence 
that decisions reflect a fair balance of all interests. While it is unsurprising that political actors 
place great esteem in justifying the democratic credentials of their own activities, these 
sentiments are significant because they relate directly to the actual structures, functions and 
exercises of policy formation these executive actors put in place. As both a normative and an 
analytical model, pluralism’s value for studying the media policymaking process lies in 
examining whether and how these myriad political processes contribute, individually and 
jointly, to a genuinely democratic aggregate consensus of competing policy interests. 
THE ELITIST CRITIQUES 
Dahl’s landmark 1961 study was partly a retort against earlier challenges to the 
behaviouralist, atomistic assumptions of positivist accounts of policymaking. Founding 
philosophies of liberal-pluralism, arising out of Enlightenment values of constitutional liberty 
and human dignity, saw decisions as innately democratic and rational because they resulted 
from the aggregate negotiated interests of “the common man” who “inherently was capable of 
good judgement” (Bachrach, 1969:27). However, critics noted a disconnect between these 
normative principles and modern developments that appeared to foster inegalitarian rather than 
democratic processes. 
The fragmentation of individuals’ interests across a greater diversity of public and 
private associations had resulted in political and social identities becoming “less and less stable, 
coherent, concrete and self-evident” (Blokland, 2011:2). Charles Wright Mills further claimed 
that those who “have lost faith in prevailing loyalties” do not seek to re-engage with more 
immediate aspects of political life but instead “pay no attention to politics of any kind … they 
are inactionary” (1970:30). The retreat from public life by substantial segments of society 
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provoked a serious contest to the model of the ‘political marketplace’, as absence from 
participation weakened the visible support for some groups’ respective interests while making 
others appear more popular and organised. Processes of ‘rationalisation’ were also causing 
political institutions and behaviours to become more calculated towards partial goals, while the 
tightening operations of governments and national economies imposed restrictive conditions 
on what types of decisions could be made and how. Bureaucracies and capitalist dicta “had 
become an iron cage in which humanity was, save for the possibility of a prophetic revival, 
imprisoned” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b:63). Rationalisation, in short, was predetermining 
the outcome of human activity. Individuals or interests that mobilised in ways contrary to these 
narrowing choices were ignored or excluded from democratic participation, and policies that 
competed with or challenged prevailing orthodoxies were also dismissed. 
Whereas pluralist theory describes a system of dispersed inequalities and competition 
between pressure groups, a number of critiques from what might be termed the ‘elitist 
perspective’ argued instead that a small class of elite actors, rich in resources and influence, 
had entrenched control of political decision-making (Mills, 1970:32). Minority domination was 
inevitable where that minority worked on a single impulse against an individualised, undirected 
mass: 
A hundred men acting uniformly in concert, with a common understanding, will 
triumph over a thousand men who are not in accord and can therefore be dealt with one 
by one.” (Bachrach, 1969:12) 
Military, religious, bureaucratic, economic and aristocratic elites, without private burdens like 
poverty, social inequalities or unemployment, became best placed to dominate rationalised 
political spaces (Hill and Varone, 2017:37). 
The elitist critiques produced two distinct models for how this domination unfolded in 
the day-to-day interactions of public and political organisation. The first, espoused most 
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notably by Italian theorists Mosca and Pareto at the turn of the 20th century, advocated rule by 
elites as superior to pluralist democracy. The stability and competence of any system of 
government depended on a unified, organised and resourceful elite class—guaranteed by their 
purer political nature to “safeguard and further the interests of the community” (Bachrach, 
1969:2)—to defend it against the irrational and impulsive demands of the masses. The 
operative task of this elite was to insulate its control against demagogic and revolutionary 
dissent, through continuously adapting political institutions to capture changing social forces 
and maintain elite authority in the wider community. 
Against this avowedly antidemocratic premise, the second account entails a concerted 
attempt to rescue pluralist ideals from those modern political developments that seemed to lead 
invariably to some form of elite domination. American political scientist Peter Bachrach argued 
that the ruling class was not a single, monolithic entity with unified interests but instead a 
competing set of “organized minorities, obeying diffuse and conflicting impulses” (1969:16). 
What had been previously envisaged as a noble but outnumbered elite class, acting in concert 
against a potentially destructive passive public, was reimagined to encompass competing sets 
of elites who defer to the masses to sustain their activities in government. Bachrach’s model of 
‘democratic elitism’ stressed that public accountability persisted in systems of inter-elite 
competition, because interest groups mobilised throughout civil society prevented “any one 
elite group from overreaching its legitimate bounds” (1969:36). Yet Bachrach remained critical 
of the general patterns of elitist organisation in modern political systems, particularly because 
“each elite tends to dominate in its own sphere of activity and [encounters] little if any 
interference from other elites” (1969:37). 
These elitist critiques may seem quaintly historical, representing efforts to understand 
the rise of populist or totalitarian movements and to reconcile their collapse with the 
burgeoning political conflicts of the second half of the 20th century. Yet these models are still 
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relevant today for their analysis of the formation of elite groups and how their interests are 
structured within the core institutions of policymaking. As more and more areas of public 
policy have been integrated with industrial and economic planning (and in particular with neo-
liberal objectives of unregulated competition and profit maximisation), policymaking is 
increasingly organised as a technocratic domain for experts, regulators, technicians and 
industry panels. Media policy especially has seen legal powers and regulatory authority for 
media systems divided out to new quasi-state institutions and agencies, creating what Harvey 
has described as “government by executive order and by judicial decision rather than 
democratic and parliamentary decision-making” (2005:66). In analysing the post-Leveson and 
BBC Charter review debates, an elitist perspective remains useful for comparing the notionally 
pluralistic patterns of policymaking with the arrangements and activities of entrenched elite 
groups, and for unpicking how elite interests are rationalised as normative political attitudes. 
These critiques also prompt us to ask whether the competition between interest groups is 
merely subordinated to the actual centres of elite authority, or if civil society organisation can 
actually function as “a centre of opposition, if not an alternative” to elite domination (Harvey, 
2005:78). 
CORPORATISM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
Early theories of political decision-making assigned only minor roles to the state and 
formal institutions of government in the dynamics of interest mediation and elite domination. 
Some pluralists asserted that the state was nothing more than another interest or association 
among many, albeit one in which all individuals are invested, and this membership “has no 
deeper or higher meaning than other memberships” (Blokland, 2011:26). Elitist critiques, on 
the other hand, conceived of the state as the means and ends for a dominant socio-economic 
group to manifest their control (Miliband, 1969; Mills, 1970), or as the driving force for 
institutionalising favoured economic and social practices (Weber, 1986). The expansion of the 
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state and its increasing role in public and private life brought a new focus on the diversity of 
state bodies, as well as the state’s active role in organising and managing the policymaking 
process. A presupposition of state passivity or elite capture undermined the fundamental 
participatory ideals implicit to democratic and constitutional structures, and new models were 
needed to salvage the notion of the state as “the vehicle of the community and the public 
interest” (Blokland, 2011:27). 
Re-evaluations of pluralist thought emphasised how executive bodies, legislatures, the 
judiciary, the civil service and their associated political classes all performed a vital function 
in bridging the plurality of social and political concerns in the public to the official structures 
of decision-making and government (Beer, 1965:71). ‘Corporatism’ represents one such model 
describing how the state, to facilitate the most effective and efficient policy outcomes, actively 
legitimises select interest groups and creates “an institutional relationship between the systems 
of authoritative decision-making and interest representation” (Schmitter, 1974:88, my 
emphasis). A number of post-War social democratic governments in Western Europe 
implemented forms of corporatism that enforced degrees of cooperation between trade unions, 
employer associations and other industrial or business groups as a means of controlling wages 
and interest rates (Hill and Varone, 2017:75-6). By co-opting major socio-economic producer 
groups into the official decision-making domain of the state, the locus of policymaking shifted 
from open conflict and bartering between competing interests (as under pluralism) to managed 
negotiation between non-competing groups who were granted “a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective systems in exchange for observing certain controls” on their 
political activities (Schmitter, 1974:93-4). 
In this sense corporatism fused pluralism and democratic elitism. Interest representation 
in Schmitter’s descriptions of corporatism is functional representation, constrained by the 
purposes a group can serve and “related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to 
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reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually accumulate further resources” 
(1974:107; see also Beer, 1965). However, as a result of this, both the corporatist model and 
the analysis it seeks to provide pay little attention to interest groups that do not exercise an 
economic or productive function. Whether a set of integrated groups actually represents a 
genuinely democratic range of interests in their respective sector depends on the existing 
balance of power in that sector and the ‘shape’ of corporatist relations the state creates for it 
(Rhodes, 2003:31). Political parties, campaign organisations and citizens’ associations are 
equal in pluralist models but, as with elitist accounts, groups that control the levers of national 
industries dominate the corporatist perspective of policymaking (Cawson in Rhodes, 2003:31). 
Ironically, analyses of corporatism emerged just at the time when corporatist economic 
management was swept aside by the rise of monetarist and neo-liberal politics across Europe 
and the US (Grant, 2000:51-3; Humphreys, 1996:161-3). Yet corporatism is still useful for 
contemporary study of media policymaking, and not simply because it offers a means for 
unpicking how state institutions (as the principal instigators of the policy process) organise 
specific patterns of decision-making that reflect entrenched state objective. Aspects of 
corporatist organisation are evident in the management of the UK Arts Council (Upchurch, 
2011), the ‘functional separation’ of broadband infrastructure from commercial internet service 
providers (Whalley and Curwen, 2017), and arguably even in the organisation and regulation 
of the BBC. As is explored later in this research, the complex arrangement of numerous facets 
of BBC policy decision-making—and the precarious constitutional relationship between the 
Corporation and the British state (Mills, 2016:213-4)—poses many challenges to the notion of 
Charter review as a public-driven and democratic process. 
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THE POLICY NETWORKS PARADIGM 
The economic trends that superseded social-democratic or corporatist patterns of 
policymaking were also accompanied by a fragmentation in the established processes of 
political representation. New realms of state activity have to negotiate with different kinds and 
degrees of cultural, social and political resources at play in modern democratic societies as well 
as financial and economic bases. Post-industrial societies now encompass a far more diverse 
range of conflicts than the dominant capital-versus-labour concerns of much of the 20th century. 
These new constellations of interest groups organise in various formal or informal associations, 
and mobilise their policy demands across numerous different relationships and interactions in 
both in civil society and official political institutions (Hill and Varone, 2017:77). Thus the 
challenge for more recent theories of policymaking is to identify how decision-making 
processes integrate the range and diversity of these complex and competing expressions of 
political will, while still producing policy outcomes that solve collective problems and 
represent an effective, participatory consensus. 
Perhaps the most salient of such accounts can be described broadly as ‘network theory’. 
It takes as its premise that a variety of interests exists not just across various social and 
economic associations within the public at large, but also within and between organised interest 
groups such as political parties, businesses, non-profits and campaign bodies. The empirical 
turn in post-war policymaking, with a greater emphasis on information exchange and the 
blurring between public and private responsibility, has led many matters of policy to be 
sectorialised and departmentalised, creating relatively distinct policy ‘subsystems’ (Adam and 
Kriesi, 2008; Baumgartner et al., 2007; Rhodes, 2003; Sabatier and Weible, 2007). These 
subsystems act (whether naturally or by formal design) to contain deliberation and decision-
making about a particular policy area, such as defence, education or health care, and enable 
“regular communication and frequent exchange of information [leading] to the establishment 
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of stable relationships between actors and to the coordination of their mutual interests” (Adam 
and Kriesi, 2008:129). This ‘network’ of interactions is argued to benefit both decision-makers 
and interest groups. Government officials can accumulate alternative arguments and evidence 
to negotiate a popular solution, while special interest groups can more easily identify and lobby 
ministers, specialists and other crucial decision-makers through standardised channels that 
form around a given policy area. 
Some like Rhodes employ policy networks as a means for explaining “the oligopoly of 
the political marketplace” (2003:9), in which governments organise the vast array of policy 
interests into more stable structures of information exchange and decision-making between a 
selection of key actors. Similar to ideas of corporatism, this interpretation expresses a type of 
governance that limits participation to groups that fulfil specific roles and work together to 
represent the aggregate mutual interests of their broader constituencies. Rhodes even presents 
a continuum of different types of networks, each reflecting the extent of cohesion and 
cooperation (or disunity and competition) between groups within a network (2003:38-9). Other 
network theorists like Adam and Kriesi employ the concept as a broader framework for 
describing the “different possible patterns of interaction among public and private actors in 
policy-specific subsystems” (2008:130). This view characterises policy networks not only by 
formal government arrangement, but also by informal relationships and the reputations, roles 
and participation of multiple policy actors with both decision-makers and one another. The 
extent of conflict, bargaining or cooperation between groups can vary hugely from issue to 
issue, and the concentration or fragmentation of power throughout a policy network impacts 
greatly on the potential for and form of policy change (Adam and Kriesi, 2008:134-5). 
This does not, however, mean that policy networks achieve the pluralist ideal of open 
access for all groups across the many various parts of a fragmented policymaking culture. 
Adam and Kriesi assert that policy-specific or domain-specific contexts determine “the shape 
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of policy networks” (2008:141) and these arrangements determine the strategies and types of 
interests that are most successful in influencing policymakers. Policy areas that have greater 
salience and visibility with the public result in a more crowded policy network, with numerous 
groups advocating a range of different interests and arguing over the potential resources up for 
grabs within that subsystem. Conversely the more peripheral an issue, “the greater capacity a 
network has to run its own affairs without politicization” (Adam and Kriesi, 2008:142) and the 
less capacity for insurgent groups or minority interests to penetrate the network and impact 
policy. 
There are two aspects here on which a brief note might be made regarding the role of 
media within a network model of policymaking. The first concerns how media organisations 
are structured into policy networks and the impact they have on competing policy interests 
within a policy domain. If we take the image of a network as a number of nodes (actors, 
organisations, sites of decision-making and interest mediation etc.) joined in variously ordered 
and cohesive relationships, it is evident that ‘media’ in its many guises may be situated at 
several points on this conceptual web. Media organisations may themselves appear in policy 
networks as actors (somewhat inevitably in debates on media policy), seeking to advocate their 
economic or political interests to policymakers through engagement and cooperation with other 
networked groups. Yet as sources of information, media exercise an additional and overlapping 
role in providing links for other actors to influence networked policymaking. Policymakers use 
the media to publicise and justify their policy aims to the public, while interest groups use the 
media to amplify their core policy appeals or to circumvent prohibitive institutional barriers in 
the formal decision-making process (Grant, 1995:133-9). 
The second aspect of media’s networked role concerns its contribution to the discursive 
infrastructure that orders groups and interests across a policy network. The salience afforded 
to a policy issue in media coverage affords status and influence to different types of actors. 
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Taking media policy and ideas of prominent or peripheral issues, subjects such as broadcast 
spectrum allocation, physical media infrastructure or regulatory quotas tend to attract more 
overtly technical (though certainly not unimportant) debates that news sources may not find 
relevant to publicise to their audiences. This ‘de-politicisation’ results in the organisation of 
smaller and more tightly regimented ‘policy communities’ (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992:251), 
with decisions resulting from exclusive bargaining between nuanced media interests and 
technical groups that share relatively common and coordinated aims. On the other hand the 
moral and social content of media texts or the cost and accessibility of media products (topics 
rarely left untouched by media coverage) attract a much larger and less cohesive set of public 
and private interests, resulting in a much more openly contested and politicised network 
structure. 
RULES, BEHAVIOURS AND ‘NEW INSTITUTIONALISM’  
The shift from centralised control to multiple networked domains of policymaking is 
clearly not unique to media policy. The fracturing of direct state command over decision-
making has driven ideas about modes of governance, in which “a variety of government 
agencies have chosen to share their authority for collective action with non-profit agencies and 
private firms in a network of mutual dependence” (Millward and Provan, 2000:360-1). Many 
theorists have debated whether this shift away from top-down decision-making is the ‘natural’ 
result of bureaucratic attempts to manage diverse policy sectors, or if it represents a conscious 
political effort to replace the role of the state in decision-making with mutually coordinating 
third-party (and particularly private sector) organisations (Fischer, 2003:24-5; Hill and Varone, 
2017:20; Millward and Provan, 2000:362). The re-ordering of relationships entailed in systems 
of governance means that contestation and bargaining is regarded as formally inter-
organisational, in a fashion that suits the theories of policy networks described above. 
Policymaking in the ‘age of governance’ is less a matter of the successful imposition of an 
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interest group’s objectives on government decision-making, and more about the common rules 
and traditions that shape how decision-making actually happens. 
Understanding the role of these organisational norms has encouraged post-positivist 
accounts of policymaking, which analyse how value-laden cultures and expected behaviours 
influence a policy subsystem and the actors within it. The network definition may describe the 
connections and relationships that constrain an interest group’s activity within a subsystem, but 
it doesn’t explain how particular patterns of group organisation actually create the substantive 
mechanisms and interactions that make up the policymaking process. ‘New institutionalism’, 
one of the more recently established branches of policy science, seeks to re-establish the role 
of social context and offers “a reaction against the behavioural revolution of recent debates” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a:2). Traditional approaches lack an appreciation of how social 
context—and not solely rational choice—determines preferred outcomes, and do not offer an 
explanation for why policy systems maintain equilibrium when “atomistic [theories] predicted 
unstable and paradoxical decisions” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a:5). 
‘New institutionalism’ seeks to redefine institutional systems as cognitive structures 
where rules, routines and scripts of behaviour are formalised within a professional field, policy 
sector or societal group. Institutionalisation—the process by which “social processes, 
obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and action” (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1991:42)—may begin as a rationalising process for adopting a shared system of 
assumed optimisations to enhance bargaining and information exchange. Eventually, however, 
“a threshold is reached beyond which adoption provides legitimacy rather than improves 
performance” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b:65). Legitimacy, more so than popular support or 
negotiated consensus, becomes the currency with which groups establish influence and 
authority in the policymaking process. 
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Absent from some early accounts of new institutionalism is an explanation for how 
policy change can happen if policy networks are characterised by homogeneity and self-
sustaining institutional behaviours. Baumgartner et al. (2007) propose that policy processes 
abide by stability and incrementalism, interrupted only by occasional large-scale departures 
from past policy caused by the rise and fall of issue salience within a subsystem. This 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ hypothesis suggests that policy institutions remain stable while the 
behavioural norms of dominant actors are capable of mitigating or finessing emergent policy 
challenges. This stability is punctuated when the institutionally-limited behaviour of decision-
makers prevents any adaptation to exogenous shocks in social, political or institutional 
circumstances. This results in policy failure, and new or minority actors become interested in 
the issue causing “previously dominant agencies and institutions … to share power with groups 
or agencies that gain new legitimacy” (Baumgartner et al., 2007:159). Similar models propose 
that change results from a ‘feedback loop’ effect, where the cumulative shortcomings of 
previous policy decisions inevitably lead to a critical mass of issues that necessitate reform to 
adapt to new circumstances (Baumgartner et al., 2007; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Meyer and 
Rowan explain the incremental form of policy change in new institutionalism by highlighting 
that “institutionalized organisations seek to minimize inspection and evaluation by both 
internal managers and external constituents” (1991:59), thereby reducing the potential for 
public or politically-motivated scrutiny that could force change in procedure – a pattern that 
could easily be applied to the foundations of both the phone hacking scandal and the BBC’s 
Charter review debates. 
For all their differences in provenance, the various models of new institutionalism 
resemble accounts of democratic elitism; dominant groups maintain their controlling status 
through managed marginal shifts in the accepted behaviours and values that guide decision-
making. Though written to offer explanatory frameworks for studying contemporary policy 
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processes—increasingly characterised by bureaucratic, technocratic and formally networked 
modes of decision-making—new institutionalism nonetheless espouses a normative conception 
of policy as an elite matter, led by elite actors and conducted through practices defined in elite 
terms. When significant exogenous changes impact on a policy system, the dominant figures 
are simply shuffled around in order to prevent a genuine re-evaluation of institutionalised 
norms. Despite colourful descriptions of how institutional patterns develop and of how change 
comes to occur within an established network of institutionalised organisations, institutional 
theorists appear reluctant to designate who, if anyone at all, has control over the 
institutionalisation of rules and behaviours in the first place. 
POLICYMAKING AS ‘DISCURSIVE POLITICS’ 
The accounts detailed in this chapter so far can be viewed as compound evolutions in 
an empirical conception of the policy process. But one significant development offered by new 
institutionalist perspectives is the notion that institutional cultures not only preclude particular 
political behaviours, but also exclude groups that advocate interests in opposition to the settled 
values and norms of a policy network. Compared to the positivist presumptions of network 
theory, this evolution is useful because it highlights the pervasive role of political ideas and 
ideology in justifying institutional policymaking practices and drawing the boundaries of 
debate. 
This is a necessary distinction to avoid naturalising the terms and the symbolic terrain 
on which institutional battles take place, or to avoid treating an institutional perspective as 
justification for apolitical policy analysis. Frank Fischer, in this same vein, argues that a wholly 
empirical approach to policy analysis diminishes ideas and political values—arguably the 
fundamental components of policy decisions—to little more than impassive properties or 
resources to be bartered. Fischer contends that “ideas and discourses can have a force of their 
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own independently of particular actors” (2003:vii), and this forms the basis for a theory of 
‘discursive politics’. 
Policymaking is a constant discursive struggle over the definitions of problems, the 
boundaries of categories used to describe them, the criteria for their classification and 
assessment, and the meanings and ideals that guide particular actions. (2003:60) 
For Fischer, policy issues should not be treated as natural phenomena to be itemised by 
objective observation or dealt with through scientific methods. They arise from the interactions 
between the competing discourses circulating in society and the political, social and cultural 
developments in everyday life. Policy processes are “infused with sticky problems of politics 
and social values” that cannot be easily reduced by positivist assessment, and it is the struggle 
to “create and control systems of shared social meanings” that determines how policy processes 
play out (Fischer, 2003:11-13). 
Fischer is especially critical of models of policy analysis which elevate the rational 
choice of decision-makers—guided by information exchange and occupational ‘expertise’—as 
the principal locus of policymaking. Positivist policymaking models are themselves infused 
with the dominant contemporary narratives of ‘evidence-based’ policymaking, in which 
supposedly noisy and messy public contributions to policy formation are subordinated to the 
clear and crisp solutions provided by impartial technical assessments. Fischer argues that this 
narrative “largely serves as an ideology that masks elite political and bureaucratic interests” by 
reconstituting policy as an apolitical, empirical practice, reducing the potential for politically-
motivated elected representatives (and thus, the wider public) to influence policymaking 
processes (2003:14). 
A discourse perspective sees the policy process as “literally ‘constructed’ through the 
language(s) in which it is described” (Fischer, 2003:43). For Fischer, policy issues are 
“interpretively fitted” into discursive accounts that attract attention or support for the issue and 
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its resolution (2003:58). Media organisations—and their role in constructing, legitimising and 
circulating ideas and values of social or political life—are clearly central within discursive 
policymaking, where interpretation and expression are paramount. Similar to new 
institutionalism, discursive politics suggests that policy actors are mobilised into political 
action by the language and social meanings that they share with others, which in turn create 
common objectives to implement through policy. Competition between groups in the policy 
process is conducted not just through the bartering of interests, but also through deploying 
competing narrative accounts which give meaning to these interests and define them in ways 
that appeal to the political and bureaucratic needs of policymakers. 
The measures of authority and legitimacy that define different policy actors’ place and 
influence in a policy debate are reproduced by these same discursive contests. Decision-makers 
and other ruling or elite policy groups (not least elite media) are closely involved in advancing 
the “particular conceptions of reality” that justify and cement their position in policy processes 
and “cover up contradictions and paradoxes” (2003:86) in those contexts. Fisher’s theory on 
policy change is similar, in this respect, to the accounts offered by the ‘new institutionalist’ 
models described above. Change arises from the failure of dominant ‘discourse coalitions’ to 
maintain “successful discursive reproduction” against opposing or insurgent narratives 
(Fischer, 2003:108). Furthermore, analysis of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the policy process is, in 
discourse theory, not concerned merely with an actuarial summary of whose policy objectives 
were or were not implemented by legislation or government action. For Fischer, “the 
conventional or accepted stories that dominate a policy controversy” are a greater indicator of 
success, as these stories will define the cognitive and linguistic frames that shape how changes 
in law or regulation are made (2003:173). 
From this Fischer encourages analysis of policy process ‘metanarratives’, which seek 
to explain the interaction between competing discourses by their differences and similarities. 
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By identifying “the existence of other narratives related to the issue … that do not conform to 
or run counter to the controversy’s dominant policy narratives” (Fischer, 2003:173), one may 
be able to better account for the different roles and tactics that opposing policy actors assume 
and how they engage, successfully or not, in the policy process. These activities should not be 
seen as impotent or recalcitrant as network theorists like Grant (1995) suggest. ‘Outsider’ 
behaviour is instead recognised as the result of contrasting narrative and cognitive frames 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, and can be just as powerful as the dominant formal policy 
practices or even (crucially) represent a fundamental challenge to otherwise normative policy 
values. The analytical role of the ‘metanarrative’ is thus to thread the wider interplay of 
narratives into a full account of policy as a product of competition between discourses in 
society. 
POLICYMAKING AND POWER 
The theories explored in this chapter do not by any measure present a comprehensive 
account of all aspects or ideas of policymaking, but they do each offer unique analytical 
perspectives which, taken together, offer a rich multi-faceted approach for studying the many 
complex processes and interactions that comprise the media policymaking process. These 
theories also share the recognition that analysis of policymaking as a social phenomenon is 
“essentially the study of the exercise of power in the making of policy” (Hill and Varone, 
2017:24). Though the attention paid to power varies across theories of policymaking (itself 
indicative of their contrasting epistemologies), study of the policy process is grounded in a 
focus on how individuals or groups can “exercise causal powers that produce specific effects 
in the world” (Scott, 2001:1). There are equally various theories of how power exists in social 
relations, how it is created, held and accrued, and more fundamentally what ‘power’ is. 
Policymaking as explored in this chapter is conceived as both a site in which power relations 
are made manifest and as a mechanism for creating, reinforcing or challenging the conditions 
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of power constituted by policy actions. Exploring the principal theories of power that describe 
these relations and conditions is therefore vital in accentuating the wider social implications of 




3. CONCEPTUALISING POWER 
Much commentary on politics, policy and social affairs is peppered with instinctive 
references to power—power over someone or power to do something; gaining or losing power; 
being more or less powerful than others; having power, exercising it, wielding it and so on—
without any discernible thread linking these colloquial distinctions. In the policymaking 
context, trying to isolate a single all-encompassing definition for how policy actors influence 
decision-making reveals just how loose a concept power really is. An extensive sociological 
tradition of theorising power offers numerous explanations for how power functions in social 
relations, and how these dynamics enable or prohibit particular courses of action. 
Unfortunately, few of the salient accounts agree on the fundamental nature of power, and fewer 
still share a classification or taxonomy for describing and delineating power’s different ‘forms’. 
As critiques of, responses to, or advances on one another, prominent strands of theory do 
however share a common interest in illuminating, as sociologist John Scott has put it, how 
power enables actors “to affect the conduct of other participants in social relations that connect 
them together” (2001:1). 
This chapter does not try to create bridges between opposing accounts where none exist, 
but instead highlights the analytical similarities and crucial differences between some of the 
most influential sociological works on power. These theories are divided into two predominant 
views, which Scott also refers to as the two ‘streams’ through which power functions; a 
‘mainstream’ that treats power as a behavioural force, and a ‘second stream’ that sees power 
as a structural force (2001). Hindess has similarly conceptualised the myriad debates on power 
as occurring in two distinct camps, one concerning “the simple capacity to act” (1996:2) and a 




Rather than treat such streams as alternative or even opposing theoretical foundations, 
this chapter presents an integrated framework that sees the various conceptions of both 
behavioural and structural forms of power as distinct, compounding, interacting and mutually 
dependent forces. This perspective is arguably essential for analysing the dynamics of power 
in the policymaking process, for which employing only a single or unitary view of power would 
elide or oversimplify the numerous overlapping social, political and cultural factors at play. As 
such this chapter begins with an overview of the two ‘streams’ of power and their particular 
manifestations, together with a prospective model for how these forms may be understood as 
collective parts in a more holistic evaluation of power. Following this the chapter explores 
some of the defining literature on power. 
In addition to drawing out the significant evolutions in thought and exploring how they 
may be applied to a study of the policymaking process, this chapter also links these theories to 
different ideas of media power as a distinct phenomenon. Media actors, media institutions and 
media processes, in many guises and roles both in and around decision-making, are clearly 
closely involved in and integral parts of political and social interactions. ‘The power of the 
media’—as an economic, political and symbolic site of social interaction—is therefore not only 
analogous to more general sociological definitions of power, but intimately tied up with the 
other essential forces and forms of power that shape people’s daily lives. Just as the study of 
policymaking processes is a study of power, a study of media policymaking is fundamentally 
concerned with how competing actors and groups (including media institutions themselves) 
influence the decisions that structure and distribute media power in democratic society. Finding 
ways to identify and measure this influence, and thus to uncover the core dynamics that define 
the media policymaking process, is this chapter’s primary goal. 
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STREAMS, CANALS AND FLOWS: A COMBINED MODEL OF ‘DOMINATION’ 
Mainstream research, according to Scott, defines power as ‘coercive influence’ or one 
actor influencing the behaviour of another by means of “punitive or remunerative sanctions that 
… work directly on the interests of the subaltern” (Scott, 2001:13). The distribution of 
mainstream power is linked closely to the distribution of material and political resources, as it 
is these resources that are used to deploy such sanctions. A mainstream analysis of decision-
making depends on the assumption of actors’ informed calculation of the options available to 
them and their rational responses to others’ actions. 
Second stream research, by contrast, identifies power as ‘persuasive influence’ that 
“operates through the offering and acceptance of reasons for acting in one way or another” 
(Scott, 2001:13). This power is not exercised directly but is formed in the shared meanings that 
structure a society and the organisations within it. Persuasive influence is consequently “the 
collective property of whole systems of cooperating actors” (Scott, 2001:9), enabling that 
system to normalise preferred courses of action or endow specific actors with the authority to 
act on behalf of the whole. Second stream theories analyse the flow of power in these systems 
by identifying the values that legitimise these shared symbols and commitments, and studying 
how such values are structured into patterns of social activity. 
The distinction between mainstream and second stream demonstrates the need to view 
power from conflicting perspectives and recognise that power can be exercised in multiple 
forms simultaneously. To enable this, Scott further divides the two streams into four elementary 
forms of power—force, manipulation, signification and legitimation—which, when actualised, 
are “structured into the stable and enduring social relations that make up large-scale social 
structures” (Scott, 2001:16). Together these produce what Scott terms domination, the basis 
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for organised leadership in mass societies by means of structuring of elementary forms of 
power into enduring or “canalised” patterns of action (Scott, 2001:16). 
Many theories of power that fit within these categories dispute the relevance or validity 
of the opposite ‘stream’, and the sorts of power relations they describe often suggest an 
intractable division between empirical observation and structuralist explanation. What is 
unique about Scott’s framework of domination, however, is it proposes that 
the power relations of any actual society are organised through its institutional 
structures into a variety of concrete combinations of power that combine these types in 
complex ways. (2001:23-4) 
From this we can envisage a tandem role played by both behavioural and structural influence 
in creating lasting systems of domination in society. Neither stream operates in isolation from 
the other, and the predominance of one form of power over others is only indicative of the 
specific combination operating in those social conditions. This recognition is especially 
pertinent to the study of policymaking, where formal political processes, informal public 
deliberations, institutional practices and cultural discourses all produce a number of power 
dynamics that change between sector, topic, time and place. Scott’s two-stream framework and 
the composite concept of ‘domination’ allow for a much broader evaluation and interpretation 
of power in policy processes, without either committing to the universalist assumptions of 
single models of power or glossing over the rich complexity inherent to the role of power in 
policymaking. 
With this in mind, Figure 1 offers an illustrative model of how the different conceptions 
of power presented in this chapter might fit within a combined account of domination. The 
position and proximity of these theories in the figure is not just a reflection of the 
epistemological similarities or divisions across the literature on power. This framework also 
infers lateral relationships between these ideas of power, and contends that mainstream and 
 
51 
second stream power should be understood as both dependent on and contributing to the effects 
of one another. Types of behavioural influence that compel someone to change their actions or 
limit their decisions rely on political, legal or cultural systems that give meaning and legitimacy 
to these attempts at coercion, but at the same time this exercise of behavioural power 
reproduces and reinforces its structural foundations. 
This same relationship can also be applied to distinct expressions of media power, 
which are arranged in Figure 1 to correspond with the elementary form of power they most 
closely resemble. Media texts and discourses can affect behaviour through encouraging or 
discouraging a course of action, but this persuasive influence is ultimately contingent on a 
deeper structural frame that establishes media and its productive institutions as essential 
mechanisms of political communication and social interaction. The particular effects of 
different forms of social, political and media power are all vital to the debates and interactions 
that constitute the policymaking process, constraining actors’ decisions and forming the ideas 
and values that drive policy change. Before analysing the specific patterns of domination that 
Figure 1. A combined model of domination 
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defined the post-Leveson and BBC Charter debates, this chapter unpicks some of the definitive 
mainstream and second stream theories of power, examines their arguments and 
methodologies, and interrogates the fundamental dynamics that influence how people engage 
in political and democratic processes. 
BEHAVIOURAL POWER: DOMINATION THROUGH CONSTRAINT 
To take a rudimentary stepping-off point, Bertrand Russell defined power as “the 
production of intended effects” (2004:23), the ability of one actor to influence another through 
inducement of reward and punishment. Power of this sort is quantifiable; someone who is more 
successful at influencing than another can be said to be more powerful than them. 
Consequently, one can take Russell’s suggestion that a person who regularly produces their 
intended effects not only possesses the means to continue that relationship but is also inclined 
to do so. C.W. Mills’ own idea of a ‘power elite’ (explored in the previous chapter) rests much 
of its analytical weight on identifying these recurring means of influencing others. Mills was 
primarily concerned with the centralisation of power in political and economic institutions, and 
how this had alienated the American public from involvement in essential democratic processes 
(1970:31). Expanding on Russell, power in this sense is not the mere exercise of constraint but 
the possession of material or social resources to maintain that constraint indefinitely and against 
opposition. For Mills the American power elite had not “emerged as the realization of a plot” 
(1970:34). Rather, the centralisation of legislative and administrative control had created this 
elite whose power “exceeds that of any small group of men in history [and created] a new kind 
of social structure, which embodies elements and tendencies of all modern society” (1970:41). 
Both Russel’s and Mills’ concepts of power identify the control of resources as a 
necessary (though not the only) means of exercising domination by constraint. This in turn 
provides a straightforward empirical method for locating powerful actors in social relations by 
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their wealth, their rank in political or social institutions, or other advantageous characteristics. 
Max Weber termed this “domination by virtue of a constellation of interests,” in which 
influence is 
derived exclusively from the possession of goods or marketable skills guaranteed in 
some way and acting upon the conduct of those dominated, who remain, however, 
formally free and motivated simply by the pursuit of their own interests. (1986:30, my 
emphasis) 
That latter clause reflects a pertinent dividing line within mainstream accounts of power 
concerning the nature of actors’ interests. Whereas Russell’s and Mills’ descriptions of 
behavioural power involve the domination by principals over seemingly passive or impotent 
subalterns, Weber brings attention to the role of a subaltern’s own interests in shaping power 
relations. The tension between actors’ rival interests and the competing goals they seek 
invariably lead to situations where individuals “pursue their own interests at the expense of 
those of others” (Scott, 2001:7). They achieve this not through violence or subjugation (i.e. 
Scott’s elementary concept of ‘force’), but by strategically changing “the bases on which a 
subaltern calculates among action alternatives” (Scott, 2001:14) in order that they act in a way 
that benefits the interests of the coercer (i.e. Scott’s notion of ‘manipulation’). 
Control of behaviour 
Keeping in mind the study of public policymaking, domination by constraint occurs not 
only through one actor manipulating another but also through the wider restrictions on legal, 
political, economic or social action that public policies are intended to enforce. This is a crucial 
distinction when analysing the flows of power in democratic institutions, and even more so 
when studying decision-making in policy processes. In both cases, the intention of the principal 
actor is to affect the behaviour of others so that this change acts back upon them as a benefit 
which “offers itself to the dominator as the product of his will” (Simmel, 1950:181). 
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Pluralists like Dahl sought to clarify what they saw as sloppy, inconsistent descriptions 
of ‘power’ by those such as C.W. Mills, and in a 1957 essay The Concept of Power (building 
on his 1961 observations in New Haven) he sought to cement a scientific model to measure 
power by empirical means. Dahl’s conceptual starting point is that 
A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do. (1957:202-3) 
Dahl’s concern with actions that someone would not otherwise do highlights his 
epistemological grounding in the rational actions and reactions of individuals. This concise 
definition of power is the central contention: B, as a rational actor, would have proceeded to 
act in pursuit of their interests—and against the interests of A—were it not for A’s intervention, 
which succeeds in getting B to act in a way that is advantageous to A. Dahl argues in both The 
Concept of Power and Who Governs? that there cannot be a power relation without an overt 
conflict between A’s and B’s interests (1957:205, 2005:189). 
Dahl provides a means for quantifying an individual actor’s power (A’s ability to get B 
to act in a particular way) in terms of probability. A’s specific power is the probability that B 
acts in a way intended by A as a result of A’s action.3 Adding in the necessity for an overt 
conflict of interests, this probability of success by A is compared to the likelihood that B would 
have performed the same action without A’s intervention. If “A unfailingly gets B to do 
something B would never do otherwise”, then A has total positive power over B, but only in 
regards to B performing the intended action and the particular means of power that A uses to 
achieve this (Dahl, 1957:205). Embedded in this calculation is the significance of A’s intent: 
A making B do x against their will and A deterring B from doing a different action y are merely 
 
3 Dahl offers the tellingly concise formula P1 = (a, x | A, w), where P1 is the likelihood that one actor, A, doing a 
particular action, w, causes another actor a to do x (1957:204). 
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semantic differences unless one assigns “a positive or negative direction to the responses of 
the respondent” (Dahl, 1957:105). 
Dahl’s claims to empirical rigour fall short in this aspect. The subjective interpretations 
of a principal’s intent, and the direction of their attempts at power over a subaltern, do not yield 
easily to scientific analysis of this sort when one recognises that Dahl’s A-over-B relationship 
rarely occurs in a political vacuum. One principal may not be the only actor attempting to 
influence a particular subject (or multiple subjects) and may themselves be the subject of a 
separate but determinative power relationship. One cannot expect to assess the magnitude of 
numerous, intersecting influences that constrain someone’s behaviour without first assessing 
each interaction independently of the observable results of this many-to-one power 
relationship. 
Such controlled environments are not readily available to the study of power in the 
messy field of policy processes. The uniqueness of every exercise of power makes it effectively 
impossible and indeed analytically undesirable to conceive that, for example, if A1 and A2 can 
each make B twice as likely to do x (to borrow Dahl’s algebraic explanations), then they would 
together make B four times as likely to do the same x, or x again, or another action y, and so 
on. Power, as Dahl himself concedes (2005:227-8), is non-cumulative, yet his method for 
comparing power relations relies on subjective assumptions, made by the observer, of the 
relative equivalence of the relationships between different actors. 
Though The Concept of Power includes a detailed example of ranking the influence of 
individual Congressional actors over separate policy fields, Dahl’s 1986 essay Power as the 
Control of Behaviour expanded on his analysis of power relationships in decision-making 
processes. Recognising that political power and authority are often invested in specific actors 
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and institutions with defined roles in policymaking, Dahl considers how one actor can affect 
the behaviour of another without the former intentionally acting on the latter: 
[A] might be said to have power when, though he does not manifest an intention, [B] 
imputes an intention to him and shapes his behaviour to meet the imputed intention. 
(1986:52) 
B anticipates A’s reaction because of A’s behaviour, such that A leads to or causes B’s response 
without necessarily willing it. Though this leans close to the dispositional character of power 
that typifies second stream theories, Dahl nonetheless insists on a positivist, behavioural 
conceptualisation of these anticipated reactions. In one sense this makes ‘control of behaviour’ 
a valuable standard foundation for analysing power in single instances, but Dahl’s pluralist 
model does not lend itself to an historical or systemic analysis of power distributed across 
society. 
Many early models of media’s behavioural effects share Dahl’s ‘one-dimensional’ view 
of power (Lukes, 2005), holding that media can influence the behaviour of audiences through 
control over the creation and content of media texts. This ‘hypodermic needle’ or ‘magic bullet’ 
theory of media effects—in which the information and ideas that audiences consume through 
media texts have a direct causal impact on their actions (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1989; 
Lasswell, 1927)—has been displaced by far more nuanced explanations. Active audience or 
reception theories4 share with broader pluralist theories an insistence that “the autonomous 
power to make sense of society in diverse ways [is] widely diffused in society. There are no 
dominant discourses, merely a semiotic democracy of pluralist voices” (Curran, 2002:120). 
 
4 These terms are used here only as shorthand for a deep tradition in media sociology (see Curran, 2002:115-6 and 
Williams, 2003:190-203) of foregrounding the ability of media audiences to approach and interpret texts 
independent of a producer’s intended message. 
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Such accounts do not, however, discount media as inert or impartial arenas. Schudson, 
writing specifically about the enabling civic role of news media, argues that “the job of the 
press is to help produce a more informed electorate” (2002:204). Freedman categorises these 
pluralist ideals as a ‘consensus’ paradigm, a normative view of media power predicated on a 
fundamental expectation of media freedom which “requires adequate competition between … 
different outlets and thus the free interchange of all players in an open market” (2014:18). This 
paradigm underlies many optimistic accounts of media history and the influence of print and 
broadcast media in the democratisation of modern societies (Curran, 2002:32), and is useful as 
a perspective on the role and power of the media in the policymaking process. The ideal policy 
function of media outlets is to facilitate debate, deliberation and argument between competing 
policy actors, informing their rational evaluation of decisions and ultimately serving as the 
arterial democratic link between the public and elected policymakers. The power of media in 
this sense is in constructing the pluralist foundations on which positivist behavioural forms of 
power depend, enabling groups to realise their interests through interaction with and 
representation in media. 
Nondecisions and media agenda-setting 
However, assumptions of the rational and inevitable emergence of important policy 
issues (and the media’s impartial role in reflecting public salience) overlook how conflicts of 
interest are actually defined. In their 1962 work The Two Faces of Power, Bachrach and Baratz 
challenged Dahl’s sole attention to “key as opposed to routine political decisions”, describing 
it as an insufficient means for analysing power because of a second ‘face’ of power that 
determines which issues are (and crucially are not) decided upon. 
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Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect 
B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing 
social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political 
process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous 
to A. (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962:948) 
They argue that using overt conflict as the basis for identifying power relations, as Dahl does, 
ignores the extent to which conflict can be made covert through the manipulation of political 
and social processes. Power of this sort is not control of behaviour but the ‘mobilisation of 
bias’ (Schattschneider, 1960), whereby powerful actors ensure unfavourable decisions are kept 
out of public consideration and remain dormant as ‘nondecisions’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 
1963). 
For Bachrach and Baratz, the topics or conflicts on which policy decisions are made do 
not arise freely from public consensus, nor are they discovered by political leaders as objective 
concerns to barter and fight over for electoral support. A distinction between key and routine 
decisions cannot be made solely on the magnitude of contestation between parties over those 
decisions, as to do this is to “accept as issues what are reputed to be issues” and take for granted 
a community’s values and practices in determining the emergence of conflict (1962:949). This 
recognition also calls attention to the influence of actors who are not official decision-makers 
but “may have been directly instrumental in preventing potentially dangerous issues from being 
raised” (1962:952). Bachrach and Baratz instead propose evaluating power in decision-making 
by first assessing the dominant political practices, cultural values and institutional norms that 
surround and shape these processes. Following Schattschneider’s assertion that “all forms of 
political organization have a bias in favour of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of 
others” (1960:71), an analysis of nondecision-making then involves examining how “status 
quo oriented persons and groups” manipulate the dominant community values to reveal those 
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processes that “tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to ‘safe’ issues” (Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1962:952). 
In both overt decision-making processes and nondecision-making, a principal’s 
assumed character or prestige, or even the set of taken-for-granted community values, can 
“effectively prevent grievances from developing into full-fledged issues which call for 
decisions” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963:641). This provides a crucial consideration of 
discursive and social context in the formation of power relations (which is the central focus of 
many second stream theories), but Bachrach and Baratz stop short of conceding that the 
discursive function of ideas can be as influential as the observable exercise of behavioural 
power by actors in actual decision-making processes. Studying the second ‘face’ of power 
improves on Dahl’s method by offering a means to identify the contextual dynamics of 
nondecision-making, but is nonetheless more akin to an analytical extension of his first ‘face’ 
of power than a complete critique of its behaviouralist foundation. 
In defining different forms of media power, nondecision-making not only offers a 
distinct theoretical model but is also poses a lively and serious challenge to normative 
democratic descriptions of media’s political functions. Whereas pluralist accounts see media 
as merely one set of actors among many (Blockland, 2011:171) or as a neutral site for 
deliberation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004:22), theories of media control adopt a greater critical 
perspective on media’s role in shaping public policy debates. Freedman contrasts the consensus 
paradigm, and its emphasis on audiences as the foundation of media power, with a ‘control’ 
paradigm that centres the power of media to “confine public discussion to a narrow and 
artificially maintained consensus” (Freedman, 2014:22). Far from being open sites for building 
public consensus, media are seen as instruments of social and economic domination by 
powerful groups. This influence is exercised principally through the processes of ‘agenda-
setting’, by which certain issues gain or lose attention and importance in public and political 
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debate. Hill argues that agenda-setting “is in many respects an ideological process, translating 
an issue into a policy proposal” (1997:115), and as McChesney notes media institutions are “in 
an ideal position to control the public perception, or lack thereof, of any possible debate 
regarding the control and structure of the media” (2008:350). 
Media agenda-setting moves the analytical spotlight away from texts or audiences and 
towards a study of the political economy of the media and the structural components that 
govern how media operate (Freedman, 2014:24): the organisation of labour and capital that 
influence how (and what sorts of) media texts are produced (Couldry, 2000; Hesmondhalgh, 
2006:224); the personal and professional proximity of media, state and corporate actors (Davis, 
2002 and 2003; Herman and Chomsky, 1988); and the fundamental commercial and corporate 
nature of media businesses which mobilise cultural capital to the pursuit of economic capital 
(McChesney, 2000). Policymakers and interest groups alike recognise media as pivotal because 
media outlets act as “the funnel regulating the flow of communications” (Spitzer, 1993:9) 
between these groups and the wider public. Attempts to ‘use’ media to publicise a group’s aims 
and goals are fundamentally contingent on finite and unequal degrees of ‘access’ to media 
production (Davis, 2007b:55), but crucially media organisations themselves “have their own 
economic and ideological interests” that they may seek to promote through their ownership and 
control of media outlets (Freedman, 2008:87). 
The ability of policy actors to engage with media and successfully influence its 
reporting is closely linked with media’s role as ‘gatekeepers’ and arbiters of what is or is not 
perceived as an important or salient issue. Material, political and social inequalities mean that 
access to media is readily available to elite groups like government insiders, corporate leaders 
and prominent cultural figures but typically out of reach of the general public. Contests over 
media access are not open as pluralists would argue but are instead centred around inter-elite 
conflict. As Davis posits, “elites are simultaneously the main sources, main targets and some 
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of the most influenced recipients of news” (2007b:60). The reliance of elites on media for 
influencing public opinion (Davis, 2007b:55), combined with the coterminous reliance of 
media on elites as sources of information, has resulted in “a form of corporate-inspired 
‘dominant ideology’ exported through the media to the mass of consumer citizens” (Davis, 
2002:178). 
Freedman notes that the increasing concentration of media ownership into fewer and 
fewer corporate organisations grants these businesses a unique status as both economic and 
cultural elites, with power over immense financial and symbolic capital (2008:106). This 
position causes the broader power elite to direct its attentions and appeals for favour at powerful 
media groups who, in turn, expect advantageous business deals or a favourable change in 
government policy (Freedman, 2014:49-50). The media power of agenda-setting is thus the 
clearest demonstration of nondecision-making, and it entails severe implications for the 
balance and accountability of notionally democratic media policymaking processes. The 
question is whether media institutions facilitate a genuine public discussion of the widest range 
of media policy issues and concerns, or whether media actors limit the scope of their reporting 
and discussion to only those comparatively innocuous issues that culminate in political 
decisions which benefit the partial private aims of elite media groups. 
Overt, covert or latent conflict? 
Nondecision-making (and the equivalent media power of agenda-setting) fit into Scott’s 
model of domination as a form of constraint that affects the ability of subalterns to actualise 
their grievances in overt political struggle. Yet despite this crucial addition to the behavioural 
notions of power, Bachrach and Baratz ultimately retreat to a method that “in the manner of 
the pluralists [analyses] participation in decision-making in concrete issues” that arise from 
subjective conflict (1962:952). Steven Lukes is particularly critical of this aspect of the second 
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‘face’ of power and offers in his seminal 1972 work Power: A Radical View5 a third face which 
proposes that power operates not only in the manipulation of overt and covert conflicts of 
interest but crucially in preventing “conflict from arising in the first place” (2005:27). 
Before exploring Lukes’ contribution to theories on power, it is worth briefly detailing 
the epistemological turn fundamental to his critique of one- and two-dimensional power. Dahl’s 
method rests on an overt conflict of interests between A and B and Bachrach and Baratz—
despite recognition that conflict can be kept from actualising in decisions—similarly claim that 
“if there is no conflict, overt or covert, the presumption must be that there is consensus on the 
prevailing allocation of values” (1970:6). Lukes challenges this positivist insistence that 
conflict can only be said to occur between conscious preferences, and argues instead that 
“people might actually be mistaken about, or unaware of, their own interests” (2005:190). 
This concern with how individuals come to form or acquire their values and beliefs is 
a central epistemological aspect of ‘second stream’ theories of power. The methodological 
tension, then, is between observing a subaltern’s subjective interests (those that are declared or 
can be inferred from B’s behaviour) and identifying their ‘real’ interests. As we will come to 
see in the following section, Marxist theories on hegemony and the Foucauldian account of 
‘regimes of truth’ fiercely contend that most actors are unaware of what is really of benefit to 
them, and are subject to (in the former) or constituted by (according to the latter) structures that 
normalise objectively harmful or limiting interests. Lukes does not lay claim to a “privileged 
access to truths presumed unavailable to others”, but nonetheless rejects the positivist 
insistence on tangible moments of decision-making as the only locus of power (2005:145). His 
conception of power, operating in ways that produce latent conflict, posits “a contradiction 
 
5 Cited here from the 2005 second edition. 
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between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude” 
(2005:28). 
STRUCTURAL POWER: DOMINATION THROUGH DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
A common contention of second stream theories is that behavioural power is 
subordinate to or subsumed by types of structural power. Proponents of the second stream do 
not view constraint on behaviour as power per se, but as a different aspect of broader political 
relations (Habermas, 1977:76) or more critically as a form of reductive violence arising from 
a failure of consensual power structures (Arendt, 1970). Scott thus proposes that what links the 
epistemological tendencies of second stream theories is their characterisation of power as 
“diffused throughout a society”, rather than as a capacity confined to individuals and 
organisations which they exercise or hold over others (2001:9). Power in this sense is 
facilitative and productive, as it creates enduring social structures that determine how people 
relate to and interact with one another. This description of power as social production stands 
in stark contrast to the negative exercise of power inferred from Russell’s “production of 
intended effects” (2004:23). Whereas first stream accounts see power as a means to an end, a 
second stream view of power raises the “communal mechanisms that result from the cultural, 
ideological, or discursive formations through which consensus is constituted” (Scott, 2001:9, 
my emphasis). 
In Scott’s description of domination these take two forms; signification and 
legitimation. The former relates to a commitment to or normalising of cognitive symbols—
“ideas and representations that lead people to define situations in certain ways”—while the 
latter indicates power that comes about through groups ascribing “a normative character to the 
views of their principals” (Scott, 2001:15). Though these forms do not appear so explicitly in 
the wider theoretical tradition of structural power, they nonetheless provide useful labels for 
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comparing the conceptualisations posited in various second stream accounts. The locus of 
power here is not individual behaviour or the use of resources to constrain others’ actions, but 
the ordering of social, cultural and political values into systems that accord individuals and 
ideas with their subject-positions in relation to one another. Rather than severing an analysis 
of the constraint of behavioural power from the power of discourses and ideas, Scott argues 
that forms of structural power “justify and mask the realities of coercion and inducement” 
(2001:21). Presented below is a selection of various theories of structural power. These are not 
intended to present a total account of all structuralist philosophies or to suggest one is 
analytically superior to others. As will be argued, these models offer further justification for 
connecting mainstream and second stream power while also illustrating the epistemological 
breadth across theories of the power of discourse. 
The third face of power 
Lukes’ critique of the two faces of behavioural power concerns how dominant ideas 
and values shape decision-making. Whereas the preceding approaches posit that power is only 
exercised in a conflict of interests, Lukes challenges the rationalist basis on which these 
circumstances are determined. Conflicts and grievances, he argues, are the conscious result of 
individuals comparing their subjective interests with the political knowledge available to them, 
to create “an undirected complaint arising out of everyday experience” (2005:28). Expanding 
Bachrach and Baratz’s ‘mobilisation of bias’ beyond its limited conceptual boundaries, Lukes 
asks 
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances in such a way that they accept their role in 
the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, 
or because they see it as natural or unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely 
ordained and beneficial? (2005:28) 
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In this ‘three-dimensional’ view of power, potential issues are not only kept out of decision-
making processes but are also prevented from being recognised as realistic conflicts in the first 
place. “Through the operation of social forces and institutional practices,” conflict is averted 
such that those who stand to gain from its recognition remain unaware of this potential while 
those who stand to lose continue to benefit from the existing state of affairs (2005:28). Scott 
helpfully summarises Lukes’ addition to the debate on individuals’ interests: “if they are 
unaware of their real interests, it is not even necessary for a principal to exclude them from 
decision-making” (2001:60). 
Lukes’ radical view of power is an eloquent description of the influence of discursive 
formation on social interactions, as well as a valuable justification for linking together 
behavioural and structural concepts of power. It accepts the basic premise that the common 
core of all power is “A in some way affects B” (Lukes, 2005:30), but challenges the analytical 
focus of ‘mainstream’ accounts on interests as objective empirical criteria. People’s expressed 
preferences may be a product of social arrangements that subdue their real interests, such that 
a positivist assessment of these preferences “inevitably takes over the bias of the political 
system under observation” (Lukes, 2005:58). Lukes concedes there are several difficulties in 
identifying power of this sort, the most pressing being the challenge that if causal values and 
ideas are embodied in social institutions then “how and where is the line to be drawn between 
structural determination … and an exercise of power?” (Lukes, 2005:52-54). Without 
acknowledging the dialectic relationship between structure and agency (as in Figure 1.) we are 
left with a sterile concept of behavioural power that takes no account of social context, or 
reduce an explanation of decision-making to only totalising structural powers that marginalise 
and diminish the role of the individual. 
Lukes is insistent on combating critics’ accusations that his third face of power 
describes a condescending “conception of the social subject as an ideological dupe” (Hay 
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quoted in Lukes, 2005:149). In a passage that would not go amiss as a retort to the pessimism 
of C.W. Mills’ introduction in The Sociological Imagination (2000:3-5), Lukes asserts that 
Our own power will in part depend on harnessing and evading or diminishing the 
powers of others. We carry around in our heads maps of such agents’ power—of their 
dispositional abilities to affect our interests—usually as tactic knowledge, which allows 
us some measure of prediction and control. (2005:65) 
Here then is a conceptualisation of power that is both constraining and structuring while still 
allowing for the freedom and reason of the individual. Individuals may of course “accept their 
role in the existing order of things” (Lukes, 2005:28) but do not do so without any personal 
introspection or unqualified compliance. Recognising that the paths to success in these ‘maps’ 
are normalised and highly ordered, while at the same time being opposed and resisted by 
individuals who are bound by the same rules, is vital for analysis of decision-making processes. 
Class power and media contradiction 
In all forms of organisation, certain powers of command are “attached to particular 
social positions” and buttressed by the corresponding legal devices or state apparatuses that 
produce that organisation (Scott, 2001:31). How these positional powers take shape and 
structure social relationships is an important consideration of policy analysis. Policies are 
shaped and implemented by legislative and government actors, who derive their authority from 
legitimised sovereign bodies—in particular parliaments, ministries and courts—and these 
actors are in turn the targets of appeals for bargaining by others wishing to influence 
policymaking processes. The extent to which these state actors can and actually do integrate 
this bargaining in exercising their specific legal or political authority is therefore a significant 
factor in what the policy decisions they make. It is not a radical claim to suggest that the rights 
of authority accorded to these actors by formal state and democratic structures are in essence 
legitimised by social and cultural norms. Elite figures are not integrated and recruited into the 
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senior legislative, judicial or executive roles of modern states through natural or unconscious 
processes. Rather, the authority of elite decision-makers is considered legitimate “because it is 
accepted as being right, correct, justified or valid in some way” by the public at large (Scott, 
2001:20). 
With this constructivist notion of ‘authority’ in mind, Marxist theories in the mid-to-
late 20th century sought to explain how capitalist states, seemingly unthreatened by class 
antagonism or world-historical revolutions, nonetheless commanded power over masses who 
“[consented] to forms of leadership that may work against their interests” (Scott, 2001:90). 
Borrowing from Gramsci’s concept of class hegemony, Nicos Poulantzas defined power as 
“the capacity of a social class to realise specific objective interests” (1973:106). In this view, 
power is a structural phenomenon that takes shape through the organisation of classes. The 
interests of a class are defined in opposition to the interests of others, and “the degree of 
effective power of a class depends directly on the degree of power of the other classes” 
(1973:108). For Poulantzas this power could only be realised through the state, which he 
conceived as the central arena of class struggle. The state, far from being the singular force of 
power, is itself subject to the control exerted on it by the dominant class and thus benefits the 
interests of that class through its economic, legal and political functions. Poulantzas’s approach 
is an exclusively structural one, in which “one need not refer to the motivations of [actors’] 
conduct, but only to their place in production and their relation to the ownership of the means 
of production” (1969:72). 
Ralph Miliband disputed this conception of classes as objective structures and of elite 
actors as “the merest functionaries and executants of policies imposed upon them by ‘the 
system’” (1970:57). In The State In Capitalist Society, Miliband argued that the state was only 
one of many distinct sites of class conflict in capitalist society, and that there is also a political 
system made up of many institutions—the church, businesses, the mass media—“which vitally 
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affect the operation of the state system” (1969:54). Contrary to Poulantzas’ claims, Miliband 
saw the individuals who lead these institutions as wielding “considerable power and influence, 
which must be integrated in the analysis of political power” (1969:54). The relationship 
between the state and these institutions was the necessary focus for Marxist critique of 
advanced capitalism, as it demonstrated how the state legitimised the authority of powerful 
institutions in the political system and while also relying on them for the “political 
socialisation” of ruling ideas (1969:241). 
As a methodological perspective, the concept of class power encourages analysing the 
motivations of actors’ decisions and actions with reference to their place in the broader 
distribution of socioeconomic power and status that shapes contemporary capitalist societies. 
Furthermore it offers a means for explaining policy actors’ interactions with state institutions 
as fundamentally determined by embedded ideological norms which restrict the types of 
political or economic interests that may be expressed. Theories of class power thus see state 
and non-state institutions as facilitating the formal authority of specific exercises of power 
“through structures of legitimacy and the value commitments that underpin them” (Scott, 
2001:30). 
The general political assessment of power in the Marxist critique is in many ways 
overly reductive. It suggests that the numerous complex interactions that comprise a policy 
process are all ultimately predetermined by class dynamics, which remain unaffected by (and 
are of course responsible for) the unique social and political circumstances that produce that 
debate. Yet an assessment of institutions as major sites of ideological reproduction also 
provides an important observation about media power, one which draws out the ambiguities in 
how media—as means of cultural production—shape and circulate the discourses that underpin 
structural power. Marx’s notion of ‘false consciousness’, applied to the productive capacity of 
mass media, implies that the formative power of agenda-setting is exercised exclusively in 
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service of the ruling ideology. Freedman is unsatisfied with the implication of media power as 
merely a function of other dominant economic or social groups (2014:25). He instead 
highlights how capitalist modes of organisation create uncertainties and inconsistencies in the 
production of hegemonic discourses. There are 
multiple contradictions within the commercial media; a simultaneous desire for a 
narrow consensus and yet a structural imperative for difference; a situation in which 
audiences are treated as commodities but in which they do not always play this role; a 
tendency for those who work within the media not to rock the boat (for self-protection 
and advancement), but, in exceptional periods, to do precisely this. (Freedman, 
2014:28) 
This analysis is an essential antidote to assumptions of media’s totalising or untrammelled 
influence over public and political debate. It accepts the vast inequalities and monopolies 
inherent to modern commercial mass media but rejects that they are “forever frozen” into elite 
systems of domination (Freedman, 2014:29). For analysis of the policy process, awareness of 
the contradictions of media power can emphasise both the instability of media institutions—
and how this is often the source of policy failure—and the agency of media actors, whether 
they are journalists, editors, executives or corporate lobbyists, to pursue their particular 
interests and policy objectives in dynamic (though nonetheless discursively structured) ways. 
Disciplinary power and media meta-capital 
Whereas Marxist theory asserts that power is a property of a person’s economic and 
social relationship to the means of production, other theorists have attempted to explain 
structural power as a social function not tied exclusively to state or political institutions. Talcott 
Parsons argued that power is innate to all forms of organisation, which create “certain 
categories of commitments and obligations, ascriptive or voluntarily assumed [that] are treated 
as binding” (1963:237). Power here is ingrained in a collective acceptance that obligations are 
shared amongst an organised group and enforceable through negative sanctions. Behavioural 
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accounts observe constraint in the singular, where sanctions are treated as unique responses to 
opposition in a specific decision-making process. Parsons, on the other hand, presents a view 
of constraint where the threat or use of sanctions is “generalized” to secure the pursuit of 
collective goals (1963:250). Here again is a valuable justification for linking ideas of 
behavioural power with those of structural power, in that the authority afforded to formal 
sanctions against non-compliance is “essentially the institutional code within which the use of 
power as a medium is organized and legitimized” (Parsons, 1963:243). 
Michel Foucault was similarly concerned with the disciplining effects of power, but 
unlike Parsons did not view it as the ‘property’ of a sovereign organisation to be justly exercised 
in pursuit of its goals. Focussing instead on the processes and discourses that produce this 
discipline in subjects, he argued for the need to “cut off the king’s head” in discussions on 
power and to abandon what he saw as obsessions with sovereignty and legitimacy (1980:121). 
For Foucault, it is the “accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse” that operates 
to produce the ‘regimes of truth’ by which individuals are constituted in their relation to others 
and institutions: 
We are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a 
certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the 
bearers of the specific effects of power. (1980:93-4) 
In his writings on medicine, sexuality, prisons and madness, Foucault explored the 
reproduction of legitimate rights and legal obligations which disguise the dominating totality 
of normalising and rationalising discourses. Though the locus of power is still between subjects 
and institutions, he posited a much more dynamic relationship than earlier structuralist 
accounts. Subjects, in their conduct as subjects, are as much involved in the reproduction of 
discourses as they are constituted by the institutional patterns such discourses produce: “they 
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are not only its inert or consenting target … they are always also the elements of its articulation” 
(Foucault, 1980:96). 
Though Foucault’s theories present discursive power as an inescapable force that 
creates all social relations and traps us into recreate them, it nonetheless has a methodological 
use for the study of policymaking. Analysis of power should not focus on the central locations 
or institutions and their general mechanisms but should instead, Foucault proposed, study 
“power at its extremities … with those points where it becomes capillary … in its more regional 
and local forms and institutions” (1980:96). As with other second stream theories, the 
Foucauldian approach presents a means of understanding one actor’s relation to others by 
reference to particular discourses or disciplines, which constitute participants as actor or acted-
upon in both specific and general social relationships. 
More importantly Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power mirrors Fischer’s (2003) 
argument that discourses have power in their own right, independent from how individuals or 
institutions actively mobilise ideas and values within their own activities. One pertinent 
example of this, particularly for the study of power in the media policymaking process, is the 
idea of ‘media meta-capital’. In On Television and Journalism (1998), Pierre Bourdieu argued 
that the difference in patterns of cultural production between various areas of social life creates 
specific ‘fields’ of discursive power. Looking at the central media forms in mass society—
television, radio and the press—Bourdieu posited that “the journalistic field, itself dominated 
by market pressures, more or less profoundly modifies power relationships within other fields” 
(1998:68). The cultural capital accrued by journalists and media organisations imbues these 
actors with a monopoly over media’s particular discursive influence (Bourdieu, 1998:77), but 
this control also re-shapes the patterns of discursive production in other cultural fields. Couldry 
refers to this as media meta-capital, a form of structural power specific to media organisations 
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which has “influence over the terms on which people can acquire symbolic capital in a range 
of other fields” (2003:12). 
From academia to art and from cookery to sport, both Couldry and Bourdieu argue that 
the meta-capital of the media field—itself contingent on economic capital—“tends to reinforce 
the ‘commercial’ elements at the core of all fields to the detriment of the ‘pure’” (Bourdieu, 
1998:70). Couldry takes the primacy of the media field one step further, arguing that media’s 
position “as the frame through which private worlds face the social” has established a structural 
distinction between a ‘media world’ and an ‘ordinary world’ (2000:14-15). This distinction 
cuts across and reshapes social reality, reifying the vast sector of social life outside 
media production as a so-called 'ordinary' domain. It also masks the complexities of 
media production processes themselves. And above all, it disguises (and therefore helps 
naturalise) the inequality of symbolic power which media institutions represent. 
(2000:16) 
In this view, the growth of mass media has altered social and cultural organisation in other non-
media fields of professional cultural production and across society as a whole, and refocused 
these fields in a way that priorities and privileges the ‘media world’. 
The media/ordinary distinction causes policy actors to “take it for granted that the media 
have the power to ‘speak for us all’”, to direct their attention to what media are saying about 
political and social issues, and to try and influence the agenda through their own engagement 
with media (Couldry, 2001:157). This allows media to “sustain their status as the legitimate 
controller of access to public existence” (Couldry, 2003:12). Media meta-capital, and “the 
extent to which social relations have been increasingly ‘mediatized’” (Freedman, 2014:6), is 
thus a crucial analytical device for understanding how different policy actors’ status, authority 
and influence are signified through the ‘media field’. From this we can challenge the notion 
that political inequalities in decision-making processes are the natural result of open pluralist 
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bargaining and competition, and instead examine how power relations in media policymaking 
are partly the products of dominant political and journalistic narratives circulated by the media 
itself. 
Communicative power and the network society 
The second stream theories discussed above all conceive of power as primarily a 
negative or repressive capacity to reduce the options to act or think in pursuit of someone’s 
‘real’ interests. Neither the critiques of class power nor the models of disciplinary power regard 
power on balance as a positive or enabling phenomenon, and their analogous forms of media 
power similarly envisage the influence of media influence as primarily restrictive. Hannah 
Arendt proposed an alternative conception of power to coincide with the political and 
theoretical values of democratic systems, and rejected those theories which defined power only 
as repressive or negative. In Arendt’s view 
it is the people’s support that lends power to the institutions of a country, and this 
support is but the continuation of the consent that brought the laws into existence to 
begin with. (1970:41) 
Within this is the proposition that constraint and the ‘organisation of violence’ are not forms 
of power at all. For Arendt, the imposition of one actor’s will over another (through physical 
or social sanctions) is indicative of a failure of power, and of the collapse of the common 
convictions “to which the citizenry had given their consent” (1970:40-1). 
Power, as Arendt describes it, is the characteristic of a group of people and is brought 
into existence by their coming together in agreement and consent towards a set of goals, 
attitudes and beliefs. As with the other second stream theories, power in this sense is not a 
utility or a means to an end but “is actually the very condition enabling a group of people to 
think and act in terms of the means-ends category” (Arendt, 1970:51). It is clear to see the 
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democratic ideals that Arendt sought to bring to debates on power. Marxist accounts presented 
power as a top-down effect of inter-class conflict, and Foucault asserted that individuals and 
institutions alike were all captured within self-sustaining systems of dominance. Arendt, in 
contrast, offers a collective and communicative model of power that “springs up whenever 
people get together and act in concert” (1970:52). 
Jürgen Habermas expanded on many of Arendt’s assertions on the nature of power, 
rejecting the notion of “purposive-rational” systems of power. 
The communicatively produced power of common convictions originates in the fact 
that those involved are oriented to reaching agreement and not primarily to their 
respective individual successes. (1977:5-6) 
Arendt’s communicative concept of power is, Habermas argues, correct in highlighting the 
“intersubjectivity generated in the praxis of speech as the basic feature of cultural life” (1970:7-
8). In his view, communication is the locus of all social relations and subsequently the locus of 
power. The multitude of perspectives and experiences that are brought together in social 
interaction are not eliminated or consolidated, but agreements and common goals are found 
and further emboldened through their communication. Adapting these core assertions to an 
assessment of communicative power in political mobilisation, Habermas argues that 
communicative power is the ‘driving force’ behind the specific power of institutions, where 
the democratic consensus mobilised through communication imbues institutions and social 
groupings with a normative purpose (1996:150). The struggle between political groups over 
which set of discourses should become this governing norm is, for Habermas, the central site 
of conflict over structural power. Those actors that other accounts treat as sovereign or 
authoritative actors “have to borrow their power from the producers of power” (1977:87, my 
emphasis), and their legitimate right to exercise this power lasts only as long as such consent 
is given by its subjects. 
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The optimistic and progressive conceptualisation of ‘communicative power’ is a 
necessary reminder of the democratic and emancipatory objectives that any study of power and 
the political process ought to have at its core. These same concerns are central to analysis of 
media’s role in society, and debates on media power are in essence questions about whether 
media actors, institutions and processes foster or endanger democratic political and social 
action. 
Such questions are as much matters of technology and individual media use as they are 
matters of politics and economics, and as such Manuel Castells posits that in a modern ‘network 
society’—driven by the development of ICTs and forms of ‘new’ media—centralised (mass) 
media power is disaggregated and challenged by mass self-communication (2007:248). In clear 
opposition to earlier notions of mass society, Castells asserts that the “from one to many” 
method of mass communication has been replaced by a social structure characterised by a 
“global web of horizontal communication networks that include the multimodal exchange of 
interactive messages from many to many” (2007:246). Widely available and inexpensive 
(compared to the entry costs of mass media) forms of electronic media have shifted the 
production, dissemination and circulation of information away from centralised media 
organisations and towards individual personal ownership. This has, Castells continues, enabled 
“social movements and rebellious individuals to build their autonomy and confront the 
institutions of society in their own terms”, thus shattering the institutional monopoly of mass 
media and creating means for media counter-power (2007:249). 
The recent theorisation of fluid, networked media stems from a view that “traditional 
mechanisms for ensuring compliance have broken down under the impact both of 
communicative abundance as well as an increasing unwillingness to ‘toe the line’” (Freedman, 
2014:21). Both Freedman and Castells note that traditional mass media organisations have been 
forced to react to the disaggregation of media power generated by new media, with many such 
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institutions making widespread changes in their commercial organisation and patterns of 
production. Yet where Castells claims that the merging of old and new has led to equal 
“coexistence and interconnection of mainstream media [and] autonomous Internet sites” 
(2007:253), Freedman is far less optimistic. He argues instead that corporate media 
organisations are colonising ‘new’ media much in the same way as they monopolised mass 
media, and that the “desire to control it is increasingly evident” in continuing patterns of 
concentration, consolidation, commercialisation and neo-liberal regulatory practices (2014:22; 
see also Curran et al., 2016 and Fenton, 2006). 
The symbolic power of media 
This chapter has thus far considered different forms of media power as reinterpretations 
of or extensions on established theories of behavioural or structural power. Given that this 
research is interested in media policymaking as a unique domain for studying dynamics of 
power, it is worth briefly exploring a specific type of power exclusive to media. This concept 
not only forms the crucial epistemological basis for the preceding ‘forms’ of media power, but 
also emphasises the importance of media policy as the means for organising and distributing 
“a new collective media influence that expresses the salience of information, symbols and 
knowledge in the contemporary world” (Freedman, 2014:5). The theoretical foundations of the 
‘symbolic power’ of media stem from structuralist conceptions of language as a system of 
socially-constructed meanings (Culler, 1972:21). Bourdieu defines symbolic power as the 
“power of constructing reality” (1992:164), the driving force behind the processes of 
socialisation that produce the social subject. It is, he posits, 
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a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, 
of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world 
and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the 
equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue 
of the specific effect of mobilization. (1992:170, my emphasis) 
This comparison with the power of constraint is a useful one, as it highlights Bourdieu’s focus 
on the arbitrary nature of symbolic power. Much as Parsons argued that powers of constraint 
are legitimised by shared obligations which justify and normalise their exercise, Bourdieu too 
posits that “symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the 
complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it” (1992:164). Couldry 
highlights how media power stems from this taken-for-granted prevalence of mass media, 
saying of television that “the paradoxical relationships between its familiarity (its inescapable 
ordinariness) and its pervasive cultural and social significance … makes the latter’s effects so 
difficult to analyse” (2000:12). 
Symbolic power is thus an ideological function, as it enables the establishing and 
reproduction of a dominant culture through the determination of social meaning and the 
structuring of social priorities. Central to this struggle is the process by which dominant 
discourses are not only created but circulated, challenged and reinforced. Habermas’ much 
celebrated and widely adopted concept of the ‘public sphere’ as the “foundation of common 
will” is useful in this aspect (2006:81). In this the roles of media and its constituent institutions 
are indispensable, as they form the central sites for these discursive processes of contestation 
and normalisation in modern societies: 
 
78 
The institutional core of the public sphere comprises communicative networks 
amplified by a cultural complex, a press and, later, mass media; they make it possible 
for a public of art-enjoying private persons to participate in the reproduction of culture, 
and for a public of citizens of the state to participate in the social integration mediated 
by public opinion. (Habermas, 2006:319) 
THE STRUGGLE TO DOMINATE 
Though the theories discussed here place varying emphases on the extent, locus and 
impact of power, they all allude to a general and systemic influence of ‘the media’ that is 
irreducible to any single place or person or text and that is instead organized more like 
a force field – the meeting point of individuals and institutions in defined contexts 
struggling to dominate creative and symbolic production. (Freedman, 2014:146) 
It is this ‘struggle to dominate’ that I wish to investigate more closely by relating the public 
policies and regulations that govern this production, and the processes through which these 
policies are formed, to media’s multifaceted role as reporters, mediators, interest groups, 
corporate enterprises and ‘constructors of social reality’ (Couldry, 2000:4). Media’s presence 
around formal policymaking processes, and policymakers’ and stakeholders’ ‘use’ of media 
for their engagement with policy, is not under contention. What requires greater inspection, 
however, is how the relationships of power between policymaking and media change when 
policies that specifically regulate media are under consideration. The various forms of power 
that underlie each of the cultural, political and economic roles of media conflate as media 
organisations, both stakeholders in and reporters of these policy debates, direct their substantial 
monopolies over symbolic power towards these debates. 
This specific media power collides with the behavioural and structural forms of power 
that surround and constitute the formal and informal processes of policymaking. The interplay 
of media power and the more fundamental forms of behavioural and structural power in media 
policymaking result in changes to media policy, which in turn lead to changes in the 
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distribution and productive capacity of media power. Media organisations are therefore 
simultaneously activists and mediators, subjects and objects of policy debates that can 
drastically restructure their own symbolic, political and economic capital. The foundational 
issues of theorising power with which I began this chapter—of understanding what power is, 
whether it is exercised or a structural force, if it can be measured and if some forms of power 
are ‘more powerful’ than others—become all the more pertinent in light of this tension between 






Uncovering the dynamics of power in media policymaking requires a set of practical 
methods that render these theories of policymaking and power to systematic analysis of the real 
life policy processes. Policy change involves a sprawling collection of actors across 
government, political parties, media industries, regulators, civil society groups and other public 
or private organisations, all trying to influence formal decision-making procedures and public 
debate through legislative drafts, position papers, parliamentary functions, meetings between 
policymakers and stakeholders, media reports, campaign activities and technical research. 
There is thus a wealth of data and sources for piecing together key events and decisions of the 
policy process, yet these artefacts on their own tell us little about the underlying political 
structures or power dynamics that actually influenced policy change. These factors are clearly 
far less amenable to empirical observation or objective assessment, and make it necessary to 
deploy a range of methods to identify and discuss the different dimensions of power in 
policymaking (Karpinnen and Moe, 2019:252; Puppis and Van den Bulck, 2019a:31). 
This chapter details the methodological approach taken in this research to construct an 
account of the media policymaking process and analyse the different dynamics of power that 
operate within it. The first section describes the rationale of the case study approach and why 
I chose the post-Leveson and BBC Charter debates as the research subjects. After this I outline 
the ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (CDA) framework that informed my analysis of these case 
studies (Ali, 2019; Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1993), exploring why CDA is particularly suited 
to studying power in policymaking, and discussing some of the issues relating to the types of 
knowledge and explanations created in a CDA methodology. Finally this chapter describes how 
the research data for this research—policy documents and interviews with policy actors—were 
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collected, selected and sampled, and details how this data was processed through a CDA 
approach to generate findings on the dynamics of power in the two case study policy processes. 
THE CASE STUDY APPROACH 
The core methodology of this research is formed of two case studies of recent media 
policymaking processes in the United Kingdom: the 2012-13 debates on press regulation 
following the Leveson Inquiry into the News of the World phone hacking scandal, and the 2015-
16 review of the BBC’s Royal Charter and renegotiation of its public licence fee funding. 
Feagin defines a case study as “an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative 
research methods, of a single social phenomenon” (1991:2), and Broughton Micova argues that 
utilising a case study approach offers the analytical flexibility and depth particularly useful for 
dealing with“the kind of complexity that media and communications policy inherently 
involves” (Broughton Micova, 2019:72). 
Choosing which policy debates to research naturally involves personal selection and 
exclusion, and any one debate cannot wholly represent British media policymaking as a wider 
field of study. These two policies are, however, significant for a number of reasons that are by 
no means limited to just their recency. The post-Leveson and BBC Charter cases stand out as 
rare moments of direct intervention in how the UK press and broadcasting industries are 
organised and governed, and also symbolise the culmination of long-term changes that have 
brought the foundations of ‘traditional’ or ‘legacy’ mass media under intense challenge. As 
generational moments of media policymaking that have determined the future development of 
the UK’s seminal political and social institutions, these debates also provided official public 
deliberative spaces for interrogating “more abstract paradigmatic views on the relationship 
between the state, society and media” (Puppis and Van den Bulck, 2019b:5). 
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The differences between the two case studies also make them interesting subjects for 
comparative research. Each debate dealt exclusively with distinct forms of mass media, 
allowing for assessment of policymaking between media systems and organisations. As 
established in the introductory chapter, the two processes have unique political and ideological 
histories, making their concurrence all the more pertinent for understanding the specific 
dynamics of power between different policymaking settings. These contrasting foundations 
raise the question of how media policymaking changes depending on whether a policy issue is 
known and prepared in advance (like the BBC Charter review), or whether it emerges suddenly 
from unpredictable circumstances (as was the case with the post-Leveson debates). The 
respective ordinariness and exceptionality of these events also affords opportunities for 
assessing the openness of media policymaking, and how the political prominence, public 
salience and official organisation of a policy debate impacts on the ability of competing groups 
to engage with and influence the policy process. 
RESEARCHING MEDIA POLICYMAKING THROUGH CRITICAL DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS 
These case studies are not intended to simply reconstruct the two policy processes by 
tracing the ‘natural’ sequence of debates and decisions from start to end. Fischer argues that 
such an insistence on rationally-guided, technocratic decision-making neglects the impact of 
ideas and discourses on the political formation of public policy, thereby serving “an ideology 
that masks elite political and bureaucratic interests” (2003:14, see also Fischer, 2007). 
Understanding these subtler, structural power dynamics of media policymaking thus requires 
a more thorough approach which conceives of policy processes and decisions as built through 
language and meaning, and recognises that these discourses both produce and are produced by 
the distribution of power across political and social systems. It is for this reason that this 
research adopts Critical Discourse Analysis as the core empirical framework for examining the 
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media policymaking process and critiquing its functions as a pivotal site of political, social, 
cultural and democratic activity. 
The CDA methodology is closely associated with the work of scholars such as 
Fairclough (1989) and van Dijk (1993), who have developed it as an approach for focussing 
on “the role of language, language use, discourse or communicative events in the 
(re)production of dominance and inequality” (van Dijk, 1993:279). CDA draws extensively on 
sociolinguistics and structuralist accounts that explore the relationship between language and 
social context: 
Linguistic phenomena are social in the sense that whenever people speak or listen or 
write or read, they do so in ways which are determined socially and have social effects 
… The language activity which goes on in social contexts (as all language activity does) 
is not merely a reflection or expression of social processes and practices, it is a part of 
those processes and practices. (Fairclough, 1989:23) 
This emphasis on discourse as productive social practice is crucial to a study of media 
policymaking, not least because so much of the ‘formal’ policy process manifests in distinct 
texts like parliamentary speeches, legal documents and evidence submissions. CDA research 
as a means of ‘interpretivist’ policy analysis (see inter alia Ali, 2019; Fischer, 2003 and 2007; 
Wagernaar, 2007; Yanow, 2000) incorporates an awareness of “the ways in which people’s 
interests are discursively constructed [and of] how they come to hold specific interests” 
(Fischer, 2003:15), and situates a study of power 
on the meanings of policy, on the values, feelings, or beliefs they express, and on the 
processes by which those meanings are communicated to and ‘read’ by various 
audiences. (Yanow, 2000:14, my emphasis) 
As argued in the previous two chapters, the dynamics of power in policymaking are structured 
across a range of behavioural and structural forms that interact to produce broader systems of 
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domination across specific political and institutional contexts. Evaluating how these systems 
take shape in media policymaking is not solely a matter of observing specific policy decisions, 
examining actors’ roles in formal deliberative processes, and inferring power from an 
evaluation of the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. CDA allows for unveiling these processes, 
relationships and practices as products of taken-for-granted mores, institutional cultures, 
historical precedents and political biases, all of which are produced and reproduced through 
language. 
This research uses two types of policy ‘text’ from the case study debates to inform its 
CDA model: documentary evidence and original interviews with policy actors. As discussed 
below, these text entail numerous formats and offer a varied range of discourses and 
experiential accounts of the policymaking process. For the purposes of this CDA methodology, 
however, these texts were all analysed through the same general approach adopted from 
existing CDA studies. Fairclough arranges this as a three-stage process; “description of text, 
interpretation of the relationship between text and interaction, and explanation of the 
relationship between interaction and social context” (1989:109). Description involves 
identifying essential contextual information about the text—source, date, topic, format, relation 
to other texts etc.—and cataloguing its linguistic and discursive features. This description is 
designed to draw out the salient discourse cues, such as its “features of vocabulary, grammar, 
punctuation, turn-taking, types of speech act and the directness or indirectness of their 
expression, and features to do with the overall structure of interactions” (Fairclough, 
1989:109). 
Interpretation involves highlighting the relationships between these features of 
discourse and language particular to the social context of the text. Given the focus here on 
policymaking and the dynamics that shape actors’ political interactions with the policy process, 
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this research used a discourse coding framework that enabled correlating the arguments and 
meanings identified in texts to a set of discursive topics and themes: 
1. Process discourses – how the text articulates specific proposals or evidence for 
policy change, and what these accounts suggest about the source group’s 
normative notions regarding contributing to and influencing official decisions 
(Milosavljević and Poler, 2019). 
2. Values discourses – how the text expresses a group’s values, interests and 
principles of press and broadcast media, and the narrative interactions between 
the document and the underlying ideological contests through which policy 
issues are defined (Löblich, 2019). 
3. Relational discourses – descriptions of different policy actors and organisations, 
their qualities and relationships with others, and what these perceptions of 
‘place’ reveal about the different political and institutional arrangements for 
interacting with the policy process (Kenis and Schneider, 2019; Van den Bulck, 
2019). 
4. Campaigning discourses – accounts of specific lobbying and engagement 
activity, how policy actors organised their attempts to influence policymakers 
or other groups and what the descriptions of these various campaigning 
strategies reveal about different groups’ involvement in or knowledge of the 
decision-making process. 
After description and interpretation of each text, the final stage of analysis involved explaining 
what the particular discursive claims and experiential accounts articulated in the text 
demonstrate about patterns and distributions of power within the policymaking process. This 
explanation is partly about situating a text within the broader power relations inherent to the 
social context of policymaking, how choices of language reflect a speaker’s subject-position, 
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and what rhetoric and vernacular reveal about normative behaviours and codes of a setting. The 
essential goal of this critical discourse analysis, however, was to ‘denaturalise’ the two policy 
processes, to trace the dwindling use of certain terms or discursive patterns, and to identify the 
emergence or repetition of specific phrases, idioms and precise wording of proposals across 
policy documents (Fischer, 2003:109). Through this the research attempts to deconstruct the 
“typically unspoken, commonplace assumptions” built into the formal mechanisms of media 
policymaking (Yanow, 2007:413), expose the vulnerability and flexibility of ‘dominant’ or 
elite discourses, and more critically unpick the dynamics of power that both shape and are 
shaped by policy discourses. 
It is not just about what is said, but who said it, where it was said, how it was said, and 
the social, political, historical and economic contexts that went into shaping what was 
said ... It is also about the negation: what is not being said, who is not speaking and who 
sets the rules of discourse. (Ali, 2019:407) 
A fundamental consideration for CDA research of media policymaking is ensuring that 
any interpretation and explanation is consistent while at the same time not being constrained 
and drawn into the very same operations of discursive power under analysis. van Dijk is 
emphatic that critical discourse analysis “is not—and cannot be—'neutral'. Indeed, the point of 
critical discourse analysis is to take a position” (1993:270). The point here is not to entrench 
oneself in a dogmatic mind-set, but to clearly establish the terms and objectives that inform the 
researcher’s own critical approach. The two case study debates are fundamentally 
manifestations of arguments about the functioning of media in modern society, involving issues 
of democracy and civic participation, freedom of expression, cultural production, public and 
private ownership, dissemination of news and information, and the formation of social 
identities. Evaluation and interpretation of these subjects is not only a central part of 
argumentation within the media policymaking process, but  is also a necessary facet of critical 
media research which cannot (and should not) be reduced solely to objective measurement. 
 
87 
“Media policy research,” as Puppis and Van den Bulck have usefully argued, “should aim to 
combine understanding with a critical stance and to let normative, theoretical conceptualization 
of media policy ‘communicate’ productively with empirical evidence” (2019b:13). 
In this instance these conceptualisations relate directly to core questions about causality 
and demonstrating links between concepts, ideas, meanings on the one hand and meaningful 
social and political action on the other. Demonstrating relationships between actors’ behaviour 
and the influence of different types of power in policymaking is both an epistemological 
concern (Seale, 2012:534) and the central evaluative purpose of critical media policy research. 
‘Traditional’ descriptions of internal validity share with positivist accounts of power the same 
empirical requirements for proving that “one thing (A) has caused another (B)” (Seale, 
2012:530). However, as the previously discussed ‘second stream’ theories of power argue, 
influence cannot always be evidenced by instances of A causing B’s behaviour. Although the 
ontological definition of a policy necessitates study “carried out by examining actual decisions 
in relation to particular issues” (Scott, 2001:61), this research does not stop at these conceptual 
borders. Through synthesising analysis of actual decisions with interpretation of the discourses 
and meanings that produced them, this methodology aims to expand case-specific policy 
analysis beyond “value-neutral positivist methods” (Fischer, 2003:36) without abandoning an 
interest in the agency of social actors. 
Through combining critical discourse analysis approaches to both policy documents 
and interviews with key policy actors, this method attempts to comprehensively catalogue the 
core dynamics of the two case study debates through 
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identifying stakeholders with a vested interest in the outcome of a particular policy, 
analyzing various views and positions on the policy topic and how they relate to wider 
paradigmatic beliefs, mapping relevant fora where key discussions are being held and 
understanding the formal and informal steps in negotiations toward a policy decision. 
(Puppis and Van den Bulck, 2019b:10) 
Hajer, in a similar study of environmental politics and ecological policymaking, provides a 
lively description for this sort of mixed-methods policy research: 
Open the black boxes and get dirty fingers in the stacks of governmental archives, at 
the disorganized shelves of Friends of the Earth, in the reconstructive expert-interviews 
in which the point is to follow the problem definitions of the interviewee and precisely 
avoid that he or she starts to answer according to the pre-conceived categories that we 
have in mind. (1995:5) 
The triangulation of these methods, as Seale describes, enables the researcher to seek out 
“instances of a phenomena in several different settings, at different points in time or space” 
(2012:535), and Bryman similarly advocates method ‘complementarity’ as a means for 
“convergence, corroboration [or] correspondence” (2006:105). The methods of data collection 
detailed below were thus not only employed to amass empirical evidence of the ‘who, what 
and when’ of each policy debate but more importantly to ascertain the patterns of ‘how’ and 
‘why’ behind these pivotal moments in contemporary British media policymaking. 
METHOD I: POLICY DOCUMENTS AND MEDIA COVERAGE AS TEXT DATA 
Although the meaning of ‘document’ as a data source can span an enormous range of 
textual, verbal and graphical artefacts, this research takes a fairly contained definition of policy 
documents as items of written text or speech created to influence or contribute to the 
policymaking process. Legislation, regulatory criteria, parliamentary Bills along with official 
proposals or drafts offer primary evidence of policy change, as they are the formal expressions 
of what changes have been made and how these changes operate. But these official texts are 
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themselves the products of extensive bartering, revision and redefinition of a policy issue that 
occurs across government reviews, public consultations, research reports, parliamentary 
debates, memoranda, speeches, hearings, public events, media broadcasts, news reports and 
campaign publications. All of these texts serve as both sources and objects of study detailing 
the public deliberation, discursive argument and technical formulation of policy: 
In the first case, documents are understood as factual or contextual sources (akin to 
historical research) that can reveal the interests and intentions of their authors or in 
other ways uncover facts about the policy process. In the second case, documents are 
treated as meaningful social products or cultural artifacts that have independent 
consequences and are worth analyzing in themselves. (Karpinen and Moe, 2019:251) 
The particular formats, audiences, messages and perspectives of these texts thus offer essential 
clues about the different ways that policy actors attempt to influence the decision-making 
process and whether they succeed in doing so. 
Identifying and finding many of the core pieces of documentary evidence for the two 
case studies was relatively straightforward, particularly because of the increasing digitalisation 
of government business and parliamentary records, as well as the growth in company and 
campaign websites and online media formats. These ‘headline’ documents in turn opened a 
warren of links and references to further documents. Finding the interim drafts, unfinished 
proposals and later-abandoned initiatives was given particular attention in order to build the 
clearest picture of the iterative (and often disorderly) processes of debate and policy 
formulation that preceded the final points of official decision. 
As these pieces were put together, broken hypertext links, defunct organisations and 
the (irritatingly regular) vanishing of specific texts from any public repository created blank 
spots and dead ends in the search. Cached webpages, searchable archives and fortuitous 
fiddling with URLs aided in filling some of these gaps, while interviewees, contacts and 
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academic colleagues kindly provided rare printed items or offered directions to documents that 
were otherwise unavailable or unknown. Following a summary reading to establish the content, 
context and position in the respective debate’s timeline, each document was categorised by its 
source and format in preparation for close reading and analysis (see below). A number of texts 
(both potentially seminal and seemingly superfluous) remain unfound and those that were 
collected do not by any means account for every elusive ministerial memo, lobbyist briefing or 
minute technical revision. However, the sample gathered tries to reflect the widest range of 
pertinent documents from the most representative set of government, political, media and 
campaign actors involved in post-Leveson press regulation or the BBC Charter review. 
This search produced a total of 276 policy documents. Table 1 details the volume 
collected for each case study debate and how these were distributed across different textual 
formats. Table 2 likewise tallies these sets by the types of policymaking bodies, stakeholder 
groups or other media policy actors that created them. These distributions are in themselves 
notable for what they reveal about the broader political and institutional dynamics of the two 
debates. A substantial proportion of the post-Leveson debates’ documentary record consisted 
of letters and statements between government, newspaper publishers and campaign groups, 
with these latter two groups accounting for almost all of the non-government or party political 
texts. BBC Charter review, by contrast, was dominated by public consultations, research 
reports and evidence hearings at parliamentary committees, with the majority of these being 
produced by government departments and the BBC itself. 
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Every one of these texts was processed through a close reading and analysis using the 
coding framework described above, recording key findings about the use of particular 
discursive patterns and linguistic trends that demonstrate the intent, values and meanings of the 
speaker. The immediate productive use of these samples was enabling the historical 
reconstruction of each policy process, threading the texts as numerous intersecting and 
simultaneous sequences of public debate, political conflict and official procedures which 
ultimately converged in decisive moments of media policy change (Pickard, 2019b). They offer 
“a sense of the times—of how people responded at that time to particular events or ideas” 
(Yanow, 2007:411, my emphasis). As explored below in relation to the policy actor interviews, 
many of these texts also provided substantive accounts of the text products of formal legislative 
and elite institutional actors of British policymaking system (Rhodes, 2003; Russell and Gover, 
2017) who I was unable to interview. Whereas the interviews predominantly recount the 
Table 2. Documentary evidence by source
Case study
N % N % N %
Government incl. ministries 29 21.8 24 16.8 53 19.2
Parliament and political parties 30 22.6 37 25.9 67 24.3
Regulators and 'ancillary' bodies 4 3.0 5 3.5 9 3.3
Broadcast media groups - - 13 9.1 13 4.7
(BBC) - - 42 29.4 42 15.2
Press and publishing groups 11 8.3 4 2.8 15 5.4
Campaign and civil society bodies 40 30.1 5 3.5 45 16.3
Independent and other* 19 14.3 13 9.1 32 11.6
Total 133 100 143 100 276 100
*Incl. private research agencies and polling companies commissioned by others
Post-Leveson BBC Charter review Total
Table 1. Documentary evidence by format
Case study
N % N % N %
Bills, drafts, legislation 14 10.5 9 6.3 23 8.3
Reports and reviews 53 39.8 48 33.6 101 36.6
Submissions to consultations 3 2.3 31 21.7 34 12.3
Letters, minutes and statements 45 33.8 14 9.8 59 21.4
Speeches and events 4 3.0 11 7.7 15 5.4
Parliamentary debates 10 7.5 8 5.6 18 6.5
Evidence hearings 4 3.0 22 15.4 26 9.4
Total 133 100 143 100 276 100
Post-Leveson BBC Charter review Total
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arguments and experiences of campaigns and media industry figures, this documentary 
evidence has ensured that the voices and discursive influence of the ‘core’ policymaking elite 
has not been neglected. 
Given the significant role of press and broadcasting organisations in the post-Leveson 
and BBC debates, it was pertinent to complement an analysis of media group’s policy 
documents with an assessment of news media coverage published by many of these same 
corporations. Two separate searches of British national newspaper coverage were conducted 
through the news archive service ProQuest, in order to source a sample of articles by UK daily 
and Sunday newspapers6 in which the post-Leveson debates7 or BBC Charter review8  featured 
as the central topic or were mentioned to a meaningful degree. These searches produced a 
useful timeline of the volume and frequency of press coverage on these two debates, from 
which smaller, targeted searches were conducted to perform a direct CDA of media texts at 
these moments of heightened activity. Additional targeted searches of newspaper coverage—
together with select examples of broadcast news coverage and current affairs programmes from 
TV and radio outlets—were conducted for salient periods of debate or conflict identified in 
analysis of other policy documents (even if these moments featured less prominent samples of 
news coverage), to evaluate the broader development of news coverage of these policy debates 
and their cumulative construction outside the central sequences of formal decision. 
A quantitative study of press and broadcast news coverage of media policy—involving 
coded measures of the tone, framing and expressed values in coverage—would no doubt be an 
invaluable resource for evidencing and detailing the scale of policy narratives at specific stages 
 
6 Selected outlets comprised the nine leading national newspapers (The Times, The Sun, Daily Mail, The 
Telegraph, Guardian, The Independent, Daily Express, The Financial Times and the Daily Mirror), the eight 
Sunday editions and their online equivalents. 
7 2,181 results, search criteria: [Leveson AND ((press regulation) OR (Royal Charter))], 29 November 2012 to 30 
October 2013. 
8 1,167 results, search criteria: [BBC AND ((Charter Review) OR (Charter renewal) OR (Royal Charter))], 16 
July 2015 to 31 December 2016. 
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in the policy process. However, for the purposes of this research, such a quantitative study 
would not easily illuminate the development of those narratives over the course of the policy 
process, nor resolve what Davis has described as “the problem of establishing the line of 
causality from news media stimuli to political response” within studies of media agenda-setting 
(2007a:182). As such the news media texts referenced in subsequent chapters were selected on 
the basis of their correspondence with significant moments of political decision, their 
demonstration of noteworthy discursive patterns, or their correspondence with discursive 
developments apparent in the main documentary record. These texts were analysed with the 
same topics detailed above, albeit with the recognition that they were produced by unique 
political and cultural institutions imbued with an innate capacity for establishing, reproducing 
or opposing policy narratives in the public sphere (Schweizer, 2019:274). 
METHOD II: INTERVIEWS WITH POLICY ELITES AND EXPERTS 
The purpose of conducting interviews with key policy actors was to acquire first-hand 
accounts from people directly involved in the variety of public and private debates and 
decision-making functions in the two media policy processes. In this sense the actors 
interviewed were primarily experts and elites, as the figures intimately involved in 
policymaking typically occupy powerful positions in political, media and public institutions or 
have significant technical expertise in that policy area. Such interviews are highly valuable for 
research of media policymaking, as these figures can provide exclusive, original knowledge of 
their interests, opinions, experiences and perceptions from the heart of the decision-making 
process. Different interviewees offer a range of perspectives from different political moments 
or discursive arenas, complementing and expanding upon (or reflexively reassessing) data 
created from other types of research data. Van Audenhove and Donders note that 
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elite interviews and expert interviews have a lot in common, yet, they take a slightly 
different perspective. In elite interviews ‘power’, ‘status’ and ‘position’ are central. In 
expert interviews, ‘knowledge’ and ‘position’ are central. (2019:181) 
Legislators, media lobbyists, campaigners and other policy professionals clearly perform 
different official and unofficial roles within the policy process, and the various ways they 
interact with the decision-making process present direct means for identifying different 
dimensions of influence and power. 
Identifying potential participants followed mostly from the documentary evidence 
detailed above, which provided ample record of the individuals and organisations involved in 
the two case study debates. Ministers and other decision-makers with political or legal 
authority, along with party spokespeople, engaged backbenchers and committee members, are 
documented throughout the official parliamentary record. Named lobbyists and other executive 
policy staff from media organisations, trade bodies, regulators and pressure groups were 
discovered by their public ‘footprints’ in myriad reports, statements and speeches. Additional 
informants were also identified from their recurring appearances in news articles or media 
broadcasts, evidence hearings or public events on the topic, or from being mentioned as useful 
sources by other interviewees (a process Davis describes as "snowballing", 2007a:185). This 
aided in widening the search net beyond the alluring “big shots” (Van Audenhove and Donders, 
2019:189) to include the likes of special advisors, researchers and civil servants – the kinds of 
‘behind the scenes’ figures that play pivotal roles in the more minute, informal and rarely-
publicised processes of policy formulation. 
This identified a total of 44 elite and expert actors with extensive involvement in, 
knowledge of or perspectives on significant periods or aspects of the two debates (see 
Appendix 1 and Appendix 2). Regrettably and to this researcher’s eternal chagrin, only 20 
responded to invitations to participate and of these just 13 people were formally interviewed. 
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While this obviously represents a major shortcoming in the empirical scope of this project, 
there is a grain of reassurance in considering what this implies about policy actor interviews as 
a research technique. Elite or expert policy actors, particularly those with senior political or 
professional roles, are occupied with ‘proper’ things to do and may not wish to replace one 
duty (attending parliamentary debates, managing a media outlet, conducting corporate affairs 
etc.) with an academic exercise. Given the explicitly public-facing roles of some of these 
figures, many had staff or automated systems for screening non-essential requests. In several 
cases, it was impossible to find any publicly available contact information for a specific 
politician or media executive (many of whom have resigned or retired from public life since 
the two debates). Some actors still work in media policy (or even in the same posts they held 
as part of the post-Leveson and BBC Charter debates) and may have been anxious to prejudice 
their involvement in future policymaking processes by speaking openly about their past 
activities (Mikecz, 2012:482). Overall these impediments highlight the general inaccessibility 
of elite political and corporate life, and provide a pertinent allegory for critiquing the supposed 
openness of public policymaking when these processes are so often led by secluded actors. 
 
Table 3. List of interviewees
Interview no. Case study Interviewee role Date conducted
1 Post-Leveson Former editor & journalist 28 September 2018
2 Post-Leveson Researcher, Media Standards Trust 24 November 2017
3 Post-Leveson Director, Hacked Off 30 November 2017
4 Post-Leveson Director, Hacked Off 8 December 2017
5 Post-Leveson Director, Media Standards Trust 11 December 2017
6 Post-Leveson Chair, PCC & Conservative peer 6 June 2018
7 Post-Leveson Director, Hacked Off 2 August 2018
8 Post-Leveson CEO, IMPRESS 7 August 2018
9 BBC Charter review Academic & parliamentary advisor 7 December 2018
10 BBC Charter review CEO, Pact 10 April 2019
11 BBC Charter review Policy advisor, VLV 1 May 2019
12 BBC Charter review Chair, Save Our BBC campaign 16 May 2019
13 BBC Charter review Policy director, ITV 17 July 2019
 
96 
Table 3 lists the individuals interviewed for each case study alongside a generalised 
summary of their position and organisation. Interviews with figures from the post-Leveson 
debates took place between November 2017 and October 2018, while BBC Charter review 
actors were interviewed from December 2018 to July 2019. Most meetings lasted between one 
and two hours, and were conducted in places typifying common media policymaking settings: 
the literally gilded halls of the Palace of Westminster, executive conference suites of media 
companies and the ultra-modern headquarters of legal firms, as well as the less extravagant 
offices of campaign groups, regulators, industry trade associations and university professors.9 
Some interviewees had to deal with other policy duties during our conversations, sprinting to 
parliamentary voting lobbies or taking phone calls from staff. These brief interruptions, in 
addition to offering a moment to digest answers and review next questions, gave an invaluable 
sense of different actors’ daily activities and helped in providing physical presence to the 
heated arguments and tense negotiations recorded in the documentary accounts of the two 
debates. 
The topic guide for interviews used the same sets of questions and subjects for every 
interviewee, though each was tailored to reflect the person’s position and interests in media 
policymaking (Van Audenhove and Donders, 2019:183). The sequencing of questions was 
designed to lead through the chronological order of the policy process, getting interviewees to 
clarify and detail their involvement in specific events, debates and decisions. The emphasis of 
questions was, however, always phrased to try and draw out their own story, experiences and 
recollections rather than simply supplement the ‘official’ timeline. These semi-structured 
topics and open-ended questions created a far more flexible conversational tone and crucially 
 
9 All interviews except two were—perhaps predictably, though no less damningly for the centralisation of British 
media policymaking practices—held in central London. 
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left the interviewee to explain and argue their answers without excessive interrogation (Van 
Audenhove and Donders, 2019:188). 
After introductions and a brief reminder of the research aims, the opening questions set 
to establish the participant’s policy and professional background, the generalities of their 
working day and their personal or organisational motivations for engaging with the post-
Leveson or BBC debates. Modelled on similar research of elite actors by Herbst (1998) and 
Davis (2007a; 2009), these questions sought to aid in settling the participant into the interview, 
mitigate “the status imbalance between researched and researcher” (Mikecz, 2012:483), and 
provide “clues as to the approaches and goals of informants” within the policy process (Herbst, 
1998:191). 
Core questions inquired about the informant’s direct experience of the policy process: 
the interests, goals and proposals they advocated; the types of documents, research and other 
materials they submitted to official processes, and how these were prepared; the decision-
makers and stakeholders they engaged with, and how they acted in these encounters; and their 
interactions with media organisations to publicise and support their advocacy. Yanow argues 
that the use of documentary evidence in interviews 
may corroborate observational and interview data—or they may refute them, in which 
case the researcher is “armed” with evidence that can be used to clarify or, perhaps, to 
challenge what he is being told. (2007:411) 
As well as helping to triangulate existing information and evidence about the two a policy 
debates, these topics allowed the interviewee to provide their own exclusive accounts of how 
the media policymaking process works on a vital, human level. 
For the central issue of this research, their answers also contributed a wealth of 
knowledge about the dynamics, structures and mechanisms of power that underpin the media 
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policymaking process. At certain stages during the interview informants were asked directly 
whether they felt their actions or arguments had a tangible influence on decision-makers or 
specific changes in policy. Many even provided unprompted discussions and explanations of 
their presumed role in official revisions or shifts in the tone of debate. Yet just as important as 
these explicit expressions of influence were the tacit hints or unspoken matters in these 
subjective reconstructions of the policymaking process (Van Audenhove and Donders, 
2019:183). These created essential accounts of interviewee’s perceptions of the interpersonal, 
political and institutional structures of media policymaking and their status, position and power 
within them. This was also inquired through questions about informant’s opinions on the 
political and social issues of media policy that created these debates, how they defined and 
articulated their arguments, values and ideas about these issues, and what role these competing 
narratives or rhetorical trends played in their own engagement strategies. Herbst argues that 
questions of this sort are vital for assessing perceptions of how public and political opinion is 
formed during a policy process, and for exploring how individual actors’ behaviour and actions 
were affected by policy discourses circulating in official documents, political debate or media 
coverage (1998:192). 
A final set of questions asked interviewee about the results of each policy process and 
its implications for wider issues of media, policymaking and power: whether they felt the 
process was open, accessible and fair; if they believed certain actors or groups had too much 
or too little influence on debate; whether they would, in hindsight, have engaged with decision-
makers or other stakeholders differently or acted in other ways; and what effect they think the 
new policies implemented by the post-Leveson process or BBC Charter review have had on 
how media organisations (newspapers, the BBC or the media ecology as a whole) operate in 
the UK. As well as concluding the interview and allowing interviewees to comment more 
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generally on the two case study debates, these questions produced unexpected moments of 
introspection, lament and even boastfulness which further enlightened their personal accounts. 
There are several pertinent methodological considerations when interviewing elite and 
expert actors. The clearest danger is that informants will lie about their involvement, 
misremember facts or details, or simply be unable to recall what they were doing or how they 
were thinking about the policy debates at the time. Where the purpose of the interview is to 
understand how informants “make sense of their lived experiences” (Yanow, 2007:410), the 
nature of informants reflecting on the past detaches data from the reality of the past event. 
Herbst argues that researchers need to be sensitive to how policy actors “might be construing 
their past behavior and opinions in order to appear more cynical, more naive, more democratic, 
or less democratic than they actually are” (1998:193). Herbst also points out that researchers 
may sacrifice critical distance in exchange for ingratiating themselves with their elusive 
contacts: 
Informants are highly trained and have fascinating insights for the researcher. 
Informants can also be quite persuasive, drawing the researcher into their conceptual 
frameworks and distracting the interviewer from the task at hand. (1998:193) 
This issue of a researcher’s positionality is especially pertinent when inquiring about policy 
narratives, which are produced intentionally to be persuasive, argumentative, value-laden and 
emotive (Herbst, 1998:193). The possibility of this detachment, however, does not pose a 
significant threat when considered alongside the other forms of evidence that will be collected. 
Although an interviewee may embellish or underplay their role, these claims can be examined, 
queried or challenged with reference to documents, media coverage or other interviewee’s 
accounts both during the interview and in subsequent cross-analysis (Yanow, 2007:411). 
Furthermore, this detachment will still represent actors’ own voiced interpretations of the 
interplays of power in media policymaking. Whether they actually reflect the reality of events 
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or not, these accounts nonetheless aid in highlighting various normative views of political 
participation, democratic processes, media policy and power, and how these norms structure 




5. PRESS REGULATION AFTER THE LEVESON INQUIRY 
British press regulation throughout the 1900s was characterised by a cycle of cosmetic 
reform and political timidity (Curran, 2000:44; O’Malley, 1997:144). Self-regulation 
(managed and monitored exclusively by newspaper publishers) was endorsed time and again 
by successive Royal Commissions or other public inquiries, with empty threats that next time 
policymakers would have no choice but to introduce unprecedented statutory controls 
(O’Malley and Soley, 2000). The 2011-12 Leveson Inquiry and its subsequent policy debates 
appeared to mark an explosive break from this pattern of ‘non-policy’. The Guardian’s July 
2011 exposé of industrial-scale phone hacking at the News of the World newspaper (NOTW) 
produced an intense public backlash against the tabloid paper, and focussed political attention 
on much more than technical issues of regulation. The phone hacking scandal revealed a deeper 
crisis at the heart of Britain’s media and political culture, in which politicians of all persuasions 
since the 1980s sought to appease powerful media editors and moguls, especially Rupert 
Murdoch and his executives at NOTW’s parent company News International. Government 
policies had accelerated deregulation and concentration in the UK’s media markets, with 
pivotal legislative and regulatory decisions often made in direct favour of Murdoch’s 
commercial interests. This democratic deficit was epitomised by governments, parliament and 
the police consistently overlooking the failures of the newspaper industry’s self-regulator, the 
Press Complaints Commission (PCC), to properly investigate unethical and illegal activity at 
the companies that controlled it. 
The Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press was an 
investigation not just into phone hacking but into the entire political economy of Britain’s 
newspaper industry. Along with probing the widespread “failure to act on previous warnings 
about media misconduct”, Lord Justice Sir Brian Leveson was tasked with recommending 
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a new more effective policy and regulatory regime which supports the integrity and 
freedom of the press, the plurality of the media, and its independence, including from 
Government, while encouraging the highest ethical and professional standards. 
(2012b:3-5) 
In a radical break from the past the Leveson Report recommended that government establish 
in law a new ‘recognition body’, which would officially verify that any new self-regulatory 
body set up by the press had powers to effectively regulate its members and was properly 
independent of both the industry and politicians. 
With the political and media establishments reeling from the phone hacking scandal, 
and with high-profile victims of press abuse publicly demanding real change, the question was 
locked on how, not whether, self-regulation should be reformed. Yet Leveson’s proposals 
directly challenged the entrenched historical principle that any political or state involvement in 
press regulation endangered free speech, and tested the legitimate boundaries between 
democratic institutions and the media that hold them to account. The post-Leveson policy 
process, made up of a fractious private negotiations between politicians, newspaper publishers 
and press abuse campaigners, thus served as the crucible for fundamental issues of press 
regulation, elite policymaking and corporate media power. 
This chapter traces the progress of these debates and analyses how the Leveson 
recommendations were interpreted, bartered and implemented through draft proposals, 
political manoeuvres and backroom lobbying. The public and private skirmishes between ‘pro-
‘ and ‘anti-Leveson’ groups were not just fights for control and organisation of press regulation, 
but also represented the fundamental clash over the responsibilities and freedoms of the press 
in the modern age. Furthermore this account seeks to unravel how a concerted public demand 
for reform, spurred by deeply emotive and explosive abuses of power, was ultimately doused 
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by the same corporate media influence over democratic processes that had fostered the phone 
hacking scandal. 
A RISING TIDE FOR REFORM – 1993 TO 2012 
The Leveson Report, published 29 November 2012, opened by attributing the Inquiry’s 
formation to the “public revulsion about a single action—the hacking of the mobile phone of a 
murdered teenager” (2012a:3) by reporters at the News of the World. The Inquiry was “the 
seventh time in less than 70 years” that a government had formally investigated concerns about 
the press (Leveson, 2012a:3), but there had been a growing dissatisfaction with press conduct 
throughout the 2000s and early 2010s. Successive parliamentary reports on press malpractice 
were attacked by the accused papers and buried by senior politicians anxious to maintain 
favourable relationships with media groups, particularly the powerful Murdoch press. 
From 2006 News International dismissed reports of phone hacking at NOTW, carried 
out by its royal correspondent Clive Goodman and private detective Glenn Mulcaire, as the 
aberrant acts of ‘one rogue reporter’. Reviews by the PCC parroted the company’s defence and 
exonerated senior staff from having knowledge of or responsibility for Goodman’s actions. 
Questions of press regulation remained a political taboo until July 2011, when the Guardian’s 
Milly Dowler reports thrust phone hacking into the centre of public attention. Amidst the 
exploding scandal the Prime Minister, himself under sustained scrutiny for his connections 
with News International executives, announced a judge-led public inquiry into illegal activities 
by the paper. Both the circumstances of the Leveson Inquiry’s formation and its comprehensive 
investigations had a pivotal impact on the subsequent debates on press regulation, and 
exemplify the chaotic mix of public pressure, political panic and pressure group lobbying that 
would go on to define the post-Leveson policymaking process. 
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‘One rogue reporter’ 
Many of the policy dilemmas at the heart of the Leveson Inquiry had already been 
investigated by Parliament’s Culture, Media and Sport (CMS) Select Committee. Reports by 
the Committee in 2003, 2007 and 2010 chart a diminishing political confidence in the PCC 
and, like the Leveson Report, each of these claimed unique pressing circumstances: a changing 
balance between individual privacy and public interest reporting following the 1998 Human 
Rights and Data Protection Acts (CMS, 2003); the “persistent harassment” of the future 
Duchess of Cambridge and initial revelations of phone hacking at NOTW (CMS, 2007:4); and 
the “libelling by the UK press of the McCann family and others”, along with the Guardian’s 
2009 exposé contradicting the earlier ‘one rogue reporter’ claims by News International 
executives in 2007 (CMS, 2010:5, see also Davies, 2014:70-4). 
Notably, neither the Labour nor Coalition governments saw these reports as sufficient 
justification for intervening in policy that had remained largely unchanged since the second 
Calcutt Report’s scathing criticisms of the PCC in 1993 (Bingham, 2007; O’Malley, 1997:155; 
McNair, 1994:150-9) . As Nick Davies, the Guardian reporter who uncovered much of the 
illegal activity at NOTW, recounts: 
There was no sudden roar of indignation from MPs or from the government, not even 
a hint of irritation that this powerful corporation could commit crime and rely on 
authorities to fail to do anything about it. (2014:203) 
The tepid reaction to the CMS Committee’s proposals (see CMS, 2003:9-11; 2007:27; 
2010:130) reflected an immovable belief in the PCC—owned and operated by the newspaper 
industry—as the only workable or even desirable self-regulatory model. As the Leveson 
Inquiry laid bare, this inaction was symptomatic of an underlying culture in which senior 
politicians courted editors and media proprietors for favourable coverage and political support, 
and in turn eschewed any contentious policy issues that might jeopardise this fragile 
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relationship (Leveson, 2012b:1438-41). The true scale of phone hacking was also kept veiled 
through a series of out-of-court settlements by News International, buying the silence of high-
profile phone hacking claimants by offering extremely generous cash sums on the condition of 
strict legal confidentiality.  
In this period before the Leveson Inquiry, the disproportionate power of media 
organisations to keep questions of press policy off the public agenda was on full display 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962:948). Leveson himself noted with concern how the intimate 
relationships between politicians and press 
impacted on the willingness or ability of politicians to decide matters of public policy 
about the media, and specifically of policy about press standards, fairly and impartially 
in the public interest. (2012a:25) 
Prior to the Guardian’s explosive July 2011 exposé, News International resoundingly rejected 
the CMS Committee’s claim that it was “inconceivable that no-one else at the News of the 
World … was aware” of phone hacking (2010:7). The company issued a furious statement 
stating “the Select Committee system has been damaged and materially diminished by this 
inquiry … certain members of this CMS Committee have repeatedly violated the public 
trust”.10  
Articles in News International papers pressed further this campaign of delegitimisation 
and self-preservation. A 2010 NOTW piece claimed the CMS Committee’s proposed reforms 
would muzzle the paper and that MPs’ deliberations had descended “into bias, spite and bile”.11 
The Sun attacked the “Labour-dominated” panel for having “abandoned fairness and 
independence in pursuit of cheap political advantage”.12 The reactions to the report also 
 
10 News International press release, 24 February 2010. 
11 News of the World, ‘Your right to know is mired in MPs’ bias’, 28 February 2010. 
12 The Sun, ‘No honour’, 24 February 2010. 
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demonstrated the convenient political alliance between News International and some 
Conservative MPs, who rubbished the 2010 report and sought to play down the allegations 
against the company. One Conservative Committee member, Philip Davies, attempted to 
remove the most damning paragraphs from the report, particularly those condemning a culture 
of staff bullying at NOTW and the paper’s “wholly unpersuasive” public interest defence for 
some of its most lurid stories (2010:23, 156). Davies later provided a damaging quote for The 
Sun’s coverage, claiming the report had been “abused for narrow petty party political 
advantage. The main purpose was to defend freedom of speech”.13 This alliance continued 
throughout the subsequent phone hacking scandal. Labour MP Chris Bryant alleged some 
Committee members were “bending over backwards” to defend News International after a 
2011 hearing in which executives were questioned over misleading the Committee in their 
previous evidence.14 
Russell and Gover emphasise the political authority of parliamentary Select 
Committees, particularly their ability to “’spotlight issues’ and draw them to government and 
wider public attention” (Russell and Gover, 2017:229). However, this period also demonstrates 
how Committee members’ political manoeuvres and the policy goals of newspapers themselves 
can drastically influence press coverage of a Select Committee’s work – a crucial component 
in this work having clout beyond insular parliamentary processes. News International titles 
consistently sought to discredit the CMS Committee’s investigations into the company, rebut 
its accusations as inauthentic or politically motivated, and generally keep questions of 
reforming press regulation out of wider public debate. This campaign to silence criticism also 
extended to campaign and civil society groups. In 2009 the Media Standards Trust published a 
forensic review of the PCC’s performance, which was dismissed by the then-PCC chair as 
 
13 The Sun, ‘Report hijack, 25 February 2010. 
14 The Huffington Post, ‘Phone hacking shows how MPs Committees need real teeth’, 11 September 2011. 
 
107 
“statistics of the madhouse” and ridiculed by other leading press industry figures. The report’s 
author recalled how this concentrated rubbishing of their criticisms prevented the group from 
effectively raising the PCC’s failings with policymakers: 
It was kind of like the third rail of British politics, you couldn’t really talk about press 
regulation without getting burned. We proved the rule, we got burned. There was a very 
aggressive reaction and as a consequence perhaps those people who might have stood 
up, might have supported our critique and might have supported change didn't because 
it was too politically costly. (Interview 5) 
The Milly Dowler moment 
On 4 July 2011 the Guardian reported that the News of the World had hacked the 
voicemail messages of the murdered schoolgirl Milly Dowler.15 There was an immediate 
eruption of public outrage at the senseless exploitation of a desperate family, a feeling 
exacerbated with additional reports of hacking, blagging and further unethical practices 
targeting victims of terror attacks and relatives of British soldiers killed on duty.16 Within days 
News International announced the closure of NOTW and the publisher’s parent company, News 
Corporation, also withdrew its controversial takeover bid for satellite broadcasting company 
BSkyB. Just as personal stories epitomised the emotionally-charged nature of phone hacking, 
public figures implicated in the unfolding scandal also shaped its emergence as a political 
crisis. Prime Minister David Cameron described the Milly Dowler allegation as “a truly 
dreadful act and a truly dreadful situation” but many questioned his willingness to act, 
particularly given his personal connections with senior News International executives, 
particularly Rebekah Brooks who, with Cameron, formed part of the elite ‘Chipping Norton 
set’ of media and political socialisers. 
 
15 The Guardian, ‘Missing Milly Dowler’s voicemail was hacked by News of the World’, 4 July 2011. 
16 Daily Telegraph, ‘News of the World: bereaved relatives of 7/7 victims ‘had phones hacked’’, 5 July 2011; 
Daily Telegraph, ‘Phone hacking: families of war dead ‘targeted’ by News of the World’, 7 July 2011.  
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More politicians from all parties called for a public inquiry into phone hacking, but the 
government resisted on the basis that this would interfere with police investigations. Yet on 8 
July 2011 the Prime Minister announced the formation of two inquiries: one to be conducted 
after legal action “to get to the bottom of the specific revelations and allegations we have seen” 
surrounding NOTW and the failed 2006 police investigation of the Goodman-Mulcaire hacks; 
and a second, to begin straightaway, to “look at the culture, the practices and the ethics of the 
British press.”17 
The decision to split the inquiry into two distinct subject areas may be seen as simply 
the Prime Minister’s “initial instinct to avoid or deflect blame” (Hanretty, 2013:9), especially 
considering the mounting political pressure surrounding the BSkyB bid (Davies, 2014:348-9). 
However, the Hacked Off campaign group also had a significant influence on the inquiry’s 
official remit. Having attracted decisive public support from the Dowler family and other 
prominent hacking victims, Hacked Off figures secured a pivotal private meeting with the 
Prime Minister during which they pressured for broadening any inquiry to look beyond hacking 
at NOTW and consider the culture of the press industry as a whole. Highlighting the Leveson 
Inquiry’s formal terms of reference announced by the Prime Minister on 13 July,18 one 
interviewee from the group pointed to “sixteen phrases which were inserted by Hacked Off, 
and frankly they are the most important phrases.” (Interview 4). In particular, the Inquiry was 
instructed to recommend a new system of press regulation, and advise on “how future concerns 
about press behaviour, media policy, regulation and cross-media ownership should be dealt 
with by all the relevant authorities” (Leveson, 2012b:5). 
This extraordinary instance of raw, face-to-face lobbying, particularly by a nascent and 
relatively unconnected campaign, would have been unthinkable without the ‘Milly Dowler 
 
17 Downing Street speech, 8 July 2011. 
18 HC Deb 13 July 2011, v. 531 c. 312. 
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moment’ having made it politically untenable for policymakers to maintain a hands-off 
approach. The Guardian’s reports in July 2011 inspired and enabled more political action in 
ten days than hundreds of cases of phone hacking—unveiling admittedly less heart-rending but 
no less illegal or unethical activity—and multiple parliamentary inquiries had achieved in eight 
years. The two decades-long silence in press policymaking was shattered, but only as a result 
of a “mixture of empirical information and emotive appeals” that shifted the boundaries of 
acceptable policy debate (Baumgartner et al., 2007:161-2). Indeed the Leveson Inquiry’s 
formation cannot be solely interpreted as a triumph of investigative reporting, public pressure 
and nuanced campaigning. The response to phone hacking at NOTW demonstrates how 
idealised pluralist methods for identifying policy ‘problems’ had been completely precluded in 
the years leading to the phone hacking scandal, precisely because of the pervasive influence of 
the Murdoch press over British political institutions. 
‘Who guards the Guardian’s guardians?’ 
The first part of the Leveson Inquiry ran from November 2011 to November 2012 and 
held formal evidence sessions for eight months, taking testimony from 337 witnesses and 
submissions from over 300 more. Leveson’s court hearings were a media spectacle, broadcast 
live around the world and with every item of evidence published online almost immediately. 
Hollywood celebrities and ‘ordinary’ victims described their experiences of harassment, 
defamation and abuse by the press; newspaper editors and executives were questioned about 
their knowledge of illegal and unethical practices in Britain’s newspaper industry; and Prime 
Ministers, party leaders and government officials from the last 30 years of British politics 
desperately defended or denied their intimate relationships with the media. The Inquiry also 
held a number of seminars and roundtables with industry experts, lawyers, regulators and 
academics, designed to explore and evaluate the failures of the PCC and discuss potential 
approaches for a new model of press self-regulation. 
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It is impractical here to explore every moment of drama or thread of intrigue exposed 
during Leveson’s marathon examinations, though it is worth briefly highlighting the role of the 
newspaper industry itself in the Inquiry process and its impact on the subsequent press 
regulation debates. This can be grouped into three settings: the industry’s insipient proposals 
for regulatory reform; official testimony from leading industry figures; and coverage of the 
Inquiry process by national papers. The industry’s formal contributions to Leveson’s work on 
press regulation helped to set the shape and scope of potential policy changes. In March 2012 
the PCC confirmed it would disband, but the organisation continued during this ‘transition’ 
period to offer its proposals for reform alongside its industry funding body the Press Board of 
Finance (‘PressBoF’). 
Star industry witnesses at the Inquiry, particularly Rupert Murdoch and Rebekah 
Brooks, expressed apparently limitless regret for the industrial scale of unethical and illegal 
practices at their papers. There was, however, a strong current of resentment and collective 
bitterness towards the Inquiry from many editors and journalists. Some challenged the 
empowering of a senior judge to conduct an inquisition of journalists, and the dangerous 
precedent it would set for press freedom and its relationship with the judicial system. Many 
saw the objectives and motivations of the Leveson Inquiry as little more than the product of 
leftie luvvies, vindictive politicians and embarrassed celebrities seeking to exploit the exposure 
of already illegal activities and mount an assault on Britain’s popular newspapers. In between 
brandishing his favourite front page scoops, declaring “privacy is for paedos” and reminiscing 
on his most effective reporting tricks, former NOTW journalist Paul McMullan argued “you 
don’t need to regulate the press. The press will eat itself.”19 Daily Mail editor Paul Dacre 
claimed “the way that the Inquiry has been conducted” meant “the British public are receiving 
a very bleak view of the press”. Dacre went on to attack Britain’s “liberal class” whose “hatred 
 
19 Testimony to the Leveson Inquiry, 29 November 2011. 
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of mass selling papers has transmogrified into a hatred of self-regulation itself.”20 “Any 
parliamentary involvement” in press regulation, he later remarked, “would be the thin edge of 
the wedge for statutory control of the press.”21 
Press coverage of the Leveson Inquiry amplified many of these same criticisms. 
Britain’s national newspapers published over 2,000 reports about the Inquiry between its 
formation and the Report’s publication. Of those articles which expressed an evaluative 
viewpoint, 76 per cent contained only a negative assessment of the Inquiry and its work 
(Ramsay, 2013). Similar analysis by Thomas and Finneman categorised editorials by Britain’s 
main daily and Sunday newspapers into four distinct trends of coverage on the Leveson 
Inquiry: catastrophization of its likely outcomes, self-affirmation of the democratic role of 
newspapers, minimisation of the significance of phone hacking, and localization of the scandal 
as concerning an already illegal act. “This was largely a shrill, hostile discourse that 
mythologized the press’ role in society yet attacked accountability as the first step on the road 
to Soviet-era press controls” (Thomas and Finneman, 2014:183). 
As a unique intervention in the affairs of the British newspaper industry, the Leveson 
Inquiry represented a major shift in political attitudes not only to questions of press policy but 
also to how these questions should be tackled. Whereas the three Royal Commissions on the 
Press entailed a non-binding approach for “making the press a subject of public, official 
scrutiny” (O’Malley and Soley, 2000:178), Leveson’s ‘judicialisation’ of the realm of press 
policy (Hanretty, 2013) shows the significance that government policymakers (and particularly 
the Prime Minister) politicians attached to demonstrating their commitment to resolving the 
major crises raised by the phone hacking scandal. That the Leveson Inquiry and its 2012 Report 
assumed such central authority in the nascent policymaking process is a reflection of the 
 
20 Speech to Leveson Inquiry seminar on ‘Supporting a free press and high standards’, 12 October 2011. 
21 Submission to Leveson Inquiry, ‘Proposals for regulation of the press’, 15 June 2012. 
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reconceptualisation (if only temporarily) of press regulation as not merely an issue to be 
sporadically reviewed, but a matter of serious public concern and ideological tension for which 
the usual methods of political decision were not appropriate. As Hanretty has written on the 
political meaning of Leveson’s being a judge-led inquiry, 
It is difficult to imagine anyone other than a judge having the level of trust necessary 
to resolve competing normative claims without giving the appearance of doing anything 
other than finding a sensible solution to a technical problem. (2013:10) 
In respect of Research Question (4) and the particular power of media in media policymaking, 
the furious campaign by some newspapers to belittle and delegitimise the Inquiry, its 
proponents and its insipient reform agenda goes some way to highlighting news media’s central 
role in framing how policy debates are defined and formalised. Furthermore it shows that such 
agenda-setting is not an uncontested process, and in the case of the Leveson Inquiry involved 
a fundamental division between one faction calling for radical reform and another wishing to 
close off the subject altogether. 
CROSSING THE RUBICON – DECEMBER 2012 
After the Leveson Report’s publication on 29 November, deliberation between 
policymakers and stakeholder groups centred on Leveson’s model for a new regime of press 
self-regulation. The core of these recommendations consisted of 38 criteria that any future 
regulator established by the press should meet in order to demonstrate its effectiveness and 
independence (and nine additional proposals to reinforce these criteria in the wider political 
and regulatory environments).22 Most MPs and government policymakers reacted positively to 
the Leveson Report. In his parliamentary response the Prime Minister specified some of the 
headline recommendations for regulation that Leveson had proposed and declared: 
 
22 See Leveson (2012b:1803-09). 
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These are the Leveson principles. They are the central recommendations of the report. 
If they can be put in place, we truly will have a regulatory system that delivers public 
confidence, justice for victims, and a step change in the way the press is regulated in 
our country. I accept these principles, and I hope that the whole House will come in 
behind them.23 
However, the Prime Minister actively rejected the substantive and symbolic core of Leveson’s 
radical departure from past self-regulation policy: that “the law must identify those legitimate 
requirements and provide a mechanism to recognise and certify that a new body meets them” 
(Leveson, 2012b:1807). 
The question of whether legislation by parliament was an appropriate or necessary 
means of reforming press regulation became the fundamental dividing line between competing 
policy actors. The Prime Minister expressed clear opposition to statute: 
I think it would be a dereliction of our duty in the House of Commons, which has stood 
up for freedom and a free press, year after year, century after century, to cross the 
Rubicon by legislating on the press without thinking about it carefully first.24 
In contrast, the Labour leader Ed Miliband stated: 
We endorse the proposal that the criteria any new regulatory body must meet should be 
set out in statute. Without that, there cannot be the change we need.25 
This statutory dilemma was not just a difference in preference between pro- and anti-Leveson 
players in these debates. The Prime Minister’s rejection of Leveson’s legislative proposals was 
also the most significant decision for structuring how the government conducted its 
negotiations, and thus drastically constrained the political settings and mechanisms of decision-
making. Throughout December and into the first few weeks of 2013, the political process of 
 
23 HC Deb 29 November 2012, v. 554 c. 448. My emphasis. 
24 HC Deb 29 November 2012, v. 554 c. 456. 
25 Ibid. c. 451. 
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translating Leveson’s proposals into a workable (but crucially non-statutory) framework took 
place in two distinct spaces: the cross-party talks between Conservative ministers and their 
opposite figures in the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties; and private meetings of the 
Conservative party leadership with senior industry representatives. 
Immediately the official response to Leveson’s recommendations had been taken out 
of public deliberation and confined to private discussions between the most powerful figures 
in Britain’s political and media establishments. In the absence of any formalised methods of 
press policymaking, this elite bargaining invariably mirrored the same old practices of national 
newspaper executives influencing decision-making at the top table. However, as we will come 
to see, the loosely structured and ad hoc nature of these private deliberations also exposed them 
to intervention and disruption from other actors and forces in the wider political arena.  
Cross-party talks 
In his response to the Report, the Prime Minister also suggested “there may be 
alternative options for … ensuring that the Leveson principles of regulation are put in place” 
without legislation.26 The Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders accepted his invitation to cross-
party negotiations, with the first session taking place immediately after his statement in the 
Commons. Despite the unique format of these talks, many key features of the ‘traditional’ 
Westminster legislative process were still evident. Opposition parties played a persistent role 
in scrutinising the government’s policy approach and focussing attention on awkward issues 
for the government (Russell and Gover, 2017:89), not least because the Liberal Democrats 
stood against their Coalition government partners to advocate in favour of Leveson’s reforms. 
At this first session the government proposed to draft a ‘Leveson Bill’, demonstrating the 
unsuitability of legislation as the Prime Minister had first suggested: 
 
26 Ibid. c. 449. 
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No matter how simple the intention of the new law, the legislation required to underpin 
the regulatory body would be more complicated.27 
Our concern is that we simply don't need to have that legislation to achieve the end 
objectives. And in drafting out this piece of legislation, what we are going to be 
demonstrating is that it wouldn't be a simple two-clause bill.28 
In a parliamentary debate on 3 December Harriet Harman, Labour’s shadow Culture Secretary, 
announced that Labour would be preparing a separate draft Bill to show that legislation “can 
be done in a tightly defined and forensic way, as envisaged by Leveson”.29 Labour’s ‘Press 
Freedom and Trust Bill’ matched most of Leveson’s requirements for the core structure and 
powers of a new regulator, and also included a clause requiring political officials to “uphold 
the freedom of the media and its independence from the executive” (Labour, 2012:1). Leveson 
had recommended this as a necessary foundation of a new culture of independent press self-
regulation (2012b:1780), and its inclusion in Labour’s draft shows the party’s initial 
commitment to the letter of Leveson’s model in its negotiations with government.. 
Harman presented the Bill as “an offer to MPs on all sides of the House who want to 
implement Leveson’s proposals”, and the Liberal Democrats welcomed the draft as “an 
important contribution to the cross-party talks”.30 However the Bill proposed that the High 
Court act as the ‘recognition body’, rather than Ofcom as Leveson had preferred (2012b:1774-
5). Conservative figures seized on this, saying that Labour “have gone from accepting the 
report in full to rejecting one of the major recommendations. ... Not only have they u-turned, 
even they admit that their proposals are quite top line and don’t address the details.”31 
 
27 HC Deb 29 November 2012, v. 554 c. 449. 
28 Maria Miller quoted in BBC News, ‘Press ‘need to act’ after Leveson’, 30 November 2012. My emphasis. 
29 HC Deb 3 December 2012, v. 554 c. 606. 




What is notable in these opening political salvos is the varying degrees of importance 
the competing parties gave to different aspects of Leveson’s official recommendations. All 
three parties for a time recognised the Leveson Report as a symbolically binding model for 
reform, but emphasised certain details of its proposals while underplaying or omitting others. 
Leveson’s suggestion that Ofcom serve as the ‘recognition body’, for example, was instantly 
dismissed and never considered again in negotiations: many MPs questioned giving “a 
Government-appointed body, the chairman of which is appointed by a Secretary of State, a role 
in the regulation of the press”.32 These varying canonisations of the Leveson recommendations, 
and the role of political ‘red lines’ in shaping policy-making, are examined further in Chapter 
7. Yet this dynamic is worthy of a brief discussion for its relation to the substance of Research 
Question (1) and the influence of official policymaking structures on how policy actors engage 
in decision-making. The immediate shutting-out of specific technical proposals shows how 
quickly the authority of the Inquiry’s recommendations—which party leaders had pledged 
themselves to—was moulded to match policymakers’ political aims. The cross-party talks 
accelerated the rationalisation of the post-Leveson decision-making process, as rival 
policymakers’ focus on specific methods of implementation narrowed the scope of potential 
solutions to only those that were amiable to either the political parties or the newspaper 
industry. Substantive reform of press regulation, via a recognition body empowered in law, 
was fast falling out of the political frame, while the design of any new regulatory model became 
increasingly defined by politicised reinterpretations of the Leveson Report. 
Industry negotiations 
In his response to the Report the Prime Minister also stated that he favoured “giving 
the press a limited period of time” to establish a Leveson-compliant regulator,33 thus granting 
 
32 HC Deb 3 December 2012, v. 554 c. 609. 
33 HC Deb 29 November 2012, v. 554 c. 449. 
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industry executives and lobbyists a unique and exclusive role in reimagining Leveson’s 
recommendations and pressuring the government’s contributions to the cross-party talks. 
During the Leveson Inquiry two Conservative peers, Lord Hunt of Wirral and Lord Black of 
Brentwood (respective chairs of the PCC and its industry funding body PressBoF), submitted 
a new regulatory framework to replace the mothballed PCC. They described their plans as 
“independently led self-regulation” based on legally-binding contracts with publishers. 
Leveson rejected the colloquially named ‘Hunt-Black plan’ as insufficiently independent from 
the industry and lacking adequate powers (2012b:1650), but the two Conservative peers 
continued to insinuate their proposals throughout the post-Leveson negotiations. 
As party leaders argued over how to build a new regulatory system that would attract 
support from the industry and victims of press abuse alike, Hunt and Black pushed ahead with 
creating their contract model in concert with publishers: 
We’d decided to try and persuade the government that the cross-party negotiations were 
unnecessary because people were going to sign up to the contract model. Most of the 
representatives of the press met at Number 10 and we all agreed to seek to find some 
way of implementing it. (Interview 6) 
On 5 December, the day after this Downing Street meeting with the Prime Minister and 
Secretary of State, “around 20 newspaper editors” convened at the Delaunay restaurant in 
central London to discuss the proposals set out in the Leveson Report.34 Minutes from the 
private meeting recorded by Peter Wright of Daily Mail publishers Associated Newspapers 
indicate that those present supported the majority of the Leveson criteria. Closer analysis 
reveals more dissent than implied.35 One example of this is the editors’ response to the process 
of appointments to the regulatory board: Wright’s minutes claim those present accepted that an 
 
34 Rusbridger in The Guardian, ‘We need reform and a free press. This will require both time and openness’, 24 
March 2013. 
35 Of the 40 discussion points noted in Wright’s minutes, 31 were recorded as “acceptable”, 5 considered with 
caveats and four branded “unacceptable”. 
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appointments board could be made up substantially of independent members, but caveated this 
with a desire that “decisions [should] be unanimous”. If implemented industry representatives 
(or any other constituency) would have been able to veto appointments, which Leveson claimed 
would undermine the necessary independence of the appointments process (2012b:1650). This 
argument over the industry’s involvement in appointments to the regulator was, as is detailed 
blow, a recurring sticking point throughout the subsequent stages of deliberation. 
Despite several such deviations between Wright’s minutes and the official Leveson 
criteria, the editors’ Delaunay meeting was seen by some press figures as a moment of 
unexpected cooperation: 
We're all used to the sort of annual fisticuffs at press awards and shouting matches [but] 
the editors of the national papers sat in a room at the Delaunay restaurant, went through 
point by point Lord Justice Leveson's recommendations for how a self-regulatory 
model worked and pretty much agreed to them all.36 
Guardian editor Alan Rusbridger, speaking at a CMS Committee hearing the next week, gave 
his interpretation of the Delaunay meeting: 
One of the reasons we wanted to meet as a group of editors, without Lord Hunt and 
without Black, last week was to try to set for them, if you like, their terms of reference 
so that Lord Hunt clearly understands when he is setting up his appointments board that 
it should be Leveson-compliant rather than industry-compliant or Hunt/Black-
compliant.37 
Yet in a sudden exercise of corporate authority, industry executives publicly dismissed the 
editors’ Delaunay terms and seized exclusive control of negotiations. In a letter to the Culture 
Secretary the five trade bodies for the UK publishing industry asserted that “publishers—rather 
than editors—are responsible for funding the regulator”, and that the PCC Chair Lord Hunt 
 
36 Chris Blackhurst (editor, The Independent) on The Media Show, BBC Radio 4, 5 December 2012.  
37 CMS Select Committee oral evidence, 11 December 2012. HC 819-i Q102, my emphasis. 
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would act as the industry’s “point of contact” with policymakers.38 Lord Hunt, together with 
Lord Black, Peter Wright and Trinity Mirror’s legal director Paul Vickers, formed the Industry 
Implementation Group (IIG) to lead the industry’s talks with government. After the “historic 
moment” of Delaunay had been overturned, “two Conservative peers were charged with 
representing the industry [and] a long period of private negotiations began.”39 This raises an 
important distinction, in relation to Research Question (4), between the collective influence of 
media institutions over policymaking and the often complex hierarchies of corporate and 
political power within media organisations. By monopolising a role as the industry’s legitimate 
representatives, the formation of the IIG substantially reduced the number and range of 
newspaper industry actors directly involved in the post-Leveson negotiations. It also 
concentrated this involvement in the hands of publishers and executives, with their coup over 
editors handing this small group of delegated executives what one Hacked Off figure described 
as “a second bite of the cherry [to] lobby Ministers with arguments that failed in front of a 
public inquiry.”40 
The (absent) role of parliament 
As these parallel threads of private elite negotiation continued through the opening 
weeks of 2013, the defining political foundation for the cross-party negotiations—the Prime 
Minister’s rejection of legislation—still determined how policy solutions were deliberated and 
the actors who could influence this. The insistence by government policymakers that they, 
together with the industry, could reach a non-legislative solution deprived MPs and peers of 
any formal decision-making function. Parliamentary debates during December contain 
countless examples of the arguments for and against implementing Leveson by statute, but 
 
38 The Guardian, ‘Publishers remind minister that they, not editors, will do Leveson deal’, 14 December 2012. 
39 Alan Rusbridger (editor, The Guardian), ‘Who should guard the Guardian?’ for Free Speech Debate (online), 
2 April 2013. 
40 CMS Select Committee oral evidence, 19 March 2013. HC 819-iii Q256. 
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these are far more notable for demonstrating the relative impotence of the two legislative 
chambers in the shadow of extra-parliamentary meetings. Cross-party negotiators viewed the 
exclusion of parliament from voting on negotiations as not only necessary but politically right. 
In a Commons debate on 3 December the Culture Secretary stated: 
I hope that there will be no votes on the issue, because what we need is consensus. We 
need to move forward with something that we can all agree on.41 
The government’s insistence on a non-legislative approach drastically constrained the types of 
actors who were considered ‘insiders’ (Grant, 1995), even to the extent of redefining the 
traditional role of parliamentarians as the ultimate decision-makers on government policy. 
Control of and authority over negotiations remained with Conservative ministers and their 
opposites in the Labour and Liberal parties, who were themselves closely bound within the 
elite political rituals of high office and subject to intense pressure from the press industry. In 
the later stages of policy formation this redefinition also affected the range of strategies 
available for influencing these debates. In creating a deliberative space outside of the official 
parliamentary process, the government transferred political control over this pressing matter of 
public policy away from the ‘standard’ functions of parliamentary plurality and instead 
conferred exclusive authority to the party leaderships and appointed industry representatives. 
THEIR CHARTER, OUR CHARTER, WHOSE CHARTER? – JANUARY TO MARCH 
2013 
On 31 December 2012 the government shared with these ‘core’ negotiators a 
prospective model for implementing Leveson’s recommendations, comprising a draft 
framework for a Royal Charter and a five-page draft Bill. The 13-page draft Charter (Charter 
#1) would establish a ‘Recognition Panel’ for assessing and approving the applications of new 
 
41 HC Deb 3 December 2012, v. 554 c. 598. My emphasis. 
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press self-regulatory bodies, and detailed ‘carrot and stick’ provisions for incentivising industry 
membership to the new system. Employing a Royal Charter—quasi-legislation issued by the 
monarch on advice from the Privy Council—had been hinted earlier in various newspaper 
reports as a legislative work-around proposed by the government’s Minister for Policy, Oliver 
Letwin. Interviewees from both sides of the negotiations claimed that the Prime Minister 
brought in his Cabinet fixer because he doubted that Culture Secretary Maria Miller was 
capable of negotiating a workable settlement between the opposing Labour, Liberal and 
industry figures. As explored further in Chapter 8, the loose structure of the post-Leveson 
negotiations exacerbated the tensions between the ‘real’ authority of Cabinet ministers and the 
political power of party leaders, in this case resulting in the Prime Minister’s office usurping a 
Secretary of State’s policy portfolio to ensure press regulation remained firmly in his control. 
The idea of using a Royal Charter was first suggested to Conservative ministers by the 
Treasury Solicitor Paul Jenkins, the head of the government’s legal service.42 Letwin and 
Jenkins floated the Charter framework to lawyers and representatives for both pro- and anti-
Leveson groups in the negotiations, with much of these early intricate legal discussions struck 
between obscure constitutional dilemmas the more pressing concern of the Privy Council’s 
independence from government. 
We had a jolly argument about how this body was going to have money. You can’t 
raise money through the royal prerogative, that was what the Civil War was about! He 
[Jenkins] later rang me and said the Secretary of State had some fund that she could 
give to this chartered body. We didn’t think it was a great idea because the Royal 
Charter sounds sort of not right, obscure, vaguely improper. But we had no objection 
to it in principle. (Interview 7) 
 
42 See Baksi (2017) and The Times obituary, 23 March 2018. 
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Oliver Letwin kept appearing in our meetings and came up with the idea of a Royal 
Charter. I remember saying “this is ridiculous,” but it was seen as a way of ensuring 
that it wouldn’t be a government body enforcing regulation. (Interview 6) 
Though neither Hacked Off nor the IIG rated this arcane Royal Charter format, it quickly 
became Conservative negotiators’ preferred method for skirting the statutory deadlock. 
The detail of Charter #1’s regulatory provisions, and the precedents it set for 
subsequent policy proposals, are therefore worthy of brief analysis. The Charter states that the 
role of the board of the Recognition Panel43 is to approve and verify new regulators, but only 
when the board is satisfied that the regulator meets “the requirements set out in 
recommendations 1 to 24 ... of the Leveson Report”. In a notably less prescriptive tone, the 
Charter also provides that the board “may take into account recommendations 34 to 47” (my 
emphasis). However, Charter #1 makes no requirements for an arbitration service nor 
establishes the various statutory responsibilities for underpinning the system in law, both of 
which Leveson saw as essential features of any new self-regulatory model (2012b:1806-7). 
Although a note in the draft suggests that “further definition of the criteria within the 
Charter remains an option for achieving greater certainty”, the specification of particular 
Leveson recommendations as necessary, optional or (by their absence) unwanted became the 
recurring point of contention between the competing pro- and anti-Leveson factions in these 
exclusive negotiations. The addition, removal and rewording of sections of text (and often just 
single words) in subsequent Charter proposals demonstrates the central role of these quasi-
legislative documents in the post-Leveson process. Crucially, in terms of Research Question 
(1), the various Charter drafts were both the principal objects of formal policymaking and the 
symbolic sites of contest where rival political ideas about press regulation were translated into 
 
43 In a clear sign of the draft’s incipient, the Board was constituted of the current and future holders of “[List of 




tangible structures and measures. As discussed below these minutiae matter for the kinds of 
regulatory models being proposed, but they are also important indications of who had power 
in these crucial drafting decisions and how they succeeded in imprinting their political 
objectives onto the formal details of Royal Charter drafts. 
With the press holding the pen 
It was publicly known from at least the end of December 2012 that the government 
planned to use a Royal Charter for a new regulatory framework. The prospective text of Charter 
#1 was, however, first shared with only a small selection of party leaders and industry 
representatives. Scrutiny of this formative document was confined to the private channels 
between these figures and government policymakers. Parliamentary actors and other interest 
groups could only comment on the broader implications of a Royal Charter as a means of 
implementation, while insider negotiators and newspaper industry executives in particular had 
intimate influence on how Charter #1 was reformulated. 
In a 4 January letter to Oliver Letwin, IIG member Peter Wright raised his concern that 
“it is going to be very difficult to sell the package as it appears to stand at the moment to the 
industry at large.” Restating the industry’s principle objection to the government’s proposed 
laws for an arbitral complaints system, Wright’s letter also queried the structures and powers 
laid out in the Charter model. Addressing the vague and undefined ex-officio membership of 
the Panel’s board, Wright suggested “it would be highly desirable” for one of these figures to 
have working knowledge of the press industry. Similarly, Wright argued that “we do not think 
the industry will buy a literal acceptance of Leveson’s recommendations as viable recognition 
criteria … We have drawn up our ‘red lines’ … but they do not seem to be represented here.” 
This letter gives one of the clearest demonstrations of how, even from the very start of 
the post-Leveson process, industry lobbyists had completely eschewed the conclusions of a 
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judge-led public inquiry and directed their efforts to maintaining exclusive control of self-
regulation. More damning still is that Wright’s letter was immediately successful in convincing 
senior Conservative policymakers, as the objections he raised were incorporated directly into 
the government’s next Charter released publicly on 12 February (Charter #2). The prescriptive 
ex-officio executive board in the unpublished Charter #1 was replaced with a four-to-eight 
member board appointed by a separate Appointments Committee, which itself included one 
person who “represents the interests of relevant publishers”. Additionally Charter #2 removed 
its precursor’s explicit reference to the Leveson recognition criteria, and instead specifies 
bespoke criteria within the Charter text itself. 
This introduced subtle but decisive deviations between the explicit provisions of the 
Leveson proposals and how these were reinterpreted in Charter #2. Leveson, for example, 
recommended that the editorial Standards Code “must ultimately be the responsibility of, and 
adopted by the Board, advised by a Code Committee” (2012b:1804, my emphasis). Charter #2 
instead requires that the Code should only be “adopted by the Board”, meaning the industry’s 
essential editorial standards would be written solely by a sub-committee of the same serving 
editors it was intended to regulate. The requirement that a regulator should “have the power to 
direct” apologies and corrections following breaches of the Standards Code (2012b:1804-5, 
my emphasis) was watered down in Charter #2 to a “power where appropriate to require 
remedial action” (2013:16), leaving responsibility for the extent of these remedies to the 
publishers in control of the regulator. Charter #1’s provision that the Recognition Panel “may 
take into account” recommendations 34 through 47 was also reworded in Charter #2 as “may 
but need not take into account”. Furthermore, the Recognition Panel is specifically instructed 




These almost indistinguishable changes between the details of Charters #1 and #2 
became the defining dynamic in how Leveson’s recommendations were transformed into 
formal policy proposals. Perhaps more importantly, this technical haggling obfuscated the 
underlying purposes and effects of regulation that each requirement was designed to bring 
about. Through this writing and re-writing, government policymakers’ proclaimed acceptance 
of Leveson’s proposals deteriorated in concert with industry complaints about how they would 
operate in practice. It can be argued whether these concessions were made as a direct result of 
this industry pressure, or if they are more symbolic of a general correspondence between the 
broader aims of Conservative policymakers and corporate newspaper publishers. Nonetheless, 
the IIG successfully imprinted their political objectives into these formal drafts at the expense 
of the government’s supposed commitment to the ‘Leveson principles’. That the industry’s 
concerns were embedded in the first publicly released policy draft gave these proposals a 
powerful position as the foundation on which subsequent deliberations were made. 
In contrast to the industry’s objections to Charter #1, IIG chair Paul Vickers welcomed 
Charter #2 in a radiantly pluralist tone: 
We welcome this very constructive announcement, the fruit of two months of intensive 
talks involving the newspaper and magazine industry and all three main political 
parties.44 
Whether the IIG truly engaged with Labour or Liberal figures as extensively as they did with 
Conservatives is questionable. Editors and other press executives did meet a number of times 
with opposition negotiators, but not remotely to the same scale or with the same degree of 
collaboration on regulatory drafts. A public letter from Harriet Harman to Oliver Letwin 
detailed Labour’s “substantive concerns” with Charter #2’s failures to meet Leveson’s 
 




recommendations,45 further muddying the industry’s claims to having engaged in wide-ranging 
consultation in the opening months of 2013. The changes in Charter #2 also show how industry 
and government figures adopted a quasi-legislative role in amending and negotiating the 
specific wording of regulatory measures. Conservative ministers and press executives 
effectively acted as one coordinated unit while industry figures had fully ingratiated themselves 
into an official status as chief stakeholders in press regulation, to the almost total exclusion of 
any wider public or political involvement in preparing these formative policy drafts. 
Parliament breaking the logjam 
Outside of these private negotiations, parliamentarians were growing increasingly 
frustrated at the lack of progress on agreeing a new regulatory framework. In an 11 January 
Lords debate on the Leveson Report, peers indicated they were ready to act where the 
government had not: 
If we believe that the recommendations of Lord Justice Leveson require action, we on 
the Back Benches in this place have a special constitutional role to play in making that 
happen. There is an onus on us to ensure change.46 
Soon, backbench MPs and peers attempted to piggyback the Leveson Report’s contentious 
legislative measures into statute by tabling amendments to existing Bills passing through 
parliament. Labour peer Lord Puttnam, who tabled one such amendment to the Defamation 
Bill, claimed these 
offer us the opportunity to break the logjam that would appear to have afflicted both 
the talks between the newspapers and the Government and the talks between the three 
main political parties themselves.47 
 
45 Letter, 12 February 2013. Available online. 
46 Lord Alli, HL Deb 11 January 2013, v. 742 c. 381. 
47 HL Deb 5 February 2013, v. 743 c. 140. 
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Puttnam’s proposed amendment created Leveson’s desired recognition body in law, but is far 
more notable for empowering courts to award costs and damages in civil trials (principally libel 
and invasion of privacy cases) based on a publisher’s membership of an approved regulator. 
Leveson recommended this as a “powerful incentive for a publisher to join a regulator” 
(2012b:1514), encouraging complainants and publishers to use a regulator’s free arbitration 
service in place of legal action and improving access to justice for members of the public 
claiming against newspapers. This ‘carrots and sticks’ measure had been fiercely resisted by 
the industry both during the Inquiry and in negotiations with government, but the success or 
failure of post-Leveson reform hinged on these changes giving legal weight to any new 
regulatory framework. 
Puttnam’s ‘Leveson amendment’ transformed the final legislative stages of several 
Bills into a focal battleground between the government and those policymakers who, until now, 
had been excluded from deliberations. Cross-bench peer Lord Skidelsky, with the support of 
campaign group Hacked Off, opened a second frontline with amendments to the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Bill.48 The government’s media minister in the Lords, Lord McNally, 
appealed to these backbenchers to withdraw their amendments and “allow those cross-party 
talks to reach their full and considered conclusion”.49 Anti-Leveson politicians, industry figures 
and libel reform campaigners attacked the amendment as a “political stunt” which risked “the 
future of the defamation bill”.50 Despite this, the Lords voted on 5 February to approve 
Puttnam’s changes and the Conservative leadership, “unsure that it would be able to get 
 
48 Press Gazette, ‘Peers in fresh attempt to pass ‘Leveson law’ with changes to Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Bill’, March 13 2013. 
49 Ibid. c. 148. 
50 The Guardian, ‘The defamation bill is now in thrall to a politically motivated Leveson clause’, 8 February 2013. 
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sufficient support in the Commons” to remove it, blocked the Bill from progressing any 
further.51 
As another sign of the sporadic and unorthodox nature of the post-Leveson policy 
process, it is ironic that the Prime Minister’s intention to keep legislators out of decision-
making ultimately led to far more drastic parliamentary intervention. The short campaign of 
backbench action rapidly shifted the balance of power away from the Conservatives’ private 
discussions with industry, with the intertwining mass of rival amendments, Charter proposals 
and political last stands accelerating decisions on press policy to their climax. By defeating the 
government in the Lords, pro-Leveson policymakers dragged discussions on press policy away 
from the private cross-party talks and industry negotiations, and bring them into the relatively 
public domain of parliamentary scrutiny. Anti-legislation newspapers and libel reform 
campaigners perceived the manoeuvres in the Lords as little more than political ‘gameplaying’ 
(Russell and Gover, 2017:102), but the close correspondence between the detail of these 
amendments and the Leveson recommendations indicates a genuine attempt by impatient peers 
to steer a particular policy outcome. Furthermore, it shows the widespread belief amongst 
parliamentarians that the Leveson Report was an authoritative, legitimate and compelling 
model for reform of press self-regulation. 
DECISION AND DERISION – MARCH TO OCTOBER 2013 
Throughout February and into the first two weeks of March, the private cross-party 
talks and industry negotiations had focussed on the government’s draft Charter proposals. After 
the House of Lords pro-Leveson amendments, however, it appeared as if a majority coalition 
of Labour, Liberal Democrat and backbench Conservative MPs would force these proposals 
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onto the statute books. On March 14 the Prime Minister announced he was halting cross-party 
talks, claiming that “those who want ... a full legislative approach to Leveson have hijacked 
important parliamentary bills”.52 Along with releasing a new draft Royal Charter, Conservative 
ministers tabled a string of amendments—including clauses to implement some though not all 
parts of Leveson’s ‘carrots and sticks’ changes in civil law—to the Crime and Courts Bill ahead 
of its third reading in the Commons on the following Monday, 18 March. 
On 15 March, responding to what they saw as Cameron’s “historic mistake” of walking 
away from talks, the Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders jointly published their own ‘take it 
or leave it’ package and stated they would instruct their MPs to oppose the government’s plans 
at the Monday votes.53 The Labour-Liberal Democrat proposals consisted of an alternative 
Royal Charter and a further amendment, this time to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Bill, prohibiting the Privy Council from altering the Charter in future without the approval of 
a two-thirds majority in both Houses. The Labour leader described this as “the minimum 
amount of legislation needed to guarantee its success and independence over time”, designed 
to “ensure that future governments cannot tamper with the new system.54 
Gambits, concessions and compromises 
The BBC’s political editor described the Prime Minister’s decision to abandon talks as 
a calculated political gambit, deliberately “demonstrating to the public that he is willing to deal 
with the issue of press excesses at the same time as indicating to the newspapers that he is 
fighting for press freedom”.55 However, comparison of the rival Conservative (#3a) and 
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Labour-Liberal (#3b) Charters also shows that the March 14 gambit was as much a 
disagreement over detail as it was a wrestle for the balance of power in parliament. 
Charter #3a contained several changes from the Conservatives’ Charter #2 that 
brought it closer in line with the Leveson recommendations. Whereas the 12 February 
framework (co-drafted by industry negotiators) designated some of the recognition criteria as 
“may but need not take into account”, Charter #3a adopted these in their original Leveson 
Report wording as must-have features for any new regulator. These included the requirement 
for a ring-fenced fund for investigating systemic misconduct, and a whistleblowing hotline for 
newspaper staff to report unethical activity. The Conservatives’ new Charter #3a also revised 
the definition of an “inexpensive” arbitration service—reflecting Peter Wright’s concerns 
about encouraging a “claims-farming industry”—to require that arbitration should be free, 
reflecting Leveson’s desire that the new framework enhance access to justice (2012c:1768). 
While Charter #3a retained the Conservatives’ material concessions to the industry 
inscribed in Charter #2, the Labour-Liberal Democrat Charter #3b reverted many of these and 
introduced several new provisions. This model removed the industry’s implicit power of veto 
over appointments to the regulator—a residual demand from both the Hunt-Black plan and the 
editor’s Delaunay checklist—and rebalanced the membership of the Code Committee to 
comprise “equal proportions of independent members, journalists and serving editors”. Taken 
together, Charter #3b’s changes are clearly aimed at reducing the potential influence of editors 
and publishers in the new regulatory regime, and pulling reforms closer to the spirit and the 
letter of the Leveson recommendations. 
The Prime Minister’s parliamentary deadline brought new pressures to the debates, 
leading to a flurry of new negotiations over the weekend before the amendment votes. By 
Monday 18 March, against all predictions—and in contrast to the combative brinksmanship of 
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the previous week—all three parties had endorsed a new cross-party Royal Charter, and in an 
emergency debate the Commons endorsed its submission to the Privy Council. Along with the 
cross-party Charter, the agreement included “that all Leveson-related clauses ... will be 
opposed by all three main parties unless they are withdrawn”.56 The backbench amendments 
had been blunted when, just hours before, a majority of MPs were prepared to impose pro-
Leveson legislation and shatter the Conservative leadership’s political authority. In their place 
the Conservatives’ last-ditch amendments from the week before were reworded to include the 
two-thirds protection against Charter revisions and provisions to empower courts to award civil 
trial costs against publishers—regardless of whether they win or lose the trial— if they were 
not members of a recognised regulator. This single measure, introduced as Section 40 of the 
Crime and Courts Act, was to later become the lynchpin for empowering the whole package of 
post-Leveson reforms. 
The infamous ‘pizza meeting’ 
Through a convoluted mix of non-statutory self-regulation, statutory ‘protections’ to 
insulate the system and new court order ‘incentives’, the cross-party arrangements had 
seemingly neutralised the ‘threat’ of press regulation established in law. 
As I believe we have shown today, statutory regulation of our media, and statutory 
regulation to create a recognition body, is not necessary to achieve the Leveson 
principles. We can do it— indeed we will do it—via a Royal Charter.57 
Tellingly both the Conservative and Labour-Liberal groupings claimed victory, having adroitly 
pulled the other side back to talks and extracted vital policy concessions in their favour. Pro-
reform campaigners, who had lobbied the Labour/Liberal Democrat negotiators throughout the 
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successive draft Charter exchanges, believed the government was forced back to the table by 
the other parties’ amendments: 
The Conservatives probably didn’t have the numbers to win given the forty or so 
Conservative people who were likely to vote with Labour and the Lib Dems. So for 
whatever reason, as soon as that calculus became apparent, it seems the government 
took a different track. (Interview 2) 
Oliver Letwin, by contrast, placed greater emphasis on the success of the Prime Minister’s 
‘gambit’ in “[evoking] a response from the other two parties”: 
The intention of the Prime Minister on Thursday was fulfilled by the response on the 
Friday; namely to crystallise an agreement that effectively we could proceed with the 
Charter.58 
 Accounts from interviewees, together with testimonies by government and campaign 
figures to the CMS Committee, provide a whirlwind of detail of how the three parties reached 
this agreement over this weekend. The Prime Minister met with Letwin to review the 
Labour/Liberal Democrat Charter #3b, met again with the Deputy Prime Minister to reconcile 
the rival Charters’ differences, and agreed to a revised joint proposal which was then put to the 
Labour leader. Whether true victory lay with the government or the other parties, all sides 
reported that agreement on the final terms of the cross-party Charter was reached by mid-
afternoon on the Sunday before the votes. Based on the content of this new cross-party Charter 
(#4a), which Letwin summarised dizzyingly as “a revision of their version of our version of 
our Charter”,59 the government conceded the major policy objections made in the opposition’s 
alternative Charter: of the twelve substantive revisions reflected in the cross-party Charter, nine 
directly adopted the wording of Charter #3b. 
 




In a final marathon session late on the Sunday night in the Labour leader’s 
parliamentary office, key figures from the three main parties—along with four representatives 
of the Hacked Off group and what one interviewee described as “an army of civil servants” 
accompanying Oliver Letwin—worked over six hours to agree the procedural arrangements 
for implementing the cross-party Charter and its associated legislation. By around 6am on the 
Monday morning, the Prime Minister approved the package agreed overnight to present to 
parliament as government business.60 Following the months of back-and-forth drafts, 
parliamentary debates and manoeuvres from parties, the industry and campaigners alike, it is 
telling that the final moments of post-Leveson decision-making were so visceral and 
personalised, and yet totally detached from public accountability or meaningful democratic 
scrutiny. After a five day period of political stalemates, hurried concessions and late-night 
ultimatum, the House of Commons agreed the cross-party Charter without division and the 
amendment Bill clauses were voted through by an unassailable cross-party majority. 
The press reaction was fiercely negative, with coverage dominated by two common 
attacks: that the new system of regulation posed a serious threat to freedom of the press, and 
that the views of the industry had been ignored in private talks “fuelled by Kit Kats and delivery 
pizza”.61 Many national and regional papers declared they would refuse to sign up to what one 
editor described as a “deal for state regulation botched together by politicians and the pressure 
group Hacked Off at a secret late-night meeting”.62 In a late twist the industry group PressBoF, 
seizing on the procedural uncertainties of Royal Charters, countered parliament’s proposals by 
publishing its own Charter on 25 April. This unexpected intervention, reportedly “the 
brainchild of a peer” with knowledge of the Privy Council’s regal processes, exploited a 
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constitutional quirk that “any proposal which is rendered controversial by a counter-petition is 
unlikely to succeed.”63 
PressBoF described its Charter as “a workable, practical way swiftly to deliver the 
Leveson recommendations … without any form of state-sponsored regulation”,64 yet the 
proposals reversed substantial aspects of the cross-party framework. As analysis by the Media 
Standards Trust deftly summarised it, 
The recognition process is owned by PressBoF; party-political peers are allowed to 
serve at all levels; the powers of the regulator are diluted; editors retain control of the 
Standards Code. (Ramsay, 2014:11) 
The PressBoF Charter also removed the requirement for a two-thirds vote in parliament before 
amendments can be made, a purely symbolic revision given the requirement was now set in 
law. Instead board members of the regulators and “all trade associations represented” by the 
industry’s funding body would be granted a veto over changes, reaffirming the publishing 
groups’ expectation (first declared openly after the Delaunay meeting) that they should have 
ultimate control over self-regulation. This effort was in vain however as on 8 October, after a 
public consultation on the industry’s alternative proposals, the government dismissed the 
PressBoF Charter and submitted the cross-party package to the Privy Council.65 
GONE AND FORGOTTEN: PRESS REGULATION AFTER LEVESON 
On 30 October 2013, following eleven months of parliamentary twists, government 
turns and mercurial revisions to policy drafts, the Privy Council officially granted the Royal 
Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press. In a last attempt to court industry approval, the 
government adopted the PressBoF proposal that any future amendments to the Charter would 
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also require the unanimous consent of the Board of the Recognition Panel. This did little to 
sway recalcitrant publishers, who mounted an eleventh-hour High Court challenge to block the 
Privy Council from bringing the Charter into effect. Industry lawyers claimed the government 
was “rollercoastering through” the process without fair consultation while PressBoF chair Lord 
Black said the Charter’s approval would have “enormous ramifications for free speech”.66 Once 
the High Court rejected the challenge, the publishers then sought a Court of Appeal ruling, 
which was again rejected in May 2014. 
It was not until November 2014 that the Press Recognition Panel (PRP), the recognition 
body constituted by the Royal Charter, was formally inaugurated to consider applications from 
prospective new press regulators. In that time the majority of national publishers had joined 
IPSO, the ‘Independent Press Standards Organisation’, which interim PCC chair Lord Hunt 
had begun creating in the immediate aftermath of the Leveson Report. IPSO operates a 
contract-based agreement with its member publishers, as originally proposed by the Hunt-
Black plan and the IIG model presented during the post-Leveson negotiations. At time of 
writing IPSO regulates over 1,500 print newspapers including the majority of national titles,67 
however its funding body the Regulatory Funding Company (the rebranded successor to 
PressBoF) continues to embed commercial expediency and a paucity of editorial accountability 
at the heart of self-regulation. IPSO’s structures and powers satisfy just 12 of the 38 Leveson 
criteria that had dominated the intricate battles over Royal Charter detail. More importantly, 
IPSO has never sought formal recognition by the PRP, and the major publisher companies have 
maintained an uncompromising and vociferous opposition to the Royal Charter framework 
since the March 2013 cross-party settlement. “It's an article of theology in the press,” IPSO’s 
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Chief Executive told an industry conference in 2015, “that they do not want to be part of a 
regulator that's covered by the Recognition Panel.”68 
To date the PRP has officially recognised just one self-regulatory body, IMPRESS, 
which chiefly regulates hyper-local publishers and small news websites, and even this decision 
was challenged by anti-Leveson publishers and press freedom campaign groups. Critics 
attacked IMPRESS’s independence and its largest source of funding, the former Formula One 
chief Max Mosley.69 The News Media Association, the rebranded publishers’ trade body, said 
IMPRESS did not merit recognition as “it is not representative of the press”, and further 
opposed its recognition on the basis that it would trigger the ‘carrot and stick’ legal changes 
agreed as part of the cross-party Charter deal. 
Recognition of IMPRESS will not create an effective press regulator, but it will impose 
on 90 per cent of the newspaper and magazine industry who have joined an established 
self-regulatory body a system of penalties that was only ever intended to affect a 
recalcitrant minority. That would be a perverse outcome.70 
As it happens, these fears were unfounded. The now-infamous Section 40 of the Crime and 
Courts Act was never brought into effect, and the framework set up by the Royal Charter is 
stranded in policy limbo. Nothing can enforce the regulatory criteria required by the PRP, yet 
there is no political will (or indeed the necessary parliamentary supermajority) for disbanding 
it. In March 2018, five years on from the cross-party agreement, the Conservative government 
declared it would repeal Section 40 following a rampant campaign by the press and a lethargic 
DCMS public consultation. In that same statement the Culture Secretary officially ended the 
Leveson Inquiry, claiming “we do not believe that reopening this costly and time consuming 
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public inquiry is the right way forward.”71 Part two of the Inquiry, which would have 
investigated illegal practices and corruption at NOTW and the failed police investigations into 
phone hacking, may now never take place. 
During the Leveson Inquiry, Leveson himself said he hoped the investigations would 
not be ignored and forgotten like the Royal Commissions and Reports of the past. 
The one thing I am determined not to do is to produce a document which simply sits on 
the second shelf of a professor of journalism’s study for him to discuss with his students 
as yet another attempt that went nowhere.72 
Fatefully this is precisely what has happened. IPSO is indistinguishable from the failed PCC it 
replaced, continuing the “pattern of cosmetic reform” that characterised all past interventions 
in press policy (Leveson, 2012b:1535). The system of industry-controlled self-regulation that 
allowed illegal and unethical practices at Britain’s biggest newspapers to go unchecked is 
effectively unchanged. With a new majority Conservative government led by one of the most 
outspoken anti-Leveson politicians, and following the resounding defeat of a Labour leader 
who actively rebuked the dominant right-wing publishing groups, this non-policy is unlikely 
to be challenged again anytime soon. 
Returning to Research Question (1), the post-Leveson debates reveal a great deal about 
the dynamics of power that are embedded in the structures, mechanisms and practices of British 
media policymaking. The institutional failures exposed by the phone hacking scandal and the 
Leveson Inquiry clearly defied ‘traditional’ methods of executive deliberation. Yet the reactive, 
frenetic and purposefully private backroom negotiations, organised between political elites, 
newspaper executives and a handful of campaigners, ensured that decision-making was still 
dominated by the same corporate press influence that pervades many of Britain’s democratic 
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institutions. As for Research Question (2), the informal structure of the post-Leveson 
processes—absent of any legal precedent or established practices—did allow a range of 
interests and stakeholders to intervene in unexpected ways as the topic or function of debate 
shifted. Hacked Off’s intimate lobbying in the chaotic aftermath of the Milly Dowler 
revelations focussed the Leveson Inquiry on regulatory reform. The Prime Minister’s formation 
of cross-party talks gave opposition parties an equitable role in the government’s Charter 
drafting. The solid bloc of pro-Leveson MPs in parliament consistently pressured the party 
leaders into adopting more of Leveson’s specific recommendations. 
However, this does not mean that decisions on press policy were the results of a 
pluralist, balanced or representative political process. Rather, the formative decision by the 
Prime Minister to reject statutory implementation restricted the scope of the post-Leveson 
debates to the sole objective of the newspaper industry. Before any policymaker’s pen had even 
touched a draft document, all subsequent disagreements or revisions in policy were prescribed 
to a narrow range of potential solutions, while the overarching political dynamics of reform 
remained captured by elite industry interests. Whether the Leveson reforms posed a genuine 
threat to freedom of the press remains a subject of major (though only sometimes earnest) 
debate, but the post-Leveson debates from 2012 to 2014 were foremost a demonstration of how 
the entrenched influence of national newspaper publishers rendered political institutions 




6. THE BBC CHARTER REVIEW 
The legal and constitutional foundation of the BBC as a public service broadcaster is 
its Royal Charter, which defines the Corporation’s purposes, governance, the scope of its 
services and how these are regulated. The Charter also determines the relationship between the 
broadcaster and the government, specifying how the BBC is held accountable as a publicly-
funded body while ensuring it maintains its essential political, editorial and creative 
independence. Each of the nine Charters granted to the BBC since its incorporation as a public 
body in 1927 has included an expiry date, specifying when a new Charter is required and 
therefore when government is likely to begin deliberating the BBC’s future. This has 
established Charter renewal as a routine episode in British media policymaking, and Charter 
review is a product of history in its own right. New or evolving political dynamics and policy 
mechanisms have changed both the formal decision-making process and the BBC’s role in UK 
media, such that the evolution of Charter review is emblematic of broader developments in 
British broadcasting policy and the dynamics of power that shape it. 
In November 2016, following nearly two years of parliamentary inquiries, public 
consultations and negotiations with the BBC, the government finalised a renewed eleven-year 
Charter to continue the BBC until 2028. This new Charter brought about many significant 
changes from the previous Charter agreed in 2006. The BBC’s two governing bodies were 
replaced with a single unitary board, while Ofcom took over regulation of BBC services and 
their market impact. At the core of the 2016 Charter is an all-encompassing requirement for 
‘distinctiveness’, a term which throughout the renewal process had served as a rallying cry 
from both government and commercial broadcasters for a less expansive, more narrowly-
focussed BBC and signified a fundamental redefinition of the political justifications for and 
social aims of public service broadcasting. The government’s May 2016 White Paper 
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articulated distinctiveness as a radical departure from ideals of ‘universality’, and suggested 
that in order “to merit its special privileges and substantial public funding, the BBC needs to 
stand apart from other broadcasters, distinguishing itself from the market” (DCMS, 2016a:28). 
These debates, inexorably bound up in the fraught politics of the BBC’s independence, shaped 
many of the pivotal decisions of the 2016 Charter review which have determined how Britain’s 
largest and most important public media institution will operate over the next decade. 
This chapter details the Charter renewal process in 2016, and analyses how the structure 
and substance of government decision-making was shaped over almost a decade of media 
scandals, political conflicts, public campaigns and corporate lobbying. Although the official 
practices of Charter review have developed over successive debates into a recognisable and 
established pattern, many of the formative moments and pivotal changes of BBC policymaking 
between 2007 and 2016 occurred in the margins of these quasi-legal processes. Central 
questions about the future of the BBC were framed through a combination of aggressive media 
coverage by its fiercest commercial opponents and the Conservative government’s 
ideologically-motivated policy objectives. Yet Charter review did not result in the death of the 
BBC or the abolition of its public funding, with a general sense of public and political esteem 
for this historic and uniquely British institution staving off more radical and destructive reform. 
The 2016 BBC Charter review is thus a rich case study of the paradoxical power dynamics 
between public participation and private elite influence over UK broadcast policymaking, and 
of how these battles changed the world’s largest public service broadcaster amongst 
accelerating changes and uncertain challenges for national and international media. 
THE AGE OF PUBLIC VALUE – 2006 TO OCTOBER 2013 
The substantive process of government consultations and reports that led to the renewed 
2016 BBC Charter officially started in 2015, yet the broader formation of the debates and issues 
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that defined these processes effectively began on 1 January 2007 with the commencement of 
the 2007-16 Charter period. The foundations of the 2016 Royal Charter started with the debates 
and decisions of its 2006 predecessor, with many of the dominant policy tensions of Charter 
review taking shape throughout this interim decade. This opening section details the salient 
policy changes implemented by the 2006 Charter and the political dynamics between the BBC 
and government from 2007 to 2016. Throughout this period the Corporation’s political critics 
and commercial rivals attempted to reframe various public scandals involving the BBC as 
pressing issues of policy failure. These events helped to shape the proposals, values and range 
of actors engaged in the 2016 Charter review, and demonstrated how incipient conflicts in any 
policy process are percolated and defined long before the formal decision-making process has 
even begun. 
The 2006 Charter review 
The defining questions of Charter review in 2006 mirrored many of the same issues 
facing the BBC in 2016, including but not limited to 
the willingness of licence fee payers to pay rising licence fees, concerns about 
programme quality and character, and concerns about the possibly adverse impact of a 
well-funded public sector incumbent on competitiveness, diversity and innovation in 
the broadcasting market as a whole. (Collins, 2007:168) 
Two major events left a lasting impact on BBC policy during the 1997-2006 Charter period. 
The Communications Act 2003 shifted all regulation of broadcasting standards to the new 
‘super-regulator’ Ofcom, laying the groundwork for governments to impose more and 
increasingly stringent market constraints on the BBC in the future (Doyle and Vick, 2005:82; 
Smith, 2006:936-7). Following a scathing feud with the Labour government over perceived 
bias in BBC coverage of the Iraq War (see Barnett, 2005:332-7), the 2004 Hutton Inquiry 
censured BBC management for failures in governance and editorial standards (2004:332). The 
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furore led to the unprecedented resignation of both the Director-General and the chair of the 
Board of Governors, marking one the most significant political crises in the BBC’s recent 
history. Just as regulation by Ofcom became the thin end of the wedge for greater market 
restrictions on the BBC’s public services, the Hutton saga gave critics fresh ammunition to 
claim the BBC institutionally flawed and in need of swathing reform (Smith and Steemers, 
2007:44). 
Charter renewal in 2006 tracked the now-familiar pattern of consultations, government 
Papers and negotiation, and interviewees involved this recalled how the structure of decision-
making put in place by Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell embodied the political approach of the 
New Labour government. 
It was pretty clear from the way the process was set up, from the way she established 
the consultation, the people she had around her, to the general benign approach of the 
Labour Party and most Labour supporters towards the BBC, it was going to be a 
friendly settlement. (Interview 9) 
This benign approach did not entirely protect the BBC from wide-ranging reforms. The 
government’s March 2005 Green Paper combined the BBC’s own policy vision, Building 
Public Value (BPV), with the recommendations of the government-appointed Charter review 
panel led by former Treasury economy Lord Burns. The Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport (DCMS) repeated the argument, voiced even more loudly since Hutton, that the role of 
the BBC Governors as judge and jury was “increasingly out of step with best corporate 
governance practice” (DCMS, 2005:6).Yet against the Burns Panel’s proposals for an 
independent Public Service Broadcasting Commission (PBSC), the government resolved to 
create a new sovereign body within the BBC. The ‘BBC Trust’ would act as “a powerful 
advocate for the public interest, with ultimate power over the licence fee and the BBC”, while 
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delivery of BBC services would belong to the formally constituted Executive Board (DCMS, 
2005:8, 72). 
Alongside the historic shakeup of corporate governance, the government’s Green and 
White Papers (DCMS, 2005; 2006a) embraced ‘public value’ as the ethos for its reforms to the 
BBC’s purpose and remit. First articulated by the BBC itself in BPV, the concept elaborated a 
new doctrine of public sector administration emphasising the public’s “needs and aspirations 
rather than institutional or personal interests” (Collins, 2007:170, see also Moore, 1995 and 
Kelly et al., 2002). To provide greater accountability to licence fee payers’ preferences, BPV 
proposed that every BBC service should contribute to at least one of five formalised Public 
Purposes: democratic value, cultural and creative value, educational value, social and 
community value, and global value (BBC, 2004:8). The renewed BBC Charter for 2007-2016 
implemented these Public Purposes as the BBC’s “main object” (DCMS, 2006c:2). Any new 
or substantially changed BBC service would face a Public Value Test, conducted by the BBC 
Trust, and a market impact assessment by Ofcom before approval. As Freedman noted shortly 
after their introduction, this shift to a quantitative, empirical approach for regulating the BBC’s 
services “will generate enormous amounts of data ... that are far better suited to an 
understanding of broadcasting as a straightforward economic, rather than a complex social and 
cultural, practice” (2008:157). 
Charter review in 2006 thus implemented a new theory of public service broadcasting 
that took the BBC’s Reithian foundations—to inform, educate and entertain—and reconstituted 
them as measurable criteria within an increasingly marketised regulatory culture. BPV 
embodied the BBC’s paradoxical influence on Charter review, representing both “the 
organisation’s pre-emptive strike” (Oakley et al., 2006:4) and a high-minded manifesto “in its 
own defence and to secure its future” (Collins, 2007:165). Indeed in relation to Research 
Question (4), these corporate maneuverers provide a useful demonstration of the power 
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relations between the BBC, its own policymaking processes and government. Anticipating 
aggressive government reform cheered on by its commercial rivals, the BBC offered to 
fundamentally reinvent itself yet ultimately ended up accepting a new Royal Charter that 
significantly diminished its status as a public institution. Coupled with a below-inflation licence 
fee settlement in 2007, the 2006 Charter heralded a new political pattern of ritual self-
flagellation that defined the BBC’s dealings with government, both throughout the renewed 
Charter period and during the 2016 review process. 
The politics of licence fee settlements 
The value of the licence fee, the BBC’s primary source of funding, has historically been 
negotiated outside the cycle of Charter review debates. However, renewed funding deals in 
January 2007 and October 2010 coloured the backdrop to the 2016 Charter review in two ways. 
First, these agreements intensified the trend of ‘ring-fencing’ and ‘top-slicing’ licence fee 
revenue to pay for government spending commitments. The 2007 deal introduced additional 
costs to the BBC including implementing the analogue-to-digital TV switchover, which created 
a funding gap of “around £2bn over the next six years”.73 The 2010 settlement froze the licence 
fee at £145.50 until 2017 (amounting to a 16 per cent cut in the total BBC budget) while 
expanding the ring-fenced digital switchover fund to pay for the national broadband 
infrastructure, shifting over £340m of public spending from the Treasury book’s and onto the 
BBC’s. Both of these settlements squeezed the Corporation’s cash flow, forcing it to prioritise 
some activities over others and fuelling criticism about how the BBC spends licence fee payers’ 
money. 
Second, these deals were reached through secretive bartering, fierce confrontation and 
last-minute concessions, epitomised by the October 2010 licence fee settlement conducted as 
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part of the Coalition government’s extensive public sector spending review. The Culture 
Secretary announced the government’s intention to shift the £556m cost of free over-75s TV 
licences (paid for by the Department for Work and Pensions since 1999) to the BBC. BBC 
negotiators responded that the plan was “unacceptable in principle” and would “transfer an 
uncapped liability for a Government welfare scheme to the licence fee payer”,74 offering 
instead to absorb the costs of the World Service and the Welsh-language broadcaster S4C (then 
paid by the Foreign Office and DCMS respectively) in exchange for a fully renewed licence 
fee deal. As the government dug in its heels, the BBC braced for a standoff. Members of the 
Trust prepared to publicly oppose the forced costs, and even threatened to resign en masse if 
the government imposed a deal without the BBC’s consent. 
This brinksmanship is all the more extraordinary given the costly liabilities the BBC 
eventually accepted, which the Director-General strangely welcomed as “a realistic deal in 
exceptional circumstances securing a strong independent BBC for the next six years”.75 After 
“all-night horse-trading” with government ministers (Snoddy, 2015:23), and without any 
consultation or public scrutiny, the BBC had conceded a raft of new costs to prevent one 
massive financial shock. Regardless of whether negotiations favoured the BBC or the Treasury, 
the deal incurred a considerable reduction in the BBC’s financial independence and, as the 
CMS Select Committee summarised, presented the BBC as “little different to a Government 
department or agency” (2011:14). This erratic and decidedly undemocratic process is 
emblematic of the power imbalance between the BBC and government during funding 
settlements, and these brief but intense skirmishes created a precedent for how the protracted 
battles of Charter renewal would unfold in 2016. 
 
74 Letter from Chairman of the BBC Trust to the Prime Minister, 17 October 2010. 
75 BBC Press Release, 20 October 2010. 
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The BBC under fire 
Just as the Hutton Inquiry set the tone for Charter renewal in 2006, between 2010 and 
2013 the BBC was beset with crises that defined the core policy questions of the 2016 Charter 
review. Following revelations of endemic sexual abuse by the deceased BBC presenter Jimmy 
Savile, the BBC brought further criticism after editors cancelled a 2011 Newsnight 
investigation into the “cesspit” culture of ignored accusations and talent impunity.76 Then in 
May 2013 the BBC abandoned its £100m Digital Media Initiative (DMI) for transitioning video 
and audio material to a bespoke digital archive. The Director-General admitted that DMI had 
“wasted a huge amount of licence fee payers’ money”,77 and parliament’s Public Accounts 
Committee attacked the BBC Trust for “a culture of complacency” in its oversight and scrutiny 
of large projects (2014:3). 
The BBC attracted more political scorn after its efforts to shrink senior management 
were revealed to have cost more than £25m in severance payments. “Weak governance 
arrangements,” the National Audit Office concluded, had “led to payments that exceeded 
contractual obligations and put public trust at risk” (2013:9). Briefings and correspondence 
between executives revealed the chaotic, opaque lines of accountability between the Trust and 
BBC Executive, and acrimonious testimony from BBC bosses at the Public Accounts 
Committee cemented popular perceptions that the BBC was overly hierarchical, stolid and 
remote.78 
The dominant interpretations of Savile-Newsnight, DMI and the staff severance 
scandals as failures of policy were primarily driven by newspapers with consistently anti-BBC 
 
76 Daily Mirror, ‘BBC axe investigation into Sir Jimmy Savile and schoolgirls’, 8 Jan 2012. Lord Patten speech 
to the Broadcasting Press Guild, 12 October 2012. See also blog post explaining Newsnight’s decision-making by 
programme editor Peter Rippon, 2 October 2012. 
77 BBC press release, 24 May 2013. 
78 See PAC oral evidence, 9 September 2013 (Q 412, HC 476-ii:48). 
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editorial lines. An established set of backbench Conservative MPs used the thick atmosphere 
of outrage to reassert their enduring demand for reform: 
There is only one way to change the culture at the BBC; abolish the licence fee. If the 
BBC had to strive and stretch for every subscription, it would soon learn to be more 
careful with other people's money.79 
Even figures in government hinted at across-the-board reform of the BBC, with one DCMS 
source quoted saying “it is clear that the Trust, which is both a cheerleader for the BBC and its 
regulator, does not work.”80 The role of scandal and political furore is not new to the Charter 
review process. But these events are nonetheless useful for demonstrating how, even though 
formal BBC decision-making takes place through recognised official mechanisms, the 
foundations and justifications for these are defined through deeply political interpretations in 
which the agenda-setting power of elite media institutions plays a determining role. 
CROWDING OUT AND CAVING IN – OCTOBER 2013 TO JULY 2015 
As the end of the 2007-16 Charter period drew closer, political and media attention 
turned to forthcoming BBC Charter renewal. The CMS Select Committee’s extensive inquiry 
on the defining issues of Charter review produced the first official articulation of BBC policy 
issues and laid the foundations for the government’s subsequent proposals. As this inquiry 
unfurled, the BBC instigated a number of pre-emptive reforms while continuing to wrestle with 
the Trust’s strained cheerleader-regulator responsibilities. The looming 2015 general election 
pulled the political realities of Charter review into the open, with the Conservative Party’s 
attacks on perceived news bias and barely-veiled threats of policy retribution further souring 
its already irritable relationship with the BBC. The emerging policy agenda focussed on four 
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main areas that comprised the substantive detail of the Royal Charter: governance and 
regulation of the BBC; the BBC’s purposes and values; the scale and scope of the BBC’s 
services; and funding. Though previous Charter debates have always covered these topics, its 
most hostile critics persistently asserted the BBC’s recent corporate failings as existential 
challenges to the public service broadcasting ideals that have historically structured these as 
policy criteria. 
‘The future of the BBC’ 
Launched in October 2013, the CMS Committee’s ‘Future of the BBC’ inquiry 
eschewed a forensic post-mortem of the on-going scandals in favour of a more wide-ranging 
review of BBC policy. Over 120 organisations and individuals submitted written evidence, and 
the Committee held in-depth hearings with senior BBC figures, commercial media executives, 
industry and audience associations, academics and commentators. This apparent plurality 
supports the notion that Select Committees serve as important bodies for involving multiple 
interests and groups in policy deliberation, gathering evidence, and fostering public debate, all 
of which help to inform the parliamentary policymaking process (Russell and Gover, 2017:228-
9). 
Yet the institutional politics of these inquiries can also limit deliberations, particularly 
through Committee members’ own policy preferences and their influence on how witnesses 
and evidence are selected. This directorial steering was especially evident during the Future of 
the BBC inquiry under the chairmanship of Conservative MP John Whittingdale. One 
interviewee, who had both advised and testified to previous CMS inquiries, recalled how the 
Committee’s focus appeared predetermined by Whittingdale’s own views on the BBC. 
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I did feel that they were sort of going through the motions. In Commons Select 
Committees it is a matter of what the Chair wants, and to what extent he or she is going 
to be prepared to compromise on the back of the other Committee members. (Interview 
9) 
Whittingdale—a staunch opponent of the licence fee, which he described as a regressive and 
compulsory “stealth poll tax”81—opened the CMS inquiry with a litany of pro-market 
arguments against the BBC’s dominance of UK broadcasting. In his view “the explosion in the 
past few years in the number of different content outlets” meant that debates on the BBC’s 
future needed to consider “what the BBC should be doing—and, indeed, what it should no 
longer be doing—in this new environment.”82 
In a further show of sensitivity to commercial media interests, the Committee appointed 
BSkyB’s former director of public affairs, Ray Gallagher, as a specialist advisor to its BBC 
inquiry. Gallagher’s appointment represented a major success for BSkyB’s lobbying efforts, 
one of many examples of the Murdoch-run company ingratiating itself with pivotal politicians 
and cementing its interests at the core of broadcasting policy debates (Davies, 2014:225). Yet 
the formation of the CMS Committee’s inquiry also shows the degree of political 
correspondence between commercial media interests and elite policymaking actors. Both 
groups conceptualise the purpose and objectives of media policymaking as exercises of 
industrial management benefitting from the input and expertise of industry executives, rather 
than as fundamental on-going examinations into the social and cultural role of media 
institutions in public life. 
Commercial media groups’ submissions to the inquiry repeated many of the same 
arguments for reining in the BBC’s market share as Whittingdale had espoused, and 
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demonstrate, in the vein of Research Question (3), the significance of language and policy 
values as a form of power resource in policymaking. Global Radio, the UK’s largest 
commercial radio broadcaster, claimed that “far too often the BBC strays into areas where the 
private sector is already operating and serving consumers” (2013:2). ITV argued that in order 
to justify the privilege of public funding the BBC “must deliver services and programme genres 
that the market will not deliver” (2013:2). Even on the often dry topic of governance, these 
groups blamed the overlap between BBC oversight and management for the expansion of BBC 
services into market ‘territory’. Commercial broadcasters criticised the BBC Trust setting the 
BBC’s strategy while regulating its market impact; in a telling admission of priorities, BSkyB’s 
director of policy complained of “a situation where the Public Value Tests are not transparent 
and where public value trumps market impact every time.”83 
These appeals for a ‘market gap’ policy of Charter renewal were not left unchallenged. 
Supporters of the BBC as a universal public service broadcaster, such as Voice of the Listener 
and Viewer (VLV) and the NUJ, argued forcefully for retaining BBC services “characterised 
by equity and excellence and delivered to wide range of audiences” (VLV, 2013:4). Media 
researchers and academics submitted market analysis indicating that “well-funded PSB 
supplied at scale does not ‘crowd out’ commercial expenditure on programming, but serves 
UK audiences and the UK economy by contributing to a ‘virtuous’ cycle of investment and 
competition” (Enders Analysis, 2013:1). 
Many of the arguments in favour of the BBC’s existing scale and scope were, however, 
subsumed within the broader perception that the Corporation had become bloated and 
unresponsive. In its February 2015 report the Select Committee recommended abolishing the 
BBC Trust—“far too protective of the BBC as an institution, rather than acting as an effective 
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151 
and objective regulator” (2015:124)—and establishing a unitary board overseen by an 
independent ‘Public Service Broadcasting Commission’ (as the Burns Panel had recommended 
in 2006). Whittingdale told the Commons that the Committee had been “unconvinced by the 
argument that it [the BBC] should continue to try to provide something for everyone”,84 and 
the report proposed lowering the threshold for triggering Public Value Tests “where there is 
prima facie evidence of the BBC crowding out others’ endeavours and having an adverse 
market impact” (2015:118-9). Although the Committee endorsed retaining the regulatory 
mechanisms introduced by the 2006 Charter—PVTs, the Public Purposes and service 
licences—its report advocated reforming these to promote a competitive and uninhibited media 
market, just as commercial broadcasters had proposed. 
The ‘Future of the BBC’ report did include some comparatively progressive 
recommendations such as criticising the government and the BBC for their 2010 licence fee 
negotiations and arguing that in future “the process must be open and transparent, licence fee 
payers must be consulted and Parliament should have an opportunity to debate the level of 
funding being set” (2015:123). However, the wider political dynamics of the CMS inquiry 
suggest that it reached its findings in a less open and pluralistic manner than the Committee 
expected of others. Throughout its deliberations and evidence-gathering, the Committee 
accepted the premise that increased audience choice and rapid technological change were a 
priori justifications for a less ‘universal’ BBC. The report thus marginalised pro-universal 
arguments in the subsequent debates, and positioned the commercial media industry’s preferred 
‘market gap’ model for the BBC at the centre of the Charter review policy agenda. As one 
academic commentator remarked, 
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the ultimate aim of this Report appears to be a smaller, poorer, less publicly attuned 
BBC filling in the market gaps, rather than a thriving and dynamic institution which 
serves its audiences and operates in the public interest.85 
Pre-emptive reform 
The BBC made numerous changes to both its broadcasting services and internal 
organisation in the final years of the 2007-2016 Charter period. A joint review by the Executive 
and Trust attempted to better distinguish the roles of the two governing bodies (2013:6), while 
the Executive implemented new rules on fiscal prudence after the NAO laid bare the public 
cost of the DMI failure (NAO, 2014a; 2014b) In March 2014 the BBC Executive proposed 
cutting costs for its BBC Three channel (aimed at 16 to 34-year-olds) by reorganising it as an 
online-only service. Despite a campaign to ‘Save BBC Three’ attracting over 300,000 
signatures, the Trust approved a Public Value Test of the move claiming “the long-term future 
of broadcasting seems likely to be online and the BBC needs to find innovative ways to support 
the audience move in that direction” (BBC Trust, 2015b:4). Genuine public engagement was 
notably absent from these efforts at reflexivity and adapting public service broadcasting to new 
challenges. 
The BBC’s institutional autonomy and its reaction to scrutiny intersected even more 
starkly in 2014 and early 2015, as senior executives began articulating their own Charter review 
agenda. Many of these appeals tacitly accepted the view that the BBC needed to limit its 
activities where they encroached on market competition. In a July 2014 speech titled ‘Compete 
or Compare’, the BBC’s Director-General Tony Hall proposed removing the ‘in-house’ and 
independent production quotas, replacing ‘managed competition’ in BBC commissioning with 
“a true level playing-field”. Pact, the independent producers association, and the BBC 
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Executive issued a joint statement outlining a new commercial subsidy, ‘BBC Studios’, which 
would “bring substantial benefits in terms of opening up new commissioning opportunities to 
competition”. The new Chair of the Trust, Rona Fairhead, similarly signalled that the BBC had 
accepted an inevitable total overhaul of its governance structure, describing the CMS 
Committee’s proposals for external regulation as “the front-runner” approach.86 
These statements and speeches from senior BBC figures suggest something of a double-
edged nature to the Corporation’s influence and role during the preliminary stages of Charter 
review. On the one hand, decisions on creative output, institutional procedures and public 
engagement formed the “continuous process” (Hill and Varone, 2017:239) of implementing 
the policy framework set by the 2006 Charter and making changes where required to reflect 
the evolving political, technological and social contexts of British media. On the other hand, 
the BBC as a policy actor is not value-neutral, and its pre-emptive reforms were guided as 
much by political tactics as by organisational imperative. 
Within the BBC’s numerous reviews, reports and public statements in this period, there 
are recurring references to enhancing the ‘distinctiveness’ of BBC services and the overarching 
need to “offer something distinctive from commercial networks” (BBC, 2013). This became 
an almost talismanic rationale for how the BBC operated between 2013 and 2015, and the term 
would later be assimilated as the Conservative government’s guiding policy narrative during 
Charter review (see Chapter 7). Much like the notion of ‘anticipated reactions’ (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1963:635; Lukes, 2005:45), the BBC acceded to elements of the market gap argument 
in order to deter some of the government’s more extreme Charter review proposals. Although 
the BBC had a critical role in constructing the political agenda of the 2016 Charter review, its 
own nascent attempts at steering this agenda in a favourable direction were clearly aimed at 
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mitigating the policy implications of anti-BBC critiques rather than actively opposing the free 
market politics of broadcasting they entailed. Changes to BBC services and prospective policy 
announcements in this pre-Charter period corresponded directly with the criticisms levelled 
against the Corporation by its rivals, suggesting in relation to Research Question (2) and (3) 
that the extent of BBC influence over its own policy debates is drastically curtailed by the 
deeper prevalence of commercial media logic in broadcast policymaking. 
The government goes to war 
In July 2015 the government published a Green Paper as its first major contribution to 
Charter review, yet the Conservative Party’s political strategy for Charter renewal had been 
evolving long before this official consultation process was set in motion. In May 2014 the 
Culture Secretary Sajid Javid announced that the government would not begin the review until 
after the general election in a year’s time. This delay reflected the political custom of distancing 
Charter renewal from election cycles, supposedly to inoculate the BBC against political 
pressure and allow it to report freely as the parties vie for power. 
Persistent criticisms of BBC election coverage throughout the campaigning period, 
along with veiled threats of policy retribution from Conservative politicians (eagerly reported 
by right-wing newspapers), suggest that any such high-minded support for BBC independence 
was short-lived. The BBC’s handling of its TV leaders debates, in particular the prospect that 
the Prime Minister would be ‘empty-chaired’ if he decided not to attend, was seized on as 
evidence that the BBC had “abandoned all attempts to conceal its left-wing bias.”87 
Conservative MPs frequently attacked what they perceived as the BBC’s “appalling left-wing 
bias” in its election coverage,88 with one arguing “you only have to consider a range of topics 
such as climate change, the EU and immigration to see that the BBC treats those who have 
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concerns about such issues with an institutional disdain”.89 Emboldened by the Conservative 
Party’s unexpected election victory on 7 May, the Prime Minister appointed John Whittingdale 
as the new Culture Secretary with an explicit instruction to “sort out the BBC”.90 The first 
decisive battle of pre-Charter review conflict erupted soon after when, a week before the 
government’s Summer Budget, Whittingdale informed the Director-General that the BBC 
would be required to bear the cost of free TV licences for the over-75s. 
Much like when this was first floated in 2010, the Culture Secretary justified the BBC 
shouldering additional costs as part of the government’s broader austerity agenda, or “what we 
need to do as a country to get our house in order”.91 Unlike 2010, however, this was an 
imposition and not a proposal. “Perhaps learning from the dramatic brinkmanship of five years 
earlier,” Snoddy suggests, the government “made it clear there was no room for the BBC to 
negotiate on the principle” (2015:20). Through private meetings and phone calls in the few 
days before the Budget, BBC executives extracted a handful of compensations from the 
Treasury: an index-linked rise in the licence fee; the release of the broadband ring-fence fund; 
phasing in the cost of paying for over-75s concessions over three years from 2018; and closing 
the ‘iPlayer loophole’ that allowed viewers to access on-demand BBC content without a 
television licence. 
The government made clear, however, that these mitigations were dependent on 
assessment of the BBC’s purpose and scope, severing the supposed distinction between the 
fiscal trade-offs of licence fee settlements and the political negotiations of Charter review. The 
BBC Trust had “put the government off” imposing drastic cuts in BBC funding in 2010, but 
“only until the next time” (Snoddy, 2015:26). The Director-General again welcomed the 2015 
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settlement as “the right deal for the BBC in difficult economic times”, but in letters to ministers 
the Chair of the BBC Trust lamented “the process by which it has been reached”. Labour’s 
Shadow Culture Secretary condemned the “smash-and-grab raid on the BBC”92 while former 
Director-General and crossbench peer John Birt castigated the pattern of 
opportunistic, expedient and unprincipled diktats issued to the BBC in the dead of night, 
a pistol to its head, absent any democratic debate—diktats that have sidelined the 
licence fee payers, the trust that represents them, the department concerned and 
Parliament itself.93 
Snoddy’s account of negotiations—complete with ministers’ flimsy assurances, sudden 
changes of heart and despondent BBC executives—hints at a fatal imbalance in the BBC’s 
relationship with government. A policy expert for one of Charter review’s central stakeholder 
groups also recalled how the settlement defied even the Culture Secretary’s own expectations 
for licence fee negotiations. 
It grates to this day and shows how realpolitik can change everything. John 
Whittingdale in his Select Committee report said no more licence fee negotiations 
should be held behind closed doors as it was in 2010. Well, draw your conclusions from 
that! The findings of the report might as well have been a complete waste of paper. A 
chair of a Select Committee makes recommendations, then becomes Secretary of State 
and doesn’t follow up on it. (Interview 11) 
Another interviewee argued that BBC executives surrendered to a second, even more damaging 
back-room deal because they were faced with a fervently ideological Culture Secretary and the 
mass of hostile press reports on waste, bias and bloat. 
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The BBC was in a very vulnerable position and felt itself to be in a very vulnerable 
position. I think it played its cards very badly but there is a sort of a ritual dance about 
it, this sort of pas de deux. It’s become more government-led over the last couple of 
funding negotiations, but the BBC may have felt they had no choice. (Interview 9) 
The 2015 settlement thus demonstrated a critical weakness in the BBC’s independence and its 
ability to defend its public service interests against outside threats. The deal left the Corporation 
in an even more compromised position, just as the real battle for its future was beginning, and 
the over-75s concession has kept the BBC in a crushing financial and political vice grip to this 
day. 
THE LARGEST EVER PUBLIC CONSULTATION – JULY 2015 TO MAY 2016 
The government formalised its BBC reform package in its May 2016 White Paper 
(DCMS, 2016a). This pivotal document was itself the product of a ten-month process 
comprising the full arsenal of formalised Charter review practices: an extensive public 
consultation on the government’s Green Paper (DCMS, 2015); a parallel public consultation 
by the BBC Trust on the BBC Executive’s Charter manifesto; a flurry of independent studies 
commissioned by both DCMS and the BBC; an expert advisory panel conducting research and 
stakeholder engagement; and frequent private negotiations with both BBC executives and 
lobbyists from the wider broadcasting industry. 
At first glance this was an exhaustively comprehensive evidence-led exercise, inviting 
the full plurality of public and private interests to forge the future of public service 
broadcasting. However, the popular impression of open and consultative policymaking 
(regularly celebrated by the Culture Secretary) obscures the constraints, conflicts and biases 
built into the government’s actual methods of decision-making. Far from entailing a simple set 
of unambiguous ‘issues’ to be untangled and ‘solved’, the dominant questions and official 
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procedures of Charter renewal in 2016 largely reinforced the aims and grievances of the BBC’s 
political and commercial opponents. 
Public consultations and the Green Paper agenda 
The DCMS Green Paper structured its public consultation around 19 thematic questions 
(2015:22-3), many of which presupposed reforming the BBC as a ‘market gap’ public service 
broadcaster. Press reports ahead of its publication hinted at a “root-and-branch” evaluation of 
the BBC’s entire operations: the government would, according to ‘DCMS sources’, call for the 
BBC to “stop chasing viewers” in competition with ITV’s primetime Saturday programming, 
with popular BBC shows like Strictly Come Dancing and The Voice targeted as “the first that 
should go”.94 The Green Paper was not so overtly extreme, but nonetheless framed its 
evaluation of the BBC around commercial concerns: 
Q4. Is the expansion of the BBC’s services justified in the context of increased choice 
for consumers? Is the BBC crowding out commercial competition and, if so, is this 
justified? 
Q9. Is the BBC’s content sufficiently high quality and distinctive from that of other 
broadcasters? What reforms could improve it? 
The inference throughout was that the government had already decided on what changes should 
be implemented in Charter review, emphasising a competitive market over any notion that the 
BBC could maintain its current scale (let alone do more). Although the BBC itself had 
previously acceded to many of the Green Paper’s suggested areas for reform, the Corporation 
nonetheless cautioned that the uncompromising tone of the Green Paper seemed to “herald a 
much diminished, less popular BBC.”95 
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By the end of its twelve-week submission period the Green Paper had garnered over 
192,000 responses, accounting for what the government described as “one of the largest ever 
public consultations” (DCMS, 2016a:6). This unprecedented volume of interest reflects the 
sheer breadth of media policy issues swept up in the gravity of Charter review. Yet within this 
diverse corpus of proposals from commercial media, civil society groups, campaigners and 
numerous other stakeholders, there are two distinct and conflicting accounts for reforming the 
BBC’s governance, purposes, scale and funding. 
Commercial broadcasters asserted the same ‘market gap’ theory of public service 
broadcasting that BBC critics had promulgated throughout the preceding Charter period. ITV 
recommended that the next Charter should include “an explicit obligation” on the BBC to offer 
“only services and content which is innovative and distinctive from that provided by the 
market” (2015:17). Sky, ITV and the Commercial Broadcasters Association (COBA) all 
favoured transferring regulation of the BBC to Ofcom, emphasising “limiting market impact” 
as a central criteria for approving and assessing BBC services (ITV, 2015:46). On Public Value 
Tests, the instrument of choice for holding back the BBC’s encroachment into commercial 
territory, COBA supported a “rebalanced” regime “to minimise the risk of negative market 
impact” (2015:15) while Sky argued that BBC services that entailed any lessening of 
competition should be rejected “irrespective of any claimed ‘public value’” (2015:17). Rather 
than shrinking BBC services by directly reducing or replacing its public funding, commercial 
rivals instead recommended stringent regulatory and structural constraints, confining the 
BBC’s output to a niche of ‘distinctive’ services that would not compete with those offered by 
the market. 
In contrast, submissions from advocacy groups and smaller industry stakeholders 
broadly supported sustaining the BBC’s public service offer. Pact suggested that the BBC’s 
expansion was not “excessive given the cost of the licence fee” and, “with regards to television, 
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the BBC’s current footprint improves viewer choice” (2015:13). VLV pointed to the economic 
benefits of a large public broadcaster, which do not 
impede the commercial market or growth, [but] actually enhances it by building the 
overall size and skills in the market, giving it global scale and attracting inward 
investment. (VLV, 2015:4) 
Whereas commercial broadcasters highlighted drama, entertainment and comedy as crowded 
genres, for Pact these formed “part of this country’s cultural heritage” that suited the public 
service aims of the BBC (2015:10). VLV similarly proclaimed the benefits of a universal BBC, 
holding that “the provision of high quality services for all homes should remain a high public 
policy priority for reasons of social equity, cultural cohesion and educational development” 
(2015:15). Ranging from pragmatic and cautious to loyal defences of the BBC as a cultural and 
democratic institution, these submissions argued that, as the campaign group Save Our BBC 
colourfully summarised it, “the BBC and PSB are for citizens and about citizenship. 
Broadcasting is a civil and societal service, not equivalent to a can of beans” (2015). 
The BBC Executive’s submission to the Green Paper consultation, British, Bold, 
Creative, laid out a determined case for the BBC’s wide-ranging social goals that retain 
“widespread public support” (2015c:9), yet its recommendations still associated these goals 
with an increasingly marketised mode of public service broadcasting. On governance, the BBC 
Executive supported replacing the existing dual model with a unitary board, accepting as a 
corollary “the move to external regulation” (BBC, 2015c:89) that its commercial rivals had 
long lobbied for. On scale and scope the Executive strongly refuted the ‘crowding out’ 
hypothesis, and suggested that the test of the BBC’s output should be that “the range of 
programmes in a BBC service should be clearly distinguishable from its commercial 
competitors” (BBC, 2015a:24, my emphasis). This is a subtle though significant difference 
from proposals by ITV and Sky that all BBC content and programmes should be distinct from 
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its competitors, but the Executive nonetheless adopted distinctiveness from the market as the 
central evaluative criteria for regulating the BBC. 
The centrepiece of British, Bold, Creative was an expanded proposal for BBC Studios, 
which included the scrapping of the 50 per cent in-house commissioning guarantee. As a 
response to the increasingly global production sector, these reforms would supposedly “drive 
creativity and value for money for audiences and licence fee payers by promoting competition 
within the supply base” (2015b:19). BBC Studios received a mixed response, with production 
companies and other stakeholder groups raising concerns about the new venture having an 
unfair advantage in BBC commissioning or breaching EU state aid law. Yet the proposals also 
epitomised a latent acceptance of competitors’ criticisms about the BBC and its position in the 
market. British, Bold, Creative celebrated the BBC’s underlying social and culture aims, but 
framed these within a policy agenda that prioritised distinctiveness, value for money and 
minimal competition with the market. This tallies closely with D’Arma’s analysis of these BBC 
‘Charter manifestos’ (2018:220-3) and, as per Research Question (3), reveals the intimate role 
of ideology in steering the language of policy debate. These documents have given the 
Corporation a central role in interpreting the core issues of Charter reviews, yet have also 
successively shifted the BBC’s articulation of its own purpose further and further into neo-
liberal discourses of economic growth and unrestrained commercial competition. 
The BBC Trust ran its own parallel consultation, titled Tomorrow’s BBC, reflecting the 
Trust’s foundational duty to represent licence fee payers’ interests and give the public “a central 
voice in the process of Charter Review” (BBC Trust, 2015a:6). Several interviewees pointed 
out the irony of the Trust inquiring on the future of the BBC while facing certain abolition, but 
nonetheless saw it as having an important role: 
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It was three-pronged. The Trust were saying “we’ve got a job to do, here we are”, it 
was also pushing back against the government’s agenda, but it was also a genuine 
attempt to canvass public opinion. (Interview 9) 
Holding public seminars across the country and collecting a further 40,000 public responses, 
the Tomorrow’s BBC report opened by noting “an extraordinary degree of popular support for 
a BBC that remains independent and universal”, adding that 56 per cent of responses “want the 
BBC to provide more” while 60 per cent said the BBC’s content was already distinctive 
(2015c:1). 
The Trust’s response to the Green Paper also opposed the solidifying definition of 
distinctiveness, and rejected the notion that the BBC’s market impact is solely negative. It 
instead championed the wider economic benefits of public service broadcasting at scale, and 
asserted that any new scheme of regulation for the BBC “should be different from those applied 
to its commercial competitors” (2015c:53). The Trust called for a series of further measures to 
protect the BBC’s independence from government, particularly during licence fee negotiations 
which “should include opportunity for input from licence fee payers and proper democratic 
scrutiny” (BBC Trust, 2015c:39). 
From these numerous tracts of debate it appears as though the Green Paper consultation 
provided a multi-faceted space for public and stakeholder engagement in the policymaking 
process. Yet the government did not appear to incorporate the mass response (and the 
conflicting views within it) into its decision-making in a comparably pluralist way. The 
DCMS’s consultation summary, published in March 2016, quantified the general sentiments 
of thousands of individual public responses but gave far greater prominence to arguments that 
reinforced the policy ‘problems’ inferred by the Green Paper. The summary noted that 66 per 
cent of responses felt the BBC had a positive market impact, yet distilled these responses to 
market gap benefits such as how the BBC “pioneers and kick-starts services that commercial 
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providers would find it difficult to lead” (DCMS, 2016b:12). Although just three per cent of 
responses said that the BBC has a negative market impact, DCMS devoted two full pages to 
showcasing complaints from rival media organisations about over-extended BBC services 
undermining commercial competition (2016b:12-14). 
This predisposition to conservative, pro-market ideals is evident not only in the 
government’s unequal evaluation of responses, but also in its treatment of different types of 
submissions and respondents. In early 2016 the Culture Secretary stated that over 90 per cent 
of the 190,000 submissions had been sent via the online campaign platform 38 Degrees, which 
had encouraged the public to oppose the Green Paper’s “plans to rip out of the heart of the 
BBC”96. Whittingdale told the Commons that the scale of 38 Degrees-inspired input 
does not mean they are not valid expressions of opinion; it just means that perhaps they 
are not wholly representative of public opinion at large.97 
In one sentence the Culture Secretary revealed the self-defeating logic that pervades attempts 
by elite policymaking institutions to demonstrate public involvement in decision-making. At 
best, public opinion is little more than an accessory to supposedly more considered, ‘expert’ 
testimony. At worst, it obscures the ‘true’ consensus policymakers are searching for when they 
open up their policy formulation to general engagement (Freedman, 2008:102-4). 
Shortly after the DCMS published its Green Paper summary, the Radio Times magazine 
alleged that Department officials had never requested the password to unlock the encrypted 
USB drive containing 6,000 readers’ consultation responses. A DCMS spokesman reiterated 
the government’s commitment that all responses “will feed into the process”98, but the 
 
96 38 Degrees blog, ‘Have your say on the future of the BBC’, 2 September 2015. 
97 HC Deb 21 January 2016, v. 604 c. 1536. My emphasis. 
98 Press Gazette, ‘DCMS did not open memory stick containing 6,000 BBC consultation responses from Radio 
Times readers’, March 15 2016. 
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omission—whether a result of in-built bias or unfortunate accident—further compounds the 
impression of policymakers’ dismissive attitude to public input. 
I think there are holes in the process. They were completely overwhelmed at the DCMS 
but they were caught out by that Radio Times dongle. We had to put quite a lot of 
pressure on them to release the summary of responses, but I think they were hoping to 
get away with not doing that, just drafting the Charter and saying “it reflects the public’s 
view”. (Interview 11) 
This raises a significant matter in relation to Research Question (1) and how the structure of 
policymaking is both produced by and reproduces an imbalance of power and status between 
different actors and interests. The Green Paper framed the consultation questions around the 
government’s preferred policy outcome and, despite its creditable pluralist aims and the 
avalanche of diverse submissions it received, the government’s partial handling of these 
responses suggests that this mass participatory policymaking exercise would always attach 
greater value to like-minded commercial concerns at the expense of a genuine consideration of 
active public input. 
Expertise, economics and ‘independent’ reports 
It is perhaps unsurprising, given the questionable purpose of the Green Paper 
consultation, that both the BBC and DCMS commissioned numerous reports and studies to 
bolster their respective policy arguments. Indeed descriptions of these reports appear to elevate 
their supposedly apolitical, expert contributions above the noise and unreliability of public 
opinion. Despite being ostensibly an exercise in public evidence gathering, the Green Paper 
stated “there are also some areas where studies, reviews and research are needed to add 
technical expertise and independence from Government” (2015:17). Following the mass 
response from 38 Degrees members, DCMS sources were quoted saying the government would 
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“in the interest of balance … conduct further polling research and focus group studies”.99 These 
are of course laudable aims central to ideals of evidence-based policymaking, yet these reviews 
fulfilled a more directly partisan objective of lending empirical authenticity to certain political 
claims while disputing or discrediting contrary proposals. 
Research by GfK, one of the world’s largest polling companies, duly produced useful 
statistical supplements for the government’s White Paper (DCMS, 2016a:28-33). 43 per cent 
of 2,000 people surveyed believed BBC One and ITV were “quite similar apart from the 
adverts,” while 35 per cent did not believe the BBC’s programmes are “more daring or 
innovative than those made by other broadcasters” (GfK, 2016:63). Curiously, government 
statements did not mention that 52 per cent of those respondents did not see the BBC as 
crowding out commercial competition (2016:60), or include polling of a further 2,900 people, 
commissioned by the BBC Trust, which found 56 per cent thought the BBC should provide 
more services and programmes compared to just seven per cent who wanted fewer (2015d:1). 
The government’s concern for balance did not, it seems, entail reflecting the full range and 
diversity of public sentiments about complicated questions of media policy. In the context of 
Research Question (2), the selective and partial use of polls and focus groups implies instead 
that some forms of public engagement were not considered reliable or legitimate, and needed 
to be ‘balanced’ with hand-picked polling results or normatively authoritative research that 
reinforced policymakers’ existing proposals. 
To support this, DCMS commissioned two media industry consultancy firms, Oliver & 
Ohlbaum and Oxera, to produce ‘an assessment of market impact and distinctiveness’. The 
O&O Report overflows with market indices, revenue projections, audience viewing trends and 
programme genre tallies but, as the title suggests, it focussed these on the extent to which BBC 
 
99 Independent, ‘If Britain’s creative industries are to stay world beaters, Culture Secretary John Whittingdale 
must fight for them’, 18 January 2016. My emphasis. 
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services crowd out commercial alternatives. It found, for example, that “a more distinctive 
BBC One [with] less competitive scheduling” could “increase commercial ad funded channel 
revenue by £33m to £40m per year.” In exchange for a precisely calculated 2.1 to 2.5 per cent 
drop in audience share, the BBC would gain a conspicuously non-specific boost in the 
“consumer and public value of BBC One output” (2016:51). Despite the wealth of hard data 
offered by the O&O Report, its analysis accepted as given the government’s assertion that 
limited competition with for-profit media companies is preferable to any social (and even 
economic) benefits of a large, popular public service broadcaster. 
The BBC Trust amassed its own statistics arsenal with studies of the BBC’s price-
setting model and potential reforms for protecting the BBC’s financial independence (Dassiou, 
2016; Helm, 2016; Moore, 2016). Two reports for the Trust, by the auditing and consultancy 
firm KPMG, were similarly laden with facts and findings but contained markedly different 
conclusions from O&O. 
Based on the available data, our econometric analysis finds that there is no evidence 
that the BBC crowds out private sector broadcasting activity in news and entertainment. 
(KPMG, 2015a:27) 
The BBC’s investment and innovation related to the online market has positive 
technology spillover benefits to firms in the wider market. (KPMG, 2015b:36) 
Just as the Trust made KPMG’s analysis a core part of its Green Paper submission, the Culture 
Secretary welcomed the O&O Report as “very thorough analysis [which] will play a key role 
in informing our thinking.” Whittingdale championed in particular the prospect that a more 
narrowly-focussed BBC could “increase commercial revenue by over £100m per year by the 
end of the next Charter period.”100 BBC executives, on the other hand, were quick to dispute 
Oliver & Ohlbaum’s conclusions which its Director of Policy said had been “designed for the 
 
100 Speech to the Oxford Media Convention, 2 March 2016. 
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convenience of its competitors not the enjoyment of audiences, to the long-term detriment of 
both.”101 None of the assorted opinion polls or quantitative studies commissioned by 
government or the BBC produced results incompatible with or in contradiction of the others. 
Yet far from adding technical expertise or definitive answers on the BBC’s market impact or 
public attitudes to its services, these studies served more to give a veneer of authenticity and 
the support of ‘hard data’ to each side’s subjective political claims. 
Aside from economic studies and audience polls, this central stage of the Charter review 
process saw a variety of qualitative reports and reviews from committees of the Welsh 
Assembly and Scottish Parliament, the House of Lords Communications Committee, and a 
second CMS Select Committee inquiry, along with many other official bodies. However, the 
report that had the clearest material impact on shaping the government’s White Paper proposals 
was the March 2016 Clementi Review on BBC governance and regulation, commissioned by 
DCMS. Sir David Clementi (a former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England) formalised 
the political consensus of the previous few years, recommending the abolition of the BBC 
Trust, the creation of a unitary board and moving regulation of the BBC’s services over to an 
independent authority. 
Many of Clementi’s proposals reflected the same concerns for ‘distinctiveness’ and 
market impact of the BBC’s commercial rivals. Whereas the CMS Committee (amongst many 
others, including the Burns panel ten years earlier) had recommended creating a new PSB 
commission, Clementi recommended that Ofcom take over regulation of the BBC’s strategy, 
performance and competition issues. 
 
101 BBC response to the O&O market impact report (online), 2 March 2016. 
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Current trends will bring the BBC into greater contact/competition with commercial 
players, and this argues for a regulator with a wide knowledge of the broadcasting 
industry. (2016:39) 
This ‘wide knowledge’ would be exercised through setting obligations on the BBC with 
particular regard for “competition policy”. Ofcom would, for example, issue Operating 
Licences for individual BBC services, redefining the Service Licences introduced by the 2006 
Charter to include “performance measures such as distinctiveness” (Clementi, 2016:52-3). 
Ofcom’s established regulatory presence is of course a practical justification for avoiding the 
bureaucratic complications of a new, overlapping regime. But Ofcom’s founding purpose is to 
promote competition across the UK media and communications sector, and its authority over 
the BBC’s public service activities clearly conflicts with its inherent inclination towards the 
interests of commercial media organisations. 
The Clementi report also recommended that the new BBC unitary board structure its 
engagement with licence fee payers “in a way that understands their interests as citizens as well 
as consumers” (Clementi, 2016:65. My emphasis). This same citizen/consumer definition of 
the public’s relationship with broadcast media had dominated debates around the creation of 
Ofcom in 2003 (Livingstone et al., 2007; Smith, 2006). Furthermore it reflects the deeper 
current running throughout the Clementi review: that the BBC’s governance and regulation 
should exist primarily to safeguard an open and competitive market, rather than develop and 
advance the public service objectives the Corporation exists to fulfil. The Culture Secretary 
praised Sir David for his “fully evidenced based” proposals which offered “streamlined 
regulatory arrangements that have public interest and market sensitivity at their heart.”102 The 
government’s White Paper adopted the Clementi model in full, “keeping the good but changing 
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where necessary” the flaws popularly perceived to beset the Trust-Executive framework 
(DCMS, 2016a:47). 
Aside from the politics of its recommendations, the Clementi Review epitomised a 
particularly influential method of elite policy formulation during this penultimate phase of 
BBC decision-making, with the Report’s appendix highlighting the variety of industry bodies, 
commercial broadcasters and insider figures Clementi consulted as part of his ‘evidence 
gathering’ on the BBC. Moreover, in respect of Research Question (1), the Review symbolises 
a fundamental and on-going historical shift in patterns of media policymaking, where the 
increasing salience of “economic and consumerist values” as policy aims valorises the 
quantitative assessment of policy outcomes (van Cuilenberg and McQuail, 2003:200). The 
centrality of expert reports and economic analyses in both the BBC’s and the government’s 
Charter renewal contributions reveals the normative value these actors ascribed to “unreflexive 
technical rationality” within the contemporary media policymaking paradigm (Freedman, 
2014:68). The formative role of private consultancies, PR firms and independent analysis—
and the apparent minimal impact of the many thousands of Green Paper responses from the 
public and non-commercial media interests—suggests that the core dynamics of the Charter 
renewal process were geared towards prioritising ‘hard’, professional evidence to resolve 
unambiguous problems facing the BBC, rather than enabling a deeper interrogation of the 
social and cultural purposes of public service broadcasting. 
A BROADCASTER OF DISTINCTION – MAY TO DECEMBER 2016 
The final moments of Charter renewal marked a decided withdrawal from its earlier 
public settings and into private, bureaucratic channels of elite decision-making. Politicians 
scrutinised the DCMS White Paper on Charter review, yet the government’s formal policy 
measures were enacted primarily in the text of successive Royal Charter drafts. Senior BBC 
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and DCMS figures wrangled over their precise wording and technical detail, while MPs and 
peers scrutinised the plans but were ultimately excluded from any formal role in deliberations. 
Implementation continued beyond the Royal Charter’s approval in December 2016, as the 
transition from old to new regulatory models exposed the immediate political challenges and 
contradictions of the BBC’s reformed policy framework. 
The DCMS White Paper 
In a speech to a students’ Conservative Association in early May 2016, the Culture 
Secretary ruminated that scrapping the BBC was “occasionally a tempting prospect”.103 This 
unguarded moment reinforced the growing feeling that the imminent White Paper would signal 
the end for the BBC as a universal public service broadcaster. Press reports claimed the 
government’s official Charter proposals would subject the BBC to “unprecedented new checks 
on the quality of its television and radio programmes” and introduce “new powers to stop the 
broadcaster competing head-on with ITV for peak-time ratings”.104 Other ‘leaked’ plans 
included forcing the BBC to divest its share in the commercial network UKTV, re-writing the 
BBC’s mission to exclude “left-wing bias”, and compelling the BBC to publish the names and 
pay details of all on-air talent earning over £150,000.105 
Whether a classic case of hardball negotiation or because of an eleventh-hour retreat, 
the White Paper was not the death warrant some had feared (or, in the case of anti-BBC 
newspapers, hoped). Titled A BBC for the future: a broadcaster of distinction, the paper 
formally articulated ‘distinctiveness’ as the organising theory for a more narrowly-focussed, 
market-conscious BBC. Emphasising the uncertainties brought about by an increasingly 
 
103 Quoted in Varsity (online), ‘Whittingdale: Ken Livingstone is “dangerously mad”’, 2 May 2016. 
104 The Sunday Telegraph, ‘BBC faces quality check after five years’, 1 May 2016; The Sunday Times, ‘Strictly 
no X Factor clashes, BBC told: BBC anger at curbs’, 1 May 2016. 
105 Daily Telegraph, ‘John Whittingdale considering forcing BBC to sell UKTV stake’, 18 April 2016; Express 
Online, ‘So it IS biased! BBC to re-write mission statement to include NO left-wing bias’, 11 May 2016; The 
Times, ‘Get serious, white paper orders BBC’, 9 May 2016. 
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fragmented, crowded and competitive media landscape, it opened by stating that “the BBC is 
going to have to work hard to maintain its privileged position over the coming decade” (DCMS, 
2016a:21). This truism was not followed by a considered reimagining of the universality of 
PSB in the digital age, and the White Paper instead called for the BBC to “do more to stand 
apart from the competition, rather than looking to replicate services consumers are already 
getting elsewhere” (2016a:23). The renewed mission statement for the BBC places this concern 
front and centre: 
To act in the public interest, serving all audiences with impartial, high-quality and 
distinctive media content and services that inform, educate and entertain. (DCMS, 
2016a:29) 
While at first glance an amenable elaboration on the BBC’s founding Reithian triptych, the 
‘public interest’ it foregrounds is defined principally as the BBC adding “public value in a 
diverse, competitive, and pluralistic environment, where viewers and listeners have increasing 
choice of media content and providers” (2016a:29). 
Many of the new framework’s specific proposals had competitiveness and increased 
consumer choice at their heart. The White Paper detailed the practical meaning of 
distinctiveness as a new top-level Public Purpose, requiring the BBC to be “substantially 
different to other providers across each and every service” and specifies original UK 
programming, the mix of content genres and risk-taking as means of achieving this (DCMS, 
2016a:33-4, my emphasis). Although the original 2006 Public Purposes featured a nascent 
recognition of distinctiveness in requiring that the BBC “[enrich] the cultural life of the UK 
through creative excellence in distinctive and original content” (DCMS, 2006b:3), the 2016 
White Paper recast it as shorthand for the BBC’s market impact rather than a by-product of its 
wider social and cultural benefits to the public. The White Paper takes up ten pages detailing 
concerns about the BBC ‘crowding out’ its commercial competitors and gives special 
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prominence to the O&O Report’s claims about the adverse impact of the BBC on commercial 
competitors, even repeating verbatim ITV’s criticism of BBC One’s “static daytime 
scheduling” (DCMS, 2016a:33; ITV, 2015:6). 
Reforms to governance and regulation set out in the White Paper further exemplify the 
shift in BBC policy towards prioritising commercial interests and market values. Along with 
adopting the Clementi Review’s proposal for a unitary board, Ofcom’s expanded regulatory 
powers over the BBC emphasise “measurable quantitative obligations” for “protecting the 
interests of third parties” and lessening “market uncertainty” (DCMS, 2016a:54-7). Many of 
the mechanical changes entailed in regulation by Ofcom prioritise giving the BBC’s 
commercial competitors a greater say in scrutinising the BBC’s ‘Service Licences’ and 
contributing to Public Value Tests. 
The government also offered its in-principle approval for the BBC Studios proposals, 
but included a new requirement that all BBC commissioning be opened to competition 
(retaining the statutory sector-wide independent quota of 25 per cent) by the end of the renewed 
Charter period, in order to 
provide a welcome boost to the creative economy [and ensure] the BBC secures the 
best possible creative ideas and provides audiences with the best possible content at the 
best possible price. (DCMS, 2016a:82) 
This radical overhaul of BBC commissioning went far beyond the Studios proposal agreed 
between the BBC Executive and Pact in late 2015, which had already offered to extend 
competition in BBC production to at least 70 per cent. As well as tightening market impact 
measures to ensure the BBC “treads more lightly and considerately around its commercial 
competitors,” (2016a:64), the new Charter would also expect the BBC to support the struggling 
local newspaper industry through partnerships with corporate publishers. 
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The White Paper’s demotion of the BBC’s social and cultural purposes is exemplified 
by the government’s revisions to the Public Purposes. The new Charter’s proposed remit of 
“providing impartial news and information” (DCMS, 2016a:12) recognises the important 
function of a public service broadcaster as a trusted news source, but removes the emphasis in 
the 2006 Charter on “sustaining citizenship and civil society” (DCMS, 2006b:3). The new 
Purposes also ditched the requirement for the BBC “to deliver to the public the benefit of 
emerging communications technologies” (2006c:3). The renewed fifth Purpose on “reflecting 
the UK, its culture and values to the world” removes the prior expectation to make “people in 
the UK aware of international issues and of different cultures and viewpoints of people living 
outside the UK” (DCMS, 2006b:4, emphasis added; 2016a:12). Although there is a welcome 
formal commitment to ensuring the BBC reflects “the diversity of the UK both in its content 
and as an organisation”, the instruction for BBC international news to be “firmly based on 
British values” (DCMS, 2016a:12) suggests that the wider politics of the on-going EU 
referendum campaign (and the Culture Secretary’s own anti-EU views) had a strong residual 
influence on the White Paper.106 
The Culture Secretary presented the White Paper to the House of Commons on 12 May 
2016 as a set of progressive and necessary reforms for Charter renewal: 
We want the BBC to thrive, to make fantastic programmes for audiences and to act as 
an engine for growth and creativity. Our reforms give the BBC much greater 
independence from Government ... At the same time, these reforms will assist the BBC 
to fulfil its own stated desire to become more distinctive and better reflect the diverse 
nature of its audience.107 
 
106 The EU referendum was announced on 2 February 2016, less than two weeks before DCMS published its 
consultation summary. The vote itself, on 23 June 2016, took place just over a month after the publication of the 
White Paper. 
107 HC Deb 12 May 2016, v. 609 c. 733. 
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MPs and peers welcomed certain proposals, particularly the new diversity requirements and 
the creation of an 11-year Charter period to separate the renewal process from the electoral 
cycle. However, both the Labour opposition and ‘pro-BBC’ Conservatives in the Lords 
challenged the significant shifts in policy brought about by the licence fee settlement, the 
changing of the BBC’s core mission and the process of appointments to the new governing 
board. One peer cautioned that the requirement for distinctiveness would make the BBC “move 
off doing popular programmes which, from the consultation, is what the public and licence fee 
payers wants”.108 Labour’s Shadow Culture Secretary, Maria Eagle MP, warned that the 
proposed mid-term Charter ‘health check’—designed “to check the effectiveness” of the new 
governance and regulatory arrangements (DCMS, 2016a:14)—would be “destabilising for the 
BBC” and could be used to “reopen the fundamental tenets that underpin the Charter halfway 
through its term.”109 The Labour Party tabled a Commons motion on 8 June, noting that the 
White Paper “fails to provide an acceptable basis for the Charter renewal”, however this was 
easily voted down by a solid Conservative majority.110 Two members of the House of Lords 
also put forward a draft ‘BBC Royal Charter Bill’, requiring that the draft Charter be debated 
and approved by both Houses of Parliament (as Whittingdale’s own CMS Committee report 
had recommended), but their proposals floundered before the final Charter was agreed. 
Negotiations and Royal Charter minutiae 
The British political landscape underwent major upheaval in the four months between 
the White Paper and the first Royal Charter draft. Following the 23 June public vote to leave 
the European Union, the new Prime Minister Theresa May quickly culled many of the former 
leader’s loyalists in the Cabinet. In place of John Whittingdale, who had supported one of her 
 
108 Lord Alli, HC Deb 12 May 2016, v. 771 c. 1826. 
109 HC Deb 8 June 2016, v. 611 c. 1212-3. 
110 Ibid., c. 1208. 
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rivals in the awkward and abortive Conservative leadership contest, May appointed the 
relatively fresh-faced junior minister Karen Bradley MP as Culture Secretary. 
Appointments were also a major issue of Charter review during the brief and brutal 
transition of power in Downing Street. Prior to the White Paper’s publication, Whittingdale 
had wanted the majority of the new unitary board chosen by government and was seeking to 
sack Rona Fairhead as Chair of the BBC Trust. Rumours and press reports suggested the 
Culture Secretary had lined up Archie Norman, a former ITV chairman, as Fairhead’s 
replacement. Fairhead outflanked Whittingdale by appealing directly to the then-Prime 
Minister David Cameron, who had supported and approved her initial appointment, and 
secured an agreement to chair the new body until 2018.111 
On 13 September, however, Fairhead resigned as Trust Chair after the government 
announced a fresh open appointment process for the chair of the unitary board, another push 
by the new Prime Minister “to unpick the legacy of her predecessor”.112 The first official draft 
of the Royal Charter, published two days later, further relaxed the Clementi-inspired balance 
of board appointments. This shift reflected some of the concerns raised by the Director-General 
that a board with a greater number of executive directors “would act more cohesively” (CMS 
Committee, 2016:5). The government signalled in turn that “some changes can be made to 
secure the independence of the Board”. Thus the revised composition of the Board scrapped 
the role of a government-appointed Deputy-Chair and, aside from the non-executive Chair and 
the four non-executive ‘nations’ representatives, four executive and five non-executive roles 
on the fourteen-strong Unitary Board would now be appointed by the BBC itself (DCMS, 
2016c:13-15). 
 
111 Daily Telegraph, ‘Channel 4 to escape full privatisation’, 10 May 2016. 
112 Daily Telegraph, ‘BBC chairman Rona Fairhead steps down after Theresa May asks her to reapply for the job 
in reversal of David Cameron decision’, 13 September 2016. 
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The Royal Charter and its accompanying Framework Agreement (which gives fuller 
detail to many of the Charter’s core terms and provisions) nonetheless implemented in full the 
government’s White Paper policy of a tightly regulated distinctive BBC. The Charter and 
Framework Agreement saw little amendment before the final texts were officially agreed in 
November 2016. Few people outside government or the BBC had any input into these formal 
texts, with those that did saying the talks “were more in terms of sense-checking our 
understanding of what they were trying to do” rather than direct negotiation of provisions 
(Interview 10). A second draft was published on 1 November, containing “minor and technical 
changes” following debates in the Commons, Lords and the devolved national legislatures 
throughout September and October. 
Although these last-minute negotiations had little substantive impact on the 
government’s policy, a small number of changes entail subtle revisions that secure some of the 
BBC’s powers and duties under the new Charter. The first draft Charter, for example, 
empowered Ofcom to conduct ad-hoc ‘competition reviews’ where it believed “a UK public 
service is having an adverse impact on fair and effective competition” (2016d:7). The updated 
draft raises the trigger for these regulatory interventions to “significant adverse impact” 
(2016e:11). Yet despite the pivotal influence these amended provisions may exhibit in future 
struggles between the BBC’s independence and Ofcom’s regulatory authority, the fact that the 
Charter faced effectively no public scrutiny—and implemented the major elements of the 
government’s White Paper policies without change—highlights the rapid withdrawal of the 




UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE BBC’S NEW CHARTER 
The BBC and the Secretary of State signed the Framework Agreement on 7 November 
2016, and on 16 November the Privy Council ordered the BBC be granted its new Royal 
Charter beginning 1 January 2017. The intensive ten year-long process of Charter review, 
which had opened with wide-ranging debates about the BBC’s future in the face of rapidly 
evolving markets and technologies, thus ended with the stark anachronism of the next decade 
in its almost 100-year history consigned in ink on a sheet of vellum. There remained, however, 
a number of crucial decisions during the transition from the old Charter model to the new 
arrangements. 
On 1 September 2016 the Commons approved a statutory instrument to close the 
‘iPlayer loophole’ as agreed during the 2015 licence fee settlement, and in October 2017 Ofcom 
issued its first Operating Licence for the BBC, detailing the remit and programming 
requirements for each BBC service: 
Distinctiveness lies at the core of the Charter, and the majority of the conditions we are 
placing on the BBC across its services are designed to promote it. (Ofcom, 2017:7) 
Ofcom’s direct role in implementing Charter policy, and the BBC’s stretched connections 
across the various bodies and agencies of the British media policy landscape, reveals another 
useful dynamic pertinent to Research Question (1). Somewhat emblematically for the 
contemporary mode of media policymaking through arms-length regulation (Abramson, 
2001:302; Feintuck and Varney, 2006:96-7; Freedman, 2008:13-15), the practical 
implementation of the 2016 Charter renewal’s proposals was applied chiefly through a series 




The appointment of the first Chair to the BBC’s new unitary board provided the final 
political flourish. The shortlisting panel comprised figures from the traditional organs of state 
power: a former Royal Navy vice-admiral, a former Private Secretary to the Queen, the civil 
service chief of DCMS and a former Chair of Ofcom. After the panel had reviewed the 
applications, including one unnamed applicant who was reconsidered following a request from 
Downing Street, the Secretary of State recommended the final candidate for approval by the 
Prime Minster. The chosen chair was Sir David Clementi, who had not applied for the role but 
somewhat suspiciously was “asked to put his name forward” by senior government figures.113 
Unsurprisingly the decision raised concerns about Clementi’s independence, given he would 
manage the very same system he had designed on the government’s behalf. One senior BBC 
source said the appointment “failed the sniff test”,114 and the Labour Shadow Culture Secretary 
attacked the “depressing lack of imagination from a government which has an appalling record 
when it comes to diversity in public life”. The BBC’s 2017-2027 Charter period thus began 
with the same fraught political dynamics that have characterised much of its history: a 
government eager to pay lip-service to the BBC’s independence but steering and influencing 
its activities through politicised appointments, restrictive funding settlements and 
ideologically-driven revisions to its fundamental public service remit. 
In the years since the 2016 Royal Charter was debated, decided and implemented, the 
BBC has faced the accelerating rise of streaming and on-demand services, the continued 
splintering and decline of its traditional ‘linear’ audiences, and repeated criticisms of its 
corporate insularity, cultural homogeneity in output and institutional bias in its news and 
journalism. These issues coalesced when Prime Minister Boris Johnson, emboldened by the 
Conservatives’ decisive election victory in December 2019, announced a review into 
 
113 The Guardian, ‘Sir David Clementi: City grandee ready to do the business at the BBC’, 10 January 2017. 
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decriminalising non-payment of the licence fee. Doing so would cut the BBC’s guaranteed 
public funding out from underneath it just as the Corporation heads into its mid-term review in 
2022, for which the same recurring ideological and corporate challenges to public service 
broadcasting will almost certainly find new vigour in co-opting the genuine challenges of a 
rapidly evolving global media ecology. 
The current perilous state of the UK’s largest public broadcaster has been made 
substantially worse (or far more malleable, depending on your politics) precisely because of 
the cumulative policy decisions concluding with the 2016 Royal Charter. Formally premised 
on a momentous opportunity for wide-ranging public debate on the future of the BBC, the 
actual policymaking process of Charter review between 2010 and 2016 was dominated by faux-
democratic modes of decision-making, unaccountable elite lobbying practices and entrenched 
ideological prejudices. While historical precedent and the over-riding impression of deep 
public esteem may have saved the BBC from radical free market reforms, these processes 
nonetheless shrunk the meaning of public service broadcasting and shifted it further into the 
domain of commercial regulation. Paradoxically, the BBC laid much of the essential political, 
financial and ideological groundwork for this quiet revolution itself. Although the most recent 
BBC Charter renewal featured a swathe of public exercises and decidedly modern debates, it 
was riven with the same skewed relationships of elite power—between the BBC and the state, 
between the government and commercial media interests, between BBC policy and the 




7. LANGUAGE, VALUES AND MEDIA POLICY NARRATIVES 
The organised official processes of post-Leveson and BBC policymaking clearly 
produced distinct structures of power, yet these debates also show the fundamental role of 
ideas, principles and language in shaping how policy decisions are made. Policy narratives are 
therefore an essential object of study for exploring how different dynamics of power influence 
the discursive qualities of the policy process, and for unpicking how media policy narratives 
justify or delegitimise different forms of political action. For this research, a media policy 
narrative refers to a set of politically or philosophically inter-related ideas or values of media 
that form the discursive basis on which arguments for or against media policies are built (see 
also Pickard, 2013:338 and Shanahan et al., 2011:374). Through constructing and mobilising 
specific images of media’s ideal social, political or democratic function, these narratives create 
the boundaries of acceptable issues and proposals available for public deliberation. Policy 
narratives are not simply instrumental arguments designed to sway policymakers, but are 
“simultaneously the driving force and the desired result of media policy actions” (Freedman, 
2008:54). How one set of policy values or a particular linguistic frame comes to mould and 
define a policy debate is closely related to the generation and circulation of discursive power 
within political processes, and crucially to the distribution of power between different actors 
or institutions across society. 
Focussing on Research Question (3), this chapter thus examines how the shape and 
content of policy debate is influenced by the language and rhetorical framing of media policy 
narratives and competing political values. Building on Fischer’s view of policymaking as a 
“discursive struggle over the definitions of problems” (2003:60), these sections analyse the 
various narratives and rhetorical forms that competing policy actors used to articulate and 
justify their policy goals in the BBC and post-Leveson debates. The chapter begins by 
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exploring the most prominent media policy narratives in each case study debate and detailing 
their core ideals, arguments and ideological interpretations of media policy. Next, it considers 
the distinct rhetorical devices and narrative framing techniques of media policymaking, and 
analyses how these influenced the official discourses in the two case study debates. The chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of policy ‘meta-narratives’ (Fischer, 2003:173), analysing 
the broader effects of discursive power on the values, meanings and principles that shape 
contemporary media policymaking. 
PRIMARY NARRATIVES OF PRESS AND BROADCAST MEDIA POLICY 
Press freedom and responsibility in the wake of the phone hacking scandal 
The post-Leveson debates on press regulation were sharply divided between two 
distinct and seemingly irreconcilable discourses, each reflecting many of the salient political 
arguments that have defined debates on press policy throughout the 20th century. On one side, 
a ‘responsibility’ narrative asserted that politicians and the newspaper industry had a duty to 
the public—and particularly to victims of press malpractice—to radically reform press 
regulation following the phone hacking scandal. Many of the arguments of ‘pro-Leveson’ 
campaigners and reform-minded policymakers told a wider critique of “a problem of culture” 
across both the national newspaper industry and the existing regulatory regime (Cathcart, 
2012:70). This critique seized on a range of issues investigated at the Leveson Inquiry and 
framed them in two common accounts of the need for ‘responsible’ press policy reform. 
One underlying argument of the responsibility narrative asserted that phone hacking 
epitomised a long-term trend of unethical reporting and declining journalistic standards in the 
British press, which was closely tied to the “incessant circulation war” (Leveson, 2012b:719) 
between competing popular commercial newspapers. This had, their argument went, created a 
constant demand for exclusive scoops and titillating exposés which in turn led to an increasing 
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use of more devious and dubious journalistic methods. As one repentant former tabloid reporter 
lamented, “the truth-seeking impulse of journalism proper will always be tainted by the excess 
of its entertainment-driven cousin” (Peppiatt, 2012:20). 
The second underlying claim for ‘responsible’ reform of press policy claimed that 
endemic cases of libellous reporting, privacy intrusions and ‘hounding’ by Britain’s leading 
newspapers had laid bare the systemic failures of the non-policy of press self-regulation as a 
policy model. Emphasising the penetration of the PCC’s structure and regulatory functions by 
the press industry, a leading Hacked Off figure argued that self-regulation was “a confidence 
trick, perpetrated upon the British public and parliament by editors and proprietors who wanted 
to protect their operations from scrutiny and criticism” (Cathcart, 2012:56). The unethical 
practices revealed by the hacking scandal were not deeply unfortunate mistakes, as many in 
the industry claimed, but reflected the broken culture of powerful newspaper publishers holding 
exclusive control of their own regulation. This underlying critique of structural failings in 
Britain’s newspaper industry buttressed the responsibility narrative’s formation as a concerted 
argument for major reforms. At its core was a condemnation of the historical abuses of power 
within the newspaper industry, and a deeper sense that the press had a social and moral 
obligation to the public which the dominant commercial model of regulation had supressed. 
The second primary policy narrative in the Leveson debates, the ‘freedom’ narrative’, 
directly opposed these claioms, and centred on the classical liberal theories of freedom of 
expression and its essential role in the democratic functioning of modern society. Particularly 
prominent in national press coverage of the Leveson debates (Ogbebor, 2018; Ramsay, 2014), 
this narrative held that any form of state involvement in press regulation poses an existential 
threat to the freedom of the press, its ability to hold the powerful to account and the public’s 
right to know about the activities of the powerful. One interviewee, a former editor and vocal 
critic of the pro-Leveson policy agenda, offered a stark definition of these absolutist principles: 
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This desperate attempt to pretend that in a binary choice there is in fact a third way, it's 
majestically Blairite and nonsensical. There is no middle way. If you involve the state 
in the regulation of press, what you've got is state regulation. It doesn't matter how 
arms-length it is, it doesn't matter how many different names you call it. It is like 
pretending that there is a halfway point between life and death. (Interview 1) 
Following the phone hacking scandal, the freedom narrative took form in a series of recurring 
challenges to the Leveson Inquiry’s investigations, the enduring opprobrium over phone 
hacking and the demands for radical reform of self-regulation. One such line of argument held 
that the interception of voice mail messages, already a criminal offence for which some NOTW 
journalists and editors were eventually jailed, did not justify the scale of political outrage or 
the public inquiry it produced. The reaction to phone hacking was a “shattering moral panic” 
(Crook, 2012:84) in which the public was “invited to accept that telephone hacking is 
intrinsically threatening to ethical, public interest journalism when it isn’t” (Luckhurst, 
2012a:203).  
The freedom narrative frequently invoked a moral distinction between the democratic, 
liberal and liberating role of the commercial press and the aims of those in favour of press 
reform. This characterised campaigners and pro-Leveson politicians as anti-democratic 
firebrands and paternalist prudes, incensed by the popular appeal and commercial success of 
the tabloid press. Such claims emphasised a populist conception of press marketization 
(Curran, 2002:22) in which the free market is the driving force behind a free press and the 
democratising effects it creates. The consumer-reader, rather than any political or media 
institution, is sovereign and the public itself is the best judge of ‘public interest’ by expressing 
its cumulative needs and wants in the marketplace of ideas. One editor described the political 
reaction against hacking at NOTW as “a reflection of the contempt felt for people who consume 
and sometimes even enjoy” tabloid newspapers (Hume, 2012:59). Along with its historical and 
philosophical foundations, the freedom narrative also embodied the current market libertarian 
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paradigm of Western media policy, in which “policy has to follow the logic of the marketplace 
and the technology and the wishes of consumers (and citizens) rather than impose its goals” 
(Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003:200). 
Unlike the subdued or stoic nature of past press policy debates, the language and 
arguments surrounding the post-Leveson process were deeply personalised and politically and 
emotionally charged. Pro-Leveson policy actors couched their appeals in terms that called upon 
the personal experiences of phone hacking ‘victims’ and the “abuses of power by people who 
boast that they hold power to account” (Cathcart, 2012:28). Phone hacking had exposed self-
regulation organised solely by the industry as “nonsense” (Mair, 2012:222) and politicians 
“[owed] it to the victims of these scandals [who have] waited too long for an independent press 
watchdog in which they can put their trust”.115 Changes in law were required to create a more 
effective system of self-regulation as the national press had proved “it cannot be trusted to carry 
out that change itself” (Cathcart, 2012:56). 
Conversely, anti-Leveson proposals stressed that press self-regulation would “not 
require the intervention of government or the use of statute which would be hugely damaging 
to a free press and therefore to democracy itself” (Free Speech Network, 2012:2). Instead, the 
industry’s own “reinvention of the self-regulatory system” (Satchwell in SoE, 2012:7) was 
promoted as notionally accepting Leveson’s criticisms of the PCC while being the only means 
of ensuring “that the body did not have too great a power to effect censorship or licensing 
powers” (Lord Judge quoted in SoE, 2012:7). 
Distinctiveness, universality and the purpose of public service broadcasting 
Debates on the future of the BBC were far less overtly split, as the major discursive 
contests of Charter review coalesced around a single term and its implied reconceptualization 
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of the fundamental purposes of public service broadcasting. As traced in the previous chapter, 
distinctiveness served as the rationale and mantra driving the Conservative government’s 
Charter reform agenda. Officially articulated in the DCMS White Paper to mean that “the BBC 
should be substantially different to other providers across each and every service” (2016a:32), 
this definition was founded on several long-standing commercial criticisms of the BBC. 
Principal amongst these was a belief that the BBC, with its public funding and remit to 
provide ‘something for everyone’, unduly distorts the broadcasting market by competing in 
areas where other broadcasters rely on commercial funding. Implicit in such an account is the 
same free market logic that pervades most areas of contemporary media policy, in particular 
the premise that broadcasting is best organised through open competition between companies, 
who stand or fall on their appeal to the largest or most profitable audiences (and can thus sell 
advertising at a premium). The BBC impedes ‘true’ competition by not playing by the same 
economic rules as its rivals, as ITV argued in its Charter review submissions: 
There is little point in publicly funding services and content which the market can and 
does provide and, indeed, doing so could be actively harmful to the public interest by 
crowding out commercial investment. (2015:52) 
A second, connected strand in the calls for a more ‘distinctive’ BBC argued that the increasing 
plurality of media sources weakens the traditional justifications for public intervention in media 
markets. This supposed explosion of consumer choice was one of the main reasons government 
and commercial broadcasters gave for proposing to restrict the BBC’s scope of services, and 
for requiring it to “prioritise its resources in areas where viewers’ needs are not being 
adequately met” (Sky, 2015:12). 
Many such claims mirrored the ‘market failure’ or ‘market gap’ definition of public 
service broadcasting. In this sense the distinctiveness narrative was just the latest iteration of 
neo-liberal thought which since the 1980s has justified reorganising media policy around 
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market growth and scaling back public media interventions (Feintuck and Varney, 2006:47; 
Holland et al., 2013:144; Humpreys, 1996:235-7). But ‘distinctiveness’ as articulated during 
the Charter review debates differed from this established free market critique of the BBC in 
two important ways. First, its proponents actively distanced themselves from the market failure 
label while nonetheless advocating for controls on BBC content that ‘crowds out’ commercial 
competitors. ITV’s plea for the BBC to produce “services that the market cannot”, the company 
suggested, “is not an argument for a narrow, unpopular, BBC focussed on market failure genres 
only, but for a BBC that does things differently to the market” (2015:4, my emphasis). 
Secondly, and somewhat ironically given the political significance of this vague 
concept, the BBC itself played a pivotal role in imbuing ‘distinctiveness’ with a central role in 
Charter review’s discursive contests (Goddard, 2017). The term can be found at least as far 
back as 1992 in a strategy paper titled Extending Choice, in which the Corporation defended 
the “distinction and quality” of its services amidst the emerging multi-channel broadcasting 
market. The term existed without any special definition or significance116 across UK 
broadcasting policy until 2010, when a BBC strategy review, Putting Quality First, announced 
the Corporation would seek to “make its output innovative and different to what is available 
elsewhere”. Though cautious to state that “distinctiveness is not about market impact,” the 
BBC nonetheless tasked itself as part of Charter review to improve distinctiveness “in markets 
where there is a broad range of commercial provision” (BBC Trust, 2010:5). 
Defining ‘distinctiveness’ was the pivotal discursive contest of Charter review, yet its 
underlying market-centred objection to PSB was still challenged by an enduring belief in public 
service broadcasting as an essential contribution to the political and cultural development of 
society. Historically the BBC has symbolised this purpose in the well-worn Reithian ethic—to 
 
116 The word featured only in the 1980 Broadcasting Act, affording Channel 4 “a distinctive character”, then 
marginally in the 2006 BBC Charter’s public purposes for “excellence in distinctive and original content”. 
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inform, educate and entertain—but during Charter review this found a more concerted 
expression in the ‘universality’ policy narrative. This emphasised the wider benefits of a large 
public service broadcaster, funded by a compulsory licence fee but free at the point of use. As 
the BBC itself argued in its DCMS consultation submission, 
The case for the BBC starts from a different set of considerations about the sort of 
society we want. Access to culture, media and information should be a basic human 
right, ensured regardless of a person’s ability to pay for it. [The BBC] also has an 
instrumental purpose: to deliver external benefits to society through, for example, 
creating a richer culture, promoting democratic debate and building a stronger sense of 
community through shared experiences. (BBC, 2015c:9; see also Heath, 2015:36) 
Support for a ‘universal’ BBC often went further than a simple recitation of these lofty 
ideals. The Conservative government and commercial broadcasters argued that changes in 
broadcasting had made it less important for the BBC to be providing as much as it has and 
‘crowding out’ others. Campaigners and civil society groups, in response, saw these changes 
as even greater justification for the BBC funding a wide range of content aimed at all audiences 
and guided by social and cultural goals instead of just profit. Some asserted that the BBC should 
produce popular, high quality services across the breadth of genres, regardless of their impact 
on commercial competitors, because providing content for all audiences is an essential cultural 
offer of PSB. “The danger of pursuing a ‘more narrowly-focussed’ BBC,” VLV argued, 
is that the BBC will be restricted to only broadcast ‘worthy’, less popular content and 
its popularity will decline, making a universal fee unsustainable; and this in turn would 
undermine the model upon which the BBC is based. (2015:13; see also Channel 4, 
2015:2) 
Others like the NUJ cautioned that, by cutting the size and scope of the BBC, “the people of 
the UK will have reduced choices in their viewing and listening and they will have to pay more 
for them” (2015:11). The BBC’s receipt of public funding allots it a central and decisive role 
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in the UK’s media ‘ecology’, “building the overall size and skills in the market, giving it global 
scale and attracting inward investment” but without commercial constraints on its operations 
(VLV, 2015:4). The clash between the distinctiveness and universality narratives rested on a 
fundamental question: whether future BBC policy should support the commercial interests of 
the UK’s media markets, or whether the Corporation’s historic social mission still held 
relevance in the context of rapid economic, technological and audience changes. The opposing 
ideological accounts of media’s purpose entailed in these positions had a fundamental 
structuring effect on how the central decisions of BBC Charter review were articulated, just as 
the responsibility/freedom contests did for the post-Leveson debates. Yet the notions of 
fostering a distinct BBC and preserving a universal one are at face value beneficial and 
complementary policy objectives, and appeals in favour of one were frequently couched with 
expressions of support for the other. The discursive contests of Charter review were thus not 
so much a head-to-head clash as a finessed struggle to define the practical regulatory meaning 
of these terms, while at the same time asserting two very different normative ideals of 
broadcasting policy. 
JUSTIFYING MEDIA POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
Clearly no policy agenda emerges fully assembled. The collective understanding of a 
problem and the scope of appropriate solutions which inform the policymaking process will to 
a large degree reflect “the individual perceptions, social representations, material interests and 
moral values of the actors concerned” (Hill and Varone, 2017:166). Agenda-setting is a vital 
method of meaning-making and the contests over interpreting a policy issue substantially 
impact how decision-makers formulate policy change. Actors that engage in and influence this 
formative process decisively shape the discursive territory of a policy debate, and define its 
central issue according to symbols, language and ideological values that reinforce their own 
policy interests. “A group that can create and promote the most effective depiction of an issue 
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has an advantage in the battle over what, if anything, will be done about a problem” (Birkland, 
2017:71). 
The phone hacking scandal and BBC Charter review were evidently not cases of 
disinterested institutional fault or matter-of-fact changes in circumstance. The core issues of 
these policy debates attracted public salience precisely because of their deeply emotive nature 
and their correlation with extant political trends, which accelerated their interpretation as 
pressing policy challenges. The hacking of a murdered schoolgirl’s phone and recurring cases 
of swollen BBC governance transgressed general codes of how media institutions should act, 
a feeling reflected in the immediate political responses to and media coverage of these 
unfolding scandals. MPs described the revelations in the Guardian’s July 2011 Milly Dowler 
reports as “a national newspaper playing God with a family’s emotions”117 and called for the 
government to listen to “the ordinary person in the street who is outraged at what has gone on 
in News International”.118 The Jimmy Savile affair, according to some national newspapers, 
demonstrated a rigid, top-down “silo mentality” at the heart of the BBC’s corporate structure,119 
while the failure of DMI project and staff payoffs compounded the evidence of a “citadel of 
profligacy” which left licence fee payers “fearing that the gold-plated BBC gravy train will 
rumble on unhindered.”120 
Notably, these scandals were understood primarily in relation to notions of collective 
public opinion and outrage. Institutional failure or ineffective implementation were not 
sufficient factors on their own for these issues of media policy breaking onto the political 
agenda. More importantly, the realisation of these debates as policy ‘issues’ rested on 
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normative social values that are, in the main, constructed by cultural and political elites (in 
particular media outlets and elected representatives). That a leading tabloid newspaper—for 
decades Britain’s self-appointed moral arbiter of public and political life—had targeted 
ordinary members of the public for scoops made it impossible for the scandal to not gain solid 
public traction. Its salience was further supported by the government’s questionable regulatory 
choices regarding the BSkyB deal and the Prime Minister’s personal relationship with NOTW 
executives (see Davies, 2014 and Watson and Hickman, 2014). These factors cemented a wider 
perception of a political class “who for years have unashamedly courted Rupert Murdoch's 
newspapers”,121 and who would be judged by an enraged public on how they squared their elite 
loyalties with their representative duties. 
Pro-Leveson interviewees closely involved in lobbying senior politicians alongside 
phone hacking victims recalled the feeling of widespread public support: 
There was an enormous amount of public outrage and public pressure for something 
more to happen ... It wasn't entirely the Dowlers but they were extremely important and 
central to it. (Interview 5) 
There was a remarkable consensus that they [politicians] couldn’t get away with not 
doing anything. (Interview 4) 
The Prime Minister announced the public inquiry into phone hacking with a similar focus on 
public opinion, claiming that the public “will be revolted by what they have heard and seen on 
their television screens”.122 The prevailing response to phone hacking established the central 
messages and language of the responsibility narrative in the nascent discourse of press 
regulation debates, particularly that victims of phone hacking were owed action by political 
leaders—a phrase repeated frequently during the negotiations on implementing Leveson’s 
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recommendations. This discourse was also instrumental in setting the Inquiry’s remit for 
recommending new regulation which “demands the highest ethical and professional 
standards”123, embedding the perception of an irresponsible press at the heart of policymaking. 
The scandalisation of the BBC’s corporate failures was no less dependent on a discourse 
of incensed public sensibilities. However, pressing issues in Charter renewal in 2016 were 
distilled over a much longer period, and involved a more concerted discursive emphasis on 
prevailing conservative criticisms of publicly-funded broadcasting rather than sudden and 
unexpected explosions of public outrage. The BBC is “an institution featherbedded with free 
money,” one Telegraph columnist complained in an emblematic report from 2013, suggesting 
that DMI, Savile and exorbitant staff payoffs showed “a top-heavy management culture 
imperiously aloof to the point of contempt over what its audience wants, likes or needs.”124 
Industry stakeholders similarly chastised the apparent disconnect between ideals of what the 
BBC claimed to do and what it had actually done with its public funding: 
The problem is the BBC is very good at spending a lot of money—like, our money—
on failed initiatives that some executive has dreamed up from some management 
consultancy recommendations. I mean God knows how much over 20 years has been 
flushed down the toilet with no actual benefit to the British licence fee payer. If that 
was a private sector company all the executives would’ve been sacked. (Interview 10) 
The image of the BBC as a bloated, out-of-touch, inefficient monolith typified criticisms of its 
corporate failings. “The BBC was being asked questions about pay, perks and public money 
which it found uncomfortable to answer” was the BBC Trust chair’s self-flagellating summary 
of the events of 2012 and 2013.125 
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The collective interpretation of these public scandals cemented the premise of systemic, 
institutional crisis at the BBC caused by a complacent and self-interested bureaucratic culture 
supposedly innate to state-funded bodies. As David Elstein, a former broadcasting executive 
and prominent critic of the licence fee, described it shortly after the Savile affair: 
The central issue confronting the BBC is not whether this or that executive—or even 
the chairman of the BBC Trust himself—might need to be replaced, or whether the 
BBC was culpable for alleged crimes in the past. It is about the basic structure and 
governance of the Corporation.126 
Such comments were commonplace prior to Charter review and had a decisive effect on the 
scope of debate, in particular the taken-for-granted claim (instanced in Select Committee 
reports and the Green Paper’s consultation questions) that wholesale reform of governance was 
not only necessary but inevitable. 
These two cases demonstrate how media policy issues can emerge onto the political 
agenda through the narrative articulation of scandal. In the wake of high-profile failures at 
Britain’s two central media institutions, the dominant discourses were defined by those groups 
that leveraged normative expectations of public accountability and moral outrage in support of 
their own interests. The two debates also demonstrate how the power dynamics inherent to 
agenda-setting change when the focus of policy debate shifts, from ‘identifying problems’ and 
deciding to act on them, to constructing the active terms on which these decisions are actually 
taken. 
Despite the early dominance of the responsibility narrative in framing the government’s 
response to phone hacking, commentary during the Leveson Inquiry itself overwhelmingly 
reflected the freedom policy narrative. Four-fifths of news articles published by Britain’s major 
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national print titles between July 2011 and November 2012 criticised the Inquiry or its likely 
outcomes as posing a fundamental threat to freedom of expression (Ramsay, 2013:11). In these 
accounts, politicians were exploiting the Leveson Inquiry to “muzzle newspapers in revenge 
for exposing [the] expenses fraud”.127 The demands for tighter regulation from witnesses at the 
Inquiry posed “an insidious threat to the right to know”128. According to an editorial in The 
Times, “some of the most remarkable journalistic investigations in recent history could have 
fallen foul of Leveson’s moral arbiters” if the government introduced new laws aimed at the 
press.129 One Conservative MP argued that such a remedy would equate to “pruning a bonsai 
with a chainsaw”. The Education Secretary, Michael Gove, introduced one of the oft-repeated 
epithets of the post-Leveson debates when he claimed “there is a chilling atmosphere towards 
freedom of expression which emanates from the debate around Leveson”.130 
As the formal processes of Charter review kicked into gear, the 2015 general election 
similarly served to amplify overtly political interpretations of the BBC’s failures as core issues 
of media policy. Under the headline ‘Tories go to war over BBC’s institutional arrogance’131 
one MP warned the BBC to “be very careful about how they use their privileged position”, 
while the Culture Secretary threatened a full investigation on political bias solely on the basis 
that one election discussion on BBC radio “came across very, very anti-Tory.” In a Radio Times 
interview the Chancellor questioned “why the BBC is so frightened of regulation by Ofcom” 
and accused the Corporation of “suffocating local news”.132 The Times, embracing martial 
metaphor, concurred; “the BBC has parked its tanks on local newspapers’ front lawns” and 
“has no business in duplicating the efforts of commercial local outlets fighting for their 
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lives.”133 These calls echoed long-standing criticisms about the BBC’s impact on its 
commercial competitors, epitomised in a 2009 speech by BSkyB’s chair, James Murdoch, who 
denounced the Corporation as a “land-grab” that “seeks to compete head-on for audiences with 
commercial providers [to] dampen opposition to a compulsory licence fee”.134 
By the time Charter review was firmly on the public agenda, the longer-term campaigns 
for a distinct public service identity in BBC output had been subsumed within the commercial 
criticisms of its competitors. The unprecedented political pressure on the BBC during the 
general election had effectively been naturalised through the dominant interpretation of the 
previous years’ scandals set by its fiercest ideological critics. This all-encompassing narrative 
of institutional crisis laid the discursive foundations for the BBC’s surrender to the hammer-
blow licence fee settlement in July 2015, and its broader pattern of least-worst option 
concessions throughout Charter review. 
Given the myriad complexities and subjective perspectives that constitute any realm of 
public life, the process of agenda-setting may seem like a necessary means for translating hard-
to-capture issues into tangible and rationalised questions of policy. After all, policymakers can 
only act on a finite number of problems in a limited window of time, and their decisions will 
depend on the information and understandings available to them. However, as is evident from 
the discursive contests surrounding phone hacking and BBC scandals, their interpretation as 
public crises (and thence as urgent questions of media policy) was sharply inflected by the 
material and ideological interests that mobilised around these events, as well as the political 
and social contexts in which they unfurled. This raises an important matter, addressed by 
Research Question (4) and expanded on in the next chapter, in relation to the specific power of 
media to influence policymaking. The power of agenda-setting is disproportionately weighted 
 
133 The Times, 14 April 2015. 
134 MacTaggart lecture to the Edinburgh Television Festival, 28 August 2009. 
 
195 
in favour of media outlets, especially newspapers, partly because they provide political elites 
with both access to a collective frame of reference and narrative justifications where their 
ideological interests intersect. 
VALUE FRAMING AND DISCURSIVE CAPTURE 
As Chapters 5 and 6 detailed, media policymaking unfolds over a variety of political, 
regulatory and legislative decisions, and competing actors and interests cumulatively form 
solutions through their engagement in and influence over official decision-making processes. 
Yet this formulation is in part a product of the mobilisation of discourses, and the extent to 
which official decisions and potential policy solutions entrench dominant political narratives 
into the practical effects of media policy. The two debates also demonstrate how the technical 
language and substantive meaning of regulatory measures, legal powers and official decisions 
repeat and reinforce particular underlying narrative expressions of media policy values. The 
vast majority of tangible changes made as a result of the two case study debates affected quota 
figures, governance arrangements and other ‘concrete’ regulatory measures, but perhaps the 
most significant factor influencing these decisions was how over-arching principles—i.e. 
freedom, universality, distinctiveness, responsibility—were translated from ideal, normative 
objectives into tangible, implementable legal and regulatory requirements. 
One strikingly similar feature of both debates is how claims central to the responsibility 
and universality narratives were diminished by political and media actors opposed to these 
ideals, who nonetheless repeated some of the main discursive appeals and idioms of these 
narratives but repurposed and re-articulated them in support of contrary principles. Lord 
Leveson framed his proposed reforms of self-regulation as designed to “support press freedom, 
provide stability and guarantee for the public that this new body is independent and effective” 
(2012a). This insistence on public trust as a necessary feature of any new regulatory 
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framework—a core value of the ‘responsibility’ narrative which defined the Inquiry’s 
formation—was echoed by the Prime Minister: 
These are the Leveson principles ... If they can be put in place, we will truly have a 
regulatory system that delivers public confidence, justice for victims, and a step change 
in the way the press is regulated in our country.135 
Likewise the government’s BBC Green Paper on opened with an affirmation of universalist 
values: 
The rationale for a publicly-funded BBC that “informs, educates and entertains” as part 
of a wider public service broadcasting ecology remains strong even in the current media 
age. The Government is therefore committed both to the future of the BBC and to its 
underlying Reithian mission. (DCMS, 2015:7) 
However, the government’s notional support for these social objectives of press and 
broadcasting policy contrasts sharply with how these principles were dissected in the 
substantive processes of policy formulation. 
Prior to the Leveson Report’s publication, the Prime Minister had cautioned that 
“heavy-handed state intervention” in press regulation would be “bonkers”136 and later 
described Leveson’s legislative proposals as amounting to “crossing the Rubicon of writing 
elements of press regulation into the law of the land”.137 Far from being a murky platitude or 
cursory political rhetoric, the Prime Minister’s apparent endorsement of ‘Leveson principles’ 
represented an inherent contradiction in the government’s policy discourse. On the one hand 
the government claimed to fully support the Leveson recommendations while on the other 
rejecting its lynchpin proposal for statutory reform, without which, Leveson had declared, 
effective self-regulation “cannot be realised” (2012a:5). It also provided a crucial justification 
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for the newspaper industry’s internal reforms, paying lip service to the amiable notion of 
‘Leveson principles’ without actually accepting the specific criteria of the Leveson Report. The 
PCC chair Lord Hunt explained his attempts at a contract-based model of self-regulation: 
By endorsing [Leveson’s] wish that the best way forward was for publishers to sign up 
to a self-regulatory body, as long as it was genuine and followed certain principles, 
there would be no problem. ... I endorsed, in my view, almost all of the Leveson 
principles. (Interview 6) 
Pro-Leveson actors saw this emphasis on ‘Leveson principles’ as a political tactic to give the 
press “the space to reinterpret what Leveson really meant, and therefore to do the bare 
minimum to achieve these quite vague principles” (Interview 2). 
The Delaunay meeting of newspaper editors in December 2012 exemplified these 
contrasting interpretations of the Leveson Report and the weight assigned to its proposals. One 
editor remarked how the meeting had “found it quite easy to sort of tick them [the Leveson 
criteria] off one by one”138, yet the meeting memo released shows many of the proposals 
‘accepted’ with heavy, almost invalidating caveats. A Hacked Off director viewed this as 
spurning the self-evident authority of the recommendations: 
We’d had a full fucking public inquiry, and these people are treating it like a menu. The 
arrogance of it was simply breath-taking. (Interview 4) 
These two discursive approaches to framing policy objectives had a clear impact on the texts 
of the draft Royal Charters, and demonstrate how the core political values of the opposing 
freedom and responsibility narratives were variously translated into the detail and methods of 
each faction’s broader policy demands. 
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Universality underwent a similar redefinition and remoulding in the official texts and 
government proposals of BBC Charter review. The Green Paper’s attempts to instrumentalise 
the term exemplified the subtle ways in which the language of official documents and 
explanatory claims can impact the formulation of policy proposals. The consultation asked 
respondents to address “which elements of universality are most important for the BBC?”, 
explaining that the word “means different things to different people” (DCMS, 2015:22;31). 
Yet the ‘elements’ of universality listed in the consultation—offering all types of content for 
all audiences, providing coverage of unifying national events or being available and accessible 
for free on all platforms—are not mutually exclusive. They represent the intrinsic 
characteristics which taken together fulfil the deeper democratising mission embodied in 
‘universality’ as the historic justification for public service broadcasting. This deconstruction 
provided the essential grounding for the market impact criticisms entailed in the distinctiveness 
narrative, such as ITV’s long-standing complaint that the BBC increasingly produces “highly 
popular and often derivative and indistinct content which drives viewing share but gradually 
makes it harder and harder for mainstream rivals to compete” (ITV, 2015:21). In light of the 
“proliferation of choice,” the Green Paper argued that the BBC’s services risked “failing to be 
sufficiently distinct not only from commercial output, but from other BBC services” (2015:47). 
This emphasis on market impact compounds through a discussion of “the positive and negative 
effects the BBC can have on the wider market”, which detailed at length five harms the BBC 
causes its competitors in television, radio, local news and online platforms against just two 
general benefits from the BBC’s economic contribution to creative industries (2015:50-1). 
The ideological orientation of the Green Paper positioned the needs of the market as a 
greater policy priority than the diffuse social benefits of universal public service broadcasting. 
Figures from campaign groups and civil society associations recalled how the tone of the 
consultation document marginalised more qualitative topics, such as the social and cultural 
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value of the BBC’s output, which in turn diminished the scope for lay public engagement in 
Charter review: 
The questions in the Green Paper were not accessible to your average punter, and I 
think that’s a failing. If you want a democracy to work effectively you need to run a 
public consultation in a way such that the public can respond to them. (Interview 11) 
As well as presenting the public consultation as an inquiry into the BBC’s negative commercial 
impact, the Green Paper also articulated the core decisions of Charter review as technical, 
empirical questions of how this impact could be limited rather than openly interrogating 
whether this was actually a desirable or effective approach to BBC policy. This writing-out 
becomes all the more apparent in light of the fact that the word ‘universality’, previously the 
BBC’s core rationale, did not appear once in the government’s flagship White Paper. 
These vernacular emphases are not just marginal differences between the officious tone 
of government statements and the more free-flowing, value-laden rhetoric of public debates on 
media policy. Rather, the choice of language reflects specific decisions about which values and 
ideas ought to be prioritised as policy objectives. In the post-Leveson negotiations, government 
ministers referred to the cross-party agreement amendments tabled in the Commons as merely 
“a dab of statute”, statutory “protection” or legal “recognition”.139 Even pro-Leveson actors 
were careful to avoid describing their demands as legislative. The Labour Party described its 
draft Bill as only “legal backing for a new system of independent self-regulation of the 
press”140, while Hacked Off qualified their proposals as “essential to underpin a regulatory 
system that breaks the historic pattern of failure” (2012). One Hacked Off interviewee recalled 
how the group finessed their language to mirror this cautious tone. 
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Well it was legislative, really. We were saying it wasn’t because it made sense to say 
that. (Interview 3) 
These notably ambiguous phrases straddle the thin discursive line between nuanced 
statutory oversight and the absolutist principles of the freedom narrative. It is a sign of the 
entrenched political dynamics of elite media policymaking that non-elite groups decided to 
adapt proposals such that they repeat the language of executive policymakers, suggesting that 
avoiding references to legislative change was felt to be a ‘common-sense’ approach. However, 
in the case of the post-Leveson negotiations, the overarching rationale for genuine structural 
reform, as proposed in the Leveson Report, was lost amid the muddled technicalities of how to 
define (or avoid defining) statutory implementation. Industry actors, along with those 
newspapers that had aided in institutionalising this narrative, easily dismissed these 
awkwardly-worded proposals as clear violations of press freedom. 
Distinctiveness similarly would not have achieved its discursive significance were it 
not for the BBC’s consistent use of the term in its own policy engagement. This was pivotal in 
evolving the term from an amenable if vague platitude into a precisely defined regulatory 
criterion for restricting the BBC’s market impact. Commercial broadcasters emphatically 
mobilised this history as both an example of the failure of BBC governance to enforce any real 
change and a confirmation of the consensus for regulatory reform. 
Every time the Charter comes up for renewal, the BBC goes back to saying it will focus 
on distinctiveness … we have no disagreement with that as a strategy, that sounds 
exactly the right thing to do … our issue is less with what they say they are going to do 
and more with delivering that on the ground.141 
Having used the term extensively in the past the BBC struggled to argue against new market 
impact regulations, or in favour of its traditional universal remit, once the debate was limited 
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to a market impact notion of distinctiveness. When the BBC proposed that this “should be 
judged at the level of services rather than programmes” (BBC, 2015a:24), commercial 
broadcasters dismissed this as far too general to effectively police the Corporation crowding 
out popular genres, particularly peak-time entertainment and drama. 
It's the classic thing where the BBC says “well Radio 3's very distinctive, we've got 
masses of distinctive content in our overall offer”. That just masks all of those shows 
on BBC One where it is not very distinctive from the commercial offer at all. That's 
where the money is, but to say “look at all these amazing orchestras!”... the BBC can 
get very pious about its own distinctiveness. (Interview 13) 
The government evidently agreed with this view. Across the renewed 2016 Charter’s arsenal 
of Public Interest Tests, Competition Assessments and Competition Reviews, Ofcom is 
empowered to 
ensure [there is] no adverse impact on fair and effective competition which is not 
necessary for the effective fulfilment of the Mission and the promotion of the Public 
Purposes. (DCMS, 2016d:5) 
Distinctiveness had been thoroughly defined as both the rationale and the narrative mechanism 
for implementing a radically redefined philosophy of public service broadcasting into the 
practical rules and codes that govern the BBC’s entire operations. 
It is not unusual that the language of media policymaking is so infused with subjective 
interpretation and competing values that shape the acceptable boundaries of political 
deliberation. Yet these discursive contests also work at a more fundamental level to restrict the 
very language of public policy deliberation. Once a particular narrative frame is established in 
official policymaking practices, the scope of possible outcomes, arguments and meanings is 
preconfigured to only a narrow vernacular that repeats and reaffirms the ideological claims of 
this dominant discourse. 
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The easier it was for the industry to disassociate themselves from the original central 
issue, to actually say “no, this is just trying to stop us doing our job”, being able to 
occupy that rhetoric made it really hard for us to reclaim the debate and talk about 
market power. It’s got nothing to do with freedom of the press but that’s a very simple 
message. (Interview 3) 
The issue was when you came up against “yes of course OK we accept the BBC must 
make comedy, but it must be distinctive.” Well, what does that actually mean? What 
they would like it to mean is comedy that doesn’t get many listeners or viewers or many 
hits online and potentially takes away from commercial providers. In other words, 
something that isn’t successful. (Interview 9) 
Thus, one of the most significant effects of discourse as a form of power is its ability to mask 
the contestable or controversial aspects of a dominant policy narrative as ordinary, normal or 
matter-of-fact. “Ideas that do not draw on or interact with the available discourses,” meanwhile, 
are dismissed as “strange or irrelevant” (Fischer, 2003:83). Those interests that align with or 
contribute to the construction of a dominant narrative prosper, while counter-narratives or 
subordinate ideas that have been organised out of debate are marginalised. 
DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE LANGUAGE OF LEGITIMACY 
Given the highly combative and value-laden nature of the policymaking process, it is 
apparent that the legitimacy of a media policy decision, i.e. the public and political recognition 
that any change in law or regulation is ‘right’, does not rest solely on the legislative or 
constitutional authority by which that decision was made. Legitimacy is chiefly a discursive 
construct that arises from how the actions and motivations of policy actors fulfil (or are seen 
to fulfil) shared standards and ideals about the nature of policymaking in democratic societies. 
These standards can be summarised in three normative characteristics: that decisions result 
from fair and open bargaining encompassing the balance of interests in society; that competing 
actors and interests have a justifiable claim for their role in the decision-making process; and 
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that decisions are made in the public interest, both in the sense that they represent a public 
consensus for change and that any change brings about positive benefits for the public at large. 
These criteria amount to the necessary conditions of a notionally pluralist and 
democratic policy process, but as with any other idealised concept they are subject to 
contestation and interpretation. Policy actors’ appeals to the ‘legitimacy’ of their actions reveal 
contrasting accounts of what makes a policy decision fair, or democratic, or in the public 
interest, and these are in themselves reflective of opposing narratives about the fundamental 
relationship between media, policymaking and democratic institutions. In both case study 
debates different actors employed the language of legitimacy in various ways to accept or reject 
media policy decisions, and these claims helped to justify actions or reaction during the 
practical stages of policy implementation. These narrative devices also involved different 
perceptions regarding what types of interest or forms of political engagement are considered 
legitimate, but crucially they also demonstrate how these competing ideological conceptions 
of the democratic process impacted directly on the outcome of the media policymaking process. 
If legitimacy derives from a fair and balanced policy process, the post-Leveson and 
BBC Charter review debates demonstrate how executive policymakers try to validate their 
decisions using avowedly pluralist language. In the Prime Minister’s words, the March 2013 
cross-party agreement on press regulation “benefited hugely from hundreds of hours of detailed 
negotiations with representatives of victims, all main political parties and the press 
themselves”.142 For the Culture Secretary the 2016 DCMS White Paper on Charter review was 
the “culmination of 10 months’ work”, taking into account both the 190,000 public consultation 
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submissions and the contributions of “all the stakeholders, BBC representatives and others who 
helped inform our deliberations”.143 
Both of these statements celebrate a lengthy media policy process involving numerous 
interests as the best possible guarantee that decisions were reached through fair and balanced 
means. Of course government policymakers and political actors can be expected to invoke 
democratic norms to promote their own democratic credentials. Such claims, however, can also 
obscure and even naturalise the instabilities and inequalities inherent to media policymaking. 
Many of the most significant decisions in both case studies resulted from deliberations between 
only a small set of elite or established ‘insider’ actors, while the influence of more public forms 
of engagement was minimal. Furthermore, these decisions often involved policymakers 
making subjective choices between irreconcilable narratives about the fundamental purposes 
of press and broadcast media. This contradiction—between the official claims of balance or 
fairness and the partial and political realities behind these claims—speaks to the broader 
inequalities of power that structure media policymaking, and the varying ability of different 
policy actors to challenge the discursive construction of policy decisions as legitimate. 
It is highly likely (and suggested by several key informants involved in Charter review) 
that the BBC felt compelled to accept the onerous cost of over-75s licences in the 2015 funding 
negotiations, rather than risk a damaging public confrontation with a hostile and newly 
emboldened majority Conservative government in advance of Charter review. What is more 
revealing for the role of discourses in policymaking is that the BBC’s Director-General 
described this deal as “the right deal for the BBC in difficult economic circumstances”.144 This 
legitimised both the draconian process of the settlement—in which, as the BBC Trust lamented, 
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the public “have not been given any say in the major decisions about the BBC’s future”145—
and the use of the BBC’s licence fee funding as an arm of the government’s austerity policies. 
In contrast, anti-Leveson actors openly challenged the legitimacy of the March 2013 
cross-party deal, and frequently referenced it as the political justification for rejecting the Royal 
Charter recognition scheme. Prior to this deal, industry negotiators had echoed the pluralist 
claims of executive policymakers, with one IIG member describing the February 2012 draft 
charter as “the fruit of two months of intensive talks involving the newspapers and magazine 
industry and all three main political parties”.146 Later press coverage, however, condemned the 
cross-party Charter as a secretive deal “fuelled by Kit Kats and delivery pizza”, “hammered 
out at 2am in the office of the Labour leader” without any press industry involvement.147 The 
recurring image of the ‘pizza deal’ as a shady decision discredited by its frivolous 
circumstances persists even today as a powerful rhetorical device to support on-going industry 
opposition to political involvement in press regulation. 
Rival claims about balance or fairness also tended to involve idealised views about 
which actors should (or should not) contribute to a media policy decision for it to be considered 
legitimate. One basic ideal of policymaking holds that deliberative processes should involve 
actors who exhibit some sort of professional expertise or relevant insight that informs effective 
and appropriate decisions. However, definitions of the ideal types of expertise or insight 
involve ideological conceptions about the overarching aims of media policy, and about which 
select groups within the wide array of public and private stakeholders can contribute 
meaningfully to media policymaking. 
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Press criticism of the figures involved in the March 2013 cross-party deal articulated 
many of the same opposing narrative claims about which political principles should guide press 
policymaking. Hacked Off’s close role in negotiating the provisions of the deal was described 
in press reports as “a sort of coup by people even more unaccountable and unrepresentative 
than the average newspaper owner”, while the Privy Council’s formal approval of the Charter 
amounted to “members of a secret body founded in the Middle Ages … forcing the Queen to 
sign a politician’s charter ending 300 years of press freedom”.148 For pro-Leveson actors, 
private industry access to senior policymakers fuelled claims that significant proposals were 
rewritten “either with the press holding the pen or with the press dictating the words”.149 One 
Hacked Off interviewee downplayed the supposed impact of the ‘pizza meeting’ against what 
they saw as a major power imbalance throughout the rest of the policy process:  
The press lobby had had endless influence, endless input, so it wasn’t as if we’d 
managed to get this one meeting at the last moment and changed everything. It didn’t, 
it changed a couple of tiny bits. It’s a bit of a joke, really. (Interview 3) 
These accounts correspond closely to the ‘gains’ and ‘losses’ of these competing factions 
throughout the timeline of the post-Leveson negotiations, yet the differing views on the 
legitimacy of involving certain actors in decision-making also repeat the underlying political 
values of the policy narratives these figures advocated. 
Even within the multi-faceted and sprawling BBC Charter review process, the 
legitimacy of different stakeholder groups’ engagement in policymaking was nonetheless 
inflected by the dominant interpretation of the BBC’s purposes as a ‘distinctive’ broadcaster. 
This focus on competition and crowding out gave priority to industry voices who echoed the 
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government’s concerns around market impact, while any other input that emphasised social or 
cultural values of public service broadcasting was diminished. The Culture Secretary dismissed 
the mass public response to the Green Paper consultation as “not wholly representative” while 
newspaper reports thundered that the process had been “hijacked” by the “left-wing”, “rent-a-
mob” clicktivism group 38 Degrees.150 This vocal aversion to public engagement presented 
Charter review as principally a process for experts and established industry voices, and 
redefined the mechanisms for public input as merely providing indicative lay support for pre-
determined objectives. Although legitimacy is clearly a fundamental democratic requirement 
of public policy decisions, the discursive construction of ‘legitimacy’ is nonetheless governed 
by the same elite political actors and vested media interests that dominate how the policy 
process itself is structured. 
It is worth dwelling briefly on notions of ‘the public interest’, and how policymakers 
seek to connect ostensibly democratic processes with the political and policy expectations of 
the public at large. During the Leveson negotiations the Culture Secretary called on the other 
parties to “put to one side the political and turn to focus on our principles”151, while the Deputy 
Prime Minister lauded the March 2013 cross-party agreement as a victory for “putting narrow 
interests aside”.152 The DCMS consultation paper on BBC Charter review also championed 
reform of the BBC’s governance as a chance to “ensure the interests of the British public are 
properly represented” (2015:134). These appeals exude many of the ideal standards of pluralist 
policymaking: elected decision-makers strive for consensus, consultation and objectivity, 
while the actual decision-making process is structured “to insulate it from the domination of 
special interests and to incorporate the views of multiple stakeholders” (Freedman, 2008:33). 
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However, this rhetoric of acting in the public interest belies the subjective ways in 
which ‘the public’ is conceived, and the ideological values that take precedence when such 
conceptions are mobilised in the policy process. Throughout the Leveson negotiations and BBC 
Charter review, the prevalent expression of the public’s relationship with media was either as 
a single-minded uniform stakeholder among many, or as mere consumers of media products. 
The emphasis on studies, reviews and opinion polls as means of gauging public involvement 
in policymaking (explored further in the next chapter) reinforces the premise of a ‘public 
interest’ that is measurable, quantifiable and reducible to partial assessments of political 
salience or economic value. Claims that a policy decision is legitimate on the basis of its 
reflecting the public interest thus do not entail a genuine engagement with the interests and 
demands of the public as a democratic collective, but rather tend to reinforce the dominant 
interpretations of the relationship between the policymaking process and ‘the public’ in the 
guise of a homogenous consumer mass. 
This is not to say that policymakers’ triumphant appeals to pluralism, consultation and 
listening to all sides are made duplicitously or out of cynical political rote. Rather, the language 
of legitimacy highlights the circuitous and self-rationalising nature of policy discourses. 
Policymaking processes that are shaped by and organised around partial and interest-led 
interpretations, and which then produce outcomes that conform to and validate these narratives, 
appear legitimate precisely because they reflect that narrative’s ideal conception of media 
policymaking. At the surface such decisions appear as the products of bureaucratic and 
routinized processes, premised on pluralist conceptions of how problems are identified and the 
appropriate means of resolving them through policy change. However, this naturalisation ought 
to be seen as a product of the unequal power relations inherent to the discursive construction 
of legitimacy. The discursive formation of decisions and policymaking behaviours as 
‘legitimate’ rests principally with actors who are already primary definers of these common 
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sense conditions—namely, political and media elites—rather than resulting from the 
accumulated assent of public and private interests engaged in the policy process. 
MEDIA POLICY AS NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Numerous theorists have examined mass media’s social and political role in 
“buttressing and (re)producing a sense of nationhood” (Rosie et al., 2006:328; see also 
Anderson, 1991; Brookes, 1999; Schlesinger, 1991). National identity is a complex cultural 
construct which inducts disparate individuals into an imagined community of shared beliefs 
and mores inherent to (and expected of) their common membership of a nation-state. Critical 
research has focussed on how the mediation of contemporary British nationhood has often 
articulated a reductive identity contrasting ‘good’ British values with ‘bad’ non-British values, 
the latter typically associated with ethnic, religious or cultural minorities (see inter alia Black, 
2016; Creeber, 2004; Innes, 2010; Lentin and Titley, 2012; Saeed, 2007). The articulation of 
national identity is thus a powerful discursive device for normalising political attitudes and 
behaviours, based on how they are perceived to embody the dominant expressions of that 
nation’s essential moral character or ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). 
Such idealised traits are, however, clearly subjective and reliant upon “the mythical 
construction of a seamless history” (Brookes, 1999:248) which inevitably emphasises 
narratively useful aspects over the fuller, nuanced reality. In recent years any notion of a 
uniform British national identity has eroded under intense contestation and uncertainty: from 
without, by economic and political shifts of globalisation and Britain’s ever-diminishing status 
as a global power; and, from within, by rising social and economic inequality across the UK 
paired with an increasingly multi-cultural and multi-ethnic population. These crises in 
‘Britishness’ culminated in June 2016 with the public referendum on Britain’s membership of 
the European Union. The immediate political build-up to and aftermath of the Brexit vote 
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overlapped considerably with the central media policy questions of the phone hacking scandal 
and BBC Charter review. What role do national newspapers play, for example, in fostering or 
countering prejudice against minority groups? How might the BBC as a national broadcaster 
provide a unique voice for communities outside the predominantly white English, middle-class 
and London-centric tone of mainstream British television? What image of Britain do print and 
broadcasting media represent, and is this the same country the public see and experience in 
their own lives? 
These questions naturally feature in the deeper and on-going interrogation of what 
makes up British society. Throughout both case studies, policymakers and stakeholders 
invoked idealised notions of British national identity to explain their policy objectives. In these 
accounts, media policy decisions reflected a shared vision of uniquely British political 
traditions and moral codes. Notably, these appeals amounted to more than rote patriotic 
rhetoric. The visions of Britishness espoused in various policy proposals also entailed 
competing normative visions of core British values of society and nationhood, as well as 
contrasting ideals about media’s place in British society and Britain’s place in the world. 
One persistent expression of media policy as a facet of national identity evoked a sense 
of the British press and the BBC as historic and distinctly national institutions. This linked the 
political and social development of the UK to the structural development of mass media, and 
therefore asserted these institutions as reflections of uniquely British legacies that should be 
preserved and protected through policy. Reforming press regulation through statute, according 
to one leader article in the Daily Mail, “would unravel liberties that have been Britons’ 
birthright for 300 years”.153 The rhetoric of 300 years of press freedom in Britain—referring to 
the abolition of government print licencing in 1695—featured in many anti-Leveson editorials, 
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linking the evolution of Britain’s liberal-democratic institutions with the freedom of the press 
from state interference. The Sun, for example, criticized the March 2013 cross-party Royal 
Charter as “ending three centuries of press freedom at the stroke of a pen”. Rally against 
legislative proposals that were “utterly alien to our traditions in this country”,154 Conservative 
politicians like Boris Johnson, then the Mayor of London, lauded “the free, dynamic, irreverent 
and independent media [that is] one of the glories of this country”.155 
Official government papers on BBC Charter review often opened with appeals to 
history and tradition as defining attributes of the BBC’s contribution to British society. The 
DCMS consultation described the Corporation as being “at the very heart of Britain” (2015:2), 
and the White Paper praised it as “a revered national institution, and familiar treasured 
companion” (2016a:5). As the BBC’s own account of its national significance suggests, these 
statements speak to a sense of the BBC as an intrinsic part of a particularly British way of life 
and, because of its universal funding and purposes, intimately connected with every British 
citizen: 
For 93 years, the BBC has played this role in our culture; we are part of what makes us 
the UK. We reflect and celebrate its different Nations and communities. We are part of 
the fabric of the country. We’re part of how other people see us and why many people 
abroad would like to have a BBC of their own. (BBC, 2015a:5) 
Claims of communal ownership materialise in familiar phrases such as ‘our BBC’ or ‘Auntie 
Beeb’, and the BBC’s universal mission is celebrated as part of its “particularly British” ethos 
(BBC, 2015c:18). Yet as a policy narrative this language entails an explicit (though, in the case 
of some government and commercial figures, begrudging) recognition of the BBC’s entrenched 
 
154 HC Deb 29 November 2011, v. 554 c. 460. 




place at the centre of the British broadcasting marketplace, granted the right to act under 
different rules and expectations due to the sheer weight of its history: 
Our view was always that the BBC was there first, and the others came in with their 
eyes open. It’s a national treasure, and the experience of public service broadcasters in 
other parts—mainly old Commonwealth countries so like Australia and Canada—is 
that once you tinkered with it, it was lost and devalued, you couldn’t resurrect it. 
(Interview 12) 
These appeals emphasise the unique and uniquely British legacies of media institutions as part 
of the social and cultural fabric that bind the public as a national community. 
Other discourses offered an image of British media policy as having a powerful 
international influence, empowering the UK as a global standard-bearer for liberal-democratic 
values. Anti-Leveson accounts credited Britain’s history of press freedom with making the 
country a global beacon for freedom and democracy, a reputation that would diminish if pro-
Leveson press reforms were enacted. Luckhurst’s 2012 pamphlet ‘Responsibility Without 
Power’ provides an evocative image of the alleged international consequences of legislative 
changes to press regulation: 
Westminster’s statutory backing for a Press Ombudsman would become President 
Putin’s State Censorship Committee, Robert Mugabe’s Ministry of Truth or Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s Board of Righteousness. Look, they would gloat, the mother of 
democracy understands the need for the state to ensure that journalists behave. 
(2012b:28) 
Industry stakeholders and press freedom campaign groups claimed the March 2013 cross-party 
charter agreement had created a global ‘chilling effect’ on journalists who had previously 
viewed Britain as an inspiration for press freedom worldwide:  
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The example parliament is setting has already been noted by a range of regimes around 
the world, and many journalists have expressed concern at the impact it will have on 
the political controls they may come to face in their own countries.156 
I went to Hong Kong and I met representatives of justice and the international 
commission of jurists from thirty different countries. They all said to me “what the 
hell’s going on in the UK? Why are you trying to fetter your free press?” … I constantly 
get confronted by a belief in the rest of the world that the UK has over-reacted in their 
attempts to marshal the free press. (Interview 6) 
This same rhetoric of international British influence manifested in references to the 
BBC amplifying the UK’s ‘soft power’. Many policy actors praised the role of the BBC World 
Service in extending “the social and informational benefits of the BBC to people in countries 
where there is less access to accurate, impartial information” (VLV, 2015:22). As well as 
effecting a journalistic noblesse oblige, the World Service and the BBC’s international projects 
produce “tangible knock-on benefits for the UK, encouraging people to do business, visit and 
study here” (Fairhead, 2015:12). Here the BBC is a significant exporter of British culture just 
as it creates additional economic value for the UK both through selling popular, profitable 
British programming overseas and re-investing its success in Britain’s creative industries. 
British values and British identity have a special place in the world—and the BBC, 
alongside others in our creative industries, has a vital role in building the UK’s global 
brand and influence. (BBC, 2015c:7, my emphasis) 
The BBC’s own Charter review submissions emphasised the Corporation’s place as “a key 
source of the UK’s competitive advantage in global media” (Heath, 2015:39), and government 
documents likewise highlighted the international status of the BBC as “a valuable engine of 
growth and an international benchmark for television, radio, online and journalism” (DCMS, 
2015:3). 
 
156 Index on Censorship (online), ‘Leveson, the Royal Charter and press regulation’, 11 April 2013. 
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These appeals to British traditions and historical legacy imply that the specific 
organisation of British print and broadcast media is because of an innate national character, 
rather than the product of often inconsistent technical decisions and political conflicts. The 
‘Whig history’ (Curran, 2000) of 300 years of unblemished press freedom in Britain offers a 
powerful narrative base for opposing state interference in the press, yet neglects the long history 
of cooperation and deference between the actions of government and the interests of the British 
corporate press. Likewise the emotive defence of the BBC as a national treasure, representing 
the ‘best of British’, casually elides the complex and persistent struggle within and around the 
Corporation between the principle of independent, democratic public service and the realities 
of a state institution closely intertwined with social, cultural and political elites (Mills, 2016), 
as well as the problems of which ‘image’ of Britain the BBC represents and presents to the 
public. 
Furthermore these exceptionalist appeals to British national identity mask their 
underlying ideological conceptions of the purpose of media policy. Anti-Leveson opposition 
to legislative involvement in press regulation was presented as an essential characteristic of 
British political and democratic culture, rather than the instrumental policy goal of an industry 
seeking to preserve its regulatory and commercial interests. Examples of statute-based 
regulation in developed democracies like the Nordic countries (consistently the highest-ranking 
countries in global press freedom reports157) or Ireland barely featured as potential models for 
reform, even though the statute-based Irish Press Council counts the Irish editions of anti-
Leveson titles amongst its members. “The sky does not seem to have fallen in in those 
countries,” (Interview 8) as one interviewee put it, yet such options were dismissed by the press 
 
157 See Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index. 
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and Conservative policymakers primarily because they would be ‘un-British’ rather than due 
to any particularly fault in their implementation. 
Likewise the focus on the BBC World Service as a triumph of British soft power frames 
the BBC’s ‘global brand’ as an arm of the British state’s diplomatic and foreign policy 
objectives. This attitude becomes clearer still in light of the 2015 licence fee settlement when, 
despite compelling the BBC to aid its policy of economic austerity, the Conservative 
government protected the Foreign Office grand-in-aid for the World Service. Reform of the 
BBC’s Public Purposes further hints at the impact of national identity on media policy. In its 
2006 Charter the BBC had a central mission of “bringing the UK to the world and the world to 
the UK,” through making people in the UK “aware of international issues and of the different 
cultures and viewpoints of people living outside the UK.” However the 2016 DCMS White 
Paper entirely removed the BBC’s duty to ‘bring the world to the UK’, requiring only that the 
Corporation reflect “the UK, its culture and values to the world” (2016a:12). Given the White 
Paper’s publication less than a month before the EU referendum—and the Culture Secretary’s 
strong support for the Leave campaign—this shrinking of Britons’ cultural window to the world 
appears closely intertwined with the fractious public debates about Britain’s place in and 
relationship with other countries and cultures. 
Policy actors rightly recognise media policy as a vital component in the discursive 
construction of nationhood, and acknowledge that the organisation and governance of media 
matters for the broader social and political development of a national community. However, 
idealised characteristics of British press and broadcasting policy also reinforce a deeply 
ideological vision of what sort of nation Britain is. The dominant expressions of media policy 
as a proxy for national identity evoke an objective value of tradition and institutional history, 
exemplified by the inter-relationship between Britain’s liberal-democratic media and its austere 
policymaking institutions. This value is premised on political principles of individual liberty, 
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the political autonomy of the press and an entrepreneurial market economy as intrinsic 
absolutes. The freedom and distinctiveness narratives that most directly emphasised these 
libertarian, free market principles were thus made to appear as natural and historically 
contiguous descriptions of British media policy, rather than the partial interpretations of 
politically and commercially motivated actors. The two case studies suggest that national 
identity remains an important factor in the discursive construction and political assessment of 
media policy change, but that the symbolic power to define and express this identity as a policy 
narrative rests with the same established forces and institutions—namely government, 
parliament and the social-cultural complex of the mass media—who benefit from the dominant 
neo-liberal frame which idealises media and policymaking as principally an economic concern. 
A MEDIA POLICY META-NARRATIVE? 
It is impossible to chart every narrative twist and turn in a policy debate effectively. 
Nonetheless, the previous discussions demonstrate how competing ideas and values of media 
policy are mobilised through distinct rhetorical techniques and discursive devices, and the 
impact this competition has on decision-making. These discussions also lend support to the 
view that policymaking is first and foremost a battle of ideas (Fischer, 2003), a struggle to 
command the meanings and narrative frameworks with which policymakers interpret and 
decide on policy problems. 
Yet these narratives, and the rhetorical devices actors used to deploy them within the 
policy process, reveal a deeper relationship between the language and values of media policy 
and the dynamics of power that structure the decision-making process. Across both 
policymaking processes, the most decisive effect of policy narratives was the progressive 
restricting and narrowing of the discursive boundaries in which pivotal decisions were made. 
This was a persistent dynamic throughout the ‘formal’ mechanisms of policymaking—
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parliamentary debates, government reports and stakeholder negotiations—as well as the wider 
political and social space of policy debate played out in news reports, public events and interest 
group campaigning. Once a narrative frame was adopted and repeated in the dominant language 
of official processes, the terms of debate in subsequent stages became defined by an 
increasingly smaller and smaller set of potential interpretations and meanings. 
In contemporary accounts of policymaking, this discursive ‘funnelling’ is posed as a 
necessary effect of the rationalisation that is both necessary and intrinsic to any public policy 
process. But this rationalising isn’t a natural or objective process: it reflects the political biases 
of policymakers, the ability of other policy actors to articulate and disseminate their demands 
in ways that appeal to them, and the hegemonic values that structure how such discursive 
formations unfold. This funnelling privileges and naturalises the demands, status and values of 
these groups, but crucially also diminishes the scope for counter-narratives or alternative values 
to influence policymaking. From this we can begin to understand how issues as emotive, 
explosive and loaded with potential as phone hacking, or a topic as essential to public media 
provision as the future of the BBC, can become construed as little more than technical and 
insular matters to be resolved principally through bargaining with elite media stakeholders. 
This does not mean that discursive processes are predetermined or inflexible. The two 
case studies demonstrate the lively interplay between competing ideas and arguments, the fluid 
cumulative shaping of ideas and issues into policy decisions, and the unique political and 
institutional forms of press and broadcast policymaking that produce new or unexpected 
discursive arenas. Yet both debates still operated within the same wider ideological context, 
and their core narrative contests reflect both the entrenched boundaries of political discussion 
and the underlying dynamics of discursive power that exemplify contemporary British media 
policymaking. The over-arching ‘meta-narrative’ (Fischer, 2003:173) connecting the post-
Leveson and BBC policy narratives is the essential question of the relationship between the 
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media and the public, and what kinds of political systems can or should govern this relationship. 
Implicit in the central arguments of the ‘responsibility versus freedom’ and ‘universality versus 
distinctiveness’ frames is an enduring philosophical conflict between social and commercial 
ideals of mass media in modern democracies. 
Over the last 40 years British media policy has increasingly articulated the cultural and 
democratising effects of the press and public broadcasting as by-products of market activity, 
rather than meaningful goals in their own right. Furthermore, these conflicts played out in 
discursive spaces (both institutional and textual) that are predominantly governed by elite 
political practices and private media interests. The result is a media policymaking process 
officially articulated as open, depoliticised, balanced and led by experts, but with its aims, 
interpretations and language ultimately defined by a pervasive neo-liberal discourse that puts 
elite bargaining, free markets, and deregulation ahead of any legitimate public say in how 




8. STRUCTURE VERSUS AGENCY IN THE MEDIA POLICY 
PROCESS 
Neither the official decision-making structures nor discursive dynamics can fully 
explain why certain people were more or less influential than others at different times 
throughout the evolving structures and discourses of the two case studies. Both cases involved 
a wide array of policy actors and groups who all performed distinct roles and utilised various 
forms of engagement to achieve their objectives. It follows that policymaking is not an 
autonomous process but is at its core a lived activity, shaped and steered by human actors with 
competing ideas and goals. Influencing policy is not, however, solely the result of intent and 
will, of being in the right place at the right time, or even of having convincing arguments and 
powerful demands that sway the minds of rationally-guided policymakers. The interpersonal 
dynamics of the post-Leveson negotiations and BBC Charter review were tightly organised 
around defined physical settings (e.g. parliamentary chambers, government offices) and 
operated under unique institutional frameworks. An individual’s capacity to influence such 
processes is deeply contingent on their own position in relation to these places and spaces, as 
well as the actions and behaviours made possible or impossible by these structures. Analysing 
how such systems develop is thus essential for explaining why certain policy actors are 
successful at influencing policy while others are not, and highlights the fundamental connection 
between behavioural and structural forms of power. 
This chapter seeks to analyse this interplay between structure and agency in media 
policymaking. It details how actors are organised, how institutional cultures circulate, and how 
specific channels and techniques for engaging in decision-making produce and distribute 
different forms of power. The first section examines the differing structures and arrangements 
of key figures and groups across the post-Leveson and Charter review debates, and analyses 
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how these ‘policy networks’ produced distinct hierarchies that preconfigured actors’ roles and 
influence in policymaking. Then the chapter details the campaigning tactics and lobbying 
practices actors used to influence policy decisions, and what the efficacy of these different 
forms reveal about the disparities in access to and influence over core sites of executive 
decision-making. Thus these discussions consider a range of deeper issues relating to Research 
Questions (2) and (4) concerning the distribution of power and influence between different 
types of actors and interests in media policymaking. Through this the analysis from the 
previous three chapters is integrated to explore whether these two case studies are evidence of 
balanced, equitable democratic policymaking, or instead produced and were structured by 
institutional biases and ‘rules of the game’ that diminished the agency of some actors while 
privileging others. 
MEDIA POLICY NETWORKS: ORGANISED PLURALISM OR STRUCTURED 
INEQUALITIES? 
The unique organisation of the post-Leveson and BBC Charter review policy networks, 
and the patterns of interaction they created, reflect cumulative historical precedents as well as 
each debate’s specific political and social circumstances. After decades of a total void in public 
press policy deliberation, and in the shadow of visceral reactions to the phone hacking scandal, 
competing actors’ frenetic activities and relationships within the disorganised arena of the post-
Leveson debates seemed almost inevitable. By contrast BBC Charter review is a routine event 
in British broadcasting policy, and the methods and interactions that pressure groups used to 
enhance their influences in these established processes adopted similarly bureaucratic and 
consultative behaviours. 
From these unique foundations and contexts, we can conceive of figurative network 
‘maps’ that illustrate the connections, relationships and flows of influence that comprised the 
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post-Leveson debates in 2012 and 2013 (Figure 2) and the BBC Charter renewal process from 
2015 to 2016 (Figure 3). These maps illustrate the defining network characteristics that 
structured different actors’ interactions with the policymaking process, with each set of actors 
corresponding to broadly cohesive interest groups or distinct political units of cooperating 
individuals. These ‘nodes’ are not intended to represent the entire corpus of individual figures 
and formal organisations involved in the two debates, and the connections only account for the 
most prominent flows of influence between these actors. Indeed each the lines connecting one 
set of actors with another could easily correspond to any number of the specific forms of 
behavioural and structural power itemised in Chapter 2’s Figure 1. The complexity of these 
interacting forces and relationships is precisely what makes the policy networks model an 
interesting if overly normative framework for analysis. Thus Figures 2. and 3. below are 
intended more as a figurative illustration of discrete power relations between actors specific to 
the two case study debates, rather than a reconceptualisation of the systemic function of power 










The people and groups involved in the post-Leveson debates were divided into 
diametrically opposed pro- and anti-statute camps, with effectively no interaction across this 
divide and all substantive deliberations and political pressure directed towards the cross-party 
talks between leading politicians, the newspaper industry and representatives of phone hacking 
victims. Actors involved in Charter review were assembled much more complexly into 
numerous clusters of broadcasting companies, public campaign groups, industry stakeholders 
and various political bodies, all engaged in multiple intersecting consultations and reviews 
feeding into the government’s central Charter negotiations with the BBC. Yet these contrasting 
network structures also imply that different sets of actors and forms of political interaction had 
varying levels of influence and engagement between the two debates. These arrangements also 
invite us to interrogate in more detail the pluralist assumptions of ‘networked’ policymaking 
that idealise bargaining and intermediation between multiple, dispersed groups as guarantees 
of democratic policy decisions. The following discussions provide a more detailed account of 
how each of these individual relationships functioned in practice, elaborates on what these 
interpersonal dynamics reveal about the hierarchies and ordering of different groups within 
media policymaking, and explores these connections and conflicts as unique and uniquely 
structured manifestations of various forms of behavioural and structural power. By 
interrogating the two policy networks and analysing how each functional layer of actors was 
composed, we can begin to unpick this premise of natural or necessary hierarchy, and instead 
expose the political biases and internal contradictions that shape how media policymaking is 
organised. 
Core policymakers and uncertain authority 
In almost all areas of British public policy, a senior government minister with 
departmental responsibility commands the core processes of executive decision-making for 
their relevant policy area. This minister, closely supported by a team of civil servants, political 
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advisors and junior ministers, prepares the detailed provisions of policy change and then 
presents them for parliamentary scrutiny on behalf of the government. In this archetypical 
model of Westminster policymaking, ministers are the idealised centre of power, with unique 
and exclusive access to professional research and professional advice for informing their day-
to-day legislative activities. Yet their actions are still fixed within the institutional guide-rails 
of personal accountability (to Cabinet and, via parliament, to the public) as well as their 
interdependence with stakeholders with whom they seek to build consensus (Rhodes, 2003:7-
9; Russell and Gover, 2017:47). 
In the post-Leveson debates and BBC Charter review, the Secretary of State for Culture, 
Media and Sport was the central figure for major moments of policy decision. Conservative 
MP Maria Miller, who held the post from September 2012 to April 2014, was integral to the 
cross-party talks on press regulation. John Whittingdale, another Conservative MP, steered the 
majority of the government’s Charter renewal process from May 2015 to July 2016, before 
being replaced by Karen Bradley MP who gave final approval to the renewed BBC Royal 
Charter. Although these figures fulfilled the constitutional duties attached to their ministerial 
role, their individual influence in the interpersonal dynamics of media policymaking was far 
from absolute. On the contrary, the ‘core’ decision-making actors in both debates comprised a 
small but diffused cluster of government and parliamentary elites with competing loyalties and 
objectives, whose political machinations and personal conflicts often diluted, and sometimes 
even circumvented, the functional authority of the Secretary of State. While official 
policymaking power may be concentrated in individual actors who hold formally constituted, 
normatively authoritative positions, the effects and limits of this authority are ultimately 
dependent on the distribution of political power within specific elite policymaking systems. 
This differential nature of executive power is especially apparent in the two case study 
debates. David Cameron’s decision to call a judicial inquiry on phone hacking was heavily 
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influenced by the fragility of the 2010-15 coalition government and his own attempts to retain 
majority control of the Commons. One interviewee highly critical of the Leveson Inquiry’s 
genesis described it as “a classic piece of Cameron managerialism” (Interview 1), as the Prime 
Minister appears to confirm in his own account of the period: 
On press regulation there was no Conservative-Lib Dem coalition and a Labour 
opposition; there was, effectively, a Labour-Lib Dem coalition and a Conservative 
opposition. It was dangerous territory to be in. (2019:259) 
The ad hoc composition of post-Leveson negotiations further demonstrates the prioritisation of 
political concerns—trying to navigate this supposed ‘dangerous territory’ of MPs ready to act 
against the government—over tackling the systemic failures in press regulation exposed by the 
Inquiry. 
The Prime Minister’s stated aim of reaching a cross-party consensus on non-statutory 
reform altered the arrangement of official decision-making actors in three fundamental ways: 
first, it prevented parliament from exercising its democratic scrutiny on proposals and, as 
already detailed, emboldened pro-Leveson politicians to implement their demands by more 
drastic means; second, it gave Labour’s shadow Culture Secretary Harriet Harman and Liberal 
peer Jim Wallace, deputised by their respective parties, unique positions as non-government 
core policymakers with effective vetoes over the private negotiations; and third, it allowed for 
much more direct personal interventions from the three party leaders as talks unfolded. David 
Cameron frequently sought to reconfigure the balance of power in these negotiations, most 
notably by imposing his Cabinet Office ‘fixer’, Oliver Letwin, as the government’s lead 
negotiator. Multiple interviewees remarked that the Prime Minister had “changed his mind 
about who was leading the negotiations” (Interview 6), allegedly because he did not believe 
Miller was capable of negotiating a settlement that would preserve his sensitive relationship 
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with the newspaper industry, or produce a commanding political victory over his Labour and 
Liberal Democrat adversaries. 
Personal politics played an equally decisive role in Charter review. For campaigners 
who supported universal public broadcasting, John Whittingdale’s appointment as Culture 
Secretary confirmed that the Prime Minister was seeking to ‘sort out’ the BBC following the 
2015 election. 
As soon as he was appointed, I was appalled and feared the worst, and I was proved 
right in every respect … He is an ideologically committed right-wing Conservative: 
pro-Murdoch, pro-Thatcher, pro-free market, and has never really liked the BBC 
despite claiming that he does. (Interview 9) 
The chief executive of Pact similarly suggested that Whittingdale was more inclined to 
accommodate ideas or policies sharing his own market-absolutist view, rather than seek to 
balance the wide range of competing public and private interests engaged in Charter renewal: 
Although I know him well, I don’t think he necessarily thinks any of my members 
should survive or not. He would say it’s entirely up to their own wit and creativity. He 
is a believer in the free market and creativity and entrepreneurship. (Interview 10) 
Whittingdale’s personal policy views were embedded throughout the organisation of the 
government’s formal Charter renewal process, not least in his hiring of former BSkyB 
executive Ray Gallagher as his ministerial special advisor. Of the eight ‘industry experts’ from 
publishers, commercial broadcasters and internet companies appointed by the Secretary of 
State to the DCMS Charter review advisory panel, many of them held direct financial interests 
in competition with the BBC.158 Only one member of the panel, VLV president Dame Colette 
 
158 DCMS press release, ‘Industry experts to advise government on BBC Charter Review’, 12 July 2015. 
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Bowe, represented any overt sympathy to audience concerns or traditional principles of public 
service broadcasting. 
These choices demonstrate once again how the normative role of ministers as even-
handed facilitators is, in reality, highly subject to personal and political biases that tilt the 
structure of decision-making in favour of partial interests. But just as with Maria Miller’s 
subdued role in the post-Leveson negotiations, Whittingdale’s individual authority was at times 
overtaken by other senior government figures intervening in BBC policy. Behind-the-scenes 
accounts of the 2015 licence fee deal paint the Secretary of State as little more than a messenger 
for the Chancellor’s austerity-driven funding settlement (Snoddy, 2015), and Whittingdale’s 
more extreme proposals for reforming BBC governance were removed from the White Paper 
following a last-minute intervention by the Prime Minister – supposedly following persuasion 
by his close acquaintance Rona Fairhead, who Cameron had personally appointed as BBC 
Trust chair.159 
The principal executive actors in these two seminal media policy debates epitomised 
Westminster power, yet their roles were organised in ways was distinctly unlike the normative 
models of Westminster decision-making. Opportunities for democratic parliamentary scrutiny 
were diminished or cursory, and ultimate approval for legal changes to the obscure Royal 
Charter format lay with government ministers from beyond the immediately accountable 
departments. By arranging the cross-party talks and the BBC Charter negotiations in this way, 
government policymakers engendered patterns of elite intermediation—between politicians, 
the press industry and a selection of campaigners, or between the government, the BBC and a 
selection of leading commercial stakeholders—as the ideal and most effective means of 
formulating policy change. These arrangements were of course founded on the decidedly 
 
159 The Guardian, ‘BBC chief voices fears over ministerial influence outlined in white paper’, 12 May 2016.  
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partisan and ideological bases: a Conservative Prime Minister desperate to prevent an 
embarrassing parliamentary defeat and preserve a supportive relationship with the reeling press 
industry; and a Conservative Culture Secretary determined to advance the marketisation of 
public broadcasting, buttressed by an unexpected election majority and a convenient backdrop 
of damaging public scandals at the BBC. However, the interactions within these two sets of 
core actors also demonstrates the fragility of ministerial authority, and the extent to which 
messy political conflicts produce instability and sudden shifts in the balance of power between 
government and non-government actors. 
The elite insularity of insider actors 
If the locus of core decision-making power changes as the policy process and its 
political constraints evolve, we also need to consider the role of non-core actors and their place 
in policymaking. Given the intricacies of most policy and regulatory issues, together with the 
multiple everyday demands that individuals in government and parliamentary positions face 
(Davis, 2010:55-63), it is unsurprising that policymakers and their supporting officials build 
functional relationships with select groups who offer information, advice and other sector-
specific expertise to inform their deliberations. This selection results in a distinction between 
‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ status (Grant, 1995), with policymakers recognising insider actors as 
pivotal players whose input is essential for informing the policymaking process. Yet the means 
by which this status is obtained or granted is itself a reflection of underlying power dynamics, 
and identifying the characteristics that delineate insiders and outsiders is essential for unpicking 
how such imbalances become built into the political organisation of policymaking. 
Several major media organisations appeared to hold positions as innate insider actors 
within the two policy networks, with their regular direct access to core policymakers construed 
as essential to executive deliberation. Editors and executives from national and regional 
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publishers were frequently invited to private discussions on post-Leveson policy with 
Conservative policymakers. The industry’s representatives in the IIG had exclusive access to 
the government’s draft Royal Charter proposals, often before other negotiators had seen them. 
Despite the usual corporate competitiveness between national newspaper brands, the IIG 
adopted an influential position representing the principal demands and interests of the industry: 
Trying to get newspaper people to agree on any common pattern of action is 
considerably harder than herding rabid cats. A committee approach was never going to 
deliver, so there was an unspoken consensus that those who had the time to do it would 
be given leeway to act on the industry’s behalf, and people would watch carefully. 
(Interview 1) 
This handful of corporate press actors, united in their opposition to statutory regulation and 
seemingly endorsed by the industry at large, held significant sway in approving or rejecting the 
cross-party proposals on behalf of the entire newspaper industry (despite several groups within 
the press industry being fully supportive of pro-Leveson proposals). 
BBC bosses have always held a fixed role at the pinnacle of the Charter renewal 
process, but over the course of recent debates the Corporation has contended with the 
government consulting closely with some of its biggest commercial challengers. DCMS 
officials presented many of the Department’s proposed reforms to ITV, Sky and Viacom as 
well as trade associations, commercial radio networks and newspaper publishers, and 
frequently based their revisions on industry feedback. The general plurality of insider industry 
voices partly reflects the number of different broadcasting interests swept up in the orbit of 
Charter review and its impact on the UK media landscape. However, much of the government 
consultations with industry stakeholders was segmented and compartmentalised, with each 
group pursuing its own partial goals in individual strands of negotiation. Alongside the central 
tussles between the BBC and DCMS, these intertwining relationships between industry and 
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government created a number of smaller sites of decision-making which compounded the 
support for commercial reforms across multiple aspects of Charter renewal policy. 
Media companies were clearly not the only insider actors engaged in the two debates, 
as a small number of campaign groups and special interest organisations were also involved in 
the higher strata of core deliberation. Figures from the Hacked Off campaign attended a number 
of private meetings with senior party politicians, and in BBC Charter review VLV was 
similarly consulted by DCMS officials and invited to ‘roundtable’ discussions alongside 
industry representatives. The influence of these campaigns on pivotal moments of policy 
decision (see below) suggests that ‘insider’ media policymaking practices are not solely 
dominated by commercial industry interests, and that the informal channels operating behind 
and around official decision-making are much more contested and messier than normative 
models of policy networks portray. 
Notably, the unique roles and arrangements of both industry and campaign insiders in 
the two debates were heavily dependent on actors demonstrating elite characteristics and 
utilising elite forms of policy interaction. Hacked Off actors combined extensive personal 
experience of parliamentary policymaking—including one former MP, Evan Harris, and a 
journalist advisor to the Commons CMS Select Committee, Brian Cathcart—with professional 
lawyers, academics and high-profile celebrity spokespeople. 
There was nothing democratic about it. We decided, well, what do we need? We need 
some experts in the area, we had ex-journalists and practitioners. We needed lawyers 
so we brought in a QC around media law and privacy. It was very much a gathering of 
elites, in many ways. (Interview 3) 
VLV likewise boasts a committed membership of former producers, presenters and senior 
executives from the BBC, including former media grandees in the House of Lords and other 
politicians sympathetic to VLV’s aims. The IIG epitomised the nexus of intimate relationships 
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between senior politicians and the press which, as the Leveson Report concluded, had aided in 
keeping failures of press regulation off the public agenda. Lord Hunt and Lord Black, 
negotiating on behalf of the PCC and its funding body PressBoF, had served as ministers in the 
Thatcher, Major and Cameron governments, while Peter Wright of Associated Newspapers and 
Paul Vickers of Trinity Mirror each held more than 20 years’ editorial and board-level 
experience at some of the UK’s biggest newspapers. 
This ‘revolving door’ phenomenon, whereby figures seamlessly transition between 
public and private positions in political and media life (Davis, 2002; Freedman, 2006),was also 
apparent amongst insider actors involved in BBC Charter review. The BBC’s executive, 
management and editorial staff are enmeshed in a sprawling organisational structure which, 
together with the Corporation’s seemingly unbreakable ties to state and bureaucratic power 
(see Born, 2005; Curran and Seaton, 2018; Mills, 2016), produces its own unique establishment 
elite. The increasing marketisation within the BBC has seen this intermingling elite paired with 
an equally pervasive circulation of commercial and political players moving in and out of 
senior policy roles. James Purnell, the BBC’s director of strategy during Charter review, was 
formerly a Labour MP and Culture Secretary under Tony Blair, while James Heath had worked 
as an advisor at both ITV and the Labour Party before becoming the BBC’s director of policy. 
This circulation flows in multiple directions, with media and political elites transferring their 
first-hand experience and connections from one domain to the next. ITV’s director of policy, 
for example, had previously worked in the Director-General’s team during the 2006 Charter 
review, following a career as a solicitor specialising in media mergers and competition 
regulation. 
These figures are not singled out to suggest that some insidious cabal controls media 
policymaking from behind the curtain. Rather, these career paths are highlighted to show the 
elite insularity of insider media policy circles, and the similar professional (and indeed even 
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personal) backgrounds of people who acquire close and consistent interaction with core 
policymaking processes. Whether from established media industry groups or special interest 
campaign organisations, the composition of the two debates’ insiders circles supports Grant’s 
assertion that a pre-condition of insider status is a close and pre-existing connection with elite 
policymaking power (1995:15-16). This has its own implications for what forms of engagement 
are open to competing media policy actors, and how acquiring an insider role in decision-
making depends on holding a strong familiarity with the practices and interactions that take 
place beneath the surface of public policy processes. 
Although insider actors come from similarly elite backgrounds that afford them unique 
connections with core policymakers, their position and influence within these processes still 
differ depending on the interests or aims they represent, and the extent to which these ‘issue 
identities’ (Maloney et al., 1994:20) are recognised as valid, necessary or useful. Media 
industry insiders’ own descriptions of their roles in policymaking echo the same dominant sets 
of values and narrative assumptions that ran throughout the two media policy debates: 
We represent competition, creativity, entrepreneurship and cultural diversity, and I 
think we are also very good at bringing evidence and arguments to convince 
policymakers that the markets may not be functioning as efficiently, as fairly or as 
optimally as they could be. (10) 
The insider status of commercial and sectoral media policy groups is thus principally a product 
of the naturalisation of commercial policy goals and the empirical, technocratic and expert-led 
methods of deliberation associated with them. Compare this to campaign and public pressure 
groups such as Hacked Off, who were no less equipped with expertise or evidence but relied 




I always considered us as a victims-and-experts organisation. That marriage was crucial 
and shaped Hacked Off quite significantly. It’s more complex than simply being a lobby 
group for victims, but there has never been a stage when victims didn’t enhance our 
ability to get to people. (Interview 4) 
As is discussed in the following sections, the changing definitions and discursive boundaries 
of a policy debate also mean that the insider status afforded to non-commercial interests is often 
in constant flux. Whereas industry actors appear to be formally embedded in the central sites 
of media policymaking, the insider status of non-industry groups is built around far more 
informal or fragile connections with executive power. 
What is perhaps most important here is recognising that insider status is not a single 
fixed category of identically influential policy actors. Competing insider actors’ connections 
with official decision-making arise in markedly different ways. Insiders’ positions in a network 
are not allotted or naturally acquired, but are reflections of their relationships with the political 
institutions and processes in that specific policy debate. Insider influence over media 
policymaking is thus exercised through many different paths and channels, the dynamics of 
which both produce and are produced by unique patterns of power. 
We can see this clearly in the interpersonal structures of the two case study debates: 
Hacked Off holding sway over the cross-party negotiations through their extensive support 
from pro-Leveson backbenchers; editors, executives and newspaper trade associations 
leveraging their unique access to government and political elites to represent the press 
industry’s shared policy interests; commercial broadcasting groups lobbying across regulatory, 
Civil Service and government actors involved in the formative granular decisions on Charter 
review; and established campaign groups like VLV mobilising a small but eminent supporter 




Although official policymaking power is centralised in a handful of executive actors, 
the multifaceted nature of policy networks means that this core decision-making is heavily 
influenced by numerous intersecting formal, informal, direct or even indirect arrangements of 
insider groups across a policy network. The issue however is that the institutional ‘nodes’ 
which connect insider routes to power are still grounded in ideological biases and behavioural 
cultures, which preclude certain types of actors, interests or influence while privileging others. 
Bodies like Ofcom, the Press Complaints Commission and parliamentary Select Committees 
are not active stakeholders but nonetheless perform a normatively authoritative role in policy 
formulation by providing evidence, analysis and commentary to inform decision-making. 
Instead of serving as autonomous and objective instruments for broader public deliberation, 
these supposedly independent groups demonstrated a much less clear-cut separation from 
powerful political and media interests. The controls and powers granted to media regulators 
reflect “the ideological frameworks on which they are based” (Freedman, 2008:14), such that 
their contributions to policy debates either promote market-based policy objectives (as with 
Ofcom) or they become wholly captured by the private interests they exist to regulate (as with 
the PCC). Select Committees are similarly prone to capture, wherein MPs’ personal views or 
political allegiances overlap with the Committee’s investigative work and tilt its deliberations 
in favour of dominant media policy interests – as was notably the case with John Whittingdale’s 
chairing of the 2013-15 inquiry into the BBC. 
Insider actors clearly occupy an exclusive and influential role in media policymaking; 
one that is not only dependent on demonstrating elite characteristics and representing 
normatively legitimate interests, but which also connects these groups to a wider range of 
private, obscured or otherwise impenetrable functions of core decision-making. The two case 
study debates even show instances where the insinuation of commercial media interests over 
successive policy debates has seen some inside actors supplant the decision-making authority 
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of government officials: the devolved negotiations between Pact and the BBC on 
commissioning and production quotas, for example, or the enduring model of press self-
regulation in which the newspaper industry is free to ‘mark its own homework’. 
Thus the most immediate power dynamic specific to insider policy actors is that their 
status derives from the pre-existing institutional structures and discursive frames that define a 
particular area of policy. The influence this status affords these actors within the policymaking 
process then further entrenches these biases in new policy changes. The general culture of 
‘insiderism’ shaping these two policy networks has deeper and more concerning implications 
for the democratic foundations of media policymaking, too. The informal connections and 
unofficial interactions typical of insiders’ involvement in decision-making are partly so 
influential because they skirt around more rigid practices that are often the only means of 
political engagement for non-elite interests. Ostensibly public media policymaking processes 
are increasingly determined by deliberations and interactions that are largely hidden from 
democratic scrutiny and involve only a select few powerful, unaccountable groups. 
Outsider actors: influence and irrelevance in the periphery 
Where a minority of insiders attain elevated influence and status, it follows that a large 
number of ‘outsider’ actors hold a far less influential, peripheral role in the policy process. In 
some ways this insider-outsider distinction is a natural consequence of the competition between 
interests that takes place as a policy debate is evolving. The central structures and relationships 
of a policy network organise around those who rise to the top of these political and discursive 
battles, while the remainder either “do not wish to become enmeshed in a consultative 




Both case studies saw numerous stakeholders who, despite their active interests in 
relevant aspects of media policy, were marginalised from core sites of decision-making. 
Groups excluded from the post-Leveson negotiations included: campaign groups such as the 
Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom (CPBF) and the Media Reform Coalition; free 
speech and civil liberties advocacy organisations like Index on Censorship, EnglishPEN and 
Liberty; representatives of the National Union of Journalists and the Chartered Institute of 
Journalists; and individual journalists, freelancers and editors from the many smaller 
newspapers subsumed within the large publishing companies’ retinue of outlets. An even wider 
range of broadcasting stakeholders were similarly shut out from the government’s core 
deliberations on BBC Charter review: the Campaign for Broadcasting Equality, Save Our BBC 
and other small public campaigns; broadcasting unions like Bectu, Equity and the Musicians’ 
Union; academic experts and industry analysts; trade and professional associations such as the 
Children’s Media Foundation and the Radio Independents Group; and, not least of all, the 
thousands of members of the public who submitted their views in consultations and online 
petitions. 
Given the variety of these groups and the myriad interests they represented, the only 
common characteristic identifying them as outsiders is that they were not insiders. None held 
established connections with political or media elites, and for many of these actors influencing 
media policy was only an incidental part of the industrial or professional purpose of their 
respective organisations. Even for explicit policy advocacy groups, their smaller resource bases 
and loose membership structures were a world apart from the vast lobbying arsenals of 
dominant media corporations embedded at the heart of the two debates. Describing their 
attempts to appeal for ‘Core Participant’ status at the Leveson Inquiry, one civil society 
campaigner recalled how his group’s established knowledge of media law and issues of press 
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freedom was overshadowed by the legal and financial clout of the powerful interests at the 
centre of the phone hacking scandal: 
It was quite a funny process, we had to go along to an oral hearing and make a bid. 
There were top barristers there for the Metropolitan Police and News International and 
others, and we popped up at the back of the room not really knowing what we were 
doing, but we’d got it into our heads that we should be there. Leveson was completely 
puzzled at what we were doing there, he said more or less “I’m sure it will be interesting 
to hear from you, you’ll have your opportunity so go away.” (Interview 8) 
Perhaps the biggest contributing factor to outsider status is that the interests and political 
constituencies these groups represented were not considered to be as legitimate or as beneficial 
to policymakers’ needs. Far from being an instrumental function of the expertise or evidence a 
group can contribute to official deliberation, this recognition primarily derives from the 
political values and discursive accounts that delineate a policy issue’s meanings, objectives and 
key players. While large corporate media institutions—themselves central in constructing these 
foundational narratives—and salient political or economic groups were afforded a normative 
insider role, a vast collection of sectoral, professional and civil society stakeholders (not to 
mention the public) were either subsumed into loosely defined ‘communities of interest’ or 
isolated from the decision-making process altogether. 
Positivist accounts of the policy process present government actors and other official 
policy institutions as passive facilitators of decision, or as interdependent agents at the centre 
of increasingly fragmented systems of governance. However, both case study debates suggest 
that notionally authoritative bodies that typically perform prescribed policy functions can also 
become outsider actors in certain contexts, and thus exercise far less influence within a policy 
network. Despite its historic and constitutional place as the locus of British political power, 
parliament itself was relegated from having any substantive role in the major decisions on press 
or BBC policy. The only direct involvement MPs and peers had in the two policymaking 
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processes was to provide cursory consent to the cross-party agreement on press regulation and 
to ‘note’ the government’s publication of the BBC White Paper. This is in part a reflection of 
Royal Charters as a unique form of policy implementation, but it also highlights how 
contemporary modes of media policymaking—increasingly characterised by fragmented 
systems of governance, arms-length regulation and co-dependence between state and industry 
actors—have separated formative acts of official policy change from traditional mechanisms 
of public and democratic accountability. 
This is not to say that outsider policy actors are all idle observers, completely unable to 
exercise any influence or agency in the substantive processes of policy formation. Rather, the 
complex and intersecting relationships that structure a policy network allow for outsider groups 
to engage with policymaking in subtle though typically more tenuous ways. ‘Outsider’ is not 
necessarily a fixed category, as different actors or interests can gain or lose new types of 
influence as a policy debate progresses and its political or discursive boundaries shift. Groups 
will organise with other outsider actors or organisations that share a common objective or 
interest, and seek to leverage this collective influence through other political conflicts or policy 
processes running concurrently with official deliberations. 
EnglishPEN and Index of Censorship, for example, spear-headed the campaign for 
reform of England’s libel laws and mobilised many of the same links with parliamentary actors 
to pressure against the pro-Leveson House of Lords amendments that threatened the passage 
of the reformers’ prized Defamation Bill. Parliament itself, though excluded from the cross-
party negotiations, was similarly able to affect these talks by pushing through non-government 
amendments with majority support from all parties. The BBC Trust, demoted to a diminished 
and effectively irrelevant role once its abolition had become all but certain, still served as an 
authoritative and influential mechanism for debate and scrutiny even from the periphery of the 
government’s core decision-making process: 
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The Trust knew it was doomed, but the consultation was a clever exercise in saying 
“we have a role here, if you’re going to abolish us you’ve got to find out who else is 
going to do this job.” So they were pushing back on the government’s agenda, but it 
was also a genuine attempt to canvas public opinion. They wanted to know, who is 
going to speak for licence fee payers now? (Interview 9) 
Although outsider groups may not play a direct role in significant policy decision, these actors 
can nonetheless shift the conditions of decision-making, either by pressuring conjoining policy 
processes or by forming coalitions with other outsiders, in turn amassing additional discursive 
or political capital in support of their policy goals. 
Ultimately, however, there are significant differences between insider and outsider 
actors and their influence on media policymaking. It is not merely the case that insider actors 
are more easily recognised as legitimate players in core decision-making processes while 
outsiders are not. Rather, the essential connections and functions that define how these 
processes work, their ideal outputs and who should be involved in them produce pervasive 
patterns of inequality across the actors, institutions and relationships that structure a policy 
network. Within the market-liberal ideological discourses dominating the two policy debates, 
outsiders’ resources have a lesser currency with decision-makers, their public or sectoral 
interests are seen as subordinate to the needs of commercial organisations, and their 
engagement with deliberation is parsed not as an essential factor in policymakers’ choices but 
rather as a supplement to them. Many of the peripheral processes ostensibly designed to allow 
the diverse range of public and private media policy interests to inform executive policymakers 
are more often perfunctory or cursory, rather than substantive attempts at organising pluralistic 
modes of bargaining and deliberation. As the following sections discuss, the different methods 
and interactions that outsider groups use to engage in these unequal structures can have varying 
degrees of influence on how decisions are made, but the role and status of these actors are 
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nonetheless subsumed within the prevailing political, interpersonal and discursive boundaries 
of debate. 
DOES CAMPAIGNING MATTER? TACTICS AND STRATEGIES FOR INFLUENCING 
PUBLIC DEBATE 
These media policy networks show the deeply entrenched interpersonal power 
dynamics that structured how different actors engage in and influence media policymaking—
the normative definitions of important stakeholders, formalised patterns elite of deliberation 
and the naturalised commercial policy objectives. However, the composition of these media 
policy networks also reveals that interest group activity takes place across numerous 
intersecting public and private spaces of debate. Pressure groups, industry lobbyists and other 
policy actors employed a range of campaigning tactics and engagement strategies in their 
efforts to influence policymakers and advance their policy interests at crucial junctures in the 
two policymaking processes. These methods had many distinct purposes, from ‘high-profile’ 
practices for publicising a group’s demands and demonstrating to policymakers “a solid basis 
of popular support” (Grant, 2000:19), to the ‘low profile’ activities aimed at intervening 
directly in political or bureaucratic decisions on the substance and implementation of policy 
change. 
It is therefore pertinent to explore the various tactics used during the two case study 
debates, and to assess whether there are recurring trends in campaigning that are especially 
familiar to and effective in media policy processes. This section examines the perennial issues 
surrounding access and balance as democratic criteria in policymaking through an analysis of 
the different forms of campaign activity that both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ groups mobilised 
within the two case study debates. It considers how the structures and characteristics of policy 
networks affect the choice of campaigning strategies available to different media policy actors, 
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and what these choices reveal about the degrees of access available to different groups across 
the places and spaces of media policymaking. It explores how outsider actors utilise alternative 
forms of public engagement to challenge established decision-making practices, and questions 
whether these forms can still have a meaningful influence on policy deliberation in the context 
of entrenched systems of elite political, institutional and media power. In assessing whether 
certain tactics are more or less influential than others, these discussions engage with Research 
Questions (2) and (4) with a particular emphasis on the public or ‘high-profile’ domain of 
media policy campaigning. 
Building and mobilising a campaign 
Material resources like finance, staff and facilities are clearly essential components for 
organising a public campaign, and the two case studies demonstrate the challenges or obstacles 
that arise when groups lack funding, tools or proficiencies for sustained campaigning. Large 
broadcasting companies and newspaper publishers possess extensive financial and 
organisational resources for supporting their policy objectives, particularly employing 
dedicated staff to meet and persuade policymakers, gathering technical evidence or funding PR 
activities. The Free Speech Network, for example, was founded and funded by newspaper trade 
associations as a public campaign opposed to the Leveson recommendations, and organised 
events, reports and opinion polls that reinforced the political arguments of major publishing 
groups engaged in the private negotiations. Other industry bodies like Pact, COBA and the 
Society of Editors also receive funding and membership dues from media groups in order to 
represent their collective sectoral interests across the breadth of policy and regulatory debates. 
Public pressure groups and civil society organisations, in contrast, face much more 
uncertainty when it comes to acquiring campaign resources. Most rely on income from 
dwindling member donations or rare grants from charitable trusts. Established groups like VLV 
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or the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom,160 which organise their activities around 
a range of political and regulatory issues relating to ‘traditional’ media, often devote as much 
time and energy to their own survival as to engaging directly in policy debates. The costs of 
office space, bulk printing and other everyday facilities are often prohibitively, and where staff 
work voluntarily or part-time alongside existing commitments this lack of organisational 
capacity or secure funding drastically constrains the choice of campaigning activities. 
We do look at the detail of government proposals, read every page, scrutinise it, but we 
just haven’t got the resources for other campaigning … We only have one part-time 
administrator who’s two days a week, and myself I’m two to three days a week which 
normally turns into seven! Other than that we have no paid staff. (Interview 11) 
For some pressure groups, the unique circumstances of a policy debate can provide resources 
and funding that would otherwise be far beyond the reach of ordinary civil society campaigns. 
The Hacked Off campaign offers an especially unique example of a small group of media 
policy activists evolving into a professional lobbying outfit: 
We started with some pocket money operating out of the Media Standards Trust’s 
offices, which was problematic for them as a charity. By the time the Leveson Report 
happened we were a registered company with a head of lobbying, a researcher, a full 
time press officer. It was an enormous undertaking but we did it, we had all the 
politicians’ phone numbers and shit like that. And we raised a lot of money, almost all 
of it from anonymous donors because they didn’t want to be monstered by the press. 
(Interview 4) 
This solid resource base enabled Hacked Off to engage in a range of campaigning and lobbying 
activities that amplified the group’s access to and influence with policymakers throughout the 
phone hacking scandal and post-Leveson debates. 
 
160 Somewhat tellingly the CPBF was wound up in 2018 after almost 40 years of campaigning on media worker 
rights and ownership reform, citing “insufficient income and resources”. 
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Groups can support their campaigning efforts with other, less tangible or non-material 
resources, such as specialist expertise, organisational renown or a cohesive and active 
membership base (Mahoney et al., 1994:24). Established trade bodies like Pact and the NUJ, 
draw on the collective industrial clout of the companies and journalists they represent, while 
VLV and Hacked Off organise their campaigning around broadcasting experts or the demands 
of high-profile victims of phone hacking. These unique bases of support typically reflect the 
broader objectives and founding purposes of a particular group, although their impact on media 
policy is highly dependent on how such interests are conceived within the terms of policy 
debate. Independent production companies formed a central part of the Conservative 
government’s marketisation of BBC commissioning in 2016, whereas the views of individual 
journalists barely featured at all in the high-level discussions on press regulation in 2013.161 
Similarly, the intense political backlash around phone hacking ensured the victims and Hacked 
Off a decisive place at the negotiating table, yet the views of broadcasting audiences featured 
only marginally in the debates on ‘distinctiveness’ that dominated BBC Charter review. 
The deeper issue for democratic policymaking, however, is that where media policy 
debates are rightly touted as dealing with crucial social and cultural questions, the possibilities 
for genuine public engagement in these essentially public matters are restricted first and 
foremost on economic grounds. Established media interests can easily out-spend and out-lobby 
civil society groups, while only in rare occasions can public campaign groups representing non- 
or even anti-commercial interests accumulate enough funding to engage on equal footing. 
Before we can even evaluate the impact of different groups and interests on media 
policymaking in addressing Research Question (2), it is apparent that engaging in public policy 
 
161 The NUJ’s position in the post-Leveson negotiations was diminished even further by several prominent 
members publicly resigning their membership (and many more demanding an all-member ballot) in protest at the 
Union leadership’s support for the Leveson recommendations. 
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campaigning is a practice already skewed in favour of larger, established corporate and political 
entities with the resources and financing to employ a variety of tools and methods. 
Campaigning in the public sphere 
Groups in both case studies used a range of high-profile campaigning methods to 
establish their interests on the political agenda, counter or rebut rival claims and generally 
attract support from the public at large. This campaigning formed a vibrant space of civil 
society activity alongside the formal decision-making processes, with a variety of meetings, 
speeches, reports, conferences and rallies all contributing to the wider public sphere of media 
policy deliberation. For many policy actors and organisations, especially those confined to 
outsider roles, such tactics were the main means of raising their political profile and persuading 
policymakers to heed their arguments. Yet questions remain about the genuine impact of this 
public campaigning on the substantive content of policy change and, crucially, whether 
competing demands and demonstrations of public support are properly reflected in ostensibly 
democratic (though predominantly private and elite-dominated) official policy processes.  
Chapters 5 and 6 have shown that the locus of decision-making power shifts as the 
media policy process advances, yet interest groups’ public campaigning strategies also evolve 
as the sites of political contestation change. Hacked Off’s formative role in pressuring for a 
phone hacking inquiry, for example, came from a combination of politicians’ anxieties and the 
group’s campaigning activities capitalising on the simmering public mood. In the days and 
weeks around the ‘Milly Dowler moment’, Hacked Off held a full-house launch event in 
parliament, organised protests and stunts around Westminster and attracted over 200,000 
signatures for its inquiry petition. This moment was, by all accounts, pivotal in British politics 
as well as a decisive instance of successful campaigning by a nascent public pressure group. 
Hacked Off mobilised the substantial public clamour for change and, with the crucial and vocal 
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support of victims of press abuse, directed it towards the fulcra of political power, forcing 
policymakers to act on the concerted demands for an inquiry which under other circumstances 
would have been subdued or ignored altogether. 
Once this opening phase had passed, however, the scope of campaigning changed 
markedly. Hacked Off began targeting MPs and Lords directly to build pressure around private 
negotiations on reform, initially with events at the 2012 party conferences ahead of the Leveson 
Report’s publication and then physically around the parliamentary estate during the cross-party 
talks: 
We were knocking on MPs’ offices, pushing paper under people’s doors. It felt at times 
like we were camping out in Westminster, almost like a canvassing operation. But we 
knew we only had a small window of opportunity to make headway with this. 
(Interview 3) 
What little overtly public campaigning that took place in the hectic opening months of 2013 
was mostly conducted by civil society groups excluded from the talks between politicians, the 
press and Hacked Off. Index on Censorship and the NUJ, among many others, held public 
events and published press releases, reports and blog posts on the negotiations, though these 
were typically aimed more at informing and encouraging like-minded campaigners, politicians 
or the spectating public rather than swaying the content of the talks themselves. The FSN 
similarly built a presence as a single issue anti-Leveson group, and collected numerous 
endorsements from trade bodies and free speech advocacy campaigns, though its activity was 
confined to repackaging publishers’ existing policy objectives as ‘independent’ claims quoted 
in anti-Leveson press reports. 
Ironically, the political development of the post-Leveson process—in particular the 
persistent opposition of both the Conservative leadership and publishers to any form of 
statutory implementation—progressively moved the debate out of the public domain and into 
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the traditional, private settings of government decision-making. In the midst of a volatile and 
frenetic public scandal, the rationalising effects of formal policy processes contained the issues 
of the phone hacking scandal within more politically manageable (and decidedly less public) 
modes of policymaking. As we shall see below, elite tactics of parliamentary bargaining and 
insider lobbying became the only viable practices for influencing substantive decisions on press 
regulation. 
Whereas the evolving structure of the post-Leveson process negated the effects of 
public campaigning almost entirely, the BBC Charter review comprised several distinct, 
formalised spaces for public engagement. The DCMS and BBC Trust consultations amounted 
to the largest formal exercises of public engagement in the history of British media 
policymaking, due in no small part to the mass online responses of the 38 Degrees website. 
Alongside these official processes, numerous interest groups fed into the broader conversations 
about the future of the BBC with their own campaign activities. Broadcasting unions launched 
a ‘Love it or Lose it’ campaign opposing the 2015 licence fee settlement, held meetings in 
parliament with opposition MPs and published an alternative White Paper which drew support 
from politicians and prominent broadcasting celebrities. The Future for Public Service 
Television inquiry, chaired by film producer and Labour peer Lord Puttnam, hosted public 
discussions with media industry experts and stakeholders, and its June 2016 report 
encapsulated many of on-going critiques of the government’s Charter review agenda. 
This lengthy public debate also saw a great deal of campaigning and consultation within 
specialist broadcasting sectors. Steemers offers a telling account of the meetings, joint 
statements and inter-group dialogue within the ‘advocacy coalition’ of campaigners, 
production trade groups and other industry stakeholders that lobbied the government for 
protection of funding for children’s television (2017:9-10; see also Sabatier and Weible, 2007). 
This process-adjacent campaigning hints at the meaningful influence of collaborating with 
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other important policy actors, being in the same room as policymakers and even physically 
confronting them—whether at public events or in the anterooms of legislative power. As one 
interviewee recounted, public encounters with policymakers can have as much effect on the 
politics of decision-making as on the content and outcome of policy decisions themselves: 
We held an hour-long ‘in conversation’ event in parliament with John Whittingdale, I 
think it may have been the only public-facing event he did during all of Charter review. 
Someone asked if DCMS were going to publish a consultation summary, and John 
Whittingdale wasn’t very clear on that. I think they were hoping to get away with not 
doing it, just drafting the Charter and saying “it reflects the public’s views”, but we put 
a lot of pressure on them to release their final analysis. (Interview 11) 
However, looking at the consultations themselves as explicitly public exercises in policy 
formulation, the potential they offer as open, plural spaces for campaigning appears limited. 
Even contributors who successfully swayed government policy expressed their doubts about 
the distinct impact of consultation exercises compared to other, more direct forms of 
engagement. 
Everyone and anyone can put in a submission. I’ve not seen all of them, obviously, but 
I’m conscious of submissions from other media and stakeholders. Most of them I could 
have written myself in terms of their position and proposals. (Interview 10) 
Another notable aspect of these consultations is the propensity of both major media 
stakeholders and the government to use external agencies, auditing companies and private 
consultancies to buttress their own arguments and evidence with extensive quantitative 
research. Reports and studies from KPMG and PWC (two of the ‘Big Four’ global auditing 
powerhouses) were core offerings in the BBC Trust’s assessments on efficiency and market 
impact, while DCMS commissioned market research firm GfK and media policy consultancy 
Oliver & Ohlbaum to supplement its Charter review fact-finding. For both parties these reports 
reinforced their existing arguments about the perceived advantages or disadvantages of the 
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BBC’s public services, suggesting the actual benefit of such private research is more political 
than empirical: 
Everyone knows it’s a bit of a game. Oliver and Ohlbaum will give you the message 
depending on who’s paying for it. They know what they’re supposed to come up with. 
I’m not saying it’s a corrupt practice but as with economists, the model you put in 
decides what you get out. You’re just trying to out-muscle your opponent’s facts and 
figures. (Interview 9) 
These tat-for-tat exchanges suggest the use of empirical research in media policymaking has 
become an industrialised feature of media policymaking. The sheer volume of data, statistics 
and econometrics takes precedence over a genuine assessment of whatever facts or issues this 
data may reveal, such that evidence-led policymaking appears more and more like policy-led 
evidence-making. Furthermore, this sort of authoritative ‘independent’ research comes at a far 
higher cost than many public campaign groups can typically afford. It demonstrates yet another 
imbalance in the nature of media policy campaigning, between on the one hand the organising 
strategies available to campaign groups (for whom these public consultations are ostensibly 
designed) and on the other hand the forms of professional engagement that policymakers 
actually take into account. 
Compared to these costly private research reports, opinion polling offers a relatively 
cheap means for interest groups to bolster their proposals with simple measures of wider public 
feeling. Pressure groups and national newspapers commissioned 21 polls on press regulation 
over the main period of post-Leveson negotiations, while extensive surveys on public attitudes 
to the BBC were an enormous part of the Charter review consultations (alongside recurring 
newspaper polls on matters such as the future of the licence fee). The sheer volume of polling 
shows its appeal as a campaigning device and the significance that interest groups attach to 
demonstrating public support. Yet its impact on either debate is unclear, especially with the 
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frequent instances of diametrically opposing views on central media policy issues between 
multiple polls. One poll by Hacked Off, asking “how do you think newspapers in Britain should 
be regulated”, found 78 per cent supported “an independent body, established in law”. Weeks 
later, The Sun reported only 24 per cent favoured a body “set up through law by Parliament, 
with rules agreed by MPs”.162 In November 2013 a Daily Telegraph poll reported “seventy per 
cent of voters believe the BBC licence fee should be abolished”, yet just two years later a BBC 
Trust poll found “nearly 60% favoured a universal style fee” over any other funding source.163 
These contradictory results do not mean that the British public is fickle-minded or prone 
to erratic reversals of opinion. Rather, it shows the close correspondence between the semantic 
framing of polling questions, along with the potential responses given to respodents, and the 
political goals of groups who commission and publicise poll results for their campaigning. 
Interest groups and policymakers alike selectively quoted polling figures that reinforced their 
existing arguments, making claim to the weight of democratic consensus based on rhetorically 
punchy (if clearly partial) statistics. Anti-Leveson newspapers almost exclusively referenced 
polls commissioned by themselves or the Free Speech Network, despite these views running 
against wider data on the views of their own readers. Analysis by Ramsay (2014:92), breaking 
down polling data by newspaper readership, found that 
readers of newspapers which had spent the intervening months publishing many articles 
containing strong and frequent criticism of the Cross-Party Charter and strong and 
frequent praise of PressBoF were more supportive of their chosen newspaper joining 
the former. 
Given the patterns of elite insularity that govern access to official spaces of decision-making, 
the popular use of opinion polling highlights the limited role of ‘the public’ as the essential 
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Trust polling see Technical Annex C: Funding of ‘Tomorrow’s BBC’ consultation (2015e). 
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stakeholder in media policy debates. The diversity of readers’, viewers’ and listeners’ views as 
citizens is reduced to snapshot samples projected onto the public at large, while a meaningful 
interrogation of the purposes and organisation of media institutions—political questions from 
which the public has consistently been excluded in previous policy debates—has been replaced 
with simplistic ‘yes or no’ verdicts on interest groups’ subjective claims. ‘Public opinion’ was 
often wielded by opposing groups, yet the public was rarely directly involved in policymaking 
as the collective body on which the legitimacy and impact of media policy decisions ultimately 
rests. 
High-profile campaigning is often the only means for many media policy interest 
groups to engage in policy debates and present their objectives in the public arena. Public 
polling and consultation submissions have made it easier for outsider actors to complement 
traditional forms of campaigning and advocacy with professional evidence and argument. 
These methods require comparatively little expenditure or effort, and can also produce direct 
interactions with the official processes through which policymakers build their decisions. 
However, it is rare that these can on their own amount to singularly significant changes in 
policy. High-profile campaigning may tweak certain elements of the policy process, but such 
tactics are more often successful in amplifying the influence or status of groups that are already 
established within the normative boundaries of a debate, rather than radically re-aligning those 
boundaries to include new or previously excluded constituencies. Public campaigning on media 
policy issues manifests in various ways, but its impact is ultimately contingent on the 
discourses and political frames embedded in official practices and interpersonal structures of 
decision-making. To understand their broader impact, we have to look the other means through 
which competing interest groups can promote their aims and values both in the public domain 
and in the insular private domains of political bargaining. 
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Media as a campaign tool? Tabloid tactics, news optics and ‘clicktivism’ 
Throughout the case study debates, news media coverage decisively shifted the political 
and narrative boundaries of policy deliberation, attributing salience and meaning to media 
issues and interpreting them as justification for action (or indeed inaction). The focus and tone 
of news media coverage is fiercely contested between policymakers, pressure groups, trade 
bodies and other high-profile media figures. Competing policy actors use media-facing tactics 
to attract favourable coverage from press or broadcast outlets, and position their political aims 
at the centre of the powerful mediated accounts of media policymaking. Thus we can conceive 
of news production processes and reporting agendas as a significant campaigning space within 
and around the media policymaking process, and an important facet of media power for 
considering Research Question (4).  
Just as insider access to decision-making depends on connections with political power, 
campaigners similarly establish access to and influence over news reporting by contributing to 
the interests and practices of news organisations (Billard, 2020; Freedman, 2008:87). 
Ministers, MPs and corporate media representatives featured prominently as sources in news 
reports on the two debates, often framed as neutral observers or leading authorities on the policy 
process (Ogbebor, 2018:198-200). But for other interest groups—especially those arguing 
against the free market policy objectives of the Fleet Street press and commercial 
broadcasters—access to and representation in news media accounts was anything but open. 
Even in rare cases where campaigns utilised their connections with journalists or editors to 
publicise their work, news coverage of groups outside the recognised elite political and media 
domains was typified at best by silence and at worst by outright vilification. 
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You knew the tabloid press were out to get you, not just to misrepresent your views but 
firmly out to get you. This made it incredibly difficult to get coverage in the other 
broadsheets, which then made it even harder to get the broadcasters onside. In the early 
days we could because of that key link with Nick Davies and his investigations at The 
Guardian, but once he left there was nobody at that paper saying “we’ve got to buy into 
this” or “we’ve got to get this right”. (Interview 3) 
Obviously the vested interests in the media worked against our campaign. The majority 
of us didn’t bother with a media strategy because the newspapers basically wouldn’t 
play. There were times when we were approached or put across our arguments, I 
certainly got involved in the occasional broadcast event. But I think it’s fair to say that 
the competitors of the BBC were not giving the issue very balanced coverage. 
(Interview 12) 
News media hold a normative role as platforms for deliberation between competing policy 
interests, political institutions and the wider public, but both the post-Leveson and BBC debates 
suggest that editorial selection and media organisation ‘news values’ frequently filter out 
voices that speak against the prevailing corporate-libertarian media policy paradigm these 
organisations seek to uphold. 
Having a nuanced understanding of how media organisations make and construct news 
is also a boon to campaigning through the media, but adapting to the logics of news production 
requires expertise in the journalistic demands of elite media institutions and knowing how to 
appear as a ‘newsworthy’ source (Davis, 2007b:55). Larger or more resourced groups employ 
former journalists or media professionals to write press releases, build relationships with 
reporters and maintain a media presence. For Hacked Off, adopting the presentational details 
and performative arrangements of news production decisively bolstered the group’s media 
presence after the phone hacking revelations. 
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The breakthrough for us was going with the Dowlers to see the party leaders. That was 
theatre apart from anything else ... The TV people would say “you can’t come out of 
that door because we can’t record that, so you have to come out of the other door,” and 
our press liaison would fix it so we came out of the right door for statements to the 
media. (Interview 4) 
These appearances produced iconic imagery of campaign leaders, celebrities and victims 
outside 10 Downing Street or in front of the Houses of Parliament, identifying them with—or 
perhaps, more appropriately, as standing against—the symbolic sites and institutions of British 
political power. Recreating the archetypical ‘optics’ of how news media cover crises and 
scandals provided Hacked Off with premium airtime in front of the assembled Westminster 
press pack. Amidst the chaotic swirl of political disarray and corporate fallout, attention to 
‘what makes news’ was arguably the major factor in Hacked Off becoming a prominent group. 
Media celebrities played a similar role in attracting media attention. Victims of press 
abuse such as author J.K. Rowling and comedian John Cleese publicly supported Hacked Off, 
along with actors Hugh Grant and Steve Coogan who frequently represented the group on 
broadcast news and current affairs programmes. In March 2014 the group funded a full-page 
advert in a number of national newspapers, listing over 200 celebrities, academics and public 
victims of press abuse calling on publishers to establish a Royal Charter-compliant regulator. 
Celebrity figures similarly grabbed headlines throughout BBC Charter review. In a July 2015 
joint letter to the Prime Minister, a host of British film and TV stars including Judi Dench, 
David Attenborough and Stephen Fry demanded that “nothing should be done to diminish the 
BBC or turn it into a narrowly focused market-failure broadcaster”.164 Comedian Lenny Henry, 
together with BAME industry groups, also successfully campaigned to reform the BBC’s 
initiatives on staff diversity both on screen and ‘behind the camera’. 
 




As a campaigning tactic, having popular figures as spokespeople is a simple way of 
getting the public and media outlets to take notice of a policy issue and communicate support 
for political action. However, the same media culture that metabolises celebrities as important 
or noteworthy voices can also trivialise these contributions if they conflict with a media 
organisation’s own political aims. Anti-BBC newspapers reported that the seemingly 
spontaneous ‘luvvies letter’ had been organised by BBC executives, branding it a “clumsy and 
arrogant attempt by its bosses to win over public opinion, which has now spectacularly 
backfired”.165 The case entered the growing canon of press attacks on overpaid BBC talent and 
a self-indulgent corporate culture. Pact’s chief executive similarly recalled other attempts by 
the BBC to dazzle policymakers with celebrity and exclusive promotions: 
The BBC’s a brilliant machine prior to Charter review, they schmooze everyone, they 
invite everyone to the Proms, they spend millions of pounds being everyone’s friends. 
Once they get what they want, that all tends to fall away. (Interview 10) 
The corporate media backlash against these publicity tactics was especially apparent in the 
post-Leveson debates. Ahead of the Leveson Report the Free Speech Network funded a full-
page advert in several broadsheets featuring a rogue’s gallery of world dictators alongside the 
question “these people believe in state control of the press. Do you?” An NMA ad published 
in April 2013 urged party leaders to implement PressBoF’s alternative Royal Charter on press 
regulation, and the following October the FSN publicised the newly-launched IPSO as “the 
toughest regulator in the Western world”. Hacked Off’s close work with celebrities attracted 
scorn from all corners of the press, especially right-wing papers whose parent companies led 
the anti-Leveson efforts in negotiations. The “red-top tricks” of “celebrity stardust and the 
emotive deployment of victims”, as one Telegraph article described them,166 were essential to 
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the group’s ‘media coup’ over the public and political reaction to phone hacking. As a 
journalism professor and former editor remarked in interviews, Hacked Off’s leveraging of 
victims’ experiences was “a superbly finessed media strategy” which used “the most basic trick 
of good populist tabloid journalism: that you should always make a story about people.” 
Taking Bourdieu’s (1992; 1998) and Couldry’s (2000) theories of the symbolic power 
of media, the case studies show that groups who appeal to the journalistic ‘media frame’ can 
alter how policy debates are represented as political and public issues. Groups that successfully 
captured the news cycle at crucial moments in the policy process shaped the core definitions 
and arguments that endured throughout the post-Leveson and BBC debates. This may in some 
ways reflect a pluralist ideal in which outsider actors, typically excluded from elite sites of 
decision making, communicate alternative policy values and influence policymakers through 
the mass media. Yet while some non-media interest groups can co-opt the symbolic role of 
news media with deft interventions in the production process, the media ‘meta-capital’ 
(Couldry, 2003:12) for determining how this power is distributed amongst competing social 
agents is concentrated almost wholly in the hands of established political elites and media 
institutions themselves. 
This strikes a fundamental challenge to the democratic auspices of news media as a 
forum or conduit for debating and engaging in media policy. Media organisations dictate how 
a policy dilemma is framed in accordance with their own institutional and corporate ideals, but 
they can also marginalise groups that challenge the political and policy foundations that enable 
this concentration of power. As the director of Impress recounted, there is a chronic imbalance 




In terms of your own comms you are put on the back foot by having to deal with these 
tropes that get rolled out over and over again. If the industry that you’re setting out to 
reform is one which can reach ten to twenty million people every day, and can recycle 
the same very limited easily-grasped set of messages, getting your own message out is 
very, very difficult. (Interview 8) 
Though broadcast news is legally obliged to report issues fairly and impartially, there is a 
substantial degree of inter-media agenda-setting (Cushion et al., 2018; Golan, 2006) where 
television and radio news narratives of media policy debates reflect and align with how these 
issues are reported in the overtly political national press. Both as a discursive space and as a 
campaigning tool, print and broadcast news appears monopolised by commercial industry 
interests and elite political objectives. Media coverage of the two debates regularly defined the 
crux of media policy issues within a prevailing Westminster ‘media logic’ (Davis, 2010:76-
81), interpreting the policymaking process as conflicts between political personalities and 
parliamentary factions, as hyperbolic existential crises of moral and historic proportions, or as 
technical questions of industrial and economic priorities in which the public are merely passive 
observers. 
Institutional biases in the news production process also mean that opportunities for 
oppositional interests to promote their aims and values through news media, either as sources 
or as ‘leading players’ within news narratives, are slim. Recent developments in the use of 
online and ‘new’ media, however, have introduced novel campaigning methods that offer the 
potential for circumventing traditional and elite-dominated channels of mediation. Social 
media posts, e-petitions and mass email correspondence to policymakers—what may be 
loosely labelled ‘clicktivism’—represent unique forms of spontaneous individual engagement 
in political processes using replicable, extremely cheap or even free digital content. Both 
Hacked Off and the broadcasting unions’ ‘Love It or Lose It’ campaign hosted hugely popular 
online petitions, with the petition for a phone hacking inquiry attracting over 200,000 
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signatures in just a few days. For Hacked Off this served as their strongest resource for gaining 
recognition, from both political and traditional media actors, in the immediate aftermath of the 
hacking scandal: 
This was ancient history from an internet perspective but in those days it felt pretty 
remarkable how many people were signing our petition within the first few hours of 
going online … then all of a sudden the media calls were coming in asking about the 
campaign, talking about it on radio. It snowballed. (Interview 5) 
Hacked Off also used mass emailing platforms to “get letters to MPs in their tens of thousands 
in twenty-four hours … Proving that we had huge public support was really key as a counter 
to the press” (Interview 3). From this we might rebut the perception of clicktivism as "a lazy 
or overly convenient alternative to the effort and legitimacy of traditional engagement" 
(Halupka, 2014:116), and instead note how impulsive and noncommittal forms of engagement 
can reconnect the ‘clicktivist’ to political processes that have become increasingly detached 
from the public. 
However, as Karpf notes, these low-quality high-volume tactics form only “an 
individual element of a broader campaign to convert organizational resources into political 
power” (2010:15). Thousands of signatures and piles of emails in policymakers’ inboxes may 
enhance the presence of public campaign groups and demonstrate a strong base of public 
support, but the tangible influence of these alternative media interventions is still bound up in 
the wider institutional and ideological constraints of the media policymaking process. Several 
interviewees from insider groups questioned the value of thousands of mass responses, like 
those organised by the e-campaign group 38 Degrees, and even hinted that they may have had 
a detrimental effect on the political balance of the government’s Charter review consultations. 
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There was a whole barracks of civil servants wading through 10,000 submissions with 
everything from “close down the BBC” to “why isn’t it making more shows I like”. It 
is one of those democratic requirements but it’s expensive and I’m not sure how much 
you actually get out of it. (Interview 10) 
The government could dismiss the findings or the results of the public consultation 
because they said “oh it’s just a lobbying group”. 38 Degrees had a certain amount of 
self-interest in just making noise about their own size, they don’t have policy expertise 
so in a way them hi-jacking the consultation didn’t help. (Interview 11) 
It is naturally difficult for campaign groups to mobilise large numbers of public supporters to 
engage actively in policy debates, but there is a greater structural barrier, alluded to in these 
remarks, that distinguishes between the kinds of public participation considered useful to 
policymaking. Professionalised campaigning and media engagement tactics have an accepted, 
even expected meaningful impact on policy change while trivial, inexpert or lazy contributions 
by social media users and digital mass movements saturate debate and give policymakers 
licence to shun public participation. Whereas these new media tools are popularly envisioned 
as exciting and disruptive forms of distinctly public participation in policymaking, official 
attitudes interpret these such that “when the public responds in unprecedented numbers, they 
are deemed to be ‘unhelpful’” (Freedman, 2008:103). 
There is, moreover, a fundamental imbalance in the availability and impact of 
‘traditional’ versus ‘new’ media forms of campaigning. Mass clicktivist expressions may have 
been prominent across both case study debates, but were treated as secondary to the private 
elite spaces where concrete media policy decisions were made. As well as highlighting the 
systemic absence of a public voice in supposedly pluralist policymaking, the diminished 
representation of a collective public will signifies the obstacles facing many outsider policy 
actors in their attempts to intervene in the policy process through media. Compare this to the 
enduring influence of corporate news media narratives on the substance, structure and direction 
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of media policy decision-making. Access to the news production process is contingent on both 
practiced demonstrations of ‘newsworthiness’ and the selection biases of news media 
organisations, who themselves seek to steer debate in their favour as a basic commercial 
imperative. Looking at the dimensions of media power and its effects on policymaking, as per 
Research Question (4), it is clear that the ‘gatekeeping’ power of media organisations is not 
limited just to filtering which issues or ideas are represented in public debate. More 
significantly, this gatekeeping determines which actors and groups are let in to (or shut out of) 
these vital discursive spaces, and how the flow of information that fuels political decision-
making is mediated to both the public at large and to executive policymakers. 
THE MANY FACES OF LOBBYING 
Despite the diversity of campaign techniques in media policy debates, there remains a 
prominent disconnect between the busy public arena of high-profile activity and the decidedly 
private practices and interactions of low-profile lobbying. ‘Lobbying’ as a blanket term denotes 
the ultimate exercise of political power; actors ingratiating themselves in elite policy circles, 
cultivating relationships with political gatekeepers, and advancing their interests through 
informal channels of deliberation. Most public campaigning is aimed at enhancing a group’s 
status and legitimacy as a means of penetrating these private processes, and accounts of 
lobbying as a general phenomenon call to mind a pervasive elite influence over democratic 
institutions (Davis, 2002; Miller and Dinan, 2008; Wedel, 2017). Policymaking is increasingly 
comprised of unrecorded meetings, off-the-record phone calls and face-to-face conversations 
between political officials and corporate lobbyists, and, as the two case study policy processes 
have shown, the details of policy change are frequently decided in secluded elite spaces that 
supplant or circumvent democratically accountability. 
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Corporate lobbying permeates major sectors of public policy—across banking and 
finance, defence, energy, agri-business and (particularly in the US) healthcare—and has 
resulted in insider cultures becoming institutionalised across many integral structures of public 
policymaking. The aims and values of corporate interests are closely reflected in policy 
outcomes, and even the methods of decision-making are more and more sculpted around 
private lobbying as the only meaningful form of policy engagement. While not as vast and 
formalised as the quasi-regulated Washington DC lobbying system, the UK media policy lobby 
is similarly defined by the intertwining of commercial media interests and the official levers of 
government policymaking. The ever-spinning revolving door of lobbyists and other media 
actors has also contributed to the formalisation of informal elite interaction as the premium 
mode of policy influence: media executives become Special Advisors, Special Advisors and 
former ministers are hired as lobbyists, and governments appoint rank-and-file party 
representatives or commercial media supremoes to the boards of regulators, public agencies 
and the BBC. 
There is an argument, of course, that lobbying is only one type of political activity 
amongst many within the multi-faceted processes and procedures of policymaking. Lobbying 
can be informative and dialogic, connecting niche interests in a particular sector of public 
policy with the political actors who exercise official control over how these sectors are 
governed. Crucially, however, lobbying involves more than a general circulation of elite 
stakeholder influence over political processes: it manifests in specific activities used by all 
kinds of policy actors to press their interests at the heart of policymaking power. The tangible 
influence these different interactions have on policymaking depends on the actors involved, the 
existing structures of formal and informal deliberation, and the broader ideological battles 
surrounding the policy issue at stake. Understanding the effect of lobbying on the media 
policymaking process, and its underlying dynamics of power, thus requires a reimagining of 
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what ‘lobbying’ entails, as well as an analysis of the various paths that policy groups take 
through the figurative (and, of course, literal) corridors and anterooms of executive 
policymaking. 
The following discussions offer an account of lobbying as the dramatic crystallisation 
of everyday politics and the deeper dynamics of policymaking power, where structure and 
agency collide and the myriad forces that swirl around media policy culminate in actual human 
decisions. In this sense this section applies an understanding of lobbying that addresses the 
substantive questions of power explicit in Research Questions (1) and (2), through which we 
can investigate how different forms of lobbying operate both as a structural form of power, 
changing the conditions in which policy decisions are made, and as a behavioural form of 
power that produces policy change in and of itself. This section also analyses how certain trends 
of lobbying have become ritualised within the institutional dynamics of British press or 
broadcast policymaking, as well as instances where spontaneous or ad hoc forms of lobbying 
run counter to normative patterns of elite or private policy interaction. 
In differentiating forms of lobbying across its intersecting physical, interpersonal, 
institutional and ideological interactions, this section seeks to provide a novel means of 
answering the enduring but often intractable questions about the nature of lobbying in public 
policymaking. Is it an exclusively elite practice, available only to dominant corporate media 
interests and established insiders, or can counter-elite groups exercise comparable influence 
through their own engagement with private channels? How do different policy actors organise 
their lobbying of processes defined by political uncertainty, implicit ‘rules of the game’ and 
constantly shifting, often hidden centres of power? Can ‘being in the room’ at crucial moments 




Lobbying as professional campaigning? 
Parliamentary bodies, party blocs and civil society coalitions present a valuable means 
for policy groups to accrue recognition, trust and status amongst political elites, thus enhancing 
their ability to intervene in policy deliberation. This is of course a normatively pluralist image 
of lobbying as a natural (though highly professionalised) political process that ensures 
decisions reflect the median interests of all groups engaged in debate. Yet conceiving of 
lobbying in this way still requires unpicking the actual practices that different actors employ to 
ingratiate with political power, and the impact of this kind of everyday lobbying on media 
policy decision-making.  
Draft bills, amendments and other policy proposals raise a number of interesting points 
about lobbying through formal political processes. Examples from the case studies suggest that 
the main purpose of draft proposals is not primarily to change government legislation, but 
rather to publicise the feasibility of alternative measures. This is as much due to the 
technicalities of parliamentary law-making as it is a reflection of policy actors’ lobbying 
strategies. One interviewee described Hacked Off’s draft ‘Leveson Bill’ as a direct challenge 
to the government’s insistence against any press statute: 
In practice non-governmental members of parliament can‘t introduce Bills on 
controversial topics, so obviously we weren‘t promoting a Bill in the legislative sense. 
But we were producing a document to show to people this isn‘t a vicious beast that‘s 
going to eat up the world. Here it is and this is what the government could do, it‘s all 
very straightforward. So yes we used our Bill as a campaigning tool, but it‘s also 
showing people what things would like look. (Interview 7) 
VLV’s policy officer described their ‘BBC Funding Bill’ as an overt attempt to stand out from 
the noise of submissions and political arguments over the BBC’s future: 
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We tried to be imaginative and come up with solutions, because it’s all very well 
responding to consultations saying “we don’t like this, we don’t like that”, but actually 
you need to come up with solutions. We tried, in that instance, to come up with a 
practical solution. (Interview 11) 
Media policy pressure groups produced draft proposals as genuine contributions to public 
deliberation, offering ready-made solutions to emerging media policy problems, but these 
fulfilled the arguably more important effect of cementing their status as experts offering 
tangible, implementable ideas. These draft proposals also have the potential to attract active 
support from legislators who may confer these drafts with quasi-legal force through votes in 
parliament. With a cross-party pro-Leveson majority in both Houses, small groups of MPs and 
peers amended otherwise uncontested government bills with measures implementing some of 
the Leveson recommendations. The prospect of losing these Commons votes eventually forced 
government negotiators to hold the last minute ‘pizza meeting’ that resulted in the cross-party 
Charter agreement. 
There are, however, two issues surrounding the actual effect of draft proposals as a 
means of lobbying core decision-making. Firstly, producing comprehensive legislative drafts 
requires more than just extensive legal expertise in parliamentary law-making. A group must 
also be able to express their broader interests and objectives in the dense and overly legalistic 
language of official policy texts. VLV contracted a QC to prepare and draft their BBC Bill, and 
although Hacked Off staff and directors comprised lawyers and legal experts, planning and 
sense-checking their Bill and Charter proposals still proved a major task. 
Here we had the things that a Lord Justice had said we needed to do in order to bring 
about change. We then went about drafting them into a bill, making the skeleton of a 
legislative framework. But to think back to those days, we spent hours and hours and 
hours, just drafting! There was a lot of heavy lifting behind the scenes, both in actual 
strategic work and the research. (Interview 3) 
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Even where most campaigners have a strong sense of what they believe media policy should 
do, few have the resources or nuanced understanding to demonstrate how policy can achieve 
this in practical terms. This leaves a stark divide between public deliberative formats like 
consultations and inquiries, to which most actors contribute in one form or another, and the 
exclusivity of the bureaucratic work done by policymakers and civil servants, who operate in 
the technical domains of legislation and regulation. This is the kind of work that lobbyists are 
most eager to influence, but not all actors possess the institutional know-how to do so 
effectively. 
A second limit on the influence of draft proposals is the institutionalisation of non-
parliamentary activities as the primary mode of media policymaking. Even when MPs and 
peers formally consider pressure group proposals, parliament is only one node in the complex 
network of government and industry deliberations. In both debates, the locus of decision-
making power centred on notably obscure, arcane and non-democratic practices, in particular 
Royal Charters, ministerial fiat and corporatist-style bargaining between government, 
regulators and major media institutions. The Commons and Lords were often secondary to 
these informal, private interactions of insider media policymaking. Efforts to change policy 
through Select Committee reports were ignored by government, while legislative amendments 
were dismissed as unnecessary disruptions to the delicate work of private negotiations. 
The main beneficiaries of this culture are actors from entrenched media interest groups, 
yet even ‘insurgent’ insiders, such as Hacked Off, also opposed the ‘wrecking amendments’ 
on the basis that they threatened to damage the group’s already precarious status as principal 
figures in the private negotiations with government: 
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Well the Puttnam amendments didn‘t really introduce Leveson, they were a bit of a 
mess and didn‘t work. I can‘t remember whether we actively intervened to try and get 
them withdrawn or whether we let it fall away, but they were nothing to do with us. 
They were just a distraction. (Interview 7) 
Along with the functional distinctions of insider-outsider actors and private-public spaces, 
there is also a hierarchy of status between different forms of lobbying and their perceived 
legitimacy in the media policy process. While policy drafts and legislative amendments may 
be an effective lobbying measure for attracting support or calling attention to peripheral policy 
issues, these efforts rarely in themselves produce direct and substantive change to the content 
of official policy. 
The question remains whether outsider pressure groups can materially influence 
decision-making through informal or less structured lobbying practices, even when they are 
excluded from the exclusive domains where actual policy decisions are made. This is a matter 
of analysing the taken-for-granted behaviours and unwritten rules that govern everyday 
lobbying (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991a:14-5), and how they affect policy actors’ interactions 
with political elites. For most actors in the two case study debates, standard lobbying 
techniques consisted of contacting central figures by telephone, email or letter and arranging 
events and meetings with important groups. 
We built up a database of contacts amongst key influencers, opinion formers and other 
people involved in the debate. We were also closely involved in the formation of the 
All Party BBC group in parliament. The combination of our intelligence and their 
political connections worked together very well. (Interview 12) 
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I would speak to the Labour or Liberal Democrat frontbench spokespeople on media. 
We were also talking to vociferous peers like Norman Fowler, who was very influential 
at the time as an ex-journalist and key Conservative figure … We eventually had our 
launch meeting in parliament in the Lords, hosted by Lord Cunningham. Somebody 
made that connection with him but you’ve got to have a peer for events like that. 
(Interview 4) 
Informal conversations with select policymakers lead to more contacts and connections, and 
this snowballing effect was pivotal in these groups expanding their influence through an active 
coalition of politicians, professional organisations and campaign groups with shared policy 
objectives. 
This sort of interpersonal lobbying is a core feature of Westminster’s political culture, 
and it calls attention to the gatekeeping done by Special Advisors, MP’s office staff and other 
background actors in controlling interest groups’ access to decision-makers. Yet these informal 
interactions still occur within an institutional policy context predominantly structured around 
commercial media interests. Lobbyists and executives from large media organisations pervade 
the corridors and meeting rooms of parliament and the Whitehall departments, and are engaged 
in routine conversations with civil servants, regulators and policymakers. With contemporary 
UK media policy objectives centred on commercial competition and light-touch regulation, 
non-commercial pressure groups find it even harder to establish their own lobbying influence 
with policymakers. Amongst the wide range of other subjects that occupy the political agenda, 
policymakers regard media policy as a peripheral or unimportant subject, and even during BBC 
Charter review and the phone hacking scandal politicians treated these major public debates as 
niche exercises best left to industry experts: 
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You’re ringing people asking them to come to your meetings and it’s surreal, I’m trying 
to speak to them about the future of children’s broadcasting or something and there’s 
this big Brexit vote or a HS2 debate. It’s hard to tell MPs that broadcasting is an 
important public policy priority when the economy is falling apart or whatever the big 
story is. They see it as a soft additional extra, it’s not a fundamental policy issue for 
them. (Interview 11) 
Look, for fuck’s sake, who wants to know about press regulation? There may not be 
more important things in life, but there are certainly more interesting things. You can’t 
expect a victim, ordinary MPs or even the public to master the technicalities of it. 
(Interview 4) 
The perceived importance of a policy issue also hinders how pressure groups lobby and 
interact with one another. The conflict between reform of self-regulation and press freedom 
became a matter of deep antipathy between the major newspaper publishers and the numerous 
groups and campaigns assembled around the post-Leveson debates. Actors categorised each 
other in terms of ‘goodies’ and ‘baddies’, and the few attempts at reaching common ground 
between seemingly irreconcilable positions typically resulted in a dialogue of the deaf. As the 
founder of the Leveson-compliant regulator IMPRESS recalled, this sense of recalcitrance and 
tribalism cut through professional or social relationships: 
Once the idea for IMPRESS had crystallised, conversations with my old journalism 
colleagues became much more fraught. I think whilst they might have accepted in the 
abstract that there might be a new regulator, they found it very difficult that I, who they 
knew as a campaigner for press freedom, might want to set that up. Someone did say to 
me, “we thought you were one of us.” (Interview 8) 
BBC Charter review lacked a comparably emotive or hostile atmosphere, and lobbying 
between broadcasting policy groups was instead structured by the complex and multifaceted 
scope of issues swept up by Charter review. Interests were ‘siloed’ into smaller topical sub-
sets, such as radio, online services, content regulation or governance, meaning that although a 
group’s individual influence within these areas was relatively strong—see, for example, the 
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lobby in support of greater public funding for children’s TV (Steemers, 2017)—their status 
within the bigger picture of Charter review was marginal. Control of the overall strategy, 
direction and core political ideals of BBC reform remained firmly within the narrow sets of 
private negotiations between the government, the BBC and select industry insiders. 
The formal and informal practices discussed here each entail distinct interpersonal 
cultures that shape how interest groups try to enhance their status and position in policy 
deliberation. These cultures are partly reflections of the historical and political precedents of 
UK press and broadcasting policy debates, but such interactions nonetheless reveal deep 
structural biases that constrain the influence of non-industry interests in particular over the 
institutional conditions and political boundaries of official decision-making. Lobbying through 
parliament or coalition-building may persuade some policymakers of the weight and veracity 
of an interest group’s objectives, but these processes still operate according to many of the 
same ideological and political preferences about who should or shouldn’t be involved in media 
policymaking. 
Corporate media actors pervade both the public and private spaces of policy 
deliberation, on account of both representing the media industries under debate and their 
extensive connections with elite political power. Non-industry groups, on the other hand, only 
attain the privileged insider status following seismic shifts in public and political opinion (such 
as phone hacking), or after years or even decades of persistent involvement in media policy 
debates (as with Pact and VLV). Even then this status is fleeting and contingent on a constant 
demonstration to policymakers of their validity and usefulness for official decision-making. 
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There’s a need for on-going influence. The lobby in favour of the BBC has largely 
fallen away since Charter review but it’s needed permanently … The big thing we need 
is more resource, because there is a need for things to continue. We can’t just keep 
wheeling everything out when we get to Charter review time. We’re up against multi-
billion pound international conglomerates, and we were very much a minnow. 
(Interview 12) 
The intention was that it would be over very quickly, we do our campaign, commit as 
much as we could for that period of time. But actually you can never stop campaigning 
around media reform because they [the press] are just so powerful and so big. It’s 
astonishing that we’ve managed to be heard as much as we have given the kind of 
megaphone they dominate (Interview 3) 
For these groups lobbying is a long-term strategic necessity for keeping their interests and 
campaigning within the political frame of media policy, rather than a short-term tactical 
preference for intervening in decisive moments. Yet even this lobbying as a form of 
professional campaigning is easier said than done, given that major media policy debates are 
so few and far between. 
Getting in the room: patterns of access and exclusion 
From looking only at its official structures, institutional constraints and entrenched 
ideological biases, many aspects of media policymaking appear mechanistic or impassive, as 
if it is fixed on rails to an inevitable outcome. Elite lobbying of core processes is a ubiquitous 
feature of much British policymaking (Davis, 2002:174-6), and the overall balance of power 
across media policy formation is certainly tilted in favour of dominant commercial media 
interests (Freedman, 2008:95-7). Yet the 2013 Charter on press regulation and the renewed 
2016 BBC Charter were nonetheless the products of cumulative decisions by human actors, 
who were themselves influenced by a range of political pressures, acted according to certain 
‘ways of doing things’, and interacted with myriad other actors across formal and informal 
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settings. No two policy decisions are ever made in the same way, and the pivotal moments of 
decision-making in the two case study debates each emerged from distinct lobbying cultures. 
The unminuted meetings, late night phone calls and behind-closed-doors negotiations 
that typify insiders’ privileged involvement in core decision-making are some of the clearest 
examples of intimate access to policymakers enjoyed by certain policy interests. But these 
private interactions do not occur in isolation from the concurrent events and forces of the wider 
policy process. Likewise, the influence of insiders’ hardball demands and tactical compromises 
within these private deliberations is ultimately contingent on the established ideals, objectives 
and modes of media policymaking, which are fundamentally products of political context, 
discursive conflicts, interpersonal structures and interest group campaigning. The relationship 
between a group’s access to elite spaces and their real influence on policy within these spaces 
is not clear-cut. By distinguishing generalised forms of lobbying from how political influence 
actually operates at the centre of official decision-making, we can begin to unravel how these 
practices expose democratic processes to decidedly undemocratic behaviours. 
One of the most striking signs of intimate lobbying in the two debates is the sheer scale 
of contact between core media policymakers and a small number of insider interest groups. 
Even without complete accounts of all the off-the-record lunches, impromptu phone calls and 
unrecorded conversations, official government files still reveal the regularity of lobbyists’ 
access to decision-makers and the disproportionate prevalence of government meetings with 
corporate media organisations. At the conclusion of post-Leveson negotiations, ministers 
involved in the cross-party talks had met privately with national newspaper editors at least 21 
times, with publisher executives and IIG representatives at least 28 times, and with the Hacked 
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Off campaign just 11 times.167 Likewise of the 89 recorded meetings relating to BBC Charter 
review, DCMS ministers held 26 meetings with representatives of the BBC, 23 meetings with 
commercial TV and radio companies, and 10 meetings with newspaper publishers and 
editors.168 Both debates demonstrate the significant weight core policymakers give to (and their 
reliance on) dominant media organisations. Even in debates involving a large range of different 
policy groups, only a select few achieve this degree of recurring direct contact with executive 
figures, leaving the vast majority of interests with a vastly diminished role in the substantive 
processes of decision-making. 
However, the relationships and interactions between lobbyists and private government 
changes drastically as the political and ideological emphasis of the policymaking process 
evolve. This is especially apparent for Hacked Off, whose access to core decision-making 
fluctuated considerably during the press regulation debates. In July 2011 the group secured 
meetings with party leaders to speak with the Dowler family and discuss their demands for a 
public inquiry. Against the frenetic political backdrop of the BSkyB deal, the Prime Minister’s 
dubious connections with News International executives and the raw public outrage against 
phone hacking, politicians effectively gave the Dowlers and Hacked Off a free hand to dictate 
the formation and terms of what became the Leveson Inquiry. 
 
167 Figures taken from records of ministerial meetings between October 2012 and March 2013, published online 
by the offices of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Office Minister and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport. 
168 Figures taken from records of ministerial meetings between May 2015 and October 2016, published online by 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. 
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Two minutes before the Downing Street meeting I was told it would be my turn to say 
that the Inquiry has to look into the role of politicians as well. So now I’ve got to tell 
the Prime Minister to put himself under scrutiny. But as I left the room at the end of the 
meeting, Cameron asked me “who do you think we should put on the panel as advisors? 
Do you think that would work?” I was thinking “put me on the panel!” I know I said a 
name and it probably didn’t make any difference, but what stuck with me was how wide 
open the door was. (Interview 4) 
However, once the private cross-party talks had begun, Hacked Off’s access to leading 
Conservative policymakers became much more restricted and the group instead depended on 
connections with Labour and Liberal Democrat figures to continue influencing the 
negotiations. The group retained a type of insider role but was removed from the central 
negotiations, instead resorting to ‘feeding’ evidence and proposals through MPs and Special 
Advisors—exchanges which one campaign figure described as “wobbly” (Interview 7)—rather 
than engaging directly with government. 
Press industry access to government policymakers during the post-Leveson 
negotiations was far more stable. Ministers frequently invited editors and publisher 
representatives to discuss reforms, in several instances even contributing directly to the content 
of formative proposals. Lord Hunt of the IIG negotiating group recalled “a whole series of 
meetings at Number 9 and 10 Downing Street” in which the industry played a crucial role in 
steering the government’s draft Royal Charter. The naturalness of this inter-elite collaboration 
is not unique to the post-Leveson debates, but can be seen as an extension of the broader media-
political culture in which editors and newspaper executives are regularly courted by political 
leaders. The ‘press lobby’, by this account, was not so much a separate constituency seeking 
to pressure decision-makers by finding niche or incisive routes to power. Rather, the press 
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industry was (and indeed still is) an embedded part of the media policy process,169 and its access 
to core decision-making came from the government’s insistence that industry approval was the 
foremost criteria in reforming self-regulation. 
During BBC Charter review, major media organisations achieved similarly extensive 
access to government policymakers and were closely involved in core discussions on Charter 
reform. It would seem obvious that the BBC itself plays a principal role in official debates on 
its future, and representatives of the Corporation negotiated with the government throughout 
the Charter renewal process. Yet the BBC’s access to government is intrinsic to its status as a 
public organisation, and this symbiotic relationship is founded on the expectation that it acts as 
the junior partner in a wide-ranging administrative review of government policy (Born, 
2005:231), rather than as an independent interest actively lobbying for its own (and licence fee 
payers’) benefit. 
You may find one or two coded speeches from BBC executives saying they don’t like 
this or that aspect of the government’s proposals, but by and large there’s a kind of 
frantic paddling under the water while both parties try to swim along serenely, and try 
not to bite each other’s heads off because of whatever’s going on beneath the surface. 
(Interview 9) 
This bureaucratic mind-set manifested throughout the regular meetings, phone calls, written 
correspondence and negotiations, with BBC representatives seeking to manage and mitigate 
the impact of funding changes or Charter revisions rather than risking a politically dangerous 
standoff against the government’s agenda. 
 
169 It is worth noting that press and other media actors also have frequent access to government figures across 
almost all sectors of government policy. Analysis by Dommett et al. found that media organisations accounted for 
14.3 per cent of over 6,000 meetings held between the major ministries and all varieties of ‘outside interests’ 
during the 2010-2015 coalition government (2017:10). 
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Commercial media organisations enjoyed far more traditional patterns of contact with 
media policymaking officials. As one ITV executive hinted, there is a taken-for-granted 
lobbying relationship between media policymakers and media organisations, and this 
relationship continued during Charter negotiations: 
We have lots of interaction with DCMS and ministers, we’re asked for our views and 
we give them. Charter review is important but it’s not the most important thing in our 
strategy. We weren’t conducting a ‘campaign’ or anything like that, we have to take a 
position on these things and people asked us for it! (Interview 13) 
Commercial lobbyists’ access to policymakers is built into the organisation of broadcast 
policymaking, and in the context of the Conservative government’s ‘distinctiveness’ agenda 
this access was even more naturalised as a mechanism for ensuring the BBC’s public services 
didn’t conflict with open market competition. Across numerous meetings, roundtable 
discussions and private lunches with DCMS officials, the government regularly consulted 
media lobbyists on the substantive proposals in its BBC policy. This collaboration extended as 
far as the government delegating some decision-making to commercial groups, as was the case 
with the independent producers association Pact endorsing the abolition of the BBC’s in-house 
commissioning guarantee: 
We were asked to go in and meet the Secretary of State and his officials, who basically 
asked us a simple question: “if you could compete for this much more, could you 
compete for all of it?” Our answer was absolutely. They said “thank you very much, 
that’s all we needed to know”, and the next thing we knew was that contestability had 
been increased to 100 per cent. (Interview 10) 
Even though established non-media interest groups like VLV also achieved close access to core 
Charter review policymakers, it is clear that merely securing these meetings is by no means a 
guarantee of equitable influence on the policymaking process. 
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I don’t like to admit it, but I think we failed. Whether that’s a reflection on VLV or it’s 
a reflection on the system I don’t know. We engaged with everybody and they all appear 
to listen, but ultimately have we had any impact on the process? (Interview 11) 
Lobbying at the heart of power 
These disparities in access, even within the tightly controlled spaces of elite lobbying, 
show the greater legitimacy afforded to the contributions and involvement of commercial 
interests in media policymaking. But ‘being in the room’ is only ever as effective as what an 
interest group can achieve when they are there. Corporate lobbyists and non-media actors alike 
employed various means of bargaining and negotiation within the private, exclusive channels 
of core decision-making, and these tactics symbolise lobbying in its rawest, most incisive and 
most dynamic form. They demonstrate how the fundamental acts of official policy formation—
when policymakers put pen to paper and transform ideas or objectives into concrete regulations 
and legal powers—are anything but dry or rudimentary. 
Even within the political and ideological constraints of the post-Leveson and BBC 
Charter debates, a small number of pressure groups successfully intervened at pivotal stages to 
produce direct changes in media policy against the apparent ‘natural’ order of official decision-
making. The efficacy of these interventions was highly contextual, resulting from the inferred 
significance of interests a group represented, the inferred political cost to policymakers of 
rejecting their demands, or simply because someone was in the right place at the right time. 
These unique instances of decisive lobbying should be seen as the essential manifestations of 
behavioural power in policymaking, when actors directly alter the course of political action 
through their material interactions with the most intimate and ultimate exercises of elite 
political power. 
There is no greater example of this lobbying at the heart of power across the two case 
studies than the so-called ‘pizza meeting’, when politicians from the three main parties agreed 
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the cross-party Charter for reforming press self-regulation. Representatives from Hacked Off 
were invited to these eleventh hour talks by the Labour leader, and one campaign figure present 
at the meeting described their distinct role in shaping how the deal was implemented: 
It looked like they were going to ask us to clear this on behalf of the victims, and sure 
enough that’s what this pizza meeting was. Most of that night was spent sitting around 
doing nothing, waiting for Clegg, waiting for Letwin, waiting for his Civil Service 
geeks to come back off the phone. The substantive issues we discussed were not the 
contents of the Charter but the timings. Who was going to speak in the House of 
Commons? How was that going to be arranged? What are they going to say? I did not 
want David Cameron standing up and welching on us at the last moment, and we got 
our assurances on measures to ensure it would happen. Then the next day everything 
was announced and it was a slam-dunk victory for us. (Interview 4) 
This account shows us how the exclusive, private moments of executive decision often unfurl 
in informal and sporadic ways, which open such interactions to influence from new or insurgent 
actors. Despite being frozen out of negotiations with Conservative ministers, Hacked Off’s 
influence over the other parties coincided with a unique reversal in the parliamentary balance 
of power. The group’s integral role involved not only providing technical expertise on press 
regulation but also offering the consent of phone hacking victims, who the Labour and Liberal 
Democrat leaders had consistently defined as essential for conferring reform with public 
legitimacy. In representing this symbolic constituency and making pro-Leveson reforms a 
condition of their support,170 an unexpected invitation gave Hacked Off lobbyists a seat at the 
top table and enabled them to circumvent the preceding months of negotiations and policy 
drafting dominated by the press industry. 
 
170 On one occasion the campaign leaked a draft letter, signed by victims of press intrusion, which threatened to 




Effecting this sort of intimate insider lobbying is therefore not wholly reliant on holding 
insider connections or demonstrating elite characteristics. Through a combination of political 
capital (i.e. the perceived importance of the interests or constituency they represent) and a 
tactical nous for identifying the decisions they are most likely to sway, emergent coalitions and 
groups from outside the embedded elite layer of state and corporate media actors can still (albeit 
rarely) exercise direct influence on key acts of executive policymaking. Lobbying actors create 
alternative courses of action or impose certain conditions that change how policymakers 
evaluate the options available to them, and these interventions are not only aimed at adding 
favourable measures or instruments to government proposals. As the Save Our BBC 
campaign’s director usefully put it, “it’s the things you stop that are as important as the things 
you get” (Interview 12), and groups were able to veto or remove aspects of BBC or post-
Leveson policy that other actors had inserted into the government’s formal Charter review 
agenda. 
It would be oversimplifying to treat these changes as part of a routine back-and-forth, 
or conclude it shows how policymakers consider arguments and appeals from all manner of 
competing lobbying groups until an acceptable ‘middle ground’ is reached. As the following 
quote from Pact’s chief executive suggests, sudden reversals are often the result of groups 
coercing policymakers to choose which set of interests or proposed changes in policy should 
be satisfied.  
The BBC wanted to get rid of the independent production quota, which we made very 
clear was a red line for us. They also wanted to reduce their out-of-London spend that 
we had fought very hard to have fixed at 50 per cent in the last Charter, and again we 
made it clear that reducing that would be a disaster. The BBC thought all of those things 
could be traded off against one another but at the end of the day we persuaded the 
government against it. (Interview 10) 
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Clearly such interventions depend on lobbying actors being aware of and having access to 
unpublished revisions and incremental additions made to official proposals. But they also show 
how the legitimacy and recognition required to engage in elite deliberation can then be 
mobilised back upon the policy process as a means of political pressure. Here the influence of 
lobbying is not in presenting a particular policy change as empirically better or worse than its 
alternatives, but in redefining the choice in terms of which interests or groups policymakers 
value more highly when deciding on policy change. 
More fundamentally, intimate lobbying of this sort epitomises the interrelationship 
between behavioural and structural forms of power as they manifest in the policymaking 
process. Media policymaking is, as the previous discussions have explored, highly 
circumscribed by the circulation of ideological narratives that define ideal goals and shape 
normative policymaking practices. Yet material policy decisions still result from interactions 
between human actors, who relate to and influence these structural conditions in complex ways. 
Categorising all the incarnations of specific lobbying methods in the two case studies is likely 
impossible, precisely because their formations and arrangements, as well as the behavioural 
cultures and political circumstances they operate in, are totally unique. Accounts from lobbying 
actors involved in the core of the post-Leveson and Charter debates do, however, allude to 
common bargaining tactics that groups employ, each indicative of the different power relations 
that arise across these various private and exclusive spaces. 
Actors may assert their objectives as ‘red lines’ or threaten to withhold support for 
policies that they deem unacceptable. As with behavioural power more generally, the influence 
of these ultimata depends on whether decision-makers see the cost of going against one group’s 
demands as greater than the potential benefits. Lobbyists offer compromises or accept less 
desirable (or even opposing) policy changes in exchange for receiving concessions on their 
own demands. These concessions can of course be seen as a typical part of give-and-take 
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negotiations between multiple parties. But the type and degree of concession reflects the power 
relations between those groups, and the extent to which actors are willing to accept undesirable 
changes in order to retain their influence and esteem with core decision-makers. For Hacked 
Off lobbyists, agreeing to wording changes in the Bill amendments passing through parliament 
was a price worth paying to see the cross-party Charter implemented: 
That was exactly the sort of compromise we were trying to find just so that didn’t look 
like regulation. We were prepared to make cosmetic changes if that helped our allies, 
even if it helped the Conservatives, but as long as it didn’t affect the substance. 
(Interview 7) 
Whereas Hacked Off viewed their ‘cosmetic’ concessions as a net positive result for their 
demands, it’s interesting to note that the Prime Minister considered the cross-party Charter as 
a victory for his party’s negotiating tactics: 
We had lost the battle by giving in to some of their demands. But we had won the war 
– we got them off the dangerous idea of state regulation. (Cameron, 2019:265) 
While individual interventions can shift pivotal decisions one way or another through deft 
bargaining tactics, there is still a tension between the subjective aims of a group’s lobbying 
efforts and the broader political environment in which these red lines are deployed. 
The perception of who is compromising what in these scenarios is also indicative of a 
deeper power relationship in media policy lobbying, namely how insider groups organise their 
bargaining tactics in response to the institutionalised rules and codes of a specific policy 
process. Snoddy (2015) has detailed the various manoeuvres, back-channel exchanges and 
counter-proposals that BBC executives used to mitigate the worst impacts of the Treasury’s 
2015 licence fee renegotiations. However, as one industry interviewee remarked, the BBC’s 
bargaining did little to prevent the long-term damage of an additional £200m demand on its 
budget of paying for over-75s free licences: 
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It’s the ultimate poison chalice, but the BBC probably saw the over-75s deal as a good 
deal. In fact they crowed about getting a good deal, and all the while this ticking time 
bomb is sitting in their lap and it’s only gets worse every year. I think it showed 
weakness on the part of BBC management to even consider it would give them any 
advantage. (Interview 10) 
Private broadcasters’ lobbying of Charter review, as we have seen above, operates as a routine 
pattern of mutual decision and consultation between market-minded government policymakers 
and embedded commercial stakeholders. For the BBC, however, with a choice between an all-
out assault from a hostile government or trading away its financial security, Corporation 
lobbyists took the latter hoping it would give them greater sway in the forthcoming Charter 
negotiations. The end result incurred effectively the same result, further separating the BBC’s 
resources and its underlying public service mission while also surrendering to another ritual 
attack on its independence. Against the wider marketization and liberalisation of broadcasting 
policy, and the enduring ideological challenges from its opponents, BBC lobbyists’ interactions 
with the core processes of Charter review are highly constrained by the Corporation’s lop-sided 
reliance on state power. 
In the post-Leveson debates, press lobbyists had similarly routine engagements with 
government policymakers, but these activities played out in a radically different way from 
Charter review. Executives, editors and other press industry lobbyists persistently pressured 
the Conservatives’ reform proposals, redefining how the Leveson recommendations would be 
reinterpreted as regulatory criteria. More importantly, however, their embedded role in core 
decision-making afforded industry lobbyists with the means to undo the reforms to which they 
were ostensibly contributing. Industry negotiators and other interviewees claimed that “no 
negotiating strategy adopted by the newspaper industry was designed to reach consensus; it 
was designed to delay imposition”: 
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I don’t think anyone was insincere, but it was largely a negotiating plot. We all knew, 
at every stage, that there was a majority in the House of Commons which would vote 
to create a statutory backstop. Anything which could delay that and could bring about 
a different outcome was worth playing for, right? (Interview 1) 
As far as I were concerned these talks were irrelevant. We’d decided to follow the 
contract model and I was going to set up IPSO. I didn’t need a ‘supervisory body’ set 
up by a Royal Charter as long as I had good independent people running the regulator. 
(Interview 6) 
It is difficult to think of any private organisation, interest group or industry other than the UK 
press which holds an inherent role in devising its own laws and regulation, enjoys private 
access to both policymakers and the intimate functions of policymaking, possesses the 
resources and political will to engage in these processes, and yet uses this immense lobbying 
influence to ensure that decisions they help to negotiate have no legal basis or meaningful 
authority. This is not so much a power of nondecision-making, limiting the scope of political 
debate (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), but a power of decision-unmaking; to render any political 
acts or policies that run counter to a group’s interests ineffective to the point of obsolescence. 
When deliberation is drawn between such overtly conflicting principles as those 
expressed in the post-Leveson and BBC Charter debates, private lobbying interactions do not 
unfold as dispassionate, measured or sober exchanges of ideas in the way that pluralist accounts 
assert. Instead, the interpersonal relationships within these lively sites of core power are often 
visceral, emotive and even sometimes plainly unpleasant experiences. One Hacked Off lobbyist 
involved in the cross-party negotiations described their meetings with government officials as 
“extremely uncomfortable and stilted” (Interview 5), while another suggested that some 




We didn’t trust the government, sometimes they flat out lied to us. On one occasion we 
were told in terms that they had not met with editors to discuss their Charter plans, and 
then the following day it was disclosed that they indeed had. There was a certain amount 
of what an old friend of mine described as ‘public school deviousness’ about their 
approach. (Interview 7) 
The enduring close relationships between political and media elites manifest not only as a 
shared system of policy values and ideals, but also as a pervasive culture of inter-elite 
familiarity and routinised behaviours. One revealing anecdote, again from a Hacked Off 
lobbyist, details how the intimate day-to-day role of press lobbying in government 
policymaking also has a direct bearing on how other groups can influence the core sites and 
spaces of power: 
As we waited in a side room of 10 Downing Street, I saw Paul Dacre [editor of the 
Daily Mail] emerge from the main room and go out the front door. Then we go into the 
meeting, and Letwin and the Prime Minister were pitching this Charter to me as if it’s 
great. They were just letting the press of the hook. They described this plan to us as ‘the 
toughest regulator in the Western world’,171 but as I said to Cameron “this isn’t your 
Charter, this is their Charter”. It was a very, very forthright meeting, and I was as rude 
to the Prime Minister as I suspect he’s used to. When we left Craig Oliver [the Prime 
Minister’s Communications Director] was still bending my ear, trying to sell me. I was 
thinking, fucking Dacre’s just left the room, what do you expect me to say? (Interview 
4) 
Quite apart from what this tells us about the crises of transparency and accountability 
in media policymaking, such experiences also highlight how lobbying behaviours involve more 
than just individuals’ personalities, emotions or attitudes (though these clearly have an 
important role). More fundamentally, reflecting on Research Questions (1), (2) and (3), the 
distinct lobbying cultures of the two policy processes epitomise the structuring effects of 
 
171 This exact phrase was also used by PressBoF, the PCC’s funding body, to promote its preferred regulatory 
model proposed in the industry’s rival Royal Charter. 
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ideology, elite power and narrative values on how decision-making is organised. In the post-
Leveson debates, the absolutist philosophy of press freedom promulgated by major publishing 
groups and their newspapers eclipsed the original concerns with press malpractice. This in turn 
reconstituted the ‘political-media nexus’, which bore the brunt of Leveson’s criticisms, in the 
form of a necessary exclusive back-channel for industry lobbyists to steer regulatory reform in 
their favour. 
The BBC’s approach to Charter review has often rested on its innate connections with 
state power. However, as Pact’s chief executive remarked, this traditional bureaucratic mode 
of Whitehall lobbying has fallen out of kilter with the market orthodoxy in broadcast 
policymaking: 
My experience of having negotiated alongside or against the BBC for two Charters is 
that the BBC is not as smart as it thinks it is. It is inherently, with all due respect, an 
Oxbridge-type institution with a very insular culture. They come from an approach to 
the market, and to broadcast policy, which is more akin to civil servants rather than like 
commercial approaches to a creative economy. (Interview 10) 
The emphasis on commercial market success as a normative policy goal—epitomised in the 
distinctiveness agenda—has led to more and more aspects of Charter review being conducted 
through private lobbying between competing commercial industry interests. Bargaining and 
persuasion within this new culture revolves around demonstrations of economic value and fair 
competition instead of arguments about the deeper cultural and democratic roles of public 
service broadcasting. 
PUBLIC PRESSURE OR PRIVATE POWER? 
Understanding the power dynamics of media policymaking evidently cannot rest on a 
singular analysis of formal processes, political conflicts or ideological currents as if one of 
these phenomena is more influential than the others. Policy decisions result from the actions of 
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individuals, and such activity is both structured by and creates the interpersonal relationships, 
institutional cultures and essential values that shape policymaking as a vital function of 
democratic societies. However the two case study debates still leave us with the enduring 
question of causality, and of where the true locus of power lies when specific moments of 
policy change are paradoxically defined by entrenched structural constraints and lively 
unpredictable behaviours. 
The policy network paradigm offers one means for understanding these myriad 
intersecting factors in terms of organised relationships between actors, processes and 
institutions. Policymakers and executive actors are the ultimate agents of policy change, and 
as such we can infer the dynamics of policymaking power from how competing interests and 
groups organise around and engage with formal decision-making. Yet media policymaking, 
both as a unique realm of public policy and in its constituent forms of press and broadcast 
policy, is epitomised by uncertain and constantly evolving definitions of who is responsible for 
policy decisions—government ministers, parliament, regulators, self-regulating media 
industries, or sometimes all of these together—and in what ways they are publicly accountable. 
The ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ categories may offer useful conceptual boundaries for identifying 
actors and their influence, but these arrangements can also shift and change depending on the 
wider contextual and political development of a policy process. 
As the policy networks in the two case studies make clear, insider actors comprise the 
typical set of embedded media industry elites and other formally routinised stakeholders. But 
insurgent groups and marginalised interests that are notionally excluded from top-level media 
policymaking can, under the right conditions, also usurp this influential status and access. 
Likewise, groups commonly recognised as outsiders—disorganised public campaigns, niche 
industrial or civic interests, political fringe actors etc.—can still decisively influence policy 
through deft campaigning or seizing on opportune moments, while traditionally ‘powerful’ 
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bodies like parliaments and ministries can be suddenly shut out of deliberation because of a 
debate’s evolving structure or political dynamics. The networked relationships of media 
policymaking are fluid and complex, with competing actors and groups connected or distanced 
as much by entrenched precedent as by unexpected new arrangements. 
The foundations of media policy networks are nonetheless organised around elite 
decision-making practices, access to which is tightly controlled and governed by elite cultures. 
The ability to influence these processes requires not just organisational resources and political 
perseverance, but a deeper recognition of and adaptation to the predominant market-centric 
logic that pervades media policymaking. In analysing the dynamics of ‘structure versus 
agency’, and pressing the distinct emphases of Research Questions (1) and (2), this chapter has 
sought to dissect the tactics and forms of influence that constituted the tangible interactions 
and relationships between actors in the post-Leveson and BBC Charter review debates. 
What, then, is the meaningful difference between ‘campaigning’ and ‘lobbying’ as 
distinct modes of political engagement and influence? It may be that campaigning is what 
typically happens ‘outside’ the substantive mechanisms and procedures of official 
policymaking, while lobbying denotes the more intimate and exclusive practices that take place 
‘inside’ the arenas of executive power. This dichotomy would, I think, be an overly reductive 
view of the importance of campaigning for mobilising competing policy interests in the public 
sphere and constructing the overarching terms of debate that guide policymakers’ actions. 
Campaigning is as much a part of elite political and media actors’ policy engagement strategies 
as it is for civil society organisations or public pressure groups, and the particular tactics these 
groups employ are in themselves indicative of the differing perceptions concerning what kinds 
of activities draw public and political attention. A more useful distinction therefore may be that 
‘campaigning’ is directed at influencing the public policymaking process—media coverage, 
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high politics, democratic institutions—whereas lobbying operates in the decidedly private 
world of executive decision, negotiation and bargaining between interests. 
Lobbying attracts a great deal of cynicism in much commentary on the political process, 
and this research presents little reason to dispute the popular image of a contemporary culture 
of corporate lobbying that is antithetical to democratic principles. It would seem 
uncontroversial to claim, on the basis of the two case studies, that small but organised elite 
interests have far greater influence through private lobbying than other groups engaged in 
public mechanisms of policymaking. Yet in considering how the range of different lobbying 
methods work in practice, identifying the precise crux of power—between the political, 
institutional and discursive constraints that shape a policy decision, and the actual human 
interactions which produce that decision—remains complex. By leveraging their acquired 
influence at the focal moments of core deliberation, lobbying actors can sway substantive 
policy decisions and directly change how media industries are regulated and organised. Even 
within seemingly fixed patterns of elite bias and exclusive policymaking practices, challenge 
and change are still possible, depending on how competing interests interact with and utilise 
the unique and changing institutional contexts, interpersonal arrangements and political 
conflicts in which core actors make decisions. 
However, these rare moments of counter-elite success should not be taken as proof of 
a natural balance across how actors organise, campaign or lobby media policy, or of the 
equitable impact of elite and non-elite groups engaged in official policy deliberation. Large 
commercial media groups are consistently engaged in lobbying government officials and 
political leaders, particularly outside of arranged policy processes. Looking to Research 
Question (4), the normative importance of the contributions of commercial media helps to 
define the purposes of media policy lobbying in terms of private over public goals, market 
competition over civic, cultural or social functions of media, and consultative over 
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participatory models of deliberation. Though decisive moments of the post-Leveson and BBC 
Charter debates were swayed by campaigning and lobbying from groups beyond the standard 
set of embedded media interests, the intimate interactions and behaviours that constitute core 
decision-making principally serve to reproduce, normalise and expand the power that elite 





As two of the most significant events in the recent history of the British media, it is 
abundantly clear that the 2012-13 post-Leveson debates and 2015-16 BBC Charter review were 
anything but rudimentary moments of dry, apolitical policy change. These debates vitalised 
issues and scandals at the collision of media and politics, and the regulatory shifts these policies 
implemented continue to have a direct impact on the day-by-day political and social functions 
of British media. More alarmingly, analysis of these case studies reinforces the sense of 
democratic crisis ailing the UK’s core political and media institutions. Media policies 
increasingly prioritise and protect dominant commercial media interests while relaxing or 
repealing rules that conceive of media as public goods. Genuine public participation in official 
policymaking is effectively non-existent, as substantive choices about the goals of media policy 
are decided almost exclusively through private interactions amongst a handful of elite figures. 
Far from enriching the policy process with lively debate between multiple competing voices, 
media organisations predominantly use their unique communicative and political resources to 
cement their own policy objectives on the political agenda. At the heights of political and 
governmental power, prevailing neo-liberal attitudes to the sanctity of market forces and 
deregulation—paired with an insidious culture of intimate connections between media elites 
and policymakers—have resulted in media policy being decided predominantly through private 
negotiations and corporate lobbying that operate without any democratic accountability. 
These observations are, of course, not especially new. Plenty of recent research has 
catalogued media policy drifting further from public democratic control and perilously close 
to near-total capture by a corporate media power elite (Pickard, 2019a; Freedman, 2008; Flew 
et al., 2019). Understanding this trend requires untangling the realities of media policymaking 
and critiquing the precise and particular manifestations of power that shape which people, 
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which interests and which ideas actually influence media policy change. Both the post-Leveson 
and BBC Charter review case studies demonstrated the endemic inequalities of influence that 
separate a diverse majority of media policy interest groups from the minority of established 
powerful media organisations and political elites. Yet these two debates were still characterised 
by complicated and often unusual political interactions, contradictory arguments and 
unpredictable interventions that moulded the policymaking process in unique ways. Inspecting 
these dynamics of power at their most intimate points, as the previous chapters have sought to 
do, is essential for developing a greater understanding of media policymaking as a critical 
juncture of the fundamental institutions of democratic society. 
This final chapter returns to the four Research Questions posed at the beginning of this 
thesis, summarising the main findings of the two case studies and exploring what they can tell 
us about the dynamics of power in media policymaking across its formal mechanisms, political 
interactions, discursive formations and intersections with media institutions. These discussions 
form the groundwork for my own prospective ‘media policy power cascade’ model, which 
hypothesises a feedback loop of routinised media power which constricts the opportunities for 
countervailing political action both within and between successive media policymaking 
processes. Lastly this chapter looks at future concerns of media policy raised by these two case 
studies, and reviews the opportunities and challenges facing both media policy researchers and 
media reform movements. 
THE MECHANISMS OF MEDIA POLICYMAKING 
Research Question (1) – How did the organisation of the post-Leveson and BBC Charter 
policy processes affect the ability of interest groups to influence decision-making? 
At its most basic level policymaking is the exercise of the power to decide, the relatively 
concrete power invested in governments and legislators to act on behalf of the public. Looking 
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at the media policymaking process it may be tempting to take a pessimistic attitude which, like 
the elitist and Marxist critiques (Miliband, 1969; C.W. Mills, 1970), sees policymaking 
institutions as wholly captured elements within much broader systems of elite corporate or 
class domination. However, this research shows that media policymaking involves a diverse 
array of official decision-making methods and mechanisms that each have unique effects on 
who is involved in making decisions and what kinds of decisions are actually made. The 
structure and organisation of media policymaking, and the specific modes and patterns of 
deliberation that policymakers employed, had a definitive effect on the arrangements of power 
between competing interests and the influence these groups had on media policy. 
The post-Leveson and Charter renewal policy processes featured lengthy public 
consultations, forensic official inquiries, and extensive negotiations between political leaders, 
policy institutions and interest groups across the media industries and civil society. To some 
extent these processes reflect the normative Westminster model of cabinet government and 
parliamentary accountability (Beer, 1965; Hay and Richards, 2000; Rhodes, 2003; Russell & 
Gover, 2017), which emphasises multi-stakeholderism, evidence gathering and competitive 
bargaining as the most effective means for governing increasingly fragmented realms of public 
life. This is apparent not just in the regimented sequence of Committee inquiries and 
government Papers on BBC Charter renewal, but even in the press regulation debates which 
(despite their hectic, disorganised format) still reverted to formal modes of policy formulation: 
the Leveson Inquiry itself, the CMS Committee’s scrutiny of cross-party negotiations, and the 
later Section 40 consultation. 
Policymakers lauded these official processes as the embodiment of responsive, 
transparent and pluralist executive decision-making. Yet the post-Leveson and BBC Charter 
processes both show how arranging various formats of deliberation between multiple 
competing groups  is by no means a guarantee that these groups enjoy equal say in decision-
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making, or that the these practices result in decisions that meaningfully balance their interests 
and demands. Most policy actors, particularly those representing smaller or less well-resourced 
groups, are rarely able to engage in all the different procedures of official deliberation. The 
formal methods most open to the majority of public and private participants were substantially 
less influential on post-Leveson and BBC policy decisions than the non-formalised decision-
making functions, such as industry stakeholder bargaining and policy text drafting with 
regulators and civil servants, which involved far fewer and typically highly specialised elite 
policy actors. It is difficult to find in these two processes much evidence of the pluralists’ 
idealised notion of ‘dispersed inequalities’, in which resources and influence may be distributed 
unequally, but decisions still reflect the cumulative balance of all interests (Blokland, 
2011:169-71; Dahl, 2005:85). On the contrary, the structure of media policymaking processes 
resulted in most mechanisms of public deliberation having little to no impact on policymakers’ 
choices. 
Much of the official organisation of media policymaking is deeply contingent on 
political context. Earlier chapters explored the unique histories and events that defined the press 
regulation debates and BBC Charter renewal, but the format and structuring of specific 
policymaking practices also has a significant effect on how subsequent decisions and conflicts 
play out. For example, the monarchical peculiarities of Royal Charters meant that the most 
substantive decisions in both case studies were deliberated exclusively in terms of private 
negotiation and ministerial fiat, with the public and even parliament totally excluded. Similarly 
the purposes and aims of the more established or official media policymaking practices were 
predetermined by formative choices made by Conservative ministers in the insipient phases of 
both debates, particularly the decisions to seek a non-statutory means of implementing 
Leveson’s recommendations and to renegotiate the BBC’s funding settlement ahead of Charter 
renewal. The point here is that the balance of power within formally organised media 
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policymaking is not simply a function of how many groups or interests are engaged in the 
process or how policymakers evaluate their competing demands. Rather, the choice by 
policymakers and political institutions of which methods and practices to use—what Hogwood 
and Gunn (1984) have called ‘deciding how to decide’—determines which groups are even 
able to engage in the process, the contributions expected of them and the future actions 
policymakers are likely to take. 
This poses a number of challenges to the democratic credentials of media policy. 
Policymaking in the two case studies was characterised by routinised processes and 
institutional practices of decision-making that privileged corporate media interests and elite 
political deliberation, at the expense of open and pluralistic bargaining between all other media 
policy interests. Media policymaking is increasingly organised around private negotiations 
with industry stakeholders and other forms of unaccountable statecraft. That these practices are 
common to both press and broadcasting policy debates speaks to the normative relationship 
between media and the public, the proper objectives of media policy, and the policy tools 
regarded as best suited to fulfilling those objectives. Deregulation of existing controls and their 
replacement with systems of governance or arms-length regulation typify the thinning (or in 
the case of the press, virtually non-existent) role of state or legislative institutions in 
contemporary British media policy. 
These implementation tools are justified as the most appropriate means of organising 
media systems that support market competition, enjoy autonomy from cumbersome political 
constraints and can adapt to changing technological contexts. But these frameworks also 
normalise and entrench the role of established (and typically commercial) industry producer 
groups at the heart of decision-making. The elite technocratic methods of deliberation that 
dominated the post-Leveson and BBC Charter policymaking processes were unlikely to 
produce decisions that didn’t reinforce the current elite technocratic paradigm of media policy. 
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Not only do these institutionalised models diminish the influence of public or non-elite groups 
over policy decisions, but such embedded cultures even marginalise or capture other ostensibly 
elite and authoritative institutions. This is evident in the limited role of parliament during the 
post-Leveson negotiations and especially in the subordination of the BBC, wherein its 
traditional, almost corporatist, role as a primary stakeholder in Charter renewal has been 
increasingly usurped by its commercial rivals and the market regulator Ofcom. From these case 
studies we can see how the ‘power to decide’, in its representative-democratic ideal, is highly 
differentiated by the specific methods and practices of decision-making that make up the 
policymaking process. In both press and broadcasting policy, the common mechanisms of 
official deliberations overwhelmingly privileged elite policy interests while pushing the 
majority of other groups (not to mention the public at large) out of meaningful decisions on 
media policy change. 
MEDIA POLICY ACTORS AND INEQUALITIES OF INFLUENCE 
Research Question (2) – Which people, interests and political tactics had the greatest 
impact on press and broadcasting policy decisions? 
This is not to say that all non-elite or non-insider actors are merely passive players, or 
that their interactions with media policy processes are futile. Rather the two case studies 
demonstrate the different ways that policy actors, bound to varying interests and resources, can 
successfully (though not always reliably) influence media policymaking. Furthermore these 
activities were not confined to just the formal processes of government and parliamentary 
deliberation. Some of the most significant interventions by pressure groups, public campaigns 
or industry stakeholders in post-Leveson and BBC policy were achieved in the insipient stages 
of debate, before the substantive policy ‘issue’ had been officially established or defined. 
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From mass petitions to back-room deals and from noisy protests to discrete revisions in 
official documents, the core decisions on press regulation and BBC Charter renewal were the 
products of two intensely public policy debates that mobilised numerous people and 
organisations to pressure for policy change. Yet the types of actors and interactions that had 
the greatest influence on decisions were by no means a full, balanced reflection of either the 
plurality of interests engaged in media policymaking or the myriad tactics and strategies they 
used. Through their persistent lobbying of and meetings with Conservative ministers, the 
newspaper industry’s top executives changed key details of the emerging Royal Charter and 
stymied any efforts by pro-Leveson groups to introduce statutory reform. Against this, Hacked 
Off campaigners and phone hacking victims used their close contacts with political leaders to 
pressure for full implementation of Leveson’s recommendations and force dramatic moments 
of political challenge in the Commons and Lords. During Charter renewal, the BBC and the 
UK’s largest commercial broadcasting companies similarly shaped the structures and 
regulations of the Corporation’s future policy framework through intense negotiations and 
private correspondence with government officials. 
The prominence of these private interactions as sites of pivotal decision is partly an 
effect of the official structures and mechanisms discussed above: policymakers organise their 
deliberations around private consultations with established stakeholders and other notionally 
useful actors, and these groups correspondingly enjoy far greater involvement in core decision-
making. Yet this utilitarian ideal of lobbying as a routine form of political mediation glosses 
over the vast inequalities in resources, access and status afforded to different types of policy 
actors. Preparing policy proposals and compiling authoritative evidence requires a developed 
expertise in the intricacies of media policy, as well as a nous for presenting these appeals in the 
language and style of elite Westminster institutions. Gaining access to executive policymakers 
like ministers, their advisors and civil servants depends on demonstrating certain 
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characteristics, but is also contingent on building personal, professional, political or cultural 
relationships within elite policy networks. The power of media policy actors to directly 
influence policymakers’ decisions, whatever interests they represent, is founded on the tactics 
available to them within the precise political contexts of debate. Perhaps most importantly, this 
influence is constituted by actors’ normative status within the entrenched political, economic 
and ideological power dynamics that define the press and broadcasting as subjects of public 
policy. 
The two case studies thus expose the normative modes of political behaviour that 
empower certain types of actors over others and afford greater influence to specific forms of 
political engagement in policymaking. Corporate media executives, professional lobbyists and 
other political insiders have developed close relationships with and extensive access to core 
policymaking institutions. Whereas even meeting with a government minister or civil servant 
is a rarity for the vast majority of people involved in media industries, these embedded policy 
actors enjoy regular conversations, frequents exchanges of information, and ultimately a shared 
culture of mutually beneficial collaboration. Within these increasingly hermetic and exclusive 
elite media policy networks, lobbying of government officials and private negotiations 
(conducted in some of the most publicly inaccessible sites of state and political power) have 
been rationalised as the standard means for mediating between competing interests and 
producing ‘consensual’ policy outcomes. Any sense of genuine public influence over how these 
discrete policy decisions are made—whether through organised public campaigning, 
consultations or even open parliamentary processes—is factored as at best a supplement to the 
decisions and debates already taking place between a select body of insiders, or at worst as 
misguided politicised disruption to the real business of ‘evidence-based’ expert deliberation. 
Attempts to influence or challenge these embedded elite patterns of power are by no 
means totally ineffectual, as was clearly the case with the enormous backlash to the phone 
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hacking scandal and the mass expressions of public support for the BBC following the 
government’s foreboding Green Paper agenda. It is not the case that specific methods of policy 
engagement are innately more influential than others, as public pressure and outsider 
interventions can create substantial shifts in the direction or results of insider deliberation. The 
problem is in the greater collection of political and institutional obstacles that non-elite actors 
and public methods of policy campaigning have to surpass in order to influence policy 
decisions to the same degrees exercised by inter-elite private policy practices. Take for example 
these comments from pro- and anti-Leveson campaigners about the success of their respective 
political tactics, and how the prospects for genuinely reforming press regulation were always 
constrained by the entrenched power of national publishing groups within the post-Leveson 
policy network: 
We thought we could make change, system change, by going through Westminster. 
Actually, we took our eyes off the fact that you need to bring a whole heap of other 
people along with you. There’s a whole culture shift that needs to happen. (Interview 
3) 
We won hands down. There was never going to be a consensus, so for those leading the 
campaign the strategy was to go along with things until we demonstrated it could never 
work. As long as this government is in power, there is no threat of statutory regulation 
of the press. No newspaper will ever sign up to any state-recognised regulator, and the 
question won’t be asked again. (Interview 1) 
These remarks expose the drastic inequalities of influence between the various groups engaged 
in media policymaking. Despite the appearance of the two case study debates as open and 
fiercely contested arenas of numerous public and private media interests, many actors from 
outside the largest press and broadcasting media organisations had effectively no influence on 
how these pivotal policy decisions were made. Amidst the swirl of lively campaigns, nuanced 
political manoeuvres and behind-the-scenes bartering, the deeply undemocratic conditions that 
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mar media policy activism and advocacy in the UK mean that basic access to the most 
important executive decision-making processes is concentrated in the same few elite groups. 
THE POWER OF MEDIA POLICY DISCOURSES 
Research Question (3) – What impact did competing values, language and narrative 
accounts of press and broadcasting policy have on the content and shape of media policy 
debate? 
It would, however, be misleading to attribute this imbalance to a co-ordinated effort by 
cynical elites to diminish public and democratic modes of media policymaking. The more 
complicated reality is that private deliberations and elite forms of influence dominated the two 
debates precisely because the underlying discourses of press and broadcasting policy construed 
these patterns and interactions as ordinary and rational. These dominant narrative accounts and 
value frames were in part expressions of the pervasive free market discourse of media 
policymaking, in which media are commercial products and the primary goal of policy is to 
promote unrestrained competition between profit-making media businesses. Yet the post-
Leveson and BBC Charter debates also show that such discourses are not hegemonic or 
unshakeable, but are modified and recirculated over the course of the policymaking process 
through competing actors’ attempts to define the principles and meanings that guide policy 
decisions. Fischer writes that the struggle for power is “played out over time through arguments 
about the ‘best story’” (2003:167). Examining the distinct stories of press regulation and public 
service broadcasting that were articulated and contested in the two case studies has revealed a 
number of important dynamics about the function and distribution of discursive power in media 
policymaking, and the fundamental role of language and narratives in shaping what kinds of 




In the earliest stages of both debates, the competing interpretations of press regulation 
and BBC Charter review as ‘issues’ to be resolved through political action had a formative 
effect on the official mechanisms and political vernacular used to formulate policy change. The 
wave of public outrage following the phone hacking scandal cemented widespread unethical 
practices in the national newspaper industry as a pressing matter of regulatory and institutional 
failure. Yet over the course of the Leveson Inquiry, the prevailing account presented in national 
press coverage and political commentary curtailed any arguments for reform in an 
unambiguous struggle between press freedom and authoritarian state control. In the years 
leading up to the official Charter renewal process, the agenda on the BBC’s future was firmly 
fixed in a narrative that asserted the commercial and political complaints of the Corporation’s 
fiercest rivals as innate anti-market faults of publicly funded universal broadcasting. 
In both cases these narrative mobilisations established the central problems of press and 
broadcasting policy in decidedly narrow, ideologically-charged discourses that not only 
normalised the policy interests of commercial media groups, but also moulded the ideal values 
and language in which these problems and their potential solutions could even be debated. 
Although the most significant contests between competing interest groups revolved around 
articulating the practical meaning of ‘distinctiveness’ and formalising the subtle technicalities 
of Leveson’s ‘criteria’ or ‘principles’, these precise policy definitions were nonetheless 
constructed under the terms of the over-arching market-liberal, empiricist discourse that 
pervades contemporary media policymaking. This discourse confers established media elites 
and other insider actors with normative status as experts and legitimate stakeholders, and 
idealises quantitative measurement of media markets, audience metrics and public opinion as 
an objective means of informing policy decisions with ‘hard’ evidence. This discourse also 
redefines core notions of public interest and balance in policymaking as characteristics of any 
process that involves a wide range of different policy groups, rather than as democratic 
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requirements that all groups (including the public at large) have the means to equally participate 
in and influence actual decision-making. 
We have also seen rich examples of the function and circulation of discourses as a 
distinct form of power that operates independently of actors and orders their own social and 
political power in relation to other actors and institutions (Fischer, 2003; Foucault, 1980). The 
core subject-positions and cognitive schemes that discourses create are in this sense productive 
of social action, yet how such formations take effect in practice depends the expressions and 
meanings that competing actors mobilise in different contexts. This creates space for 
contradictions in and challenges to the core ideals and vernacular that policy discourses entail. 
The phone hacking scandal provoked a drastic (if only temporary) redefinition of the normative 
‘non-policy’ of press regulation, empowering new policy interests in public debate and forcing 
a public reappraisal of the underlying philosophies of press freedom. The widespread esteem 
and global renown of the BBC similarly introduced a strong contrasting narrative account 
which refuted neo-liberal arguments currently dominating broadcast policy discourses, and 
even provided for a sub-genre of BBC rhetoric focussing on different appeals to the 
Corporation’s uniquely British cultural and political impact. 
But the real power of policy discourses to affect policy decisions is ultimately tied to 
how these arguments, principles and stories are mediated, adopted and articulated by governing 
institutions and processes of media policymaking. These elements are, as the case studies make 
abundantly clear, controlled or captured by many of the same interests and groups that are 
actively seeking to influence policy in their favour. Although discursive power may be 
understood generally as the collective property of all people engaged in shared social 
experiences, the power to shape what kinds of policy issues enter the public agenda, the goals 
and principles of political action and how these conflicts are literally narrated to policy actors 
is overwhelmingly concentrated in the meta-capital of elite media organisations (Couldry, 
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2003). This intense imbalance in the ability to influence discursive contests contradicts the 
common argument (itself a feature of contemporary media policy discourses) that a multiplicity 
of diverse voices and media outlets naturally results in all ideas and values receiving their 
proper representation in public debate. Given that media policy intrinsically concerns the 
distribution of symbolic power amongst social and cultural institutions, it is deeply troubling 
for ideals democratic participation that most policy groups and the public at large are 
predominantly marginalised from these essential discursive processes. 
THE COMPLEMENTARY FACES OF MEDIA POWER 
Research Question (4) – What is the specific influence of media organisations on media 
policy decision-making? 
The previous sections summarise three distinct and mutually reinforcing patterns in the 
structures, tactics and discourses of media policymaking. On their own, any of these patterns 
is indicative of a severe imbalance of power and a democratic deficit in how media policy is 
made, the interests involved in making it, and the resulting legal or regulatory implementation 
of press and broadcast media systems. 
Taken together, however, the two case study debates demonstrate how these 
intertwining power dynamics contribute to and are exacerbated by the unique and uniquely 
multifaceted power of media organisations in the media policymaking process. These ‘faces’ 
of media power, to borrow Lukes’ (2005) term, can be categorised in the following forms: the 
communicative power of media as producers of information, knowledge and texts; the policy 
power of media organisations as industry stakeholders and professional interest groups 
involved in official policy decisions; the elite power of media actors as individuals with 
extensive cultural, social and political ties with other elite figures across government, state and 
public life; and the institutional power of particular media entities and formats as significant 
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cultural and political institutions with embedded traditions, histories and normative functions. 
Both the post-Leveson and BBC Charter case studies show the extent to which these variously 
behavioural and structural forms of media power interact with and complement one another 
within the media policy process, and the compounding effects that media power has on how 
media policy issues are debated, decided and implemented. 
Communicative power is the most obvious type of influence exercised by media 
organisations, not least because media policy debates are typically focussed on how this power 
is organised, distributed and governed. Yet the communicative power concentrated in news 
media and national newspapers especially, to report, publicise and comment on media policy 
issues, drastically shifts the scope and substance of media policy debate to encompass only 
those topics that support (or at least do not challenge) the subjective political and policy 
interests of these same media organisations. Newspaper coverage of both press regulation and 
BBC Charter renewal comprised frequent stories repeating the claims of commercial media or 
groups with similar interests, representing policy issues and political processes in terms 
favourable to their efforts and goals, and attacking (or simply not even acknowledging) the 
actions and demands of rival groups. 
One argument holds that such avowedly partisan reporting is a necessary feature of a 
politically independent press industry, which has every reason for promoting its own interests 
in order to preserve the essential democratic function and freedom of expression of print 
journalism. What is missing from this view, however, is an account for why the central 
questions, objectives and justifications that defined official deliberations in the two debates 
were so closely aligned with (and in some cases repeated verbatim) news coverage and editorial 
commentary published by the UK’s major newspaper titles. Whereas a ‘consensus’ notion of 
media power maintains that competition between media sources fosters a naturally balanced 
and pluralist representation of public opinion (Freedman, 2014), in reality media policy issues 
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are frequently presented to the public—and, by extension, to policymakers and political 
leaders—in terms of the private interests of commercial media organisations. Even for 
broadcast news platforms, which are bound by legal requirements for impartiality and balance, 
policy reporting reflects much of the same political focus originally established by print 
newspapers. Although a forensic study of how broadcast news organisations reported the post-
Leveson and BBC debates is at least one alluring avenue of future study, research by Cushion 
et al. (2018) highlights an extensive ‘inter-media’ agenda setting effect whereby the news 
values and production processes of broadcast news correlate with reportage by right-leaning 
newspapers. 
Communicative power is not a ‘one-dimensional’ interaction in which media 
organisations use their control over media texts to coerce policymakers. Editors and journalists 
do of course use their publications to tell politicians what they believe should be done, and 
some politicians may change their decisions because of how they value these journalistic 
appeals within their own work. The far more pervasive and noteworthy aspect of media’s 
communicative power is in creating the overall agenda for identifying, understanding and 
giving meaning to policy issues as substantive matters of official political decision. News 
media organisations play a formative role in deciding what policy issues receive public 
attention and political prominence and establishing the basic narrative terms in which these 
issues are expressed. As the years preceding the exposure of the phone hacking scandal make 
all too clear, this near-monopoly over agenda-setting affords news media a significant 
nondecision-making influence in imposing policy ‘silences’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 
Freedman, 2014:70). Although other actors can in the right circumstances have their interests 
fairly represented by news media outlets, or even bypass this gatekeeping through established 
and alternative news production processes, questions of media policy and reporting of the 
policymaking process are predominantly shaped by the interests of private media organisations. 
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Furthermore, the discursive trends and reporting cultures that typify the UK’s national 
newspaper industry mean that these crucial debates are framed tonally in terms of horse race 
politics, personal drama, conflict and binary moral dilemmas that preclude sincere public 
interrogation of the media policy issues at stake, while also masking the profoundly ideological 
interpretations and values of media policy such discourses entail. Media’s communicative 
power over media policymaking is emblematic not only of concentrated corporate media 
ownership and pallid media diversity in the UK, but also of its political processes that are led 
more by the imperatives and logic of news media than by efforts at genuine public participation 
in media policy debate (Garland et al., 2018). 
The policy power of media may seem an obvious feature of media organisations’ direct 
involvement in media policymaking processes, but the acquisition and effects of this power are 
often far more subtle. Pluralist principles hold that because many media interest groups—
companies, trade associations, unions, etc.—have some direct material stake in the laws and 
regulations implemented by policy, they develop an innate access to decision-makers and a 
collective, dispersed power to barter, challenge, propose and consent to policy change. The 
reality, as the two case studies suggest, is that this stakeholder legitimacy does not derive from 
any natural balance of all concerned groups, but stems from two inter-related structural 
dynamics: the normative objectives and values that guide how the media policymaking process 
is organised; and how the control and management of these ‘innate’ stakeholder interests is 
actually distributed amongst media organisations. In the first case policy power is a product of 
certain media organisations’ innate communicative power, as news media can create and 
promulgate the policy discourses that establish their own interests and contributions as 
necessary to official deliberation. Yet the broader effect of policy power arises from the 
technocratic and economic emphases of contemporary media policymaking, which afford the 
largest media organisations—national newspaper publishers, major commercial television and 
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radio companies, and the BBC—with a privileged role in and influence over official decision-
making. 
These organisations are by no means representative of the full range of diverse public 
and private interests that are impacted by policy decisions. However these few organisations, 
which already account for huge concentrations of corporate, economic and cultural power, are 
embedded within the official processes and organised practices of press and broadcast 
policymaking. Along with their extensive resources for engaging in professional lobbying, 
public affairs and campaigning activities, these groups sit at the centre of the principal policy 
networks that connect interest groups with political and government authority. Their status as 
major media organisations allots them intimate access to policymakers and regular cemented 
involvement in elite decision-making, such that the fundamental structures and procedures of 
press and broadcast policymaking are built around their economic and institutional interests 
rather than the deeper social, political and cultural potentials of mass media. 
The post-Leveson and BBC Charter review debates demonstrate how this intrinsic 
policy power of select media organisations produces both a behavioural influence (leveraging 
the normative significance of these organisations for the success of media industries and their 
policy frameworks), and a structural effect (moulding the foundations of media policymaking 
processes to ensconce powerful media interests at the heart of decision-making). From this we 
can advance an understanding of policy or regulatory ‘capture’ as the result of an imbalance of 
policy power, wherein policy processes and regulatory frameworks are unduly geared towards 
promoting and protecting the interests of established media policy groups at the expense of 
almost all others, particularly the public (Picard, 2020:40). As the following interview quotes 
suggest, this capture is not only evident in the total saturation of press regulation by the 
commercial and political interests of the newspaper industry, but even across the broader 
debates and political conflicts that surround BBC policy. 
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It was a press conviction that appointing the Chair of the regulator was part of their 
patronage, part of their thing was that they were able to reward friends and seal 
connections with the Conservative Party through these posts. They remain to this day 
wedded to the idea that the industry should appoint these positions. Alan Moses’s seat 
is being kept warm for a Tory peer, it’s as simple as that.172 (Interview 4) 
I think the problem comes when you have self-interested commercially driven groups 
who can outspend, out-lobby, outmanoeuvre and out-muscle the civil society sector. 
The weakness of civil society in pushing a non-commercial case for the BBC and public 
service broadcasting is the problem, and I’m not quite sure how you get around that. 
(Interview 9) 
These quotes also relate to the third face of media power; the elite power of media 
actors. Many of the key media players at the heart of the two case study debates epitomised 
elite authority and status, not just because of their respective institutional roles—as editors, 
executives and lobbyists at major media institutions—but more importantly due to their 
extensive personal connections and professional experiences across the power elite of British 
society. The leading policy actors from the national newspaper industry, the BBC, commercial 
broadcasters and media industry lobby groups enjoyed close ties to senior politicians, civil 
servants, party aides and other core policy figures, developed through shared social and cultural 
backgrounds. In several notable cases, media elites at these organisations have moved 
seamlessly between roles in policymaking, political parties, journalism and public affairs. The 
same is of course true for many politicians: former ministers and party grandees take up 
directorate roles at the BBC in much the same way as former newspaper editors and 
broadcasting executives gain appointment as special advisors and heads of ‘independent’ 
government bodies. This revolving door phenomenon has created a self-sustaining network of 
elite policy figures who are intimately familiar and comfortable with the unspoken rules of the 
 
172 Alan Moses QC resigned from his post as the first appointed Chair of IPSO in December 2018, and was 
replaced by the former Conservative minister Lord Faulkes QC. 
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game that govern access to one another’s worlds. As Wedel has written on elite ‘flex nets’, 
these figures form “dense, self-propelling, informal (and, often, longtime) trust networks that 
pursue common goals, coordinating their efforts inside and outside official structures” 
(2017:164). 
The elite insularity of media policymaking is already a recognised and well-
documented feature of British politics (see, inter alia, Curran and Seaton, 2018; Davies, 2014; 
Mills, 2016; Watson and Hickman, 2012), and echoes C.W. Mills’ (1970) description central 
institutions of public life becoming overtaken by a corporate power elite. But the actual effects 
of media actors’ elite power in media policymaking are diffuse and localised, rather than 
totalising and top-down. Actors from the principal press and broadcasting media organisations 
do not hold a single uniform set of interests, needs or political objectives, and are indeed 
regularly in disagreement as part of the deliberations and conflicts of decision-making. This, 
as we have seen, can lead to the opening of new avenues and unlikely connections between 
policymakers, media elites and other non-elite groups, as insider actors seek new coalitions or 
pressure points to bolster their influence across the different branches of a policy network. 
But such conflicts, rather than producing new dynamics of truly pluralist and 
competitive bargaining between myriad forces, are typically inter-elite skirmishes that recreate 
and operate by elite terms (Davis, 2007:55). A handful of individual media elites—the names 
Murdoch, Dacre, Desmond, Rothermere and Barclay persist throughout the recent history of 
British media politics—have routine unfettered access to the highest echelons of state and 
political power, see their opinions and demands heeded by the leaderships of almost every 
major political party, and exercise direct command over some of the largest and most influential 
media institutions in the country. Their status as media elites grants them immense personal 
power within media policymaking, not least because the routine unminuted meetings, private 
phone calls and late night negotiations are founded on an institutionalised culture elevating 
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these figures as essential players in official media policy decisions. The pressure they exert, 
whether explicitly or implicitly, pervades the basic social and political structures that define 
how all policy actors conceive of their place and power within media policymaking: 
I’m not sure that if certain personalities were removed, whether it would have played 
out the same. If it wasn’t Murdoch-owned newspapers, if it wasn’t Paul Dacre… there 
were certain key personalities in the press regulation story that were hell-bent on power, 
and made it very, very difficult to do certain things and really reach the people in charge. 
(Interview 3) 
These media elites may differ on issues of policy and are by nature of their respective 
organisations in direct competition with one another. However, their intimate relationships 
with political elites and elite policy institutions (combined with the corresponding 
communicative and policy faces of media power invested in media organisations) coalesce into 
a model of policymaking organised around elite media power, built on shared cultural 
perspectives and political loyalties, conducted through exclusive personal interactions, and 
ultimately separated from any form of public or democratic accountability. 
The fourth face of media power is less palpable than the preceding three, yet is integral 
to unpicking how the dynamics of power in media policymaking change according to the actual 
media formats and industries under debate. Throughout their historical development, the 
British press and the BBC have each adopted corresponding systems of taken-for-granted rules, 
essential principles and naturalized myths that engender recurring cultures of policymaking. 
And although the post-Leveson and Charter renewal debates shared significant core features of 
policymaking and power, the contrasting political traditions and policy rituals surrounding 
them have created recurring patterns of institutional power that shape how these major media 
institutions manifest as specific categories of media policymaking. This power does not 
necessarily belong to nor is exercised by specific media actors, organisations or formats, but 
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instead circulates as rationalised modes of thought and action that underpin the behavioural 
and structural roles of media in policymaking. 
The press and the BBC are founded on principles that idealise independence from 
government and political interference, yet both are bound up in complex relationships with the 
state, party politics and policy processes that contradict or jeopardise these ideals. As was 
evident throughout the post-Leveson negotiations, the penetration of government decision-
making by editors, executives and select journalists blurs the notional separation between the 
people who wield public power and those who hold them to account. With policymakers 
attentive to how just a few national newspapers represent their actions to the public, the politics 
of press regulation are fundamentally skewed such that self-regulation (controlled exclusively 
by the industry itself) is an inseparable condition of keeping favour with these publishing 
groups. 
Whereas institutionalised values of press freedom obscure and normalise a distorted 
compact between elected representatives and corporate newspaper interests, the BBC’s policy 
autonomy is regularly damaged due to its intimate intertwining with statecraft and high politics. 
BBC negotiators traded away core aspects of the Corporation’s financial and regulatory 
independence on the basis that the government’s imposed alternative would be far worse. The 
BBC’s quasi-statutory status as a public body governed by Royal Charter creates another aspect 
of its institutional politics, in which governments can use the unique opportunity of Charter 
renewal to mould the BBC’s structure, funding and purposes to suit their own political goals: 
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Governments quite like doing it. It gives them power and the ability to influence 
something which is relatively straight-forward. Parliament doesn't really have a 
massive role, so it's real executive power about who gets what, particularly the licence 
fee, and who runs things. That's quite unusual in contemporary politics. More and more 
of media policy is negotiated, there are lots of interest groups, certain decisions are 
made through secondary powers or legislation. But Charter review is different. 
(Interview 13) 
Although these institutionalised political cultures embedded elite interests and private 
interactions in policymaking, policymaking tensions also emerged through certain enduring 
ideals about the fundamental social and cultural roles of the press and the BBC. The phone 
hacking scandal is the definitive example of this, as the traditional conceptualisation of the 
press as an engine of adversarial popular journalism—buttressed by commercial funding and 
market ideals of the sovereign consumer—was brought into stark contrast with the actual 
reporting malpractices and corporate corruption enabled by the failures of self-regulation. The 
post-Leveson debates were in many ways a textbook case of Baumgartner et al.’s ‘punctuated-
equilibrium theory’ (2007), in which the internalised stability and political monopolies 
established by particular policy frameworks eventually culminate in collapse and expose these 
institutionalised systems to challenge from new groups. Although public service broadcasting 
is increasingly subordinated to the needs of market competition—and thus involves many of 
the same deregulatory practices and commercial values that characterise the wider broadcasting 
sector—the BBC’s symbolic capital as a cherished national institution made the views of the 
public a far greater part of Charter renewal than the on-going technocratic paradigm of media 
policymaking typically allows. 
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We were scared it was going to be a revolution, and that the BBC would be decimated, 
but it wasn’t. I think that was partly because of the 182,000 responses to the Green 
Paper. People came out in support of the BBC far more strongly than anyone would’ve 
anticipated. There was a big public response saying “we love the BBC, don’t mess it 
up”. I think that made the government think twice about some of their more radical 
proposals. (Interview 11) 
These moments of resistance and contradiction in the settled institutions of media 
policymaking were, however, the exception rather than the rule. In seeking to understand the 
role of media institutions in policymaking, and particularly the dynamics of power that enable 
and structure this role, it is impossible to ignore that these particular formations and routines 
are in part created by the laws, regulations and political procedures of media policy itself. As 
policy decisions lead to direct changes in how media institutions are organised, imagined and 
controlled, these institutions correspondingly gain or lose power in different forms, and thus 
see their role and influence in the policymaking process changed too. What is needed is a model 
to explain this iterative relationship in a way that recognises the complementary faces of media 
power, and situates these dynamics as the essential objective of studying media policymaking 
as a crucial site of democratic politics. 
THE MEDIA POLICY POWER CASCADE 
My central interest throughout this research has been unravelling and denaturalising the 
media policymaking process, and exposing the dynamics of power behind two seminal 
moments of media policy change in the UK. Clearly the two case study debates were 
fundamentally shaped by diverse collections of people, interests and institutions which, 
through their various activities and arguments, produced media policy change. But rather than 
treating the post-Leveson and BBC Charter case studies as proof of pluralist, competitive 
bartering and depoliticised decision-making, we need to understand the essential dynamics of 
these debates in relation to a much broader system of power. Furthermore we need to unpick 
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how this system is not limited just to individual moments of decision, but expands and evolves 
as the policy process progresses, and even threads into the organisation of future policy issues. 
The principal effect of this phenomenon, which I term the ‘media policy power 
cascade’, is to progressively restrict the scope of policy debate and diminish the available 
courses of action with each successive decision, political realignment or discursive redefinition 
within a policy process. Any new or emerging policy conflict is first conceived within the 
political structures and ideological assumptions inherited from previous policy decisions. Even 
after the dramatic revelations of the phone hacking scandal, any sense that widespread 
journalistic malpractices or the corruption of the PCC warranted a new mode of press policy—
founded in participatory decision-making and public accountability—was precluded from the 
start by the same naturalised ‘do nothing’ approach that had fostered these institutional failures. 
Though Charter review has never been a shining example of public participation, the residual 
choices and arguments of the 2006 Charter review and the creation of Ofcom in 2003 had 
normalised and accelerated the insulation of BBC policy as an exclusive domain of state actors, 
BBC executives and commercial stakeholders, working towards normative goals of ‘public 
value’ and deregulated market competition. 
In both instances, the range of methods and policy topics that formed the official 
decision-making process was preconfigured by the rules and values of the existing policy 
settlement, which embodied the dominant forms of power that created and benefited from these 
previous decisions. From this preset state of affairs, the cascade effect continued throughout 
the critical moments of political conflict, discursive formation and official decision that made 
up the substantive policymaking process. Each time an actor or interest group successfully 
swayed the course of decision-making in their favour, subsequent stages of debate adopted the 
organisation and purpose of the actions and paths that came before. 
 
313 
The Prime Minister’s decision to reject a statutory solution—itself a definitive principle 
of the ‘freedom’ narrative expressed persistently in press coverage of the post-Leveson 
process—provided the political basis for private negotiations in which the extensive insider 
influence of elite press industry actors prospered. With each new draft Royal Charter proposal, 
the actual provisions of press regulation drifted closer and closer to publishers’ objectives (and 
away from the Leveson recommendations) while further naturalising the role of these figures 
in core decision-making. The government’s concerns about the BBC ‘crowding out’ 
competition—fomented by the commercial and deregulatory preferences of the Corporation’s 
political and industry rivals—similarly resulted in the focal mechanisms of Charter review 
being built around quantitative assessments of market impact and technical discussions of 
necessary governance reform. The consultations, reviews and inquiries through which the 
government formed its distinctiveness agenda were naturally partial to the expertise and 
professional evidence of commercial lobbyists, who subsequently acquired a deeper role in the 
government’s Charter negotiations with the BBC. Over the course of both debates, the choices 
available to policymakers and other actors seeking to influence policy were increasingly 
funnelled towards a narrower and narrower set of potential outcomes, while the particular 
forms or mobilisations of power that created these conditions grew increasingly influential.  
Arguably the cascade phenomenon set out here is no different from path dependency, 
or simply offers a policy-oriented retelling of ‘new institutionalism’ which describes the 
“historically specific and changing relationship between institutions, ideas and interests over 
time” (Bannerman and Haggart, 2015:2). The main contention of the media policy power 
cascade model, however, is not only that the contemporary dynamics of media policymaking 
are perilously captured by the pervasive and multi-faceted power of media in the decision-
making process. These same dynamics are increasingly geared to producing policy decisions 
that concentrate even more power in dominant corporate media institutions. Crucially, this 
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cascading process is both incremental and cyclical. Media actors and organisations play a 
leading role in setting the agenda of policy debate, communicating the terms and meanings of 
an issue and articulating its core dilemmas in relation to their own interests. These same actors 
hold an innate role in formal and informal decision-making processes, enjoying privileged 
private access to policymakers and engaging in official deliberative exercises that naturalise 
elite lobbying techniques. These interactions contribute to media policy decisions that 
implement new legal powers, regulatory frameworks and political precedents, which all afford 
certain influential media organisations with expanding commercial opportunities, relaxed 
economic restrictions and greater consolidations of political, cultural and economic power. 
Finally these dynamics create a feedback loop: influential media groups evolve into even more 
powerful institutions for defining, advocating and benefitting from future media policy 
changes, or preventing any issues or policy failures that may challenge this entrenched system 
of media power from gaining political and public attention. 
It is important to stress that this power cascade effect does not mean that all non-media 
actors or non-elite forms of policy advocacy are in any sense ineffectual or meaningless to how 
media policy decisions are made. Media policy is still a lively arena of significant concern to 
numerous collections of public and private interests. Their various contributions to and 
engagements in policymaking can still sway the political context of debate and the formal 
arrangements of decision-making in sometimes unpredictable and even radical ways, as the 
Hacked Off campaign and the loose coalition of pro-BBC ‘universalist’ groups made 
abundantly clear. The more troubling implication of the media policy power cascade is that the 
possibilities for genuine public intervention or democratic participation in media policymaking 
are likely to become thinner and less frequent with each new media policy debate. As long as 
the normative goals of media policy continue to be defined in a narrow neo-liberal vernacular 
of market competition and deregulation (or even non-regulation in the case of the press), and 
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as long as the practices of media policymaking continue to embed these values in elite 
technocratic forms of private decision-making, the self-perpetuating crisis of media power 
seems set to only get worse. 
It is highly likely that this media policy power cascade is more useful as a critical 
historical account of the (re)distribution of power particular to policymaking on Britain’s two 
major media institutions, rather than as a conclusive theoretical argument about media power. 
Clearly, further forensic research would be needed to see whether the Irish or Danish Press 
Councils, the FCC or the German ARD (to take only a few parochially Western examples) 
have been subjected to similar patterns of increasingly normalised elite media lobbying and 
self-perpetuating practices of neo-liberal decision-making. Each of these systems is a product 
of its own historical precedents, distinct legal and constitutional systems, overlapping political 
and social contexts, and unique (national) institutional cultures of decision-making. It is also 
apparent that the pattern described by the ‘cascade’ effect could easily be applicable to realms 
of public life and policy beyond the media: elite organisations of financial, industrial, 
technological and military power embed themselves so deeply in the hierarchies of official 
decision-making such that ‘public’ policymaking in these areas may be redefined entirely in 
their interests. 
Yet as just a brief comment on the generalizability of the media policy power cascade 
model, it is important to restate the significance of media institutions as essential means of 
public communication and the significant meta-capital this confers on newspaper publishers, 
television networks and online media services to influence how debates across all realms of 
public life take shape. Some countries and some areas of policy have proved susceptible or 
resistant to the broader neo-liberal realignment of the past 40 years, but within the context of 
accelerating global media concentration and deepening socio-political inequality, elite media 
organisations have acquired a pervasive power over many aspects of public and political life. 
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As the four ‘faces’ of media power discussed above suggest, this influence is not confined to 
just ‘mediatisation’—realms of society, politics and culture becoming increasingly organised 
according to the logic and discourses of the media ‘frame’—but manifests as the real, 
practicable power of media elite actors, media organisations and commercial media discourses 
insinuated into the core of democratic, public and even private institutions. Whereas the media 
policy power cascade describes how these faces of power reproduce and idealise this influence 
within media policymaking, it is important to consider how the cascading, circuitous trend 
results in a spiralling concentration of media power in many other areas of public policy beyond 
the media domain. 
THE FUTURE(S) OF MEDIA POLICYMAKING 
If this power cascade phenomena accurately describes the historical trend in British 
media policymaking, what are the future prospects for media policy in the UK? 
In the time since the Royal Charter on press self-regulation and the BBC’s renewed 
Charter were formally adopted, the prevailing patterns of press and broadcast policy debate 
have exemplified the same distorted dynamics of power that forged these seminal decisions. 
National newspaper editors and publishing executives have reinforced their privileged and 
routine access to the heights of political power. It is often difficult to discern between the 
corporate interests of press lobbyists and the policies of the current Conservative government, 
as the 2019 Cairncross Review into ‘a sustainable future for journalism’ makes clear. Closely 
advised by a panel of top industry figures (including Associated Newspapers’ editor emeritus 
and IIG lead negotiator Peter Wright), the review recommended extending tax breaks for 
newspaper publishers and supporting local news with even more subsidies drawn from the 
BBC licence fee. The role publishers themselves have played in cutting local and regional 
journalism in favour of cheaper online formats has barely featured in these debates, and the 
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Johnson government has eagerly propped up the largest corporate newspaper groups (many of 
them slavishly supportive of his premiership) with no-strings-attached financial support. 
Editorials and ministerial statements instead target online media platforms like Facebook and 
Google as the sole source of plummeting revenues and circulation. Press policy debate is 
focussed on subjecting these global companies to some form of stringent regulatory regime the 
likes of which the press industry would never accept for itself and indeed actively spurns in its 
continued derision for the increasingly marginalised Press Recognition Panel. 
Debates about the future of the BBC have only grown more fractious and more deeply 
trapped within government politicking. In July 2020, the BBC announced the end of the free 
television licence scheme for most over-75s. A chorus of ministers, backbench Conservative 
MPs and anti-BBC newspapers condemned the Corporation’s heartless betrayal of pensioners, 
apparently unconcerned that the estimated £1bn cost of this welfare benefit had been imposed 
on the BBC in the government’s severe funding freeze five years earlier. The government’s 
review of licence fee decriminalisation (the second in five years) and the Commons Select 
Committee’s ‘future of PSB’ inquiry (the fifth in seven years) have provided ample space for 
commercial lobbyists and free market pressure groups to bolster their arguments against the 
BBC’s services and funding model in formal ‘expert’ policymaking settings. The new Director-
General, Tim Davie, has found little difficulty in quickly showing his willingness to placate 
the right-wing campaign against public service broadcasting. A former Conservative councillor 
and CEO of BBC Studios, Davie has pledged to ‘balance out’ left-wing comedy and ban BBC 
staff from expressing personal views on social media. Whether any of these plans and proposals 
take shape or not, the politics of broadcasting policy since Charter renewal has intensified the 




One notable effect of these evolving policy issues is that they have made media policy 
more visible. The press and the BBC are not just major sources of news journalism, but are at 
their core essential components in how the public, as individuals and as a common collective, 
make sense of and participate in political, cultural and social processes. This basic purpose of 
media dovetails with many prominent debates about the future of democratic societies: how 
emerging technologies are changing our interactions and relationships with one another; how 
the full diversity of people’s thoughts, beliefs, cultures and identities can best be expressed and 
represented; how widening inequalities of wealth, health, education and civil liberties can be 
resolved and by what means; and how the growing detachment, distrust and unaccountability 
between central institutions of power and the public might be remedied. As it stands, our media 
institutions are drastically ill-equipped to account for these crises and in many ways are 
responsible for exacerbating them. This is a consequence of a media system which has, over 
many years, increasingly subordinated the communicative and information needs of audiences 
to the private interests of shareholders or the ideological goals of political and media elites. 
The structures and practices of media policymaking are correspondingly predisposed to these 
interests and groups, replicating the same policy conditions that empower them and failing to 
properly accommodate public participation in this process. 
There is, however, another possible future of media policymaking. Its goal is a media 
system created by the public, controlled by the public and that speaks to the public in a way 
that empowers them as citizens. 
A well-informed citizenry will only establish itself if knowledge of the world connects 
reliably with the power to change it. For this to happen our knowledge must have a 
public dimension in two senses. It must be secured in part by collective action and it 
must be widely shared with others. (Hind, 2012:156) 
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This future will obviously not be won overnight, and first requires that the current arrangements 
of media policymaking be dragged out from their neo-liberal rut. This means mobilising 
ourselves as academics, activists, lobbyists and citizens all at once, as interested, informed and 
impatient participants, not so that we might become embedded players in the elite theatre of 
media policy but so that we can change it. As academics, we “need to design blueprints for the 
media systems that we want to build and have a program of action to make them a reality” 
(Freedman, 2019:629), developing our own systems of policy expertise which recognise and 
defuse the biases of ideologically-charged empiricism. As activists and lobbyists, we need to 
build cooperative movements with groups traditionally shut out of policy debates and chase 
connections with those plugged into the heart of power, knowing when to be noisy in the streets 
and when to steal a seat at the table. Finally as citizens we need to assert that proper public 
participation in policymaking is the only condition that affords media policy decisions with 
any democratic legitimacy. Implicit in all of these is that we situate ourselves as active players 
in vital historical junctures, aware of the many minute decisions and broader conflicts that 
created the media we have now. 
Once we see how the current system was contingent, that it was not foreordained, but 
rather there were other options, other roads not taken, we can begin to imagine that a 
very different media system was—and still is—possible. (Pickard, 2019b:510) 
With this, we may have the means to expose the entanglements of political and media elites 
that have characterised how media policies are made, demonstrate the unequal distributions of 
power engendered by these decisions, and ultimately reform the dynamics of media 
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APPENDIX 1. KEY ACTORS CONTACTED FOR INTERVIEW, POST-LEVESON CASE STUDY 
Actor description Interviewed Role in policymaking / relation to power 
Conservative Party leader   Prime Minister, organised cross-party talks 
Labour Party leader   Negotiated Royal Charter terms, organised 'pizza meeting' 
Culture Secretary   Negotiated Royal Charter terms 
Cabinet Office minister   Proposed Royal Charter format, liaised with industry 
Shadow Culture Secretary   Negotiated Royal Charter terms, liaised with Hacked Off 
Deputy leader, House of Lords   Negotiated Royal Charter terms, liaised with Hacked Off 
Conservative peer   Organised pro-Leveson efforts in parliament 
Backbench Labour MP   Tabled pro-Leveson Bill amendments in Commons 
Chair, PCC & Conservative peer ● IIG negotiator with government, formed IPSO 
Chair, PressBoF & Conservative peer   IIG negotiator with government, formed IFG 
Special advisor, Labour Party   Advised Labour negotiations, liaised with Hacked Off 
Editor Emeritus, Associated Newspapers   IIG negotiator, led industry response to policy drafts 
Legal director, Trinity Mirror   IIG negotiator, drafted PressBoF 'alternative' Charter 
Editor, The Guardian   Published phone hacking reports, split from industry negotiations 
Policy advisor, News Media Association   Coordinated publishers' anti-Leveson campaign Free Speech Network 
Director, Hacked Off ● Campaign spokesperson, attended 'pizza meeting' 
Director, Hacked Off ● Campaign legal advisor, attended 'pizza meeting' 
Director, Hacked Off   Former MP, coorindated parliamentary lobbying and attended 'pizza meeting' 
Director, Hacked Off ● Lobbied Labour cross-party negotiators 
CEO, Index on Censorship   Organised libel reform campaign, lobbied against pro-Leveson Bill amendments 
Policy advisor, NUJ   Advised NUJ's response to Leveson recommendations and cross-party proposals 
CEO, IMPRESS ● Founded IMPRESS, lobbied journalists to support Leveson recommendations 
Director, Media Standards Trust ● Testified to Leveson Inquiry, attended 'pizza meeting' 
Researcher, Media Standards Trust ● Analysed Royal Charter drafts and PCC/IPSO/PressBoF submissions 




APPENDIX 2. KEY ACTORS CONTACTED FOR INTERVIEW, BBC CHARTER REVIEW CASE STUDY 
Actor description Interviewed Role in policymaking / relation to power 
Culture Secretary   Led government's Charter renewal decision-making, previously CMS Select Committee Chair 
Permanent Secretary, DCMS   Coordinated civil service Charter renewal work, including Green Paper submission analysis  
CEO, Ofcom   Consulted on BBC market regulation, implemented first Service Licences under new Charter 
Special advisor, Conservative Party   Former BSkyB director, appointed to advise DCMS Charter policy drafting 
BBC Director-General   Coordinated BBC's Charter review policy and licence fee negotiations 
Public affairs director, BBC Executive   Negotiated Royal Charter terms with government 
Policy director, BBC Executive   Negotiated Royal Charter terms with government 
Chair, BBC Trust   Organised Trust consultations and formal response to DCMS Green Paper 
Policy director, ITV ● Prepared ITV responses to government consultations and lobbied DCMS policymakers 
Policy director, BSkyB   Prepared BSkyB responses to government consultations and lobbied DCMS policymakers 
CEO, COBA   Prepared COBA responses to government consultations and lobbied DCMS policymakers 
CEO, Pact ● Negotiated BBC Studios proposals and consulted by government on Royal Charter 
Labour peer   Chaired 'Future of TV' inquiry and challenged government policy in Lords debates 
Academic & parliamentary advisor ● Contributed to expert panel discussions in DCMS & Trust consultations 
Academic & broadcasting executive   Contributed to expert panel discussions in DCMS & Trust consultations 
Academic & broadcasting analyst   Contributed to expert panel discussions in DCMS & Trust consultations 
Chair, Save Our BBC campaign ● Coordinated pro-PSB public campaign and draft SOBBC's policy submissions 
Campaigns director, 38 Degrees   Organised public petition response to Green Paper consultation 
Policy advisor, VLV ● Lobbied DCMS on children’s content production and produced group's consultation submissions 
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